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"Evers' judges" is our effort to present information about Gov. Tony Evers' appointees to the bench. The information is taken from the appointees' own judgeship applications. Italics indicate direct quotes from the application. Typos, including punctuation errors, come from the original application even though we have not inserted “(sic)” after each one. WJI has left them as is.  Name: David O. Hughes
Appointed to: Kenosha County Circuit Court Appointment date: Dec. 23, 2025, to term ending July 31, 2027 Education: Law School – University of Wisconsin-Madison Undergraduate – University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan High School – Forest Hills Central, Forest Hills, Michigan Recent legal employment: June 2021-present – Supplemental court commissioner, Kenosha County Circuit Court July 2012-present – Attorney, Puntillo Camilli & Hughes, Kenosha, Wisconsin Bar and administrative memberships: State Bar of Wisconsin U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin General character of practice: I maintain a general civil practice that does not include family law or criminal law. My practice includes both litigation and transactional matters. In addition, I serve as a supplemental court commissioner for the Kenosha County Circuit Court. In that capacity, I cover proceedings in criminal intake court, family court, juvenile court, traffic court, and small claims court. Describe typical clients: My typical clients are individuals, families, small to medium businesses, local colleges, and regional financial institutions. I have focused on estate planning, probate administration, trust administration, commercial litigation, higher education, commercial and residential real property, and providing outside general counsel services. Number of cases tried to verdict: 3, not including small claims matters List up to three significant trials, appeals, or other legal matters in which you participated as a judge or lawyer in the past seven years: From 2018 through 2020, I represented a married couple as lead counsel in a property damage claim against their neighbors and their neighbors' insurer in Kenosha County, Wisconsin. … The matter was significant both because it proceeded to a full jury trial and because private nuisance was the central claim. Public and private nuisance are notoriously complex legal questions. From 2020 through 2023, I defended a former homeowner as lead counsel against misrepresentation claims arising from my client's sale of a home in Kenosha County, Wisconsin. … The matter was significant because of its procedural complexity, which involved a plaintiff, defendant, and two intervening insurers, each of whom had a different interest in the action. It also entailed multiple summary judgment motions, one of which decisively resolved a complex question about the purchaser plaintiff’s insurer's subrogation rights in my client's favor. And while outside the seven-year scope of this question, I also defended a trio of beneficiaries as second counsel from 2012 through 2016 against claims that they improperly received assets that should have been distributed to the plaintiff beneficiaries in Racine County, Wisconsin. … The matter was significant because it represented my earliest exposure to probate, probate-adjacent litigation, and appeals. The court ultimately dismissed all of the claims against my clients for failing to state a claim and on summary judgment. I undertook the legal research and wrote the briefs that supported those dispositive motions. The plaintiff beneficiaries appealed both decisions. The court of appeals upheld both decisions on appeal. I undertook the legal research and wrote the briefs that defended those decisions on appeal. I also find this matter to be significant because it substantially informed the advice I would give to future estate planning. Experience in adversary proceedings before administrative bodies: I have successfully represented clients in adversary proceedings before the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Equal Rights Division of the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, as well as investigations by the Division of Animal Health at the Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection and the Division of Industry Services at the Wisconsin Department of Safety and Professional Services. Describe your non-litigation experience (e.g., arbitration, mediation). I regularly represent clients in mediation, usually as ordered by a court in the context of ongoing litigation. In many instances, my clients have been able to resolve and settle their disputes as a result of mediation. I have also successfully represented a homeowner in a claim against a construction firm in binding arbitration before the Metropolitan Builders Association Construction Arbitration Board. Position or involvement in judicial, non-partisan, or partisan political campaign, committee, or organization: I volunteered in support of Angelina Gabriele's campaign for election to the Kenosha County Circuit Court in 2021. I was a member of Heather Iverson's campaign committee when she sought election to the Kenosha County Circuit Court in 2024. I was a member of Carli McNeill's campaign committee when she sought election as the Kenosha County District Attorney in 2024. Previous runs for public office: Not applicable All judicial or non-partisan candidates endorsed in the last ten years: Judge Angelina Gabriele, Kenosha County Circuit Court - Branch 3, 2021 Judge Heather Iverson, Kenosha County Circuit Court - Branch 6, 2024 Carli McNeill, Kenosha County District Attorney, 2024 Professional or civic and charitable organizations: Kenosha County Bar Association, including as president and director, February 2014-present Friends of the Kenosha Public Museum, including as president and director, May 2013-present Kenosha Public Museum Foundation, secretary and director, February 2015-present Visit Pleasant Prairie, director, February 2025-present Kenosha Housing Authority, treasurer and commissioner, July 2019-present Kenosha Courthouse Restoration Project. Blue Ribbon committee, July 2023-October 2024 Leadership Kenosha, participant, September 2012-May 2013 Significant pro bono legal work or volunteer service: I have provided substantial volunteer service to Kenosha County since moving here after graduating from law school. As detailed in my answer to question 28, I have served on the boards of many different civic and charitable organizations. In that capacity, I have contributed countless volunteer hours. For example, I have organized and then volunteered at events sponsored by the Friends of the Kenosha Public Museums in support of the Kenosha Public Museums. I perform a similar function for almost every event sponsored by the Kenosha County Bar Association since I joined its board in 2014. Quotes: Why I want to be a judge: Despite (or perhaps because of) being the child and grandchild of attorneys who later became judges, I never wanted to be an attorney or a judge myself. When faced with the inevitable questions about my plans after college, I always answered that I planned to do anything but attend law school. A summer internship put flight to that answer. I spent a summer providing technical support to local law firm, where I found myself fascinated by the actual work that attorneys do. After graduating from law school, I still maintained that I had no interest in crossing the bar and taking the bench. I went to law school to be an attorney. That meant a career of examining, analyzing, and solving problems for clients. I have had the good fortune to develop a practice that has allowed me to grapple with those challenges. But an unexpected opportunity has tested and overwhelmed my professed judicial disinterest. In 2021, the Honorable Angelina Gabriele asked me to serve as a supplemental court commissioner in Kenosha County. I accepted her offer because I wanted to push myself to learn and apply law outside my normal civil practice. While presiding in family, juvenile, and criminal intake court has broadened my experience, I also discovered that I enjoy the freedom that accompanies the responsibility of presiding over the matters before me. When sitting on the bench, I do not have to build a legal argument in service of my client's interests. Instead, I survey and construct the available law according to my best interpretation of the applicable statutes, decisions, and legal principles. When sitting on the bench, I do not have to probe for support for any particular party's position. Instead, I sift through the facts presented, find the most important to the questions before me, then apply those facts to my interpretation of the applicable law. The process liberates me from the compromises that accompany advocacy. I want to serve as a judge because it will allow me to use that intellectual freedom to the benefit of the people of Wisconsin. But more important than any intellectual freedom is the opportunity to do justice by listening to the people of Wisconsin. When I sit on the bench, I do not see plaintiffs, defendants, petitioners, respondents, victims, or witnesses, but people who often find themselves enmeshed in a complex and unfamiliar system. Each has complaints, frustrations, and problems that bring them to court. Justice is not just a decision; justice is a process. That process requires more than the clinical application of law. No matter the decision, the people before me should know that I heard them and considered their case. I want to serve the people of Wisconsin because I can do justice by listening to them. Describe which case in the past 25 years by the Wisconsin Supreme Court or U.S. Supreme Court you believe had a significant positive or negative impact on the people of Wisconsin. I believe two recent cases have had a significant impact on the people of Wisconsin. The first is Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018). In Carpenter, the FBI obtained cell site records from wireless carriers for a number of defendants accused of orchestrating robberies across Michigan and Ohio. The cell site records connected one particular defendant to the times and locations of several of the charged robberies. However, the FBI obtained the defendant's cell site records without a search warrant. The defendant argued that the warrantless seizure of their cell site records violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court's decision overturned the lower court decisions that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the defendant's cell site records and, in turn, held that acquiring those records required a warrant. While I applaud Carpenter’s holding, I find its reasoning to be even more important for the people of Wisconsin. First, the Court's decision bolstered the privacy-based interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as a protection against otherwise overwhelming and unavoidable surveillance. Second, and more importantly, Carpenter reexamined and narrowed the third-party doctrine. In doing so, the Court functionally recognized that modern life requires people to provide their data and records to third parties. Its decision allows the people of Wisconsin to participate in that life without forfeiting their right to be free from arbitrary searches and seizures. The second is Banuelos v. University of Wisconsin Hospitals & Clinics Authority, 2023 WI 25, 406 Wis. 2d 439, 988 N.W.2d 627. In Banuelos, the plaintiff requested electronic copies of her medical records from the defendant pursuant to section 146.83 of the Wisconsin Statutes. That section describes the process by which health care providers must provide patients with access to their medical records and also allows health care providers to levy certain charges for providing copies of medical records. The defendant charged the plaintiff for her medical records and the plaintiff filed suit to challenge those charges. The defendant argued that the statute did not explicitly prohibit charging patients for electronic copies of their medical records, which meant that it could impose such charges. The plaintiff offered the opposite interpretation: the statute did not specifically allow health care providers to charge for electronic copies of patients' medical records, so the defendant had no authority to demand copying or production fees. The Court held that the statute's silence did not equal permission. Once again, I believe the specific holding of Banuelos matters less than its larger context. In Banuelos, the Court untangled an underappreciated corner of the Wisconsin Statutes, which accrued to the benefit of the people of Wisconsin. The Wisconsin Statutes have lots of other underappreciated and unexamined corners that the people of Wisconsin regularly encounter. The Court's examination and interpretation of those statutes often provides the greatest practical and beneficial impact for the people of Wisconsin. Two or three judges whom I admire and why: The first justice that I admire is Justice Elena Kagan, of the U.S. Supreme Court. I usually find common cause with her jurisprudence, especially her approach to statutory construction and her perspective on the necessity and benefits of the administrative state. But more importantly, Justice Kagan has a well-deserved reputation as the best legal writer on the Court. Her opinions eloquently distill intricate legal concepts into accessible explanations. And she does so without sacrificing nuance or eroding their inherent complexities. When I write to or speak with clients, I aspire to make myself as clear and as coherent as Justice Kagan's explanation of the fiendishly complex application of time to principal beneficiaries and derivative beneficiaries during the visa application process in Scialabba v. de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 46-56 (2014). The second judge that I admire is Judge David P. Wilk of the Kenosha County Circuit Court. Much of my litigation practice has occurred in the civil divisions of the Kenosha County. Judge Wilk has spent much of his tenure presiding over one of the two branches assigned to civil actions in Kenosha County. As such, I have had many opportunities to watch Judge Wilk manage his courtroom. Those observations have led me to admire Judge Wilk's temperament and composure. While he has high expectations of the attorneys that appear before him, he treats them as colleagues, not combatants. Judge Wilk allows attorneys the opportunity to advocate for their clients, while respectfully probing the strength of their arguments. As importantly, he accepts challenges to his initial impressions without rancor. When pro se parties appear before Judge Wilk, he keeps them to the narrow path where they can present evidence, argue their position, and tell their story while also abiding by the applicable rules of civil procedure and evidence, all without arousing their ire. And while just outside the scope of this question, I also admire both Professor Orin Kerr and Radley Balko. Professor Kerr, of Stanford Law School, focuses his much of his scholarship on the Fourth Amendment. In particular, he has frequently written about the Fourth Amendment's collision with emerging digital phenomena like GPS location data and cloud-based records. I do not agree with all of Professor Kerr's answers, but his writing asks important questions that the Fourth Amendment's text and case law do not immediately answer. Mr. Balko, formerly of the Washington Post, frequently writes about areas of the criminal justice system that are particularly susceptible to institutional abuse. His reporting has exposed me to the often unseen limitations of many criminal forensic techniques and the unintended consequences that can accompany the militarization of law enforcement. The proper role of a judge: During his confirmation hearings, future Chief Justice John Roberts famously quipped that "I will remember that it's my job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat." While I understand why Judge Roberts downplayed the judiciary's role in making law, I fundamentally disagree with his characterization. To extend Justice Robert's analogy, judges do not just call balls and strikes. They also decide the strike zone. I identified Banuelos v. University of Wisconsin Hospitals & Clinics Authority, 2023 WI 25, 406 Wis. 2d 439, 988 N.W.2d 627, as a decision that has significantly benefited the people of Wisconsin because it illustrates this function. That case did not turn on a narrow reading of the statute, but on the Court's decision about how to read that statute. Expanding its gaze to examine the statute's context and legislative history allowed the Court to conclude that the statute's text did not license the defendant to charge additional fees. A judge's proper role is to interpret the law as enacted in statute and decided by precedent. But a judge must also recognize how their framing of the law can push their decision in a particular direction and use that framing as an opportunity to do justice. Second, a judge's role is to manage their courtroom with respect for the parties appearing before them. That respect takes two forms. First, a judge must remain humble and aware of their own limitations. Donning a black robe does not convey an unimpeachable knowledge of the law and relevant. A judge must know the law and understand the facts, but accept the possibility of their own error. Whether pro se or represented by an attorney, every party should have an opportunity to state their case and have their argument honestly considered. Second, a judge must balance that opportunity with regards for the time and burdens of the other parties in that matter or other matters on the calendar. A judge's role is also to oversee an efficient courtroom. Finally, I believe that the most underappreciated, but perhaps most important, role of a judge is to listen to the parties. In serving as a court commissioner, I have found that most parties, whether represented by counsel or pro se, want to know that someone has recognized the facts, feelings, and frustrations that brought them to court. It can be tempting to tune out the parties' emotions and focus on the outcome. But a judge should make the parties aware that they heard what they said and took it into account when rendering a decision. As importantly, a judge should do their best to help the parties understand the reasons for their decision and why it did, or did not, go in their favor. By listening to and acknowledging the parties, a judge helps preserve the legitimacy of their court and the legal system at large.
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Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The rule for this is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision. The “upshot” and “background” sections do not count as part of the 10 paragraphs because of their summary and necessary nature. We’ve also removed headings, citations and footnotes from the opinion for ease of reading but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. Italics indicate WJI insertions except for case names, which are also italicized. Emphasis in the original opinion is italicized and underlined. The Case: State v. K.R.C.  Protasiewicz Majority: Justice Janet Protasiewicz (15 pages), joined by Chief Justice Jill Karofsky and Justices Rebecca Frank Dallet and Susan Crawford Concurrence: Justice Brian Hagedorn (13 pages), joined by Justices Annette Kingsland Ziegler and Rebecca Grassl Bradley Upshot We hold that Kevin was in custody for purposes of Miranda when he made statements to law enforcement. Because he was under custodial interrogation and was never Mirandized, his statements should have been excluded at trial. However, we hold that admitting his custodial statements was harmless error. Accordingly, we need not address whether his statements were involuntary. We affirm the court of appeals and the delinquency finding. Background In June 2022, Kevin was in seventh grade and 12 years old. One day at school, Kevin touched a classmate in the groin as he walked by. The classmate reported the incident to school staff and to his father, who spoke with a school administrator and eventually a school resource officer (a law enforcement officer deployed to a school, also known as an SRO). The next day, Kevin was removed from class for questioning. The interview was in the school resource officer’s office. The room was “a very small tight office . . . kind of like a closet,” and it had a single door which remained closed during the interview. Kevin sat in the office with two police officers. Both were strangers to him: one worked at another school and the other was new. One officer did the questioning. She sat across from Kevin, perhaps 10 feet away, and she wore street clothes and a vest that identified her as a police officer. The second officer was in full police uniform and was armed. He stood positioned in front of the door throughout the questioning. He did not speak. Kevin was alone in the room with the two officers for the entirety of this questioning, except for a moment when a staff member knocked on the door to see if Kevin was there. A piece of printer paper with a handwritten message was taped to the office wall. In purple and blue marker, the paper said: “You Are in Here Voluntarily Unless Told Otherwise. You are Being Filmed And Can Leave at Any Time!” Though the piece of paper hung close to Kevin during the interview, no one acknowledged it or explained it to Kevin. The officer questioned Kevin about touching the other student. Though the tone was conversational and some questions were open-ended, the officer told Kevin that there were witnesses, despite knowing there were none. She also asserted to Kevin that “it happened.” The officer did not provide Miranda warnings to Kevin. She never told him that he was free to leave, that he did not need to answer questions, or that he could call his parents. The officer questioned him for approximately 10 minutes, and Kevin sat in a comfortable position and seemed to understand the conversation. At some point during the interview, Kevin said that “he accidently, possibly, hit” the other student’s groin. After the questioning, the officers let Kevin leave the office, but it is not clear where he went. Less than an hour later, the interrogation resumed. This questioning took place in the student services area, which was right outside the school resource officer’s office. Kevin sat in a cubicle designated for in-school suspension. Three or four adult authority figures stood around Kevin—the two officers, an assistant principal, and perhaps another school staff member. The questions were “more direct” this time. Whereas the first interview involved asking questions to figure out what happened, this time the authority figures told Kevin what they heard happened. Though the assistant principal did much of the talking this round, one officer asked some questions and may have raised her voice with Kevin. They questioned him for two or three minutes, and Kevin once again stated that he “did it by accident.” After the interrogation, Kevin remained in in-school suspension. *** The State filed a delinquency petition charging Kevin with one count of Fourth Degree Sexual Assault. Kevin moved to suppress his statements to the officers, arguing that law enforcement elicited the statements in violation of Miranda and that his statements were involuntary. The circuit court held a suppression hearing and heard testimony from the school resource officer who questioned Kevin. In the end, the circuit court denied the suppression motion, concluding that Kevin’s statements were admissible because “this was a non-custodial voluntary conversation.” The circuit court held a bench trial at which four witnesses testified, including the school resource officer, who testified about Kevin’s statements that he might have accidentally touched the other student. The court found Kevin delinquent. Kevin appealed, arguing that his statements should have been suppressed. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that Kevin was not in custody and that his statements were voluntary. Guts To determine whether interrogation prior to a Miranda warning about now-familiar rights was “custodial” and thus impermissible, first, we ask whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave. To do so, we consider the totality of the circumstances. We must look at the objective circumstances, not subjective views. Relevant factors include “the location of the questioning, its duration, statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning.” We have also said we consider “the degree of restraint; the purpose, place, and length of the interrogation; and what has been communicated by police officers.” In turn, when evaluating the “degree of restraint” we consider “whether the suspect is handcuffed, whether a weapon is drawn, whether a frisk is performed, the manner in which the suspect is restrained, whether the suspect is moved to another location, whether questioning took place in a police vehicle, and the number of officers involved.” Second, the court looks at whether the environment was similar to the type of station-house questioning in the Miranda case. *** Reasoning in a pertinent U.S. Supreme Court case highlights the special care we must take when analyzing the interrogation of children. It is a “commonsense reality” and “beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave.” And when it comes to interrogation, events that “would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens.” The Court also addressed the unique nature of schools. A student’s presence at school is compulsory and . . . disobedience at school is cause for disciplinary action.” When analyzing Miranda custody in the school setting, courts consider factors similar to those in the adult context, but also consider factors unique to students. For example, courts have considered traditional adult-custody factors—albeit from the perspective of a child—such as: traditional indicia of arrest, like frisks and handcuffs; physical restraints; the length of the interrogation; the location of the interrogation; statements made during the interrogation; and whether the student was released at the end of the interrogation. But courts consider some factors unique to school interrogations. First, courts, of course, consider the age of the student. Second, courts consider the role of police versus school administration; the more police officers are present, and the more they play a role in questioning, the more likely a student is in custody. Finally, courts will consider whether parents or other friendly adults were contacted or were in the room. *** The facts of Kevin’s interrogation establish that he was in custody. It started when Kevin was removed from class for questioning, which would likely unsettle a middle schooler. He went to the student services area where he met not with school staff or friendly adults, but with two police officers, one of whom was fully uniformed, armed, and equipped with handcuffs. Both the officers were strangers to him. They questioned him in a small, closet-like room, designated for law enforcement use. For all intents and purposes, this office was the schoolhouse version of a police-station interrogation room. The door was closed. While Kevin sat across from one officer who questioned him, another fully uniformed and armed officer stood positioned in front of the door. The questioning officer asked him about an alleged sexual assault. She told him—untruthfully—that there were witnesses. She also accusingly told him “it happened.” No one told him he could reach out to his parents or any other adult. No one told him he was free to leave. No one told him he did not need to answer questions. It is true that the paper sign hung on the wall, the interview was 10 minutes long, the officer spoke to Kevin in a conversational tone from approximately 10 feet away, Kevin was allowed to leave the office after the questions, and he was not handcuffed or frisked. But in the end, a 12-year-old boy was questioned in a closet-like law-enforcement office with two police officers, one who was fully uniformed and standing in front of the door. *** . . . . We would not expect that a child would ask a fully uniformed and armed police officer to step away from the door so that he could leave. This is especially true given that Kevin was questioned by police officers only and in a space designated for law enforcement. And other factors point toward a lack of freedom to leave: Kevin was restrained in a small space with a closed door, there were no parents or friendly adults in the room, and no one told him he could leave or refuse to answer questions. The piece of paper on the wall does not change our conclusion. No one acknowledged the paper or explained its message, and the circuit court found it was unclear whether Kevin even saw it. Further, its physical characteristics—handwritten in marker and taped to the wall—undermine its impact. And its language—“you are in here voluntarily unless told otherwise”—might have been confusing to a 12-year-old. In some cases, freedom-to-leave advisements may be weighty, but not in this case. *** The interview in the school-suspension cubicle makes our custody determination a closer call, but we conclude that a reasonable 12-year-old would not have felt free to leave. Importantly, this interview occurred within an hour of the previous interview, just outside the school resource officer’s office, and with the same officers present. Moreover, as Kevin looked up from his seat, he would have seen three or four adult authority figures standing around him. A reasonable student would not feel free to disobey them by walking away. And after all, Kevin was in a school-suspension cubicle. Students do not feel free to walk out of suspension. *** Our statutes counsel that criminal judgements shall not be affected by errors “which do not prejudice the defendant.” Considering harmless error furthers “the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.” An error is harmless if it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” We conclude the admission of Kevin’s statements under custodial interrogation was harmless. *** A reasonable factfinder would have found that the State proved all the elements of Fourth Degree Sexual Assault even without Kevin’s inadmissible statements. The court erred in admitting Kevin’s statements that he “might have accidently touched” the victim. The value to the circuit court of those statements, if any, would have been that Kevin admitted the contact occurred. But that evidence already came in through the assistant principal. The assistant principal testified that he talked to Kevin without law enforcement present and Kevin said there was a “tap” or a “hit.” Moreover, Kevin’s statement was not necessary to a finding of intent. Indeed, Kevin’s statement suggests the touching was accidental, while the circuit court heard other evidence that it was intentional. The victim testified that he thought Kevin touched him intentionally, and provided details to support that conclusion: Kevin angled toward the victim with his hand out; Kevin cupped his hand; Kevin was not swinging his arms or messing around in a way that could have led to an accidental hit; and Kevin did not say “oops” or otherwise apologize for the contact. Finally, the State did not mention Kevin’s statements under custodial interrogation in its closing. In sum, the school resource officer’s testimony about Kevin’s statements was duplicative of other testimony, unnecessary for a finding of intent, and went unmentioned during the State’s closing. We conclude that, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational factfinder would have found Kevin delinquent even without his statements while under Miranda custody.   Hagedorn Concurrence
I would affirm the court of appeals as well, but for different reasons. Kevin was not entitled to Miranda warnings prior to questioning because this encounter was not a “custodial” interrogation as defined by Miranda and its progeny. Even if Kevin was not free to leave, this brief, fragmented questioning during the school day did not approximate the kind of prolonged, inherently coercive police station questioning to which Miranda’s prophylactic rules apply. In my view, the majority’s contrary view misses the forest for the trees, erroneously transforming a rather ordinary schoolhouse questioning (on a serious offense, to be sure) into a matter of constitutional moment. The majority overemphasizes the freedom to leave inquiry, and offers little analysis on the critical question of how this interrogation compares to the station house questioning in Miranda. The Supreme Court has made clear “that the freedom-of-movement test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody.” To be sure, the Miranda framework can be challenging to apply. It is even harder when the suspect is a minor, with one commentator opining that court rulings on these matters “appear to be utterly irreconcilable.” Even so, Kevin’s situation is not analogous to the coercive pressures that motivated the Court in Miranda. And while a trip to the office may cause an ordinary 12-year-old student to sweat, these run of the mill schoolhouse fears do not—at least under the facts here—require that the student be warned of his constitutional rights first. I respectfully concur. *** . . . We must first determine whether a reasonable person in Kevin’s position would have felt free to end the interview and leave. The majority spends considerable time contending that a reasonable 12-year-old in the same situation would not have felt free to leave. On one level, that is reasonable, and I need not spend much time disputing it. However, that conclusion here is odd because, during the middle of this two-part interview, he did leave at the officer’s invitation. I am unaware of any Miranda cases where the suspect is told he is free to go, then leaves, and yet is still determined to be in custody. Given the majority’s analysis treating this as one continuous interrogation, the fact that Kevin did leave when told he could is pretty sound evidence that he was not functionally under arrest. The majority marshals no authority for this unusual situation either. In any event, much like a traffic stop or the prison context, the freedom to leave analysis is not particularly helpful to the determination of whether Kevin was in custody. During the school day, a student’s freedom is always limited and subject to the direction of adults in whose care they have been entrusted. It wouldn’t matter whether the adult giving direction is a principal, teacher, coach, instructional aide, or SRO. Thus, although I question the conclusion that a reasonable person in Kevin’s position would not have felt free to leave the questioning by the SRO (given that Kevin was afforded the opportunity to depart, and did so), this prerequisite—even if satisfied—is of little assistance in answering the main question. Turning to the ultimate question, for an interrogation to be custodial for purposes of Miranda, the circumstances of Kevin’s questioning must be akin to the police-dominated atmosphere that Miranda’s prophylactic procedures were designed to guard against. As the following analysis spells out, would a reasonable 12-year-old in this situation feel some pressure? Absolutely. But was this the kind of hostile, inherently coercive questioning that animated the court in Miranda? It was not. *** . . . This entire officer-involved investigation was extremely brief. The initial interview with the officers was just 10 minutes, followed by a substantial break where Kevin was free from police supervision, followed by a two to three minute session led by the vice principal. In no way was this a set of interviews that can be described as “relentless questioning” “with no respite from the atmosphere of domination.” Kevin was not subject to an environment marked by psychological trickery designed to wear him down over time. Quite the contrary, the main interview—and the only one conducted alone with law enforcement—was conversational, with no one raising their voice, and no aggressive tactics or fist-pounding. *** Even though there were two officers in the room, the second officer was in training and did not participate in the interrogation, which minimized the impact of his presence. He may have been standing in front of the door, but there is no sense in the record that a reasonable 12-year-old would interpret this as a show of force or restraint. The room was, according to the testimony, quite small. Kevin was not physically restrained, handcuffed, or frisked, nor were there any markers of arrest. Kevin was not cut off from the outside world. He sat comfortably in the SRO’s office. Within the first 10 minutes of questioning, a school administrator even made sure he arrived at the SRO’s office. And Kevin left after the first questioning for up to an hour—hardly the marker of being in custody. Following the interview, he was set free for school activities; he was not taken into custody or arrested. In short, the typical marks of functional arrest are simply not present. The majority sees things differently. And given the contradictory cases on these questions, its decision presents a reasonable countervailing view. Even the court of appeals described this as a close case. The majority correctly points to some facts that make this case more difficult. Officer Propson lied about there being a witness to the event, at one moment pointedly asserting “it happened.” Perhaps she raised her voice during the second brief encounter that included school administration. And Kevin was brought back for ongoing questioning after he had been initially allowed to leave. One of the officers was fully uniformed, including with his weapons. At no point were Kevin’s parents, presumably the friendliest adults available, mentioned by anybody. These facts give some support to the idea that a reasonable person in Kevin’s situation would have felt pressured to confess. Under my read of the cases, however, more is required to approximate the coercive environment at issue in Miranda. Someone in Kevin’s shoes would certainly feel the weight of adult condemnation. His conscience might even call him to come clean in the face of a serious infraction. But this normal human experience should not so quickly be placed on par with the uniquely coercive station house questioning to which Miranda applies. The majority places inordinate weight on the vulnerability of children in this atmosphere. But the Supreme Court has explained that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination “is not concerned ‘with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.’” Rather, “[t]he sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, is governmental coercion.” In the context of Miranda itself, it is police coercion that the prophylaxis is designed to guard against. And we simply do not have that kind of environment here. In the end, this was a brief, non-coercive interview in a safe and familiar location. A reasonable person in Kevin’s position would have been nervous, scared, and concerned about the consequences that might follow. He would certainly feel pressure to talk to an officer, just like a student would on a trip to the principal’s office. But the environment Kevin faced was not the police-dominated inherently coercive atmosphere to which Miranda’s procedural safeguards apply. Whereas Miranda was worried about a defendant being “thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures,” Kevin was in a familiar place with familiar people where he was subject to conversational questioning, even if somewhat pointed at times. Whereas Miranda was worried about an environment “created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner,” this was an extremely short set of fragmented interviews during a school day conducted by the school officer and administration. The persistent interrogator in Miranda can exercise complete dominion over the suspect until he gets his confession. Only then will the interview end. A reasonable person in Kevin’s situation, however, knows he can be saved by the bell; the school day does not last forever. He was already given permission to leave one short interview, so a reasonable person would think he would be allowed to leave again. By Alexandria Staubach
Among the nearly three dozen new laws Gov. Tony Evers signed recently is one generating hope within the prison reentry community because it allows expansion of Medicaid coverage for those nearing the end of incarceration and returning home. While the impact of the new law, Act 233, will not be felt immediately, there is nevertheless cause for excitement for those involved in reentry services. “We don’t know how this is going to pan out,” said The Community’s Shannon Ross, on a call with Wisconsin Justice Initiative. “But we’re opening up a runway here. It is really exciting.” The Federal Inmate Exclusion Policy currently prohibits the use of federal Medicaid funds and services for those held in public institutions. But in some counties, a prison may be the largest healthcare provider. Act 233 requires that the Wisconsin Department of Health Services submit a waiver request to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services for a pilot project to provide “prerelease healthcare coverage” to incarcerated individuals for up to 90 days if the person is otherwise eligible. Permitted waivers from Medicaid requirements (known as section 1115 waivers) offer states an avenue to test innovative approaches for Medicaid dollars. The ability to provide services through Medicaid for 90 days before release, in and of itself, would significantly improve continuity of care, but such a program has even more potential. The new law specifically references case management services and medication-assisted treatment for all types of substance use disorders for 90 days before release, plus a 30-day supply of prescription medication. Successful waivers in other states have been worded similarly but have ended up reaching further. The deviation activities should “promote the objectives of the Medicaid program,” but the states have some flexibility in how that money is spent, according to the federal Medicaid website. KFF, an independent news source for health policy, has been tracking these waivers across the country since the waiver program’s inception. More than 66 waivers have been approved across 47 states, with an additional 34 pending across 27 states. The bulk, like Wisconsin’s planned application, deal with expanded eligibility groups, especially for those returning from incarceration. In both red and blue states, 24 of these waivers (whether pending or approved) have dealt with broader reentry services. Some provide behavioral health or community-based benefits. Connecticut’s application reveals that states can put more on the table than health care coverage. While the application lists case management services, medication-assisted treatment for substance use disorders, and a 30-day medication supply, it also provides for “one-time transition and moving costs, housing deposits, and medically necessary appliances and home accessibility modifications.” In Hawaii, the funds have also been used to help fund reentry housing, Ross told WJI. DHS has until Jan. 1, 2027, to submit its waiver application under Act 233. The department's comments in support of the legislation give no hints at what the final application could include, but “case management services” included in the new law could be broad. DHS did not respond to a request for comments. By Alexandria Staubach There’s some consensus among lawyers that ethics rules already cover the responsible use of generative artificial intelligence in court submissions, but a recent petition to the Wisconsin Supreme Court is asking for more. The rule change petition seeks to mandate explicit disclosure to the court and disclosure by the court when generative AI is used in the preparation of everything from court filings to opinions. The petition was filed by frequent pro se (self-represented) litigant Jay Stone. Stone’s petition “has a lot of the hallmarks of a ChatGPT document itself,” attorney Stacie Rosenzweig recently remarked to Wisconsin Justice Initiative. Rosenzweig, a partner at the law firm Halling & Cayo, specializes in legal ethics and professional responsibility. She said by email that while it would be unusual for Stone’s petition to be adopted by the Supreme Court as is, the petition “could spur some further discussion or an invitation from the Court for comments.” Rosenzweig discussed “a bit of debate” in ethics circles about the necessity of additional guidance. According to personal injury attorney Ann Jacobs, Wisconsin’s code of legal ethics should be sufficient to cover the landscape regarding AI use. Jacobs recently gave a continuing legal education presentation on the topic. She told WJI that rules regarding confidentiality, candor, and competence are sufficient to protect against the dangers of generative AI. The trouble, though, she said, is that those rules are not always followed. For example, earlier this year Kenosha County District Attorney Xavier Solis found himself in hot water after failing to disclose the use of AI in a brief he submitted to a court. The brief included hallucinated (made-up or fake) citations and ultimately resulted in sanctions. In late 2025, a misattributed citation by Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Annette K. Ziegler in a dissent regarding congressional redistricting had some speculating about the use of AI. “It looks and quacks like an AI generated error,” said Jacobs. And there are now a handful of databases tracking legal decisions in which generative AI produced hallucinated content. One demonstrates that internationally, United States judges and arbitrators are by far the most frequent offenders in this area, with 871 offenses. Canada (139 offenses) and Australia (73 offenses) are next in line. The most prolific of the watchdog projects is run by Damien Charlotin, a senior research fellow at HEC Paris, a top-ranking European business school. Another newer and less robust Charlotin database tracks legal cases in which generative AI was used as evidence to argue or prove a point. But the use of AI itself isn’t the issue. Instead, the problem is the technology’s propensity for inaccuracy. Courts across the United States have sanctioned, fined, and otherwise provided extreme consequences for attorney misuse of generative AI, primarily viewing them as ethics violations. In Wisconsin, Supreme Court Rule 20:1.1 governs attorney competence about technology: “(A) lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology,” the rule says. Other rules regarding client confidentiality and candor to the court supplement that rule. For example, using AI may involve an attorney providing sensitive client information to an unsecure system. That implicates a client’s confidentiality and triggers a lawyer’s obligation to communicate with the client, Jacobs said. Rule 20:3.3 requires candor to the tribunal. “You cannot have read a fake case, which means your work has not been thorough,” said Jacobs. In July 2024, the American Bar Association issued a formal opinion on attorney use of generative AI. It cited existing ethical obligations “such as those relating to confidentiality, communication with a client, meritorious claims and contentions, candor toward the tribunal, supervisory responsibilities regarding others in the law office using the technology and those outside the law office providing (generative AI) services and charging reasonable fees.” But what’s happening in practice is nevertheless evolving, shaped by local rules and sanctions when things go awry. Kenosha County (where petitioner Stone lives) and Waukesha County have local rules requiring disclosure to the court regarding AI use.* Complicating the issue is little specific instruction for litigants who represent themselves—which generative AI may encourage more people to do. Some, like Stone, believe that upfront disclosure of generative AI use should be a requirement moving forward. No stranger to litigation, Stone has a handful of what he calls “election integrity” cases pending in the Court of Appeals and lower courts. He used AI in many of them. “It’s a tremendous tool,” Stone said on a call with WJI. “But it can be very harmful.” Throughout his litigation, Stone observed there was no AI disclosure requirement for pro se litigants. Holding pro se litigants to the same standards and expectations of attorneys is based on caselaw. He feels disclosure is the right way to go. “I believe in full transparency,” he said. The current rule change petition would require a self-represented litigant who uses a generative AI tool in preparing any filing or other written work product submitted to a state tribunal to independently review and verify the accuracy of all statements of fact and law and the authenticity of all citations before filing. The pro se litigant would have to disclose such use in the same manner as an attorney. The proposed rule emphasizes that existing ethical duties of competence, confidentiality, candor, and supervisory responsibility apply fully to the use of AI tools, Stone wrote in the petition. For Rosenzweig, a rule applicable to pro se litigants makes more sense as a rule of civil procedure. “Perhaps disclosure rules, more generally, and applied across the board, are a good stopgap,” Rosenzweig said. “(T)hey’ll remind people—lay and lawyer—of their obligations.” But we may have already entered a world where most people use AI without even knowing it. “I think eventually we won’t need disclosure,” said Rosenzweig. “Either AI will fizzle as a fad, or will be integrated into so much that affirmative disclosures would be as useless as disclosing whether you used Google or a cloud server.” The Supreme Court has not yet taken any action on Stone's petition, known as petition 26-02. *Correction: The initial version of this story indicated that Kenosha and Waukesha counties were the only circuit court jurisdictions with a local rule about AI use. Following publication, WJI learned that Portage County, too, has a rule requiring disclosure of AI use (Portage County Circuit Court Rule 2.15). If you know of other Wisconsin circuit courts with AI disclosure rules, please let us know.  Suggested disclosure from Stone's rule change petition. "Evers' judges" is our effort to present information about Gov. Tony Evers' appointees to the bench. The information is taken from the appointees' own judgeship applications. Italics indicate direct quotes from the application. Typos, including punctuation errors, come from the original application even though we have not inserted “(sic)” after each one. WJI has left them as is.  Name: Owen Piotrowski
Appointed to: Milwaukee County Circuit Court Appointment date: Jan. 7, 2026, (effective Feb. 1, 2026) to term ending July 31, 2027. (Piotrowski was earlier appointed to a planned retirement vacancy in Branch 38 and then named to Branch 31 to fill the immediate vacancy created by resignation of Judge Hannah Dugan.) Education: Law School – University of Wisconsin-Madison Undergraduate – University of Wisconsin-Eau Clarie High School – Pacelli High, Stevens Point, Wisconsin Recent legal employment: September 2014-present – Assistant district attorney, Milwaukee County District Attorney’s Office Bar and administrative memberships: State Bar of Wisconsin General character of practice: I am an Assistant District Attorney in Milwaukee County. My practice is exclusively in the area of criminal prosecution. For the past several years, I have supervised a team of four Assistant District Attorneys and two Assistant Attorney Generals who are responsible for the prosecution of non-fatal shooting in Milwaukee County. Describe typical clients: I serve the people of Milwaukee County. Given the size of the Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office, I have served in a number of units prosecuting specific kinds of offenses: the domestic violence unit, the sensitive crimes unit, and the violent crimes unit. Number of cases tried to verdict: 63 List up to three significant trials, appeals, or other legal matters in which you participated as a judge or lawyer in the past seven years: State v. Xavier Sevilla, Milwaukee County case 22CF2693 This was a serious case that received significant media attention. As a 15 year old, Mr. Sevilla fired a gun during an ongoing dispute with another group of young people inside Mayfair Mall. Ultimately he shot 8 people inside the mall, four of whom had nothing to do with the ongoing dispute. The case began as a juvenile case and was waived into adult court only after the juvenile proceeding was appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. I inherited this case shortly before the sentencing hearing when the prior ADA left my office for different employment. I had one week to familiarize myself with the case, communicate with victims, and make an appropriate sentencing argument. I succeeded in making an persuasive sentencing argument for an appropriate sentence without demonizing a defendant who was only 15 at the time he committed a mass shooting. State v. Kendall Love (22CF1689 and 22CF2000) and State v. Marvin Johnson (22CF1690 and 22CF1999) These cases involved two individuals who, acting together, shot two people around three hours apart in Milwaukee. In a nutshell, each defendant found a person they had a previous dispute with, hunted them down, ran up behind them, and repeatedly shot at their intended target. I charged the case, litigated the pretrial issues, and tried each defendant separately. Both defendants were convicted of a number of charges, including Attempted First Degree Intentional Homicide. Both defendants had significant criminal records. In each case the Judge followed my recommendation for an appropriately significant sentence of 40 years of initial confinement. State v. Sanchez Wilson, Milwaukee County case 19CF1411 This was a horrific case in which Mr. Wilson sexually assaulted a young girl in the morning and then, during a shootout with her uncle later that day, shot the same girl he had assaulted. This was my case from the beginning: I met with the family at charging, handled the pretrial litigation, tried the case (securing convictions on all counts), handled the sentencing, and consulted with the Wisconsin DOJ on the appeal. This case sticks out to me as significant because of the severity and variety of the crimes committed. It involved a wide variety of evidence: forensic interviews of children, DNA evidence, ballistic evidence, and many others. Ultimately during cross examination the defendant admitted to shooting the young victim. Experience in adversary proceedings before administrative bodies: My career has been spent prosecuting cases in Circuit Court, so I have never practiced before an administrative agency or commission. Describe your non-litigation experience (e.g., arbitration, mediation). My career has been spent litigating criminal cases, so I do not have significant experience with arbitration or mediation. Position or involvement in judicial, non-partisan, or partisan political campaign, committee, or organization: I have never held an official position in a political campaign, partisan or otherwise. I was publicly involved in and did some campaign work on a State Senate campaign in 2020. My father ran as the Democratic candidate for the 24th Senate District. I made some public appearances as part of the campaign and engaged in some fundraising. Previous runs for public office: N/A All judicial or non-partisan candidates endorsed in the last ten years: N/A Professional or civic and charitable organizations: Historic Brewers Hill Association, April 2025-present Public office to which you were appointed or elected: Kenosha Housing Authority, appointed, July 2019-present Significant pro bono legal work or volunteer service: As an attorney for the State of Wisconsin I cannot provide pro bono legal services. A few years ago I joined the Milwaukee Curling Club. The MCC is run mostly by club members volunteering their time, and I regularly volunteer at these events. My wife and I co-chaired/ chaired the MCC's end of year event for club members in the Spring of 2024 and 2025. I have also volunteered at Polish Fest for the last couple of years. Quotes: Why I want to be a judge: I have served the people of Milwaukee County as a prosecutor for over eleven years, and I believe that I can best continue to positively impact my community as a Circuit Court Judge. I have the courtroom experience, professional judgment, and empathy necessary to be a judge in a trial court. Circuit Court Judges are uniquely situated to positively affect their community. The Court system, whether in the criminal or civil context, is where we as a people resolve our disputes. Both parties advocate their positions, but ultimately the Judge makes the tough decisions. I have spent my time in the Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office seeing how judges make those tough decisions every day. I have the courtroom experience to make the appropriate calls regarding evidence and the willingness to listen to the parties and make the right decision for the community. As a prosecutor I have served not only as a zealous advocate, but more importantly as a minister of justice. Acting in that role in Milwaukee County criminal courts presents unique challenges because of the volume of cases and the amount of information that needs to be processed. Throughout my career I have developed the ability to handle that volume without losing sight of the most important question in every case: is what I am doing the best thing for the community in this situation? Simply put, I love Milwaukee County. I am a lifelong Wisconsin resident who grew up in Stevens Point, then went to college in Eau Claire, and law school in Madison. But Milwaukee is where I have made my home. There's no place else I would rather be. and there is no better way I can serve my community than as a Circuit Court Judge. Describe which case in the past 25 years by the Wisconsin Supreme Court or U.S. Supreme Court you believe had a significant positive or negative impact on the people of Wisconsin. I believe that the U.S. Supreme Court decision that had the biggest negative impact on the people of Wisconsin, and people across the United States, in my lifetime is Citizens United v. F.E.C., 558 U.S. 310 (2010). For more than 100 years before that case was decided, there were some limits on independent expenditures by people and corporations. The U.S. Supreme Court obliterated those long held limits in Citizens United. The only potential beneficiaries of that decision are large corporations and extremely wealthy individuals. Every Wisconsin resident has experienced firsthand the consequences of that decision. As a traditional political battleground State, Wisconsin residents are subjected, election after election, to ads run by Political Action Committees. These ads, as long as they aren't formally coordinated with a candidate, are entirely legal after Citizens United. This has changed the entire tenor of political discourse for the worse. As a Political Science student at the University of Wisconsin - Eau Claire between 2007 and 2011, I remember many debates about the effectiveness and appropriateness of attack ads in political campaigns. Those debates feel like ancient history. Citizens United has turned political campaigns into a series of increasingly dishonest and vitriolic attacks on candidates, which has shunted actual political discussion to the side. Possibly worse, because PACs are allowed to run these ads technically "independently" of candidates and campaigns, it's unclear to people watching just who is responsible for spewing the lies and hatred common in ads these days. Virtually everyone in Wisconsin seems to agree that political discourse has degraded over the past ten years or so. Every dinner table at every family gathering across the State seems to include a lament about the way politics used to be. Citizens United is directly responsible for that degradation by allowing PACs to spend virtually unlimited amounts on blatantly dishonest and hateful advertising. Two or three judges whom I admire and why: I have been fortunate throughout my career to practice in front of many excellent Circuit Court Judges, two of whom have now been elected to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Justice Rebecca Dallet is the current Judge or Justice who I admire most. Early in my career, while she was the Judge in Br. 40 of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, I was primarily assigned to her courtroom. At the time, she was assigned to a calendar of domestic violence cases. I was able to see firsthand how Justice Dallet conducted her courtroom. I was consistently struck by her ability to maintain firm control over her courtroom (and as anyone who has practiced in Milwaukee County in the domestic violence courts can attest, maintaining control over those chaotic calendars is one of the most difficult tasks a judge can face) while treating everyone with respect and dignity. I remember trying one particularly difficult case in Justice Dallet's court with a particularly difficult pro se defendant. She demonstrated tremendous patience with the defendant while holding me to a high standard. I have been impressed with Justice Dallet's work on the Supreme Court. She always held me to a high standard as a young lawyer, and she continued the hold prosecutors statewide to that same high standard in State v. Wayerski, 385 Wis. 2d 344 (2011). That case, arguably, expanded a prosecutor's obligation to uncover and disclose exculpatory information to the defense. I believe that prosecutors should be held to the highest standards, and I admire Justice Dallet's willingness to enforce that standard. As a historical figure, I have always admired former Chief Justice Earl Warren. I don't think that the impact of the decisions made by the Supreme Court can be overstated. The landmark Brown v. Board of Education Decision that abolished segregation in public schools may be the most significant civil rights decision in the history of the United States. It is also indicative of two things this I admire about Justice Warren. First, this was the controversial topic of the day, and Justice Warren managed to author a unanimous opinion on the topic. Obtaining that unanimity, rather than showing the public a divided judiciary, I believe contributes to the lasting impact of that decision. Second, Justice Warren considered social science research about the effects of segregation in reaching this decision. I believe that the most important quality that a Judge or Justice can display is a willingness to listen. Justice Warren, by engaging with and considering social science, opened the door for courts to consider a wider variety of information and reach better decisions. The proper role of a judge: I believe that a good judge serves three main functions. First, a good judge listens to the parties. Second, a good judge properly administers the rules of procedure. Third, a good judge makes substantive decisions on a case with the good of the community in mind. A judge needs to really listen to and engage with the parties in a case. When a party states their positions, I believe that a good judge considers it, and asks follow-up questions as needed. Listening is not a passive activity. This also means carefully considering the written submissions of the parties. This active listening is one of the things that I believe separates a lawyer's functions from a judge's function. A lawyer will zealously advocate for their positions. The judge must listen to the positions of both parties, sifts through the self-serving statements by both parties, and reach the appropriate legal decision. Second, a judge must accurately administer the rules of procedure. We have a justice system that runs on an adversarial model. The rules of evidence, rules of civil procedure, and rules of criminal procedure set the expectations of the parties. A judge must have a mastery of those rules so that the parties have a basis from which to litigate a case. I firmly believe that this does not involve splitting the proverbial baby; if a call on an evidentiary or procedural issue is close, a good judge considers all of the available information and makes a tough decision. Ultimately the system falls apart and becomes unpredictable if procedural rules are not applied accurately and consistently.  By Margo Kirchner
Just seven judicial races across Wisconsin were contested in yesterday's elections. You’ve likely already heard about Judge Chris Taylor winning the open Supreme Court seat over Judge Maria Lazar. No Wisconsin Court of Appeals races were contested, so Judges Joe Donald and Rachel Graham were reelected to Districts 1 and 4 respectively, and newcomer Anthony LoCoco will join the appeals court in District 2. What happened in the six contested circuit court races? Here are results from the unofficial reports posted online by the respective counties. Dane County Branch 1: Recently appointed incumbent Ben Jones held off challenger Huma Ahsan, 55.7% to 43.9%. Florence and Forest Counties: Robert A. Kennedy Jr., with 2,182 votes, defeated Alex Seifert, with 1,644 votes. Kennedy will succeed retiring Judge Leon Stenz. Marathon County Branch 3: Michael D. Hughes defeated Douglas Bauman, 64.6% to 35.2%. Hughes will succeed retiring Judge LaMont Jacobson. Washburn County: Incumbent Angeline Winton-Roe beat challenger Aaron Marcoux by 819 votes, 2,792 to 1,973. Washington County Branch 2: Challenger Grant Scaife won against the incumbent, recently appointed Gordon Leech, 60.5% to 39.1%. Wood County Branch 3: Recently appointed incumbent Emily Nolan-Plutchak held off challenger Elizabeth Gebert, winning by 659 votes, 9,588 to 8,929. The election winners will start their new terms on Aug. 1, 2026. By Margo Kirchner In last week’s Wisconsin Supreme Court candidate debate, Wisconsin Justice Initiative’s legal challenge to the spring 2020 ballot question was the foundation for one of the final questions. WISN 12 in Milwaukee held and broadcast the debate between Wisconsin Court of Appeals Judges Chris Taylor and Maria Lazar on April 2. About 10 minutes before the end, WISN moderator Matt Smith asked Taylor why she had voted against the constitutional amendment known as Marsy’s Law when she was a state legislator. Taylor served in the Wisconsin Assembly prior to appointment as a circuit court judge in 2020. After Taylor’s answer, discussing her constituents' concerns with the provision, Smith turned to Lazar. He asked her about Marsy’s Law as follows: “Judge Lazar, critics have challenged the wording on the ballot as unclear and insufficient. The court, though, in a 6-1 ruling, disagreed with that. It has led to some questions, including new debates, about what information should be made public and when. Are there negative, unintended consequences to Marsy’s Law?” Lazar first answered that the amendment “is a very good, strong law,” but admitted that “there are some issues that have come up” for the courts to decide. “I think there are some points that will have to be addressed, but overall it has been astonishingly effective and important,” she said. She attributed issues with the amendment to the drafters not knowing all the possible perspectives or effects. “It’s not like we have lawyers in our Legislature drafting most of these bills,” she said. Though Smith did not name WJI or mention the caption of the court decision, his question referenced the lawsuit WJI brought in 2019 to challenge the Marsy’s Law ballot question. WJI argued that the ballot question not only failed to fully and fairly inform voters about the contents of the amendment but, in fact, misled them. WJI argued that the ballot question failed to inform voters of the amendment’s reduction of rights of an accused. An accused's right to a fair trial, for instance, was deleted from the constitution. The Supreme Court in 2023 ruled against WJI, six to one, on a ground that had not been raised by the state defendants and that two justices sprung on the parties at oral argument. The decision gave the Legislature broad freedom to describe proposed amendments, regardless of voters being confused or misled by the ballot questions. Voters are not entitled to a fair explanation of what they are voting on. Justice Brian Hagedorn wrote for the majority that the Wisconsin Constitution “does not require any substantive discussion of the amendment in the ballot question submitted to the people. No explanation or summary is constitutionally commanded.” A ballot question is deficient “only in the rare circumstance that the question is fundamentally counterfactual such that voters were not asked to approve the actual amendment,” he wrote. Justice Rebecca Bradley concurred, saying that “(t)he constitutional purpose of a ballot question . . . is not to educate voters.” “Voters are trusted to inform themselves,” she wrote. A recent bill, AB 207, would have provided voters with significantly more information. Introduced by Republicans, it ended up with bipartisan support in the Assembly, where it passed out of committee with a unanimous vote in October 2025 and then passed the full Assembly in November. The bill would have required the Legislature to draft a one-page disclosure notice for voters with the entire text of the actual proposed constitutional amendment (not just the ballot question), a plain language summary of existing law, and a plain language explanation of the effect of the proposed amendment. The disclosure notice would be published on the Wisconsin Elections Commission’s voter registration website for at least 30 days before an election, posted on each county clerk’s website, mailed with absentee ballots, and posted at the polls on election day. Sponsor Rep. Jerry O’Connor (R-Fond du Lac) stated in written testimony in both chambers that “(n)o one likes to be at a disadvantage when asked to take a position on a crucial matter such as amending the state Constitution. Yet that is how we treat our voters when we present the voters with a referendum question on a ballot. This is unfair and unreasonable. We can and should do better.” Rep. Dan Knodl (R-Germantown) stated in written testimony urging passage, “Ballot questions are not written to explain a proposal, they’re written to implement it.” He noted that the bill "strengthens voter trust through transparency and accuracy." The Senate received the Assembly’s approved bill in November. However, the bill did not progress through the Senate’s Committee on Licensing, Regulatory Reform, State and Federal Affairs. The bill died when the Legislature adjourned in March 2026. The Senate’s version of the bill, SB 205, received a hearing in that same committee in November 2025, but the committee failed to vote on it. As for Lazar’s statement that the Legislature does not have lawyers drafting bills, in the case of the Marsy’s Law constitutional amendment, it might not have been drafted by people in Wisconsin at all. Marsy’s Law has been the personal cause of Broadcom founder, billionaire, and later convicted drug felon Henry Nicholas III, following the tragic murder of his sister. Beginning with a Marsy’s Law constitutional amendment in California in 2008, he and his organizations have advocated for substantially similar amendments in at least 20 states. Marsy’s Law for Wisconsin, LLC spent over $1.5 million from January 2017 through June 2019 lobbying the Legislature to approve the amendment and ballot question so the matter could be sent to voters in spring 2020.  Wisconsin Court of Appeals Judges Maria Lazar (L) and Chris Taylor (R) vie for an open seat on the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The election is tomorrow, Apr. 7. City of Milwaukee commission to study lack of enforcement of housing voucher antidiscrimination laws4/1/2026  By Alexandria Staubach
A Milwaukee County ordinance makes discrimination against housing voucher holders illegal, but enforcement is essentially nonexistent. A City of Milwaukee agency is now looking at the issue. In 2018, then-Milwaukee County Supervisor Marina Dimitrijevic sponsored and helped pass the county ordinance that made discrimination against housing voucher holders illegal. But the county failed to develop a serious enforcement mechanism and has never litigated a complaint, says Stefanie Ebbens, senior administrator of the Inclusive Communities Program at Metropolitan Milwaukee Fair Housing Council. FHC is a local nonprofit that operates a full-service fair housing program. Private landlords are not required to opt into the subsidized housing voucher (known as section 8) program, but if they do, they cannot then discriminate against those who use them. Discrimination against voucher holders isn’t just illegal at the local level. Wisconsin’s fair housing law also prohibits landlords from discriminating based on a person’s “lawful source of income,” which includes vouchers with monetary value. Nevertheless, in a decision from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which includes Wisconsin, the judges questioned whether federal rent vouchers fit within the meaning of "lawful source of income." The City of Milwaukee’s Equal Rights Commission is now taking a closer look at the county ordinance and others around the state that are designed to protect individuals who have managed to obtain a subsidized housing (known as section 8) voucher to help cover the cost of rent. At a commission meeting in February, Ebbens told the commission about the frustration she and her clients experience when trying to secure housing. She said Milwaukee landlords have become “more bold because they know no one is coming after them.” FHC’s Megan Wanke presented problematic trends and discrimination in the acceptance of vouchers in Milwaukee. Maps in the presentation showed a disproportionate concentration of households using federally subsidized vouchers in Milwaukee’s highest poverty areas, which remain consistent with historical racial segregation and Milwaukee’s long history of redlining. The problem is a mismatch of available properties and people receiving housing vouchers. FHC shared data from a Center on Budget and Policy Priorities think tank study conducted between 2017 and 2021, which showed that while only 20% of the city’s voucher affordable properties are located high-poverty census tracts, 32% of voucher holders reside in them. Meanwhile 34% of the city’s voucher affordable housing properties are in low-poverty census tracts, and only 17% of the city’s voucher holders live there. FHC recently conducted its own testing investigation, which showed that 45% of major property owners in Milwaukee prohibit or restrict the use of section 8 vouchers, some with policies that are exclusive to Milwaukee. Wanke told the commission that about three-fourths of those property owners refuse to accept vouchers at all, while the others disqualify voucher holders with targeted restrictions that effectively cut them out of the market. One company in fact accepts voucher renters, just not in Milwaukee. Wanke shared that the investigation involved more than 7,000 residential units. Wanke said the difference in where voucher holders are concentrated cannot be explained by housing stock or average cost of rent, and it has “despicable racial discrimination implications.” Section 8 vouchers belong to a rental assistance program managed by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. They are supposed to ensure that low-income families, seniors with fixed incomes, and disabled individuals have access to private-market housing. Participants pay roughly 30% of their income toward rent and utilities. A local public housing agency pays the remainder directly to landlords. The public housing agencies act as a conduit for the federal funding and ensure that rent makes it directly into landlords’ hands. The agencies have broad discretion in running their programs, which impose strict income requirements. The waitlist to receive benefits is often years long. In Milwaukee, the program is administered by the Housing Authority. Its waitlist is so long that it is currently closed. Participants are subject to criminal background checks that can be disqualifying. The local program must “accurately distinguish between criminal conduct that indicates a demonstrable risk to resident safety and property and criminal conduct that does not,” according to the Milwaukee Housing Authority’s Admissions and Continued Occupancy Policy. Despite these protections, many still have trouble finding landlords willing to take their vouchers. Members of the public who testified at the commission’s meeting shared stories of landlords “ghosting” them at showings or failing to return calls. One woman, Katravia Lee, shared her struggles in attempting to find a landlord willing to accept her voucher in time for her to use it, after she had waited years to receive the voucher at all. Lee also expressed frustration at paying as much as $75 to fill out an application, just to have a landlord decline her without providing a reason. According to Wanke, the pressure to find housing reduces a renter’s desire to file a complaint to enforce the antidiscrimination laws. Complaints would take months to resolve, which they don’t have. Also, many who feel or know they have been wrongfully discriminated against also do not want to risk being seen as problematic. And despite the 2018 enactment of the county ordinance, there is no clear path to file a complaint with the county, Ebbens told the city commission. Milwaukee County's corporation counsel could not be reached for comment on this issue. The issue is not as pronounced in Madison. Wanke and Ebbens said that Madison has a more comprehensive and structured administrative process under a city antidiscrimination ordinance. Commission Chair Tony Snell Rodriguez assured community speakers that the commission would take action, ordering a comparative analysis of the Wisconsin county and municipal fair housing law from the city’s Legislative Reference Bureau and creating a subcommittee to evaluate whether the commission can enact more robust protections. Note: Author Alexandria Staubach serves on Milwaukee's Equal Rights Commission. |
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