The SCOW docket: Court mandates adherance to 2-day rule in termination of parental rights case6/28/2024 Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The rule for this is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision. The “upshot” and “background” sections do not count as part of the 10 paragraphs because of their summary and necessary nature. We’ve also removed headings, citations, and footnotes (with an exception in this case) from the opinion for ease of reading but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. Italics indicate WJI insertions except for case names, which are also italicized. In this case, emphasis included in the opinion has been underlined.  Karofsky The case: State of Wisconsin vs. R.A.M. Majority: Justice Jill J. Karofsky (15 pages), joined by Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, Rebecca Grassl Bradley, Rebecca Frank Dallet, and Janet C. Protasiewicz Dissent: Chief Justice Annette Ziegler (10 pages), joined by Justice Brain Hagedorn The upshot The circuit court violated (Wisconsin statutory law), when it failed to wait at least two days before proceeding to a dispositional hearing once the court found R.A.M.'s absence was "egregious and without clear and justifiable excuse." Consequently, the court lacked competency to proceed in this case and R.A.M. is therefore entitled to a new dispositional hearing. Background R.A.M. is the parent of P.M., a son born in February 2015. In 2017, a police officer who was already in R.A.M.'s apartment building for an unrelated reason heard a woman shouting, a child crying loudly, and a loud thump, after which he said the child became louder. The officer knocked on the door, and R.A.M. allowed the officer to enter the residence. The officer found P.M. with scratches, bruising, and bleeding from the nose. R.A.M. was the only adult present at the time of the incident. She was subsequently convicted of one count of Child Abuse - Recklessly Causing Harm, and was sentenced to one year of initial confinement and two years of extended supervision. Immediately following the incident, the State placed P.M. in foster care. In 2019, P.M. was placed with his paternal uncle, with whom he continues to reside. The State filed the present petition for the termination of R.A.M.'s parental rights in 2021, after P.M. had resided outside of R.A.M.'s home for more than three years. The grounds for the petition were that P.M. was a child with a continuing need for protection and services (CHIPS) under Wisconsin statutes and that R.A.M. had failed to assume parental responsibility under the statutes. R.A.M. contested both grounds, and a court trial began on March 28, 2022. Two additional hearing dates were set in March and April of 2022, both of which R.A.M. attended. When more time was needed to conclude the grounds phase and hold a dispositional hearing the court set three more dates in July (including July 5, 2022). (In a footnote:) Termination of parental rights cases proceed in two phases. In the grounds phase of the proceeding, the petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the grounds for termination of parental rights enumerated in (Wisconsin statutes) exists. If the petitioner does so, the case proceeds to the dispositional phase, where the court must determine whether the termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. On July 5, 2022, R.A.M. failed to appear in court. The parties disagree as to the cause of R.A.M.'s absence; however, there is no dispute that the judge had previously issued a standing order requiring R.A.M. to attend all court appearances or risk being found in default. When R.A.M. did not appear, the State and the guardian ad litem asked the court to enter a default judgement against R.A.M. in the grounds phase. The circuit court made the following finding: "[S]he was ordered to be here this morning and we can't proceed on the merits without her. The State is prejudiced in not being able to finish its cross examination. I think she's misleading the Court; I think she's misleading [her counsel] in her version of the events. And I do find that to be egregious and bad faith and without justification." The court then granted the Petitioners' motion for default judgment. At the conclusion of the grounds phase, the court found that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence both a continuing need for CHIPS and a failure to assume parental responsibility. As a result, the court determined that R.A.M. was an unfit parent. The court immediately moved to the dispositional phase and concluded the dispositional hearing on that same day without R.A.M. present. The court found that termination would be in the best interest of P.M. and ordered the termination of R.A.M.'s parental rights. R.A.M. appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the order terminating her parental rights. . . . Subsequently, the guardian ad litem filed a petition for review, which this court granted. The guts To resolve this case we must interpret the applicable statute, which reads in pertinent part: "[A] parent 18 years of age or over is presumed to have waived his or her right to counsel and to appear by counsel if the court has ordered the parent to appear in person at any or all subsequent hearings in the proceeding, the parent fails to appear in person as ordered, and the court finds that the parent's conduct in failing to appear in person was egregious and without clear and justifiable excuse. Failure by a parent 18 years of age or over to appear in person at consecutive hearings as ordered is presumed to be conduct that is egregious and without clear and justifiable excuse. If the court finds that a parent's conduct in failing to appear in person as ordered was egregious and without clear and justifiable excuse, the court may not hold a dispositional hearing on the contested adoption or involuntary termination of parental rights until at least 2 days have elapsed since the date of that finding." (Emphasis added by Karofsky.) The crux of this case is the last sentence of the statute (underlined above), which presents a straightforward conditional statement. If the court finds that the parent's failure to appear as ordered was "egregious and without clear and justifiable excuse," then the court "may not" hold a dispositional hearing until at least two days after the court made the egregiousness finding. *** The petitioners . . . do not meaningfully contend with the conditional statement discussed above. Instead, they urge us to consider the statute in context, and argue that a waiver of counsel must occur in order for the subdivision to apply. Additionally, petitioners insist that the statute is ambiguous. To resolve the ambiguity, petitioners encourage us to look to both the statute's title and its legislative history. *** Because the conditions that trigger the two-day waiting period are plain and unambiguous, we will not use (the statute's) title—"right to counsel"—to create ambiguity or rewrite the plain text of the statute. Statutory titles may be helpful "for the purpose of relieving ambiguity," but ultimately, "titles are not part of the statutes." Therefore, the title of the statute does not alter our understanding of the statute, or compel us to add any additional conditions for the two-day waiting period to occur. Similarly, when the meaning of a statute is plain, we do not consult legislative history to ascertain its meaning. Consequently, we do not consult the statutory title or legislative history in this case, or use either of them to supplant the language of the statute itself. To summarize, (the statute) is unambiguous, allowing us to rely on its plain language without reliance on extrinsic sources. That plain language dictates that when a court finds that a parent's failure to appear was egregious and without justifiable excuse, there is a presumption that the parent has waived their right to counsel, and, importantly for this case, the court must wait two days to hold the dispositional hearing. Having determined that the circuit court violated the statute by failing to wait two days to hold the dispositional hearing, we next must determine whether the court lacked competency to hold the dispositional hearing before the two days had elapsed. . . . The two-day waiting period at issue here is couched in mandatory language. The statute states that if a court makes an egregiousness finding, it may not proceed to a dispositional hearing without waiting two days. "'May not' is a negative term. Where statutory restrictions are couched in negative terms, they are usually held to be mandatory." Interpreting a similar "may not" structure, the court of appeals wrote in a prior case: "Negative words in a grant of power should never be construed as directory. Where an affirmative direction is followed by a negative or limiting provision, it becomes mandatory. Thus, where the statute says that the time for motions after verdict may not be enlarged, these are negative words regarding the grant of power. We hold that the language is mandatory." And here the circuit court clearly failed to follow the statute's mandate. *** Here, we conclude that the two-day waiting period is central to the statutory scheme. The two-day waiting period serves as a basic procedural safeguard for parents in termination of parental rights proceedings, potentially providing them opportunity to participate in the disposition hearing, or to ask the court to reconsider a default judgment following an egregiousness finding. Affording parents basic procedural safeguards serves the express legislative purpose of providing "judicial and other procedures through which children and all other interested parties are assured fair hearings." The requirement also serves the underlying purpose of chapter 48 of the Wisconsin Statutes: "the best interests of the child . . . shall always be of paramount consideration." This is true not least because a brief, two-day window may allow certain matters to be resolved that would otherwise result in months or even years of appeal. The waiting period is therefore no mere technical requirement, but is instead central to the statutory scheme . . . . Because the two-day waiting period is central to the statutory scheme, a court lacks competency to proceed to a dispositional hearing when it fails to wait at least two days after finding a parent's absence to be egregious and unjustifiable. As a result, we hold that the circuit court here lacked competency to proceed with the dispositional hearing.  Ziegler The dissent
The purpose of the TPR (termination of parental rights) statutes is to provide predictability, permanency, and stability for the child. In pursuit of this purpose, "[t]he courts and agencies responsible for child welfare should also recognize that instability and impermanence in family relationships are contrary to the welfare of children," so they exist to help "eliminat[e] the need for children to wait unreasonable periods of time for their parents to correct the conditions that prevent their safe return to the family." But the opposite is happening for this child. P.M.'s best interests have not been paramount. P.M. has been left waiting in a place of ongoing instability for his biological mother, R.A.M., to correct the conditions preventing his safe return. P.M. has suffered long periods of instability and impermanence, culminating in the State's petition to terminate R.A.M.'s parental rights to P.M. *** The majority errs in applying the timing requirements of the applicable statute to the facts and procedural posture of this case. The statute addresses the right to counsel and waiver of counsel, not default. While the title of a statute is not dispositive, the words of the statute are, and every single part of that statute deals with TPR proceedings and whether a parent has a right to counsel. Here, R.A.M. had counsel, and counsel was present and actively participated at R.A.M.'s TPR trial. Counsel was never even presumed waived. The statute the majority relies upon is inapplicable here. The majority misapplies the second subsection of the statute to reverse the circuit court's decision to proceed immediately to disposition. However, the language of that subsection addresses when a parent is presumed to have waived their right to counsel by their conduct. As the record clearly demonstrates, the court never found a presumption that R.A.M. waived counsel. Counsel was present in court and meaningfully participated. Waiver of counsel was never discussed. A finding of waiver of counsel was never made. In fact, the court's finding, that R.A.M. egregiously failed to appear in the courtroom, was made pursuant to a standard default judgment sanction with her counsel present, not a waiver of counsel standard. Hence, the majority applies a statute addressing presumed waiver of counsel via conduct to the wrong context. The majority relies on the wrong statute to impose time constraints which handcuff the circuit court from acting. *** The majority ignores the statute's contextual clues to hyper-fixate on the last sentence of the statute, which states: "If the court finds that a parent's conduct in failing to appear in person as ordered was egregious and without clear and justifiable excuse, the court may not hold a dispositional hearing on the contested adoption or involuntary termination of parental rights until at least 2 days have elapsed since the date of that finding." When we interpret statutes, we begin with the language of the statute. So, while "[c]ontext is important to meaning," we cannot isolate portions of a statute's plain language to analyze while ignoring the rest. Rather, the "statutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole . . . ." The language of this entire statute is plain: This statute deals with waiver of counsel. The statute addresses the scenario in which a parent, by their conduct, is presumed to have waived their right to counsel. This understanding of the statute mirrors the plain language of the sentences which immediately precede the sentence the majority focuses on, which references when a parent over 18 years of age is presumed to have waived counsel. This understanding of the statute is further reflected in the subsection which immediately follows the sentence the majority focuses on, which again deals with waiver of counsel. As the plain language of the statute shows, this entire statutory scheme deals with the waiver of counsel. This statute is intended to apply to situations in which a parent, by their conduct, is presumed to have waived their right to counsel. *** . . . As the record shows, the court's egregiousness finding was made pursuant to a standard default judgment sanction. The circuit court found that R.A.M. was not being honest about her reasons for failing to appear as the court ordered her to, and determining that R.A.M.'s behavior was not forthcoming, the circuit court granted default judgment against R.A.M. Notably, R.A.M.'s counsel was still present and still representing R.A.M. even in R.A.M.'s absence. These factual findings are due our deference. There was no waiver of counsel connected to these egregiousness findings. R.A.M.'s counsel was still present and representing her. Given this context, we are not in a waiver of counsel posture as required under the statute. Instead, default proceedings and the rules of civil procedure apply, "except where different procedure is prescribed by statute or rule." *** Default or finding of default is different than waiver of the right to counsel . . . . The statute is reflective of how important the right to counsel is, and how the court must make certain findings before presuming parents have waived their right to counsel. Here, the court's findings were related to default by R.A.M. not appearing as required pursuant to the court's scheduling order. Nothing in the court's findings dealt with R.A.M. waiving the right to counsel by conduct, as is discussed in the pertinent statute. R.A.M. was represented by counsel at disposition. The court permitted R.A.M.'s counsel to continue her representation in R.A.M.'s absence. The court definitely did not dismiss R.A.M.'s counsel. So, even though R.A.M. was defaulted at grounds, she was still actively represented by counsel at disposition. The court made egregiousness and bad faith findings here pursuant to the court entering a default judgment sanction against R.A.M. As a result, the statutory two-day delay is not implicated. *** I would also note that not all default sanctions will implicate the waiver of counsel. TPR disposition time periods are outlined in a statute, and a judge may proceed immediately from receipt of a TPR after factfinding to hear evidence and motions for disposition. It is only if counsel is presumed waived by the parent egregiously violating an order to appear without clear and justifiable cause that the court has to wait two days before holding a dispositional hearing. To conclude otherwise would allow the tail to wag the dog: a parent who wishes, for whatever reason, to cause additional delay could simply choose to not show up to the remainder of the hearing and thereby receive additional time they would not otherwise have. But judges must be able to control their calendars and courtrooms. Default judgment is a tool available for judges to use in TPRs, and does not always extinguish the parent's right to counsel. Here, the statutory two-day waiting period was not automatically triggered, as the facts of the case, and the findings supported in the record, clearly indicate that the circuit court sanctioned R.A.M. with default for her violation of the scheduling order. Default judgment is an appropriate sanction for R.A.M.'s nonattendance. The court never made a determination that R.A.M.'s still-present counsel was presumed waived. The statute at issue does not properly apply to the facts of this case.
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Wisconsin Court of Appeals OKs resurrection of dismissed conviction in impaired-driving case6/26/2024 By Alexandria Staubach The Wisconsin Court of Appeals recently allowed the Rock County Circuit Court to resurrect a conviction previously dismissed under the “single-conviction provision” in Wisconsin law. The single-conviction provision permits prosecutors to pursue multiple counts that arise out of a single incident and fall into the three categories prohibiting operating a motor vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant or other drug. Under the provision, if a defendant is convicted of multiple impaired-driving offenses for the same incident, all but one is dismissed so a single conviction remains for purposes of sentencing and counting convictions. District IV of the Court of Appeals held that dismissal of a parallel count can be reversed if the offense chosen for the sentence is later thrown out on appeal. The dismissed count can be revived and then provide the basis for a new sentence.  Blanchard Judge Brian Blanchard wrote for the court, joined by Judges Rachel Graham and Jennifer Nashold.
A Rock County jury found Carl Lee McAdory guilty of two eighth-offense driving-while-intoxicated charges arising out of the same incident: (1) operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of one or more controlled substances (“OWI”), and (2) operating a motor vehicle with a restricted controlled substance (“RSC”). The OWI offense required the state to prove that McAdory’s driving was actually impaired by drugs or alcohol, while the RSC charge was a strict liability offense, meaning the state merely had to prove McAdory had consumed drugs and was operating a motor vehicle, regardless of whether the drugs affected his driving. Though found guilty on both counts, under the single-conviction provision McAdory could be sentenced on only one. At sentencing, the state asked the court to dismiss the RSC charge and sentence McAdory on the OWI charge. Judge Karl Hanson did so. McAdory appealed his OWI conviction to District IV of the Court of Appeals and won. The appeals court reversed the OWI conviction for violation of McAdory’s right to due process. Hanson had permitted a modified jury instruction as to the OWI offense, which, coupled with arguments raised in opening and closing arguments by the prosecution, resulted in a “reasonable likelihood that the State was effectively relieved of its burden to prove that McAdory was ‘under the influence’ of cocaine and marijuana while driving,” wrote the court. The appeals court sent the case back to circuit court “for a new trial on the [OWI] offense.” The appeals court was not asked to and did not address the merits of the dismissed RSC charge. McAdory did not get a new trial on remand, however. Instead, the prosecutor asked Hanson to reopen the judgment, dismiss the OWI conviction, reinstate the RCS conviction, and sentence McAdory on the RSC charge. McAdory argued that the court lacked the authority to reinstate the dismissed count and that reconviction would violate protections against double jeopardy (the legal theory prohibiting multiple prosecutions for the same incident). Hanson agreed with the prosecutor, entering a new sentence and judgment on the RSC charge. McAdory again appealed. He argued that Hanson exceeded his authority when he ignored the appellate court’s order for a new trial, nothing in state law authorized reinstatement of the RCS charge, and the second RCS conviction (following dismissal of the first) violated double-jeopardy protections. (WJI wrote about McAdory’s appeal here shortly after it was filed.) The appeals court found that nothing in Wisconsin law prohibited reinstatement of the RSC count. Although the single-conviction provision does not explicitly address the procedures to be used to accomplish the result of a single conviction, a prior Court of Appeals opinion “interpreted the single-conviction provision to mean that ‘the defendant is to be sentenced on one of the charges, and the other charge is to be dismissed,’” Blanchard wrote. In McAdory’s case that was what the prosecutor requested at the first sentencing hearing and what the prosecutor requested on remand—sentencing on one count and dismissal of the other, Blanchard said. “(T)he only reasonable interpretation is that the single-conviction provision implicitly authorizes circuit courts, in the procedural posture here, to accomplish the intended goal of a single conviction in this way,” Blanchard wrote. “(I)t would be unreasonable to interpret the single-conviction provision to mean, as McAdory contends, that the court’s post-trial dismissal of the guilty verdict on the RCS count in order to satisfy the provision was necessarily permanent, regardless of subsequent events in the case.” Further, “in enacting the single-conviction provision the legislature is presumed to have been aware of the postconviction and appellate relief potentially available to defendants in criminal cases, specifically in the form of potential reversal of individual counts of conviction,” Blanchard wrote. Blanchard said the court’s decision comported with language from the Wisconsin Supreme Court that impaired-driving convictions “terminate with one conviction for all purposes,” because even through the second appeal McAdory’s case had not yet terminated. The court found no double jeopardy problem. Read the full opinion here. "Evers' judges" is our effort to present information about Gov. Tony Evers' appointees to the bench. The information is taken from the appointees' own judgeship applications. Italics indicate direct quotes from the application. Typos, including punctuation errors, come from the original application even though we have not inserted “(sic)” after each one. WJI has left them as is.  Name: Kristin M. Cafferty
Appointed to: Racine County Circuit Court Appointment date: Feb. 2, 2021 (effective April 9, 2021, and elected to a six-year term on April 5, 2022) Education: Law School – Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin Undergraduate – Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin High School – St. Joseph Academy, Green Bay, Wisconsin Recent legal employment: October 2004-present – Attorney/Shareholder, Habush, Habush & Rottier, S.C., Racine, Wisconsin 1996-October 2004 – Attorney, Hostak, Henzl & Bichler, S.C., Racine, Wisconsin Bar and Administrative Memberships: State Bar of Wisconsin U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana Federal Court of Claims General character of practice: I have a busy practice representing individuals who have sustained personal injuries. I carry a heavy caseload and usually have 20-30 cases in active litigation. I help my clients seek fair compensation for their medical bills, wage loss and pain and suffering. I handle cases in the claims stage, in litigation (including court and jury trials), and in the appellate courts. I practice primarily in Racine and Kenosha counties, but handle cases all over the State of Wisconsin, and in federal court. Describe typical clients: My clients are as diverse as the population of Racine County. I represent people from a variety of backgrounds. My clients vary in terms of their race, ethnicity, level of education, employment status, physical abilities and income. I have clients who come from all neighborhoods and all walks of life. My clients have many different stories, and it is my job to understand their unique perspectives so that I can advocate on their behalf. Number of cases tried to verdict: Over 30 List up to three significant trials, appeals, or other legal matters in which you participated as a judge or lawyer in the past seven years: Racine County personal injury case: [The client] sustained a severe pylon fracture of his heel and ankle when he fell from a roof while gratuitously cleaning his neighbor's gutters. [His] injury should have ended his job as an ironworker, but his wife's cancer diagnosis and his family's need for ongoing insurance required that he return to work, even before he was released by his doctor … [resulting] in daily and constant pain. His quality of life, as well as that of his wife, was significantly impacted by his injury. The liability for the incident was challenged by the neighbor's insurance company, whose counsel suggested … [it resulted from] his own carelessness. After a three-day trial [in 2014], the jury awarded damages … in excess of $1,000,000 and found him to be only 15% responsible for his fall. … It was my privilege and honor … to obtain a fair verdict for their losses. Racine County work injury case (2017): [The client was injured] at work when he was assisting a semi-truck driver backing his trailer into a loading dock. The trailer lurched suddenly, and its tire ran across [the worker’s] foot. Initially, his injury was not thought to be severe; however, over time his wound worsened. At first his toes, and eventually his lower leg, required amputation. I visited [him] and his girlfriend in their home over the years as we witnessed his health progressively decline. I watched in stunned silence as he navigated the steep front steps to his home by transferring out of his wheelchair and crawling up the steps to his front door. Limited worker's compensation benefits prevented [him] from finding a new home that accommodated his disability. His injuries took a significant emotional toll. In addition to a loss of dignity, he lost his sense of purpose in gainful employment, which caused a loss of confidence. … [His] case was eventually settled without a trial, and with the funds from the confidential settlement he achieved financial security and regained his sense of hope and purpose. Later, I was honored to preside over the marriage of [the couple in] a service conducted in their new disability-accommodating home. … Milwaukee County personal injury case: [The client] was severely injured in a roll-over car accident [in 2017] causing the car to start on fire. In addition to a fractured leg and other injuries, [she] sustained burns over 30% of her body … and accumulated over $1,000,000 in outstanding medical bills. The driver of the car falsely claimed that [the client] was driving. … [The client] explained that she had initially hired another lawyer, but had been dismissed as his client when the lawyer learned there was a dispute over who was driving the car and that there was limited insurance coverage. In addition to abandoning her case when it became challenging, her prior lawyer had not even assisted [her] in completing the simple paperwork that was required to have her health insurance process her medical bills. I assisted [her] … and also used this evidence to convince the driver’s insurance company to pay their policy limits. … I negotiated the health insurance liens to obtain a greater recovery … and worked with the district attorney and the driver’s defense attorney to enable [her] to seek additional restitution for future treatment that would not be covered by insurance. I attended the sentencing hearing with her to give emotional support while she read her victim impact statement. Competently resolving [her] case required a great deal of time and understanding of both civil and criminal processes, navigation of auto and health insurance issues, and knowledge of caselaw involving restitution and civil releases (an issue I had argued before the Wisconsin Supreme Court). … It was extremely rewarding to have been able to alleviate her burden of medical bills, to achieve a just result in the outcome of the civil and criminal cases, and to help [her] move forward with her life. Experience in adversary proceedings before administrative bodies: My practice does not generally involve proceedings before an administrative agency or commission. Describe your non-litigation experience (e.g., arbitration, mediation). Most courts now require some kind of alternative dispute resolution as part of the litigation process, so many of my cases involve a mediation. I estimate that I have participated in well over 100 civil mediations. I have participated in a few arbitrations over my career, but arbitration is not as popular for personal injury cases. Position or involvement in judicial, non-partisan, or partisan political campaign, committee, or organization: I have held fundraisers for the following candidates: Governor Tony Evers, Attorney General Josh Kaul, 1st Congressional District Candidate Roger Polack, Judge Lisa Neubauer, Municipal Judge Rebecca Mason, Mayor John Dickert I have volunteered for the campaigns of President Barack Obama, Municipal Judge Rob Weber, Justice Rebecca Dallet and Justice Jill Karofsky. Previous runs for public office: n/a All judicial or non-partisan candidates endorsed in the last ten years: Judge Jack Jude, Circuit Court, 2004 Judge Faye Flancher, Circuit Court, 2003 Judge Gene Gasiorkiewicz, Circuit Court, 2010 Professional or civic and charitable organizations: Wisconsin Association for Justice, 2007-present, including as president-elect Racine County Bar Association, 1997-present, including as president Racine Neighborhood Watch, 1998-2006, including as board member Conflict Resolution Center, 1996-2006, including as board member St. Joseph Parish, Parish Council, 2012-2019 St. Joseph School, Enhancement Committee, 2007-present Siena Catholic Schools, Education Committee, 2017-2019 Significant pro bono legal work or volunteer service: I have been the volleyball coach for Racine Youth Sports spring volleyball league (coaching 2 teams) and for grade school volleyball teams through the Racine Parochial League/South Shore Parochial League since 2015. I have volunteered my time to do election protection for the Democratic party since 2008, at first being an election observer, and then working in the boiler room, most recently acting as County Counsel for Racine and Kenosha counties for the last few statewide elections. Quotes: Why I want to be a judge: Serving the residents of Racine County as a Circuit Court judge will allow me an opportunity to demonstrate my gratitude and share my knowledge and experiences. The people of Racine have been wonderful to me and my family. My husband and I moved to Racine in 1995 to practice law. We chose to raise our four children in Racine. For twenty-five years, my family has been enriched by the relationships we have formed in our diverse community. Our Racine neighbors and friends have exposed us to traditions, languages, foods, and perspectives that have brought depth to our family's character. Unfortunately, our positive experience living in Racine is not universal. A 24/7 Wall St. article recently rated Racine as one of the worst cities in the United States for African Americans. Highlighting the race-based gaps facing Black Americans in education, income, health, incarceration and achievement, the article noted that Black residents earn half of white residents, are nearly 12 times more likely to be put in prison, and three times more likely to live in poverty. These statistics mirror my observations. I have witnessed the challenges that families of color face in Racine. I have fed, clothed, educated and cared for young Black men with amazing potential, and despite my best efforts, have lost them to violence and to the streets. Others have a fundamental mistrust of the legal system due to a history of mistreatment, and I have worked particularly hard to gain their trust. Serving Racine County as a Circuit Court judge would grant me an opportunity to ensure racial equality in my courtroom and to inspire trust and equity in the justice system. Racine's challenges extend far beyond race. I have helped clients dealing with homelessness, struggling with mental illness, and living in poverty. I have visited many of my clients in their homes (or in the jail) and read about their private challenges in their medical records. I have helped clients with basic skills like opening a bank account, requesting a birth certificate, obtaining health insurance, or explaining themselves to a medical professional. Some of my clients are disabled and live on limited income, many are working with no health insurance and others have exhausted their savings to pay for large health insurance deductibles. I have learned from these experiences to be mindful of the individual circumstances of the person sitting across from me. My desire is to treat everyone with respect and equity regardless of socioeconomic status. For many years I have reflected on how to use my skills to make a more meaningful impact on my community beyond just the lives of my clients. The following quotation encapsulates my desire to focus my energy on public service. Cornell West said, "Never forget that justice is what love looks like in public." I would be honored and humbled like to serve the people of Racine to return the love they have shown to me, through a justice system that is fair, compassionate, and independent. Describe which case in the past 25 years by the Wisconsin Supreme Court or U.S. Supreme Court you believe had a significant positive or negative impact on the people of Wisconsin. The U.S. Supreme Court in Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), changed the landscape of campaign finance in the United States by invalidating federal and state limitations on corporate spending in elections. Campaign finance rules since Citizens United have been eroded and the power of the Federal Election Commission has been eviscerated. Large amounts of money from secret corporate donors has flooded into federal and state elections, including judicial races. Corporations are now significant, but anonymous, influencers in elections. By removing transparency in campaign funding, the U.S. Supreme Court has prevented the media, watchdog groups, and the public from critically analyzing campaign donations. This decision has had a profound negative effect on judicial campaigns and the integrity of the courts, particularly in Wisconsin. The Citizens United decision and its progeny have undermined the public's confidence in the independence of the Wisconsin judiciary. Prior to the Citizens United decision, spending in Wisconsin judicial elections by outside groups was rare. Terry and Bard, Judicial Elections and Issue Advertising: A Two-State Study, 39 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 579 (2017). In the years since the opinion was released, however, Wisconsin has experienced exponential growth in election spending for judicial candidates to the Supreme Court. Id. Independent expenditures have often outweighed the spending of the candidates themselves. Id. The influx of money into all Wisconsin elections is troubling, but the consequences to the perceived independence of the judicial branch is extremely concerning. In 2015, the spotlight was on the Wisconsin Supreme Court when it ruled to close an investigation into coordination between the executive branch and outside interest groups. The Court ordered that the documents related to the investigation be destroyed. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. Peterson, 2015 WI 85. When probe documents were leaked to the press, international attention was directed to the impartiality of the Wisconsin Supreme Court Justices. Certain Justices came under scrutiny for this decision because their campaigns benefitted from the same dark money groups that were involved in the probe. Consequently, the legitimacy of the decision to close the investigation was clouded. The world asked the precise question asked by Justice Kennedy in the Citizens United decision; namely, whether the justices elected to the Wisconsin Supreme Court with the assistance of dark money were subject to "disproportionate influence?" The worldwide focus on the lack of transparency and accountability in judicial campaign funding after Citizens United has created an impression of potential corruptibility of the Wisconsin judiciary. This perception tarnishes the people of Wisconsin and the entire American judicial branch. Influences of dark money persist, unchecked, under Citizens United. The scrutiny continues to this day as the Wisconsin Supreme Court makes rulings on issues of nationwide importance, such as election integrity. It is imperative that courts, both in Wisconsin and nationwide, regain the confidence of their constituents by attaining transparency in judicial campaign funding. Two or three judges whom I admire and why: Justice Janine Geske When I was attending Marquette University Law School, Justice Janine Geske became the second woman to sit on the Wisconsin Supreme Court. At that time, she was a well-respected Milwaukee Circuit Court judge, generous with her time to law students and in the community. I knew her to be an empathetic, energetic, and introspective jurist. Justice Geske helped shape my view of justice through her efforts in promoting alternative conflict resolution. Her passion resonated with me as I served on the Board of the Racine Conflict Resolution Center. At the time, our Center offered free mediation services for small claims cases, a program which Justice Geske facilitated in Milwaukee. Sr. Lois Aceto, our Executive Director, was also an advocate for restorative justice, and she taught us how these critical programs bring healing to both the victim and perpetrator. I have often employed and relied on these skills throughout my career. In 1998, Justice Geske made a bold and courageous decision to step down from the Supreme Court to focus on restorative justice. She impressed upon me the need to discern the impact a lawyer wants to make on society, which often involves making difficult choices. Her brave decision involved forgoing professional achievement in order to pursue personal fulfillment. When contemplating this application, I recalled Justice Geske's encouragement to lawyers to follow their hearts. If chosen for this appointment, I, too, will be moving away from many opportunities I have worked hard to create, including leadership roles that are far too rare for women trial lawyers. I am fortunate to have the support of my family and the encouragement of my partners to take this step, and I thank Justice Geske for inspiring me to embark on this journey toward public service. Judge Stephen A. Simanek Judge Stephen A. Simanek has enjoyed a thirty-year career as a Racine County judge. He cares deeply about the Racine community and its citizens. He has presided over some of the County's highest profile cases with patience and grace. I have tried cases and argued motions before Judge Simanek and found him to be humble, measured, compassionate, and independent-minded. Although a gifted intellect, he has never insinuated that he is superior to any of the parties who appear before him. He is secure and confident in his convictions, but never considers himself to be beyond reproach. If he makes a mistake, he will recognize the error and remedy it. Above all, Judge Simanek retains his sense of humor even in difficult and stressful circumstances. Judge Simanek treats all litigants with respect, dignity, and kindness. He takes the time necessary to explain his decisions so that, regardless of the outcome, all will feel they have been heard. Regardless of the outcome in Judge Simanek's courtroom, all parties involved will leave knowing that the judge was prepared, engaged, and with an understanding of the judge's rationale. If am fortunate enough to receive this appointment, I aspire to be as prepared, confident, respectful and fair as Judge Simanek. The proper role of a judge: The coaches on my son's travel basketball team often told the boys to "Trust the Process." These devoted leaders encouraged the team to follow their plan in order to achieve success both on the court and in life. To many of the players on the team, the coaches were important role models who offered essential leadership, discipline and structure. The role of a Circuit Court judge is much the same as these coaches - to exemplify patience, to set expectations, to offer appropriate direction, and to facilitate respect - thereby instilling trust in the process. Appropriate judicial temperament is paramount to creating trust of the legal system. Judges should never be condescending to staff, attorneys, or the citizens who appear before them. This approach is especially critical when a case involves pro se litigants who do not understand the intricacies of the legal system. Circuit Court judges must always act with civility, as they are the face of the justice system and often the only decision-maker that many will ever encounter. A court's dehumanizing attitude toward a litigant (or an attorney) can make a person question their abilities and make them feel disrespected and unheard. The court has tremendous power to define a person's self-worth, which should be exercised to inspire and motivate, not to belittle and berate. A judge should set an example of excellence and define her expectations so that those who appear before her are likewise prepared and organized. A trial court judge must act with preparedness, intelligence, diligence, fairness, and decisiveness. Judges must issue timely and well-reasoned decisions to adequately serve the litigants. An efficient courtroom is essential to the fair administration of justice. A judge can earn credibility by facilitating equity. By exercising her discretion within the boundaries of the law, a judge can help others to believe the system is fair for all. A judge should explore evidence-based alternatives and study solutions to issues facing the system. For example, the creation of specialty courts helps to facilitate positive change from within and offers litigants specifically tailored results. A judge can also use her discretion in sentencing decisions, setting bail, and motion practice to promote the fair administration of justice. A judge who is willing to look to alternatives, focus on treatment over incarceration, or consider thoughtful approaches to resolution may be effective in establishing her credibility without going beyond her authority. When a judge sets reasonable and appropriate expectations for the parties and issues consistent, well-reasoned decisions, it permits lawyers to give reliable advice to their clients. This leads to a perception of fairness and confidence in the integrity of the judicial system. In America and Wisconsin, we must instill and nurture belief in the fairness of the judicial system for all who encounter it. We must continue to build and enhance the relationship between our citizens and their democracy. It is the role of a judge to restore that trust in the process. By Alexandria Staubach
Earlier this month the Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld the Wisconsin Department of Justice’s denial of Scot Van Oudenhoven’s handgun purchase application based on an previous misdemeanor domestic violence conviction that had been expunged under Wisconsin law. The decision reinforces the narrow effect of expungement on criminal convictions in Wisconsin, where they are difficult to obtain and of limited effect. Expungement seals a criminal court file but has no impact on the conviction itself. Judge Gregory B Gill Jr. wrote for District III appeals court. He was joined in the opinion by Judges Lisa K. Stark and Judge Thomas M. Hruz. Van Oudenhoven was convicted of battery as an act of domestic violence in a 1994 Calumet County case. In 2019, a Calumet County Circuit Court judge granted Van Oudenhoven’s petition for expungement. In 2022, Van Oudenhoven attempted to purchase a handgun in Wisconsin. The Wisconsin Department of Justice (DOJ) denied the purchase based on his misdemeanor battery conviction. After Van Oudenhoven exhausted administrative remedies with the DOJ, he sought judicial review in Winnebago County Circuit Court. Judge Teresa S. Basiliere affirmed the DOJ denial. Federal law prohibits the sale of firearms to individuals who have been convicted of offenses related to domestic violence, but among the exceptions are misdemeanor cases. Possession is permitted where the misdemeanor conviction has been “expunged or set aside.” On appeal, Van Oudenhoven argued that expungement under Wisconsin law has the same force and effect as “expunged or set aside,” which phrase is not explicitly defined under federal law. Van Oudenhoven argued that the U.S. Supreme Court provided a common understanding of the phrase when it said in Logan v. United States that “expungement,” “set-aside,” “pardoned,” and “civil rights restored,” “describe[] a measure by which the government relieves an offender of some or all of the consequences of his [or her] conviction.” Because Van Oudenhoven’s expungement removed “some” consequences of his conviction, the Calumet County court “expunged or set aside” his conviction, he argued. The Court of Appeals rejected Van Oudenhoven’s argument that his conviction had been “expunged or set aside.” “The terms expunged, set aside, pardoned, and restoration of civil rights all, by definition, require state action that removes the prohibition on an individual from possessing or receiving a firearm under federal law,” wrote Gill. “The state procedure in question must completely remove all effects of the conviction at issue,” he said. Wisconsin’s expungement law does not remove the effects of conviction; “the statue merely removes evidence of the conviction from court files,” said Gill. Current state law permits expungement for an offense with a penalty of six years or less, as long as the offense was not a violent felony, the person was under 25 years old and had no prior felony record, and the person requested expungement at the time of sentencing. If all conditions are met, a subsequent court may grant a request for expungement after the person has successfully completed their sentence. During the last decade, several bills have been introduced to reform Wisconsin’s expungement and pardon laws. Last session, one bill seemed poised for success. Senate Bill 38/Assembly Bill 37 received broad support, with organizations on both sides of the aisle registering in favor, from the conservative group Americans for Prosperity to the ACLU. The bill also had a bipartisan group of 63 co-sponsors. Although the bill successfully made its way through the Assembly, it ultimately failed to get a vote from the Senate. “Expungement is an issue that has been before the Legislature and the Supreme Court for several years, yet, despite extensive study and discussion, there have been few changes made,” wrote the State Bar of Wisconsin in support of the bill. “Without expungement, every sentence is a life sentence,” it said. Some legislators remain undeterred. Rep. Tip McGuire (D-Kenosha) told WJI “It has unfortunately been a long, difficult road for the expungement reform bill. However, every session brings in new legislators and a fresh chance for us to get on the same page and recognize the importance of getting this done.” “Too many people in our state have trouble finding work or housing because of low-level crimes they committed many, many years ago when they were quite young. I’m hopeful we can properly strike a balance between public safety and rightfully giving people a second chance to build a life and a career for themselves,” McGuire told WJI. According to a 2018 Wisconsin Policy Forum report, an estimated 1.4 million individuals in Wisconsin have criminal records that may hinder their ability to find employment. In Milwaukee County, 30,638 cases closed between 2006 and 2017 technically meet the current restrictive eligibility criteria but have not been expunged, said the report. In 2020, the Court of Appeals held that even minor, technical violations of community supervision rules will bar expungement.
By Margo Kirchner Several organizations and activists this morning called on Wisconsin legislators and the governor to return 17-year-olds to the juvenile justice system and ensure that no 10-year-olds are eligible for the adult criminal justice system. The call came at a press conference outside the Milwaukee County Courthouse organized by Rev. Joseph Ellwanger on behalf of the Milwaukee Inner-city Congregations Allied for Hope (MICAH) Transformational Justice Task Force. Ellwanger was surrounded by more than two dozen supporters of youth justice reform, including two representatives from Wisconsin Justice Initiative. Ellwanger noted that the press conference was motivated by upcoming hearings in the case of a young boy who killed his mother when he was 10 years old. Under Wisconsin law, anyone charged with first degree intentional homicide, even a 10-year-old, is charged as an adult. (WJI guest columnist Roy Rogers previously wrote about the case here.) Hearings for a "reverse waiver" to juvenile court are set for next week in the young boy's case. Several speakers at the press conference referenced research indicating that the human brain does not fully develop until around age 25. Joshua Rovner of The Sentencing Project flew in from Washington, D.C. for the press conference. He noted that Wisconsin is one of only four states that treat all 17-year-olds as adults in the criminal justice system. (Wisconsin is aligned with Georgia, Texas, and Louisiana on that point.) Similarly, Wisconsin is one of just three states that allows a child as young as 10 years old to be charged as an adult for certain crimes, he said. Regarding the pending case, Rovner emphasized that “this is an elementary school child we are talking about.” Wisconsin’s Legislature and governor need “to fix these laws,” Rovner said. Emily Coddington, associate director of the Wisconsin Association of Family and Children’s Agencies, read a statement on behalf of the Raise the Age Coalition, a group of more than two dozen nonprofit and advocacy organizations pushing for legislation returning 17-year-olds to the juvenile justice system. “Wisconsin has failed to acknowledge what 46 other states already know: that raising the age (of adult prosecution) lowers recidivism rates, responds to often neglected mental health concerns and cognitive development research, provides a restorative and rehabilitative lens to youth justice, and begins to address racial disparities in the criminal justice system,” Coddington said. “We know that youth incarcerated with adults are 34% more likely to commit future crimes than youth served in settings designed to meet their unique needs, yet we continue to charge all 17-year-olds as adults,” she said. Wendy Volz Daniels, a clinical social worker and chair of the Felmers Chaney Advocacy Board, discussed how adults held by the Department of Corrections do not receive important anger management and cognitive behavior treatment until shortly before release. Several thousand individuals are on waiting lists for substance abuse and cognitive behavior treatment. “Sending children to the adult criminal justice system ensures that they will not get the treatment and rehabilitation that is needed,” she said. “Children cannot wait,” Daniels said. “Their needs are better served in the juvenile justice system, where they will immediately receive therapy and treatment,” she said. Two system-impacted individuals, including James Price, spoke about their own experiences as youth in the adult system and how children do not belong there. Price said that he “was absolutely scared” when he was age 14 in adult court in the building he now stood before, and he had to make adult decisions as a 14-year-old. Another system-impacted man said that when he was a teen and waived into adult court he “lost anything that looked like help,” including a social worker and psychiatrist who had been helping with his anger management. The Department of Corrections (DOC) called him “an overweight kid with PTSD” when he entered the corrections system, yet he did not receive necessary treatment for 27 years, shortly before his release. Other speakers included Sylvester Jackson, chair of the MICAH Transformational Justice Task Force; Dr. Kweku Ramel Smith, a psychologist and social justice advocate; and Dr. Richard Shaw, pastor of St. Matthew C.M.E. Church and MICAH president. Jackson emphasized that the DOC is “not prepared to deal with mental health and trauma” and “we should not forget that that’s a child,” referring to the pending case. He argued that society should not accept the charging of a 10-year-old as an adult Smith discussed how the education system has different levels of ages because of the vulnerabilities caused by mismatching age with setting, and the lack of such age differentiation in the adult corrections system. Shaw noted that God shows compassion and mercy, yet under current law “we have little to no compassion and mercy on children.” “We are challenging our government, we are challenging legislators, to change this law,” he said.  Wendy Volz Daniels speaks on June 18, 2024. Photograph courtesy of ACLU-Wisconsin.  By Alexandria Staubach Time-sensitive functions of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court are moving to children’s court in the Vel R. Phillips Juvenile Justice Center during the Republican National Convention (RNC). “The courthouse is already difficult to get to” said Chief Judge Carl Ashley in an interview with WJI. He anticipates that security checkpoints, crowds, and the unavailability of parking will dramatically intensify with the 50,000 people expected to participate in RNC activities. WJI talked with Ashley and Chief Court Administrator Stephanie Garbo about the court’s plans during the convention, which runs July 15 through July 18 in downtown Milwaukee. Garbo is helping to orchestrate the move to children’s court, which is located west of I-41 at 10201 W. Watertown Plank Rd. Garbo, like other Milwaukee-area officials, is organizing essential functions in and around the security footprint of the RNC without a complete picture of the U.S. Secret Service’s plans for the area. Garbo said a full outline of anticipated changes to court operations is yet to be announced but is expected in the coming weeks. Some of the changes Garbo anticipates include:
The Milwaukee County Jail will remain accessible to visitors and attorneys, but visitors will likely have to pass through intensified security to get to the building. As court plans remain in flux, Garbo encouraged anyone with court business the week of the convention to monitor Milwaukee County’s convention website, which will contain the most up-to-date information as the convention approaches. At a press conference in February, Mayor Cavalier Johnson also announced a city convention website, but as of today, both websites largely contain placeholders for plans that are still being developed and encourage the public to check back soon. The courts are not the only county functions likely to experience reorganization during the RNC. The county anticipates changes to several bus routes that ordinarily penetrate the RNC’s security zone. Currently, the county website for the RNC informs riders that “the security plan for the 2024 RNC is still in development – as soon as its finalized, riders will be alerted to impacts on bus routes” and “changes to the RNC’s security perimeter may happen on short notice.”
Milwaukee County Courthouse. Photographs by Alexandria Staubach.
 By Margo Kirchner Monday, June 17, is Wisconsin Women Lawyers Day, so proclaimed by Gov. Tony Evers to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the first woman's admission to the practice of law in Wisconsin. Lavinia Goodell was admitted to practice law at the Rock County Courthouse on June 17, 1874, following a bar exam conducted orally in a courtroom by a judge and senior lawyers. Milwaukee County will honor its women lawyers in a ceremony at 9 a.m. Monday in Room 200 of the Milwaukee County Courthouse. County Executive David Crowley and County Board of Supervisors Chair Marcelia Nicholson will recognize female deputy corporation counsel and court commissioners, the Milwaukee Justice Center director, and other female attorneys working for the county. In Rock County, a ceremony and short reenactment of Goodell’s admission to law practice is planned for 5 p.m. Monday at the courthouse in Janesville. Wisconsin Supreme Court Chief Justice Annette Ziegler is scheduled to speak, as are Dane County Circuit Judge Angela Bartell (retired), who is president of the Wisconsin Historical Society Board of Curators; State Bar of Wisconsin Executive Director Larry Martin; Green County Circuit Judge Jane Bucher; and Rachel Frost Starkey, a descendant of Goodell’s sister. Rock County Circuit Judge Barbara McCrory will preside over the ceremony. Milton Municipal Judge Kris Koeffler has coordinated the reenactment. A reception will follow at a Janesville wine bar. A committee of women attorneys has been working since mid-2023 not only to commemorate Goodell’s bar admission but also to celebrate Wisconsin women in the law more broadly. In addition to planning the Rock County event, members of the committee advocated for the governor’s proclamation and a series of articles in Wisconsin Lawyer magazine profiling current-day women in Wisconsin’s legal profession. Committee member Nancy Kopp says she came up with the idea of celebrating Goodell's admission to practice almost two years ago. “It dawned on me that there had not been a celebration in 1924 or 1974, 50 and 100 years after Lavinia became the state's first woman lawyer, and I thought it would be a shame to let the 150th anniversary pass without doing something to honor the occasion,” she told WJI. “It is very rewarding to be able to host a celebration of her admission to practice exactly 150 years after it occurred, in a courthouse that sits on the same site as the one in which she passed a bar examination,” Kopp said. Kopp first heard of Goodell in the 1970s and together with attorney Colleen Ball founded www.LaviniaGoodell.com, a website devoted to Goodell’s story and accomplishments. “I have been researching Lavinia for six years now and in addition to learning a great deal about her, I have also learned a great deal about the history of Janesville and Lavinia's contemporaries,” Kopp said. Kopp’s research into Goodell led to contact with descendants of Goodell’s sister, and several of them are expected at the Rock County Courthouse event. “While they were aware that Lavinia was Wisconsin's first female lawyer, they knew very few details about her life and have been very excited to see all the information that has come to life,” said Kopp. Committee members also have planned a special continuing legal education program on June 20 at the State Bar of Wisconsin’s annual meeting and conference. The program will discuss legal developments affecting women such as the right to practice law, the right for married women to have credit and own property in their own names, fair employment, and the Violence Against Women Act. Presenters include Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Hannah Dugan, former State Bar President Diane Diel, Elizabeth Fernandez, Martina Gast, and Kopp. On Aug. 8, Old World Wisconsin will stage a reenactment of Goodell's supreme court battle with Chief Justice Edward Ryan for the right to argue before the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Back in 1874, attorneys were admitted to practice at the trial court level. Goodell found that practicing before the state Supreme Court was a separate matter. Her attempt to appeal a case to that court was rejected because of her gender. Goodell lost her petition to that court to proceed with her client’s appeal. Ryan infamously wrote in his decision denying Goodell’s application that “(t)he law of nature destines and qualifies the female sex for the bearing and nurture of the children of our race and for the custody of the homes of the world and their maintenance in love and honor. And all life-long callings of women, inconsistent with these radical and sacred duties of their sex, as is the profession of law, are departures from the order of nature; and when voluntary, treason against it.” Undeterred, Goodell found another route. She drafted a bill to prohibit gender discrimination in the practice of law, persuaded male legislators to pass it, and persuaded a male governor to sign it, opening the Supreme Court door to women. WJI profiled Goodell, her groundbreaking achievement, and her fight to argue before the Wisconsin Supreme Court in this “Unsung Heroes” post. Read more here. Earlier this year WJI called upon the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the State Capitol and Executive Residence Board to commemorate this 150th anniversary year with portraits of the court’s female chief justices and a bust of Goodell in the Supreme Court hearing room foyer. Goodell’s bust could be appropriately placed opposite Ryan’s.
Text of Evers' proclamation: WHEREAS; over 9.400 women lawyers throughout Wisconsin pay a vital role in providing legal services to the public for law firms, private corporations, banks, insurance companies, nonprofit organizations, and government agencies; and WHEREAS; on June 17, 1874, Lavinia Goodell became the first woman lawyer in Wisconsin, pioneering a path for women in the legal profession across the state; and WHEREAS; despite facing institutional barriers, including being refused admission to practice before the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1875 based on her gender, Lavinia Goodell demonstrated unwavering resilience and advocated for legislation that prohibited discrimination on the grounds of sex in admission to practice before the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which was signed into law in 1877; and WHEREAS; over the past 150 years, countless women have entered the legal profession, contributing to the richness, diversity, and fairness of the Wisconsin and national legal system; and WHEREAS; women lawyers in Wisconsin have been instrumental in driving significant legal reforms, advocating for the rights of the underrepresented, enhancing the delivery of justice, and fostering an inclusive environment that values diversity and equality within the legal community; and WHEREAS; the state of Wisconsin recognizes the lasting impact of women lawyers on the fabric of the state's legal system and emphasizes the importance of continuing to support and promote the advancement of women in the legal profession; NOW, THEREFORE, I, Tony Evers, Governor of the State of Wisconsin, do hereby proclaim June 17, 2024, as WISCONSIN WOMEN LAWYERS DAY throughout the State of Wisconsin, and I commend this observance to all our state's residents. By Alexandria Staubach
Today the Milwaukee Common Council passed an ordinance restricting movement and property within the Republican National Convention (RNC) “security footprint” zone. While coolers and nonplastic water bottles will be prohibited, all guns not otherwise prohibited by state law are OK. Newly prohibited items include those commonly associated with acts of civil unrest, at times taking that definition beyond its logical conclusion. The ordinance bans everything from tennis balls and canned goods to bicycle locks. The list contains 27 categories of prohibited items, but Police Chief Jeffrey Norman will have the last say, as the ordinance also provides a catch-all provision prohibiting anything he deems to present a “clear and present danger.” Last week, at a special meeting of the city’s Public Safety and Health Committee, Ald. Robert Bauman, whose district includes the security footprint zone, introduced a version of the ordinance that would have kept firearms out. The committee had no appetite for that version, with Common Council President José G. Pérez and Alds. Sharlen Moore and Scott Spiker voting no. Ald. Peter Burgelis voted in favor. Ald. Lamont Westmoreland abstained. Had the proposed ordinance prevailed, any attempt to keep legal firearms out of the RNC would have violated state law, said newly elected City Attorney Evan Goyke in a letter to the committee last week. Goyke pointed out that a Wisconsin statute bars the city and all local governments “from prohibiting the possession or carrying of legal firearms.” The RNC, taking place in Milwaukee in July, and the Democratic National Convention, taking place in Chicago in August, are designated National Special Security Events (NSSEs) by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). NSSEs include large-scale events where DHS anticipates the attendance of dignitaries; which are of political, historical, or significant symbolic significance; and which are “likely to draw the attention of terrorists or other criminals, particularly those interested in employing weapons of mass destruction,” according to the DHS website. Once an event has been designated an NSSE, the U.S. Secret Service “assumes its mandated role as the lead federal agency for the design and implementation of the operational security plan,” says the DHS website. On July 28, 2020, shortly after Milwaukee was announced as host for this year’s RNC, the Common Council passed an ordinance precluding all persons “without the required credentials” from entering or being in the security zone during times to be designated by the Secret Service and Milwaukee Police Department. The ordinance also puts time and place restrictions on counterprotests, which are the subject of a recent ACLU lawsuit against the city. Many details regarding who and what will be permitted in the security zone remain a mystery, with the RNC set to kick off in just over a month. By Alexandria Staubach
The Milwaukee Police Department on Monday amended Standard Operating Procedure 660 governing police pursuits. The change narrows the conditions for officers to pursue a suspected “mobile drug dealer,” meaning a drug dealer operating out of a vehicle. The policy previously permitted pursuit whenever “occupant(s) of the vehicle are engaged in drug dealing proximate in time to the initiation of the vehicle pursuit.” Under the new version, pursuit is “limited to only incidents in which the observed drug dealing is directly related to a substantive drug investigation or long term investigation,” and then only when a suspect “flees while driving in a reckless manner” and after an attempted stop or a refusal to stop. Review of SOP 660 comes in response to the second-longest pursuit in 2023, which extended 49.9 miles, lasted 55 minutes, and resulted in recovery of a small quantity of narcotics, said MPD Assistant Chief Craig Sarnow during testimony before the Milwaukee Common Council’s Public Safety and Health Committee last week. “We continuously look at this to hone in because there is a risk to the community every time we engage in a pursuit” and “we have seen very tragic endings,” said MPD Chief of Staff Heather Hough at last week’s hearing. In 2010, following four incidents in which third parties were injured, MPD adopted “one of the most restrictive policies in the nation,” which “essentially handcuffed” MPD, said Sarnow. In 2017, at the direction of the Fire and Police Commission, the policy was relaxed to its current state following an uptick in reckless driving, Sarnow said. The 2017 changes “took the hand cuffs off,” and “pursuits have gone up significantly,” he said. MPD statistics show that 14% of all vehicle pursuits in 2023 resulted in crashes, up 30% from 2022. Hearing such policy updates is new for the council's committee and follows the Legislature’s adoption of Act 12 last summer. The act largely stripped the Fire and Police Commission of authority to set policies for the police and fire departments, transferring that power to each department’s chief. The Common Council has taken the position that it retains oversight authority and can veto policy by a two-thirds vote, although that position is under review by the city attorney’s office. “We’re the only game left,” said Public Safety and Health Committee Chair Ald. Scott Spiker. When questioning the change to SOP 660, Spiker seemed at odds with MPD. “Hands will be tied now in a way that they weren’t before,” said Spiker. “Has the world changed enough since (2017) that we should now make a different judgment?” he asked. “What we’re talking about is what officers may do,” said Leon Todd, executive director of the Fire and Police Commission, at the committee hearing. “It doesn’t mean they always can, always will, or always should.” The commission also considered the change to SOP 660 and was unanimous in finding it “reasonable and positive,” said Todd. According to MPD statistics, vehicle pursuits occur most frequently between 7:00 p.m. and 9:59 p.m. on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays. Densely populated MPD District 1, which encompasses a five-square-mile area of downtown and the East Side, saw an 83% increase in pursuits from 2022 to 2023. But District 6, on the far southside of Milwaukee, saw a 72% decrease in pursuits from 2022 to 2023. Most pursuits in 2023 occurred in District 7 on the northwest side of Milwaukee (262 pursuits, up 19% from 2022); District 2 on the near southside (253 pursuits, up 25%); and District 3 on the west side of Milwaukee (246 pursuits, up 54%). Ben Austen, author of Correction: Parole, Prison and the Possibility of Change, came up from Chicago to talk about not just the problems of America's criminal justice system but why and how we change it. He discussed his research regarding parole hearings, the continued reliance on the facts of past crimes rather than changes in the people who committed them, the difference one or two people in positions of power can make, the different trajectories of corrections systems between America and Scandinavian countries and the absence of a social safety net in America, and some changes to be made from viewing prison facilities as warehouses to places of rehabilitation. Attendees experienced a lively cocktail hour, conversation, Ben's thoughtful and thought-provoking presentation, and the thoughts of others in response to Ben's talk. If you missed the event, or just want to watch Ben's presentation again, here it is! WJI thanks the following sponsors for their support of the event: Platinum
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