By Alexandria Staubach A new Wisconsin Policy Forum report concludes that a dramatic decrease in arrests has not negatively impacted crime rates in Milwaukee. While the report does not provide a single explanation for the overall decrease in crime or arrests, it suggests that community-oriented solutions could be contributing to the decline. The report’s key findings were presented to Milwaukee’s Fire and Police Commission at a meeting last week. Milwaukee Police Department Chief of Staff Heather Hough suggested that instead of executing arrests, officers now have “more tools in their tool box for different outcomes.” She cited specifically the specialty task forces the department employs. Wisconsin Policy Forum’s Ari Brown highlighted at the same meeting that a decade ago among peer cities Milwaukee ranked number one in arrest rates and number seven in reported offenses. In 2023, though, the city ranked 10th among its 12 peers for both arrests and offenses, Brown said. Using Wisconsin Department of Justice data, the forum concluded in its report that MPD made fewer overall arrests year over year except in 2021. MPD made 51,175 arrests in 2012, falling to 9,061 in 2023, a decline of 82.3%. Traffic stops have also dramatically decreased, falling from 149,721 in 2015 to 27,715 in 2023. Reported instances of crime have declined in Milwaukee, helping to partially explain the arrest decline, the report said. Whie violent crime rates, particularly homicides, remain elevated over numbers from the early 2010’s, they remain on a downward trend as well. The report indicates that MPD has focused more on combatting high-priority crime, which requires more significant officer resources. The report attributes some of the overall declining arrest rate to an increased focus on solving and addressing more violent crimes that “draw significant community and media interest.” The report points to no single cause for the arrest rate drop off. However, the combined effect of decreased reported offenses, amorphous national “societal factors” in the wake of George Floyd’s murder, decreased traffic stops, decreased staff competing with elevated serious crime levels, leadership changes at MPD, and a 2018 settlement in the Collins case have all played a significant role. The Collins settlement of a lawsuit against MPD in 2018 over its stop-and-frisk practices, for example, called on MPD to track several data points about every traffic stop it makes. The forum’s report concluded that “there be can be no doubt that the Settlement’s fundamental intent to eliminate unjustified stops has, indeed, been a contributor to the reductions in both stops and arrest.” The report points to changes in leadership at MPD since 2018 as another significant factor. Former MPD Chief Edward Flynn emphasized data to measure officer performance—better performance reviews for more arrest made. Neither subsequent Chief Alfonso Morales or current Chief Jeffrey Norman use such measures to gauge officer performance. Brown was careful to say he did not believe Milwaukee needs to be making more arrests, but he highlighted that the sharp declines are worth closer examination. He said anecdotal evidence gathered from interviews suggested that MPS patrol officers now spend significant amounts of time shuttling detainees to medical services and watching surveillance footage. Because Milwaukee is duty bound to allocate significant resources to the recruitment, training, and hiring of new law enforcement officers as a result of 2024 state legislation, figuring out how to better use officer time was a “worthwhile” endeavor moving forward, Brown said.
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"Evers' judges" is our effort to present information about Gov. Tony Evers' appointees to the bench. The information is taken from the appointees' own judgeship applications. Italics indicate direct quotes from the application. Typos, including punctuation errors, come from the original application even though we have not inserted “(sic)” after each one. WJI has left them as is. ![]() Name: Lukas L. Steiner Appointed to: Crawford County Circuit Court Appointment date: July 26, 2024, to term ending July 31, 2025 (seeking election in April 2025) Education: Law School – Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin Undergraduate – University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh High School – Potosi High, Potosi, Wisconsin Recent legal employment: January 2020-present – District attorney, Crawford County, Prairie du Chien, Wisconsin January 2016-December 2019 – Attorney, McNamara, Reinicke, Vogelsberg & Helmke, Lancaster, Wisconsin January 2011-December 2015 – Attorney, Kopp McKichan, LLP, Platteville, Wisconsin August 2010-December 2010 – Attorney, Law Office of Attorney Luke Steiner, Platteville, Wisconsin Bar and administrative memberships: State Bar of Wisconsin General character of practice: I am presently the Crawford County District Attorney, and being the only lawyer in the office, I handle the prosecution of all criminal and most traffic violations in the county. I also prosecute nearly all government-related juvenile matters, in the county, including delinquency and CHIPS/JIPS cases. Describe typical clients: My current "clients" are the people of Crawford County, and I try to take care to remember that I work for everyone, and not let myself get sucked into the trap of focusing my efforts to appease law enforcement officials or our county's social workers, who investigate the cases that I prosecute. They do good work, and they are good folks, but they, like all of us, have their own agendas and viewpoints. I feel it is important, in this position, to try to identify and address the diverse concerns and perspectives of my constituents. Often, I must do that in the abstract, so a general sense of empathy and objectivity is required. I specialized, in my general practice, prior to becoming District Attorney, largely in criminal defense, so I feel I have a very strong foundational basis for competently handling criminal cases. I also practiced fairly extensively in family law, handling divorces and custody/placement disputes. My experience, in that area is recent enough, that I feel comfortable with my general competence in that area, as well. Number of cases tried to verdict: Appoximately 20-25, by jury trial. Approximately 100, by court trial. List up to three significant trials, appeals, or other legal matters in which you participated as a judge or lawyer in the past seven years: In October, 2023, as Crawford County District Attorney, I prosecuted a felony impaired-driving case that involved a Defendant, who was found asleep, alone, in the driver's seat of his vehicle, on a country road, late at night. Judge Lynn Rider presided, and Attorney Daniel M. Key represented the Defendant. The case-in-chief was unremarkable, and went as one might expect, under these circumstances. The case became more remarkable, when the Defendant chose to testify, and claimed that he stopped on the country road and drank a large amount of liquor, while stopped. In my case-in-chief, I called the alcohol analyst, from the State Laboratory of Hygiene, and introduced the blood-alcohol test results. In response to the Defendant's testimony, I recalled the analyst, in rebuttal, and went through a "blood-alcohol curve" analysis to demonstrate that the Defendant's claim, specifically as to the amount, and time, that he claimed to have drunk the alcohol, was inconsistent with the reported test result. This trial was significant because it forced me to quickly assess the Defendant's claim against the evidence already introduced, and to adapt to address that unexpected testimony. I had experience with "blood-alcohol curve" evidence, as a defense attorney, and I was able to put that experience to use, more clearly and seamlessly than might have expected. The jury's verdict resulted in a conviction. In February, 2022, I prosecuted, and tried, domestic battery charges involving a reluctant victim. Again, Judge Rider presided, and the Defendant was represented by Attorney Jeffrey W. Erickson. Despite my, and my victim-witness coordinator's, best efforts, we were unable to convince the complaining victim to participate in pretrial preparation. The suspicion of spousal intimidation was historically documented, at least generally. I was well aware that the victim was reluctant to testify, but the evidence that the victim was assaulted was relatively clear. My direct examination was difficult, but I was able, using the recorded evidence, e.g., recorded statements and photographs, to tease out a basic recitation of particulars the assault. I believe that I did so with sufficient tact, that the victim's reluctance to testify noticeably waned during the course of my examination. That experience, itself, taught me several lessons, but is not primarily why this case was significant. On cross examination, the victim contradicted, in most material respects, the testimony the victim gave, on direct. The victim even went so far as to testify that the testimony, offered on direct, was untrue. I did my best to rehabilitate, on re-direct, and rested the State's case with a sense that the jury could “see the forest for the trees.” The Defendant chose to testify, and he admitted that he assaulted a bystander, for which he was also charged; however, with respect to that charge, the Defendant claimed self-defense. In his direct testimony, he did not testify to any facts relating to the assault of the reluctant victim. In my cross-examination, I fixated on the self-defense claim, and chose not to explicitly press the Defendant on his basic claim that he did not engage in assault of the reluctant victim. In addition to the fact that he offered no testimony regarding the reluctant victim's assault, I thought that the extent to which the reluctant victim's contradictory testimony had been addressed was adequate to support the argument that his unspoken claim that he did not assault the reluctant victim should be disbelieved. This case's primary significance arose in the context of closing arguments. In my closing, I addressed the Defendant's claim of self-defense, as best I could, and then I made the mistake of addressing his lack of testimony about the reluctant victim's assault, by essentially saying that if I were accused of such an assault, and I didn't do it, I would have so testified. The jury convicted, on the reluctant victim's assault, and acquitted on the charge, to which the Defendant claimed self-defense. My rash comment, in my closing argument, was made without objection, and led to an ineffective assistance of counsel challenge, which ultimately laid bare my folly. Had I simply questioned the Defendant about the particulars of the reluctant victim's assault, I could have commented on his responses; however, because I neglected to do so, and made the flippant comment I did, I had to concede that I improperly commented on a matter to which the Defendant had not testified. I conceded not only my error, but also my error's import, and agreed to the case being reopened, and the conviction being vacated. The ultimate significance of this case is that it demonstrates the care one must take to not let one's frustration cloud one's focus and judgment. I let my frustration, with the context in which testimony was introduced, control the manner in which I commented on that testimony, in a way that I would not have, had I taken more care to let my frustration pass, and been more diligent in my focus on the rules of evidence, as opposed to the particulars of the case and the trial. I have found, over the years, that I am a person who learns as much, and often more, from my failures and follies than from my successes. This case was a good example of that. Experience in adversary proceedings before administrative bodies: I have not done much, except for administrative review hearings in the context of defending clients accused of impaired driving, as well as a few probation revocation hearings, for private clients, prior to becoming District Attorney. Describe your non-litigation experience (e.g., arbitration, mediation). Most of my experience, prior to becoming District attorney, strictly involved litigation, as most of my clients did not have the resources to attempt both arbitration/mediation, as well as litigation, in the event of unsuccessful alternative efforts. I did infrequently counsel divorce clients in mediation. I acted as local counsel in a single instance of formal mediation of a civil dispute, with former-judge Patrick Fiedler, acting as the mediator. Position or involvement in judicial, non-partisan, or partisan political campaign, committee, or organization: I have only participated in my own campaign, for my present term, as District Attorney. I ran unopposed, in 2020, so I did not engage in much of what would be considered campaign activities. To the extent campaign activities were conducted, I did them all. Previous runs for public office: District Attorney – Crawford County, elected November 2020 Public offices to which you were appointed or elected: District Attorney – Crawford County, appointed and then elected, January 2020-present All judicial or non-partisan candidates endorsed in the last ten years: None listed Have you ever been party to a lawsuit, either as a plaintiff or a defendant? Shortly after my admission to the bar, circa 2010, I was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct, in Winnebago County, for my drunken part in an altercation with my then-wife, and her sister. I took, and continue to take, full responsibility for my disorderly, irresponsible, and regrettable behavior. I entered into, and completed, a diversion agreement that involved participating in counseling, for several months. As a result, the case was dismissed, without entry of a conviction. Professional or civic and charitable organizations: Grant County Bar Association, president, 2014-2015 Significant pro bono legal work or volunteer service: In my practice, prior to becoming District Attorney, I did not engage in what I would consider formal pro bono work, but I often took clients and represented them, as their circumstance dictated, knowing, from the outset of engagement, that I would be compensated less than fully. To the dismay of some of the partners, at the firms for which I worked, I never fully embraced the practice of law as a business-person, and never lost the, too-often youthful, idealism of law as a means to help people, more than as a means to build financial stability or accumulate wealth. I never considered the size of a client's fee-deposit/retainer, in determining the scope, or extent, of the services I provided them. Early in my tenure as District Attorney, colleagues would ask how I liked the position, and I often offered that I enjoyed, inter alia, not having to track my hours and being able to disregard the financial aspects of a private legal practice. Quotes: Why I want to be a judge: I want to serve the people of Wisconsin, and specifically, the people of Crawford County, as a judge, because I believe they deserve a judge who cares about their community. I first made Crawford County my home, when I began my appointment as District Attorney in January, 2020. Honestly, I was slightly apprehensive about moving to Crawford County because, in the surrounding area, including neighboring Grant County, where I was raised and had practiced law for the preceding 9 years, Crawford County was often, mostly jokingly, derided as being a less refined or sophisticated place. I have found those, again mostly, though not entirely, facetious derisions to be well off-base. My neighbors and contemporaries, here, are amongst the best people with whom one might hope to associate. I aim to be, hopefully as judge, a fixture in the Crawford County community for the rest of my career. To the extent that some of the specific quarrels with Crawford County’s criminal justice culture had merit, I have worked hard with local authorities to correct and improve the deficiencies I’ve encountered. It would be disingenuous of me to disclaim my own ambition as a basis for my desire to become a judge. A judge is, I believe, close to the pinnacle of this profession. I have studied and practiced the law earnestly for essentially my entire adult life, and I am motivated and aspirational, by nature. As District Attorney, for nearly the past 5 years, I have become acquainted with the local legal community, and as such, I believe that I am well, and perhaps uniquely, suited to foster a manner of continuity that I believe will be helpful to the continued function of our court system. To this point, I have been a member of Crawford County’s Treatment Court Program, which was in its relative infancy when I became District Attorney. The program has grown, during my involvement, and I am pleased to say that it is in a more robust, functional, and productive state than it was when I first became involved. That said, treatment courts are a relatively new, and unquestionably delicate, institution. I believe that a transition of my role, in that program, will facilitate the program’s endurance and growth. Most of all, I want to become the judge in Crawford County because I have a deep sense of commitment to the law as a societal bedrock. I am confident in the breadth and depth of my legal knowledge, as a foundation for the rigors of running the only circuit court in the county. I feel a sense of obligation, to both the law and to this community, and I welcome the challenge of fostering the continuation of, and improvement to, a fair and just system legal system here. Describe which case in the past 25 years by the Wisconsin Supreme Court or U.S. Supreme Court you believe had a significant positive or negative impact on the people of Wisconsin. Though it has, perhaps, become a cliché, in response to similar questions, I believe that Citizen’s United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), has, of any case issued in the past 25 years, had the most significantly deleterious impact on the manner in which elections are conducted, and even the manner in which elected offices have, subsequently, come to be executed. I take little issue with the decision, on its basic merits; however, its import is undeniable. The rapid expansion of spending on all manner of elections, in the wake of Citizens United, has impacted the political and social discourse, in this State, and this country, to an extent that I don’t expect was fully anticipated. In that regard, I believe it serves as a solemn reminder that judicial decisions often reach far past the interests of the litigants before a particular court. While judges certainly have a duty to decide the cases before them, I believe it also important that judges and justices give earnest consideration, to the fullest extent possible, to how their decisions might play out, in the real world. I believe that to be a commentary endorsing judicial restraint, rather than activism. The most recent contest for a seat on the Wisconsin Supreme Court serves as an example. In the race for that seat, over $50 million was spent, in total, including over $20 million, by the candidates, themselves, a sum more than quadrupling the spending, by candidates, in the preceding election*. The influence of the often unclear sources of these expenditures is readily apparent. In that election, candidates, in ways, and to an extent, not previously seen, disregarded the long-standing principle of restraint in expressing opinions, and positions, on matters before, or likely to come before, the court. This has, in my estimation, eroded some of the foundational integrity of our courts. I firmly believe that those seeking, or seated on, courts have a duty to avoid even the appearance of having pre-judged any matter that jurist might be called upon to decide. While I recognize that contemporary funding of these races encourages, and in some respects even seems to mandate, broadcasting such explicit positions, I feel that those seeking judicial positions have a duty and obligation to refrain from succumbing to the temptation that has arisen from Citizens United. The positions subsequently taken, and proliferated, by PACs were, I think, easily conceived and expected; however, it is unfortunate that the same response now seems to be the norm for candidates. As to the contemporary manner in which elected offices are executed, Citizens United has led to far too many legislators, executives, and thankfully, to a lesser extent, judges, seemingly engaging in constant politicking, rather than simply performing the duties of the offices they hold. There is no simple remedy to the present state of affairs, short of significant campaign finance reform. That being unlikely, the proper path forward may simply be a renewed, and perhaps redoubled, commitment to basic principles of integrity that are consistent with the foundations of our governmental institutions. *See, e.g., “Wisconsin Supreme Court Race Cost Record $51M,” at https://www.wisdc.org/news/press-releases/139-press-release-2023/7390-wisconsin-supreme-court-race-cost-record-51m, (last accessed 5/27/24). Two or three judges whom I admire and why: Three of the judges I most admire include the three, before whom, I have most regularly appeared: recently retired, Judge Robert P. Van de Hey, Judge Craig R. Day, and Judge Lynn M. Rider. I count myself lucky to have been able to practice before such competent and prudent judges. By presiding over the vast majority of the cases I’ve handled, they have each played a role in my continued development as a lawyer and as a man. Each has done so in different ways. I am sincerely humbled that each of them so willingly endorsed my application to the bench. Judge Van de Hey had been on the bench for over 10 years when I first began my regular practice in his courtroom. I was initially, and continued to be, throughout my career, impressed at his expansive legal knowledge. He represented, and indeed he was, a judge who was never confused, or flummoxed, by even the most esoteric legal particularities. I have now practiced law for just slightly longer that J. Van de Hey had, when he was first appointed to the bench, and, throughout my career, I have considered his apparent expertise in all substantive areas of the law as an aspirational exemplar. Judge Van de Hey had a notably calm and reserved demeanor, on the bench, that I always found impressive, and which he always maintained, even when the proceedings before him occasionally became abnormally contentious or disordered. Judge Day is, frankly, the judge who I believe has most impacted my development as an attorney. He has done so by being a judge who clearly conveys his simple, and basic, expectation that lawyers, practicing in his court, do so efficiently and proficiently. I have often heard fellow lawyers complain, of Judge Day, as intimidating and overbearing, often, in terms that decorum demands I not repeat, here. I have never found that to be my impression, of him. He demands lawyers be prepared, concise, competent, and respectful – all qualities that good lawyers should aspire to possess, in abundance. Judge Day is also a thoughtful, intelligent, and eloquent man, and he takes care to explain his decisions, from the bench, clearly and comprehensively. That benefits the parties and the lawyers who practice in his court. I have a great deal of respect for Judge Rider, and I have a somewhat unique relationship with her, in large part due to the fact that I practice, in her court, nearly every day that she holds court. We have a unique professional relationship, being the lone judge and sole prosecutor, in a small county. We have worked together in Crawford County’s Treatment Court, as equals, which I believe is to her significant credit. Apart from her fairness and competence, I most respect Judge Rider’s compassion and empathy. She regularly make clear that she cares about the litigants, in her court, apart from the circumstances that brought them there. I try to emulate those qualities in my current practice, and hope to do so from her bench. The proper role of a judge: It may be a bit trite, but I believe, a judge is a shepherd of the law. In performing the, perhaps, primary task of hearing and deciding cases, a judge has a duty, above all, to fidelity to the law. A judge has a duty of impartiality and an obligation to ensure justice and fairness for the litigants who appear in that judge’s courtroom just as importantly, but only, in turn, to his duty to the law. Judges certainly have the authority, and in some instances, the obligation, even, to creatively apply the law to cases the judge hears; however, a judge must take care to never stray too far from the law’s strictures, in the judge’s endeavor to see that justice is done. A judge must be a willing and eager scholar. Our law is so voluminous, and ever-changing, that, as judge, one must accept that an adequate understanding requires continuous study. A judge cannot become complacent in his, or her, own grasp of the laws, procedural and substantive. In this regard, a judge must also be humble and willing to accept the law’s application, in various controversies, that may be presented in creative and perhaps novel ways. A judge must carefully entertain the law’s application, as may be suggested by litigants, while gauging the application against that judge’s own base of knowledge. A judge has an obligation to oversee, and direct, the procedural application of the law. That duty may be no more true, or expansive, as it is in a single-judge county. This requires a judge to supervise the conduct and performance of the court’s clerks and staff. I have gleaned that this is a delicate undertaking, and as such, a judge must be understanding of the personalities involved. A judge must be a leader, and set the tone, so to speak, for the entire legal community, in that judge’s jurisdiction. I have found that my own style of leadership, is by example. That requires integrity in a judge’s personal, as well as his professional dealings. A judge must set expectations for all who work and transact in the judge’s court, if that court is to function as designed. I firmly believe that a judge can, and should, play a significant role in the development of the members of the bar. Judges can do so by setting clear expectations and demanding quality work, through preparedness, professionalism, and candor. A judge must be patient, calm, and reserved, even under circumstances where the judge’s clear expectations are not met. This is perhaps most true in a judge’s dealings with unrepresented litigants. A judge has an obligation to promote free access to the court and, when dealing with unrepresented parties, a duty to help them navigate the complicated legal process. Judges can, and must, do this without giving advice or hinting at prejudgment. Finally, a judge must be a bastion of integrity. Particularly in a small community, like Crawford County, the judge never ceases to exist in his professional capacity. Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The rule for this is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision. The “upshot” and “background” sections do not count as part of the 10 paragraphs because of their summary and necessary nature. We’ve also removed headings, citations, and footnotes from the opinion for ease of reading but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. Emphasis by the court is underlined. Italics indicate WJI insertions except for case names, which are also italicized. ![]() The case: Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Secord Majority: Justice Janet Protasiewicz (11 pages in a new slip opinion format), joined by Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, Rebecca Dallet, Jill Karofsky, and Brian Hagedorn Concurrence: Hagedorn (8 pages) Dissent: Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley (2 pages), joined by Chief Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler Upshot The Wisconsin Voter Alliance filed identical petitions for writ of mandamus against the registers in probate for 13 circuit courts around Wisconsin demanding access to Notice of Voting Eligibility forms ("NVE forms") under Wisconsin's public records law. In the first case to reach the court of appeals, District IV issued a unanimous, published opinion holding that public records law and WIS. STAT. § 54.75 exempt NVE forms from disclosure, so the Alliance is not entitled to them. Shortly after, District II issued a split opinion in this case. The majority reached the opposite conclusion, holding that public records law and § 54.75 do not exempt NVE forms from disclosure, so the Alliance is entitled to them with possible redactions. *** While this appeal raises an important issue regarding public records law, we do not reach it due to District II’s patent violation of the precedential case of Cook v. Cook. . . . When the court of appeals disagrees with a prior published court of appeals opinion, it has two and only two options. It may certify the appeal to this court and explain why it believes the prior opinion is wrong. Or it may decide the appeal, adhering to the prior opinion, and explain why it believes the prior opinion is wrong. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to District II with instructions to follow the Cook case. Background This appeal concerns the petition for writ of mandamus that the Alliance filed against Kristina Secord, the register in probate for the Walworth County Circuit Court. The petition asserts that when a court finds an individual incompetent to vote, the clerk of court completes an NVE form indicating the individual’s name, address, finding of incompetency to vote, and other personal information. The clerk sends the completed NVE form to the Wisconsin Elections Commission (“WEC”), which maintains a public database of registered voters in Wisconsin called WisVote. According to the Alliance, WEC is required to identify individuals who are ineligible to vote due to incompetency on WisVote, in order to prevent them from registering to vote and voting in elections. The Alliance sought access to NVE forms that Secord “sent to the Wisconsin Elections Commission anytime.” At a minimum, the Alliance wanted the names and addresses of the individuals declared incompetent to vote. Citing public records law, the Alliance claimed that it needed this information in order to prove WEC was not always updating WisVote to show individuals found incompetent to vote in Wisconsin elections. Secord moved to dismiss the Alliance’s petition for writ of mandamus . . . . Secord argued that WIS. STAT. § 54.75 exempts NVE forms from disclosure under public records law. Therefore, the Alliance was not entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling disclosure of the NVE forms. The circuit court agreed with Secord and dismissed the Alliance’s petition for failure to state a claim. The Alliance appealed to the court of appeals, District II. By this point, the Juneau County Circuit Court had already dismissed an identical petition for writ of mandamus that the Alliance had filed against Terry Reynolds, the Juneau County register in probate. The Alliance had appealed to the court of appeals, District IV. In Reynolds, District IV held that the Alliance was not entitled to the NVE forms under public records law and § 54.75 and affirmed the Juneau County Circuit Court’s dismissal of the Alliance’s petition. The Alliance did not petition this court for review of Reynolds. District II issued its decision in this case after the Reynolds decision. Guts The parties agree that NVE forms are “court records.” They dispute whether NVE forms are “pertinent to the finding of incompetency” under the first sentence of § 54.75. They also dispute whether the Alliance is entitled to the NVE forms under the second sentence of § 54.75, which authorizes disclosure of limited information to a person who demonstrates a “need” for it. In Reynolds, the Alliance’s initial brief presented this issue to District IV: “Whether [an NVE form] used to communicate to election officials or an agency the circuit court’s determination of a person’s competency to register to vote or to reinstate the right to vote is subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act.” In a unanimous, published opinion, District IV held that NVE forms are exempt from disclosure under the first sentence of § 54.75 because they are court records “pertinent to the finding of incompetency.” They are created during proceedings where a court determines incompetency for purposes of establishing a guardianship, and they contain information drawn directly from this proceeding. *** We turn to District II’s opinion in this appeal. The Alliance’s initial brief in the court of appeals presented the identical issue as in Reynolds. But District II issued a split opinion, including a majority, a concurrence, and a dissent. The majority opinion acknowledged that it was bound by Reynolds “to the extent it is not distinguishable.” Then it distinguished Reynolds. The majority noted that in Reynolds the circuit court granted the motion to dismiss the Alliance’s petition for writ of mandamus without waiting for a response or full briefing. This prevented the Alliance from clarifying its records request and defending its position. By contrast, in this case the circuit court had the benefit of full briefing and argument. The majority also reasoned that while the Alliance seeks “the very same records” in both cases, “that is neither dispositive nor a basis upon which to avoid ruling on an issue previously not decided. The question is whether the issues vary. And they do.” The majority opinion did not address whether NVE forms are “pertinent to the finding of incompetency” under the first sentence of § 54.75. It reserved that analysis for the concurring opinion. Instead, the majority opinion began by performing a public policy balancing test and found that the policy of protecting an incompetent person’s dignity and privacy “is expressly outweighed by the legislature’s mandate that voting ineligibility determinations are to be publicly communicated to the local officials or agencies through WEC (as directed by the Court System) and the public in general.” *** The two judges in the majority also filed a concurring opinion. The concurrence construed the first sentence of § 54.75 and declared: “[W]e disagree with the analysis in [Reynolds] with respect to the definition of the phrase ‘pertinent to the finding of incompetency.’” The concurrence reasoned that circuit court records and forms “leading up to” the finding of incompetency are “pertinent” to the finding of incompetency. But the determination that an individual is ineligible to vote does not “lead up” to the finding of incompetency. It is a “consequence” of that finding. Therefore, NVE forms are not pertinent to the finding of incompetency. As an initial matter, we find the District II majority’s attempt to distinguish Reynolds unpersuasive. In both cases, the Alliance filed identical petitions for writ of mandamus demanding access to NVE forms. In both cases, the registers in probate moved to dismiss the Alliance’s petitions for failure to state claim upon which relief could be granted. In both cases, the circuit courts dismissed the Alliance’s petition because NVE forms are confidential under § 54.75. The Alliance appealed both decisions. In both appeals, the Alliance sought “the very same” records and presented—verbatim—the same issue of law. In both appeals, the register in probate argued that NVE forms are exempt from disclosure under § 54.75. On the facts and the dispositive legal issue, the two appeals are virtually indistinguishable. District II simply disagreed with Reynolds. Cook v. Cook instructs the court of appeals how to proceed when it disagrees with one of its prior published opinions. We explained that while the court of appeals is comprised of four districts that sit in different parts of the state, it is a unitary court, not four separate courts. Officially published opinions of the court of appeals are precedential and have statewide effect. Therefore, only the supreme court may overrule, modify, or withdraw language from a published court of appeals opinion. *** We reject the District II majority’s effort to skirt Cook by drawing fine distinctions between arguments and assuming additional or different facts. If we were to ignore or approve what the District II majority did, we would gut Cook. Like the Alliance, future litigants would feel encouraged to litigate issues “multiple times in the four districts.” Why not? Like the Alliance, if they lose in one district they might win in another. ![]() Concurrence The majority holds that the decision of the court of appeals below contravened a prior published decision of the court of appeals, and therefore violated Cook v. Cook. Indeed it did, and I join the court’s opinion. I write separately, however, to address two issues. First, I write to clarify the role of mandamus in public records cases. Both parties, and the court of appeals below, discuss the mandamus requirements in ways that are inconsistent with the law and likely to confuse matters further. Second, I write to discuss the reasoning of Cook v. Cook, and question whether the rules it announces rest on a solid legal foundation and are worth reexamination. First, it is important to clarify the unique way mandamus applies in public records cases such as this. We have described the common law writ of mandamus as an extraordinary legal remedy that may issue only when a party can show: (1) a clear legal right; (2) a positive and plain duty; (3) substantial damages; and (4) no other adequate remedy at law. Both parties in this case and the court of appeals misunderstand how these requirements apply in public records cases, however. Secord suggests, for example, that WVA failed to meet the fourth requirement for mandamus because it could obtain the records another way—such as requesting a court order for the records under Chapter 54. The parties also debate whether the records should be released on the grounds that WVA failed to establish the third mandamus requirement—substantial damages. Secord appeals to the public goods and harms that could result from releasing or protecting the documents. WVA counters that it would not be able to carry out its investigatory purposes without the records, and is therefore harmed. And the court of appeals entertains these arguments and concludes the third mandamus requirement is met because voter integrity and public confidence in our elections support WVA’s claim of substantial damages. This reasoning reflects a mistaken understanding of the law . . . . *** . . . Our cases teach that the only inquiry that matters in public records mandamus actions is whether the requester has a legal right to the records. This step is where a court determines whether the documents are records at all, whether any statutory or common law exceptions apply, and whether the balancing test would preclude release. All of this is appropriately part of whether a requester has a right to the records in the first place. If records have wrongly been withheld, the custodian must turn them over to the harmed requester, and a writ of mandamus ordering the custodian to do so is the prescribed remedy. The second issue concerns the basis for the decision in the majority opinion. In 1997, 20 years after the court of appeals was created, we considered “whether the court of appeals has the power to overrule, modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals.” We answered that it did not. But the reasoning offered was sparse, and rested predominantly on pragmatic and policy concerns. *** . . . It is true that this court has a primary role in clarifying the law in Wisconsin. And it is true that error correction is a primary role of the court of appeals. But throughout its history, the court of appeals has decided high profile cases of first impression. And it was right to do so. Both the court of appeals and this court have an important role to play in clarifying the law. That’s why the published decisions of both courts have statewide precedential effect. Thus, while most of the cases the court of appeals handles fall in the category of error correction, and most of our cases involve issues of statewide importance, this fact does not implicate the power of a court to overrule itself. The Cook court’s reliance on the different roles between the court of appeals and this court does not provide a sound basis for its conclusions. *** In the end, while the rules Cook establishes may be a permissible and reasonable exercise of our constitutional authority, it is not a decision commanded by the constitution itself. Over the years, it has had the regrettable effect of expanding the power of this court, and minimizing that of the court of appeals. I encourage my colleagues in the bench and bar to consider whether alternatives might better serve the people of Wisconsin. ![]() Dissent The parties presented two issues to this court: Whether the court of appeals violated Cook v. Cook, by contradicting its own precedent, and whether Notice of Voting Eligibility forms (“NVE forms”)—used to notify election officials that a court has deemed an individual incompetent to vote—are “pertinent to the finding of incompetency” under WIS. STAT. § 54.75 and thereby statutorily exempt from Wisconsin’s public records laws. One of those issues presents an opportunity for this court to analyze and resolve weighty matters of privacy, open access to public information, and election integrity. The other allows us to wag a finger in admonishment at the court below. Although both parties urged the court to resolve the substantive issue, the majority dodges it and chooses to scold the court of appeals instead. The majority could have summarily reversed in a per curiam opinion but instead forced the parties to bear the cost of fully litigating the case before us. Principles of judicial economy and fundamental fairness demand we decide the substantive issue instead of skirting it on a technicality. Judicial economy is a prudential consideration that promotes the effective use of judicial resources to avoid duplicative or unnecessary litigation and fulfills this court’s duty to clarify the law. Even if the resolution of one issue disposes of a case, “to further judicial economy and guide trial courts and litigants, we may consider additional issues which have been fully briefed and are likely to recur . . . in the interest of conserving judicial resources and clarifying an important point of law.” This principle also embodies a concern for the resources litigants must spend to resolve their disputes. Nothing compels this court to disregard these considerations and favor Cook instead. When previously confronted with conflicting court of appeals precedent, this court has chosen to decide the merits of the case while also reminding the court of appeals of Cook’s edict. The majority claims Cook commands reversal because actually deciding this case would somehow “thwart the ‘principles of predictability, certainty and finality relied upon by litigants, counsel and the circuit courts.'” While those are indeed important principles, a new majority of this court did not hesitate to thwart them repeatedly last term. Setting aside the new majority’s newfound regard for the principles of predictability, certainty, and finality, none of them preclude us from deciding the merits of this case. A reversal premised on Cook, if warranted, should have been done summarily and promptly after the petition for certiorari was filed. Instead, by order of this court, both parties filed a complete set of briefs fully addressing the merits of the substantive issue in this case. The court accepted amicus briefs from three separate non-parties, each of whom explored various substantive legal issues. At oral argument, both parties agreed a decision on the merits was appropriate notwithstanding Cook. Nevertheless after ordering both parties to expend considerable time and resources and bear the substantial costs of appellate litigation—the majority deprives not only the parties but the people of Wisconsin of a decision on the merits. Perhaps the majority agrees with District IV and disagrees with District II. Then say so. By dodging the core issue, the majority not only burdens the litigants with its own inefficiency, it also leaves unresolved issues of great importance to voters, election officials, and people from whom courts have removed the right to vote due to incompetency. Because the time for resolving this matter under Cook has long since passed, I respectfully dissent. By Alexandria Staubach
The Wisconsin Supreme Court on Wednesday approved the State Bar of Wisconsin’s petition seeking recognition of a special continuing legal education (CLE) credit for courses concerning cultural competency and reduction of bias. Attorneys must complete 30 hours of CLE every two years. The State Bar successfully argued that attorneys could credit up to six hours of cultural competency courses toward those 30 hours. “If a result is that one attorney in this state is more attuned to the marginalized communities in this state, that is good enough for me,” said Justice Jill Karofsky at the Supreme Court’s open conference on Wednesday about the proposed rule change. Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, Rebecca Dallet, Karofsky, and Janet Protasiewicz approved the State Bar’s petition. Chief Justice Annette Ziegler and Justices Rebecca Grassl Bradley and Brian Hagedorn opposed it. The court has a history with the issue. The State Bar sought a similar rule change in 2023. At that time, former Chief Justice Patience Roggensack joined with Ziegler, Grassl Bradley and Hagedorn to deny the State Bar’s petition. At Wednesday’s conference, Grassl Bradley called the new petition a thinly veiled “rebrand” and said education in cultural competency is “coercive.” In a heated statement of opposition, she accused the four justices approving the petition of “virtue signaling.” Grassl Bradley's comments suggested that the country was “thankfully” moving away from diversity, equity and inclusion education, as demonstrated by the results of the most recent election. In her concurrence to the 2023 decision, Grassl Bradley cited conservative political commentators to say that diversity, equity and inclusion education panders to identity politics and “poses a threat to republican self-government by corroding patriotic ties, fostering hatred, promoting cultural separatism, and demanding special treatment rather than equality under the law.” Hagedorn on Wednesday said that although cultural competency was “well intentioned,” he thinks such education is “wrong-headed and likely counterproductive.” He cited the actions of major corporations like Disney and Amazon to move away from diversity, equity, and inclusion education. Zeigler took issue with the fact that more than half of CLE credit hours could be satisfied by “nonsubstantive” education, in a state where attorneys from Wisconsin’s law schools do not have to take a bar exam. Six hourly credits are allowed for educational programs regarding mental wellness and another six are allowed for law practice management. The Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty opposed the petition. In a letter to the court, WILL argued that “DEI training has been shown to increase bias,” citing a Harvard Law Review article, which in reality says “we’ve seen that companies get better results when they ease up on control tactics” and “people often rebel against rules to assert their autonomy.” The new rule will not require that any CLE credits come from cultural competency training; it merely permits attorneys to obtain credits within the category. The court voted in favor of the State Bar’s petition without making the trainings mandatory. At least some, however, would have preferred a rule that required at least one hour of cultural competency education. During oral argument before the court’s open conference, Legal Action of Wisconsin attorney Jacob Haller expressed concern that only already interested attorneys would opt for the courses and that “a single mandatory course will help raise awareness.” Haller argued that such education is “the very least we can do” to reduce negative bias, calling the work “critical.” “For me this is the Sermon on the Mount,” said Walsh Bradley. Exactly when the new rule will take effect is not yet determined. It could have taken effect as soon as this summer, but discussion during open conference resulted in the justices’ agreement on a pause until the next cycle of CLE reporting turns over. Attorneys are to complete CLE requirements and file a report certifying attendance by Jan. 31 every other year. The two-year cycle depends on the year of admission to the bar. A written order is expected before the end of the court’s 2024-2025 term, a condition on which Dallet predicated her vote. By Alexandria Staubach
A group of system-impacted individuals is building a coalition seeking to disrupt stagnation around criminal justice reform by using connection. Personal connection with legislators will be at the forefront. The group plans to build a relationship with every member of the Legislature, regardless of party or politics. Shannon Ross, founder and executive director of The Community, leads the effort. WJI recently sat down with Ross to talk about the coalition, its goals, and how they plan to achieve them. “As a society we should seek more collaboration,” said Ross. “There are (legislators) who genuinely agree with us,” he told WJI, “and maybe our goals are unpopular with their constituents, but we are going to find a way to connect with them … a way to help their constituents understand.” Coalitions are common among organizations, but this group intentionally includes individuals regardless of what other affiliations or professions they have. Ross hopes everyone involved will have the ability to act independently from positions that other organizations may take. Messaging will be central to the group’s success, Ross said. “We need big numbers,” he said. “We need a lot of engaged people to make this work.” The coalition includes individuals from all over Wisconsin. So far, everyone participating has engaged in policy work and two are already registered lobbyists—numbers the group hopes to expand, Ross said. While the current group members are mostly directly system-impacted individuals, Ross wants to avoid only engaging those who are system impacted. “We need everyone,” he said. Structurally, the coalition is intentionally built in opposition to the experience people have within the system, meaning there is no top-down hierarchy. It is organized from the middle outward, comprised solely of committees. While the group will have a “coalition coordinator,” no one individual will be a central figure. Ross does not anticipate winning that role. He hopes he will be able to fade into the background of coalition’s work. Ross says he was inspired by gridlock in the Legislature. He has observed “a consistent failure to get anything across the finish line that was something serious,” he told WJI. He hopes the group will be able to cross party lines and end what he described as “two decades without any real policy change.” Over the summer, the group participated in a retreat, speaking with Milwaukee County Circuit Court Chief Judge Carl Ashley and former Department of Corrections secretary Kevin Carr, who left that job in 2024. While the group is still fleshing out all of its goals, Ross said he anticipates their short list will include capping supervision, and overturning truth in sentencing will be a long-term project. The coalition is still recruiting members. According to the Wisconsin Division of Community Correction year-end review, 18,909 people were on extended supervision at the end of December. Extended supervision can last decades, requiring adherence to 18 or more rules during all that time. People often find themselves back in custody for rule violations alone. In November 2024, 48% of people admitted to Wisconsin prisons were admitted solely due to revocation of supervision, regardless of whether an individual had new pending criminal charges; 16.6% of admissions were for revocations resulting from a new criminal sentence. By Alexandria Staubach
Today, the Milwaukee Common Council’s Judiciary and Legislation Committee unanimously approved a legislative lobbying plan that includes amending state law to increase use of jail as punishment and to eliminate protections against jailing of the poor by municipal courts. The state legislative package approved by the committee Monday morning describes what city representatives should pursue with the Legislature in 2025 and 2026. That the committee would take up the package was announced late Friday. Wisconsin Justice Initiative, the ACLU of Wisconsin, Milwaukee Turners, and several individuals were denied the opportunity to speak about the package, despite appearing in person at the meeting on short notice. In explanation, Alderperson Mark Chambers, Jr. said the document was a “living file” and in theory subject to change. Alderperson Robert Bauman encouraged interested people and entities to reach out to their alderpeople individually. “It felt a bit like a cold shoulder on a 12-degree day,” said James Gramling, WJI board member and former municipal court judge, who attended the committee meeting. WJI and others specifically sought to address the legislative priority of amending state law to increase the use of jail to enforce municipal forfeitures. Many municipal judges have decreased the use of jail commitments to enforce municipal forfeitures, as such jail time is widely considered counterproductive and harmful to low-income individuals. The ACLU of Wisconsin recently released a report highlighting how carceral sanctions in Wisconsin’s municipal courts inherently criminalize poverty and result in racially disparate effects. The city's legislative priority would have its lobbyists pushing for statutes permitting municipal courts to impose jail time “as a penalty for individuals who have failed to appear in court and have accumulated more than 15 outstanding citations or owe $20,000 or more in unpaid fines.” But Wisconsin law already permits jail time for any unpaid monetary judgment ordered by a municipal court, not just after a certain dollar amount accumulates. Using jail as punishment for those with 15 or more citations, though, is new. Importantly, an alternative proposed change would eliminate protections that prevent poor defendants from jail time when they do not have the ability to pay. The city’s lobbying proposal seeks to “waive the requirements” of the statute that “limits the use of jail sentences in certain situations.” Those "certain situations" include when a defendant is deemed impoverished and lacks the ability to pay municipal court forfeitures, such as when a defendant receives public benefits. “The proposal to waive these requirements will essentially recreate debtor’s prisons—a torturous, outdated and unconstitutional relic openly forbidden by Congress in 1833 and condemned by everyone from Charles Dickens to Michelle Alexander,” Emilio De Torre, executive director of the Milwaukee Turners, told WJI. The state legislative package includes more than one hundred priorities, which its executive summary says are designed to “reflect Milwaukee’s unwavering commitment to a brighter future” and “shape Milwaukee’s development for years to come.” Bauman described the document as a “big wish list.” The committee unanimously adopted the legislative plan as proposed. It will go to the Milwaukee Common Council for approval before heading to the mayor’s desk. By Margo Kirchner
Just eight of 38 circuit court judicial races in Wisconsin this spring are contested. Notably, not one of the six Milwaukee County judges up for election is challenged. Waukesha County and Jefferson County will be campaign hot spots, though, with two contested circuit court races each. St. Croix County will have a primary on Feb. 18, as three candidates vie for the seat that opened when Judge Edward Vlack chose not to run for reelection. The Wisconsin Elections Commission's Jan. 8 candidate tracking report indicates that James Jamie Johnson, Heather Amos, and Brian Smestad are preliminarily approved for the election. Candidates had until the end of the business on Jan. 7 to file their nomination papers and enough valid signatures to get on the ballot. The Jan. 8 report shows candidates who appear to have met the filing requirements, but submissions are still subject to challenge and await official approval by the commission. The commission is scheduled to meet on Jan. 14 to finalize the list of candidates. Provided that Cortney Iverson’s submitted signatures and required Statement of Economic Interests form are approved, Jefferson County Branch 2 also will have a primary on Feb. 18, with Jennifer Weber and Iverson taking on recently appointed Theresa Beck. The top two finishers in each primary will advance to the general election on April 1. Contested races with two candidates for the April 1 election:
Three of 16 court of appeals judges are up for reelection, none challenged: Mark Gundrum in District 2, Lisa Stark in District 3, and Jennifer Nashold in District 4. You’ve likely heard about the contested race for the open Wisconsin Supreme Court seat due to Justice Ann Walsh Bradley’s retirement. Brad Schimel and Susan Crawford have been campaigning for months and have been preliminarily approved for the election. No surprise additional candidate filed nomination papers by the deadline. Wisconsin Justice Initiative will ask all candidates in contested races to complete questionnaires about their work experience, judicial philosophy, and desire to be a judge. Look for their answers in the WJI blog in February and March. By Alexandria Staubach On Monday, Wisconsin’s 107th legislative session kicked off with the swearing in of 34 new members, 90% of whom are Democrats. This is the first legislative session impacted by the new district maps signed into law by Gov. Tony Evers in early 2024, ending more than a decade of extreme partisan gerrymandering. Fifteen senators were sworn into office. Six are embarking on their first full term. Five of those six are women, all are Democrats, and two served in the Assembly last term. Thirty new members were sworn into the Assembly, 76% of them Democrats. The new session sees the narrowest advantage Republicans have held since 2011. The Senate includes 18 Republicans and 15 Democrats. The Assembly has 54 Republicans and 45 Democrats. The two bodies got straight to work. The Assembly took its first action of consequence, sending to committee AJR 1, a proposed constitutional amendment requiring valid photo identification to vote in an election. If the resolution passes, it will be the proposed amendment’s second trip through the Legislature. If it passes quickly, it could then appear on the April election ballot. Both chambers voted on structure and schedules. In the Assembly, Rep. Kalan Haywood (D-Milwaukee) unsuccessfully nominated Rep. Greta Neubauer (D-Racine) for speaker, as an alternative to Rep. Robin Vos (R-Rochester). Vos has served in the role for more than a decade. Haywood suggested the Assembly ditch Vos because the chamber should not be “an experimental national right-wing Republican testing ground.” He encouraged his peers to abandon “the stagnation of the status quo.” “Compromise is what will lead to productivity and results,” he said. “We’ve strayed so far from Wisconsin’s long-standing tradition of transparent government with the current leadership,” said Haywood. Vos was ultimately elected with 52 votes of the possible 54 Republican votes. Afterward, Vos gave a speech that included predictions about what will occur during this legislative session. He anticipates a tax cut “focused on those who pay taxes in Wisconsin” and emphatically stated the money set aside from any such cut would not be spent by the treasury. He vowed not to create any new government programs because “socialism, in any form does not make us more free.” Vos also said he would demand “accountability and measurable results for any funding we provide.” He predicted that the newly created Assembly Committee on Government Operations, Accountability and Transparency would “lead the way” in innovating how government operates in the state. Ceremonies took place simultaneously at the Capitol in the two legislative chambers. Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley administered the oath of office in the Assembly. District II Court of Appeals Judge Maria Lazar administered the oath of office in the Senate. Chief Justice Roberts decries defiance of judgments but fails to address his court's ethics issues1/2/2025 By Margo Kirchner
In his year-end report on the federal judiciary, Chief Justice John Roberts discussed the increase in calls to defy court orders and opinions, but glaringly absent was any recognition of the role his own court’s ethical failings play in that dangerous trend. Roberts noted that after the Brown v. Board of Education case some state governors sought to defy desegregation orders, but the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations stood behind the judges, and for decades afterward even unpopular court decisions were followed. "Within the past few years, however, elected officials from across the political spectrum have raised the specter of open disregard for federal court rulings. These dangerous suggestions, however sporadic, must be soundly rejected,” Roberts wrote. At least one commentator thinks Roberts aimed these comments at JD Vance. In just one paragraph near the end of his report did Roberts suggest that federal judges themselves play a part in the public’s willingness to abide by court orders, but he then tied judges’ duties to abiding by separation of powers principles. He made no mention of possible harm to the court’s authority related to justices’ failures to adopt enforceable ethics standards or publicly report gifts of luxury trips from wealthy individuals. Roberts wrote: “The federal courts must do their part to preserve the public’s confidence in our institutions. We judges must stay in our assigned areas of responsibility and do our level best to handle those responsibilities fairly. We do so by confining ourselves to live ‘cases or controversies’ and maintaining a healthy respect for the work of elected officials on behalf of the people they represent. I am confident that the judges . . . and the corresponding officials in the other branches will faithfully discharge their duties with an eye toward achieving the ‘successful cooperation’ essential to our Nation’s continued success.” Roberts’ report focused on judicial independence. He cited, in addition to defiance of court orders, three other “areas of illegitimate activity” that threaten judicial independence: violence against judges, intimidation of judges, and disinformation. In discussing recent violence against judges, he noted the murders of state judges in Wisconsin and Maryland in response to adverse rulings by those judges. In Wisconsin, retired Juneau County Circuit Judge John Roemer was murdered in 2022 at his home in New Lisbon by a man whom he had sentenced 17 years earlier. Roberts discussed attempts to intimidate judges through doxing (the publishing of addresses and phone numbers online) and, “regrettably,” statements by public officials suggesting bias by judges as the basis for court rulings. Roberts said he was grateful for the work of federal and state legislators to sponsor legislation to protect judges’ personal information and of marshals and other law enforcement officers to keep judges safe. In Wisconsin, three acts signed into law in March 2024 are aimed at protecting judges’ personal information and reducing intimidation of judges. Regarding disinformation, Roberts suggested increasing civic education on a national scale and taking protective measures against hostile foreign actors. |
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