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By Alexandria Staubach Earlier this month, Dane County Circuit Judge Jacob Frost declared part of Act 10—the 2011 statute that gutted collective bargaining rights—unconstitutional, finding that the law’s application to some public safety groups but not others had no rational explanation and therefore violates equal protection rights.  Frost found the provisions of the act related to collective bargaining modification void. (The full order is here.)
Equal protection arguments arise under federal and state constitutions when similar people are treated differently. Act 10 significantly diminished collective bargaining rights for everyone but select government employees deemed “protective occupation participants.” This classification included government workers like police but excluded some similar groups like the Capitol police. Whether the statute violates equal protection hinges on whether the state had a “rational basis” for determining who fell into the protective occupation classification, Frost said. Act 10 did not provide a definition for “protective occupation participants.” Instead, it relied on another Wisconsin statute that defined “protective occupation participants” who receive state benefits. Under that statute, there are 22 groups in the protective occupation classification. The groups “cover a variety of categories of work—law enforcement, fire fighters, and, oddly, motor vehicle inspectors,” Frost noted. The Legislature chose only seven of those 22 groups for protection in Act 10. Frost found that the Legislature failed to explain why just those seven groups of workers would essentially be exempt from the restrictions on collective bargaining implemented under Act 10. “No explanation presented to or thought of by the Court can explain why those 7 groups are in but the other public safety type groups are put in the general employee category,” Frost said. “(T)his is the purpose of rational basis review—to ensure there is an explanation that makes rational sense as to why a group is treated differently and who is in the group,” he wrote. “(T)he Legislature did not define the bounds of who is in the public safety group with words or explanation. It only did so by naming the specific employees put into the public safety group. Because the Court cannot come up with any policy that explains why these 7 groups of employees are included but other similar employees are excluded, the classification lacks a rational basis,” Frost said. Frost said the Legislature “absolutely has authority to define the public safety group and set the bounds of who is included as long as there is a rationale for it and the bounds apply fairly to all who fall within them.” A group of labor organizations filed the equal protection lawsuit in Dane County in November 2023. The defendants—state agencies and officials who oversee Act 10 enforcement—and the intervening Legislature asked Frost to dismiss the case on the grounds that the issues raised were decided in two prior cases, which deemed the law constitutional; implications for the state’s budget and the amount of time elapsed since Act 10’s enactment prejudice the state; and the law does not violate equal protection. Federal courts and the Wisconsin Supreme Court have previously found the law constitutional, but Frost said those cases and arguments were different. A case filed in federal court in 2013 by a (mostly) different group of labor organizations sought to invalidate Act 10 for violating the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. Frost found that the plaintiffs before him challenged Act 10 under the Wisconsin Constitution. “(T)hough the state and federal arguments surely have similarities they are not the same,” he said. Frost concluded that the prior federal case was not binding on Wisconsin courts because “Wisconsin’s Supreme Court has developed a 5 factor test to apply to certain equal protection challenges,” which the federal appeals court “never discussed or applied.” In 2014, labor organizations again unsuccessfully challenged Act 10, but in state court. They argued that Act 10 violated equal protection under the Wisconsin Constitution because it treats employees who chose union representation differently from those who chose not to be represented by a union. Frost wrote that “this is entirely different” from the question of whether Act 10’s protective occupation classification violates equal protection. Frost disposed of the prejudice argument by saying that the Legislature had failed to demonstrate any prejudice other than the ordinary inconvenience and disruption of litigation. “Those costs also would exist no matter when the law[suit] was brought,” he wrote. “(S)imilarly, if Act 10 were overturned, the effect on budgets would have occurred right after the law’s passing the same as it does now.” The defendants are likely to appeal Frost’s decision once it has been fully litigated, and it is likely to be another case that ends up before the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Recently, a host of cases in the Supreme Court have sought to overturn Wisconsin law on controversial topics—from the 2023 case that led to redistricting, to this month’s decision by the Wisconsin Supreme Court that absentee ballot boxes are allowed, to a case on whether the state constitution protects a right to abortion.
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"Evers' judges" is our effort to present information about Gov. Tony Evers' appointees to the bench. The information is taken from the appointees' own judgeship applications. Italics indicate direct quotes from the application. Typos, including punctuation errors, come from the original application even though we have not inserted “(sic)” after each one. WJI has left them as is.  Name: Adam Y. Gerol
Appointed to: Ozaukee County Circuit Court Appointment date: May 24, 2024, to term ending July 31, 2025 Education: Law School – Drake Law School, Des Moines, Iowa Undergraduate – The University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa High School – The Prairie School, Wind Point, Wisconsin Recent legal employment: July 2009-present – District attorney, Ozaukee County September 2008-July 2009 – Assistant district attorney, Milwaukee County July 2008-September 2008 – Assistant attorney general, Wisconsin Department of Justice, Criminal Litigation Division September 1992-July 2008 – Assistant district attorney, Ozaukee County Bar and administrative memberships: State Bar of Wisconsin U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin Illinois State Bar Association (lapsed) U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit General character of practice: I advise law enforcement on investigations, and assist with law enforcement training. I review and charge criminal cases, litigate these matters through trial to disposition, and sometimes through the appeal. I am also the department head of my office for purposes of budgeting, staff supervision, and government relations. As an assistant district attorney in Milwaukee County I was assigned to the Drug Unit and the Gun Unit in the Violent Crimes Division where we handled everything from Felon in Possession to Attempt Homicide. Staffing in Ozaukee County allows for little specialization. However I have always prosecuted the bulk of sensitive crimes in Ozaukee County, and as the district attorney I personally review and prosecute the most serious of allegations .… Describe typical clients: Prosecutors don't have clients in the traditional sense. We act in the name of the State of Wisconsin, and law enforcement agencies are our witnesses. We have statutory and constitutional obligations to the victims of crimes, but they are also, technically, not our clients. As the district attorney I still assign myself the bulk of all the sensitive crimes Number of cases tried to verdict: Approximately 250 jury trials List up to three significant trials, appeals, or other legal matters in which you participated as a judge or lawyer in the past seven years: I was the prosecutor in State v. Banas, Ozaukee County Case No. 2018CF000333. My participation began with the investigation commencing in 2007, where ultimately, more than 20 women reported being surreptitiously drugged after socializing with a local man. While all the women reported similar experiences, none had come forward within the time frame where traditional forensic testing could help identify the substances used or even what conduct may have occurred. Ultimately, a victim in 2014 did report within a time frame where we were able to use forensic hair analysis as pioneered by a leading world expert on drug-facilitated crimes, Dr. Pascal Kintz of Strasbourg, France. The case was tried before The Honorable Todd Martens, a Washington County judge. Motion practice was extensive, and the three day trial began on February 24, 2020. The opposing counsel was Brent Nistler. This case demonstrated the difficulties in applying the statute designed to address this type of behavior, Wis. Stats Sec. 941.32, Administering Dangerous or Stupefying Drug. There was extensive public attention to this matter from the earliest days of the investigation through trial. I was the prosecutor in State v. Kerschbaum, Ozaukee County Case No. 2020CF000156. Opposing counsel was Attorney Jerome Buting. Only the second phase of a bifurcated case was tried, and that was to the bench. The Honorable Sandy Williams was the judge. This was a sensitive crime prosecution, together with related counts of Child Pornography. The behavior was among the most disturbing I’ve ever encountered. This case involved applying existing state and federal law on the question of Miranda and police interrogation of a special needs suspect. However, the critical issue was the role of the defendant's (redacted) and how it might apply to questions of intent and mental responsibility. A related question was the relevance of expert testimony on the question of a knowing and voluntary Miranda waiver. This defendant suffered from significant limitations, and this case demonstrated the sometimes awkward fit between existing law and the state of medical science when addressing questions of cognition and intent. I was the prosecutor in State v. Difrances, Ozaukee County Case No. 2019CF000143, where the defendant was convicted of Incest with a Child, contrary to Wis. Stat Sec. 948.06. I litigated all material aspects of this case from its inception in June 2019 through trial and through the post-conviction motions that concluded on April 8, 2023. The two day jury trial began on June 29, 2021 before the Honorable Paul Malloy. Opposing counsel was Jason Baltz. This case touched on almost every reason why the Shiffra/Green procedure harmed victims. Here, it resulted in substantial delays but also demonstrated other aspects of how that process was flawed. When asked for a treatment history, this child didn't know who she might have treated with when she was very young. This was also the first case where I encouraged the victim to seek her own representation because Marsy’s Law creates tension between a prosecutor's interest in complying with a discovery order and the victim's right to have her records remain private. This victim was represented by Attorney Nancy Noet of the Crime Victims’ Rights Project, associated with Legal Action of Wisconsin, Inc. This case is also an example of another related privacy concern with incest victims. When we charge the crime of Incest, the identity of – and the trauma experienced by – the victim essentially becomes public. In these cases, I would ordinarily choose just to charge a sexual assault for this reason, leaving out the Incest count entirely. That option wasn't available here. Experience in adversary proceedings before administrative bodies: I have no recent experience. More than 30 years ago I represented a client involved in a banking regulation matter. We were able to resolve the matter with the Wisconsin Department of Justice without any further litigation. In private practice I represented a client who was a witness in a matter with the Department of Regulation and Licensing related to a fraud committed by a real estate agent. As a defense attorney I represented a number of people who had been charged with operating while intoxicated at their administrative hearings regarding their drivers licenses. Describe your non-litigation experience (e.g., arbitration, mediation). In the early years of my practice I worked on corporate formation, creation of employee benefit plans, and the occasional tax problem. A number of years ago I formed a non-profit corporation, negotiated a land transfer, and obtained charitable status for a local dog park. As a volunteer with Habitat for Humanity, I assisted with land use questions, grants, and corporate compliance. I offer advice from time to time to my wife's employer, the Milwaukee Center for Children and Youth. Position or involvement in judicial, non-partisan, or partisan political campaign, committee, or organization: I've served as treasurer for Jim Konowalski who was running for the county board approximately 10 years ago. I was the Courthouse Representative with the Ozaukee County Republican Party, and was active with them from 2009 until 2022. I know that I have dropped literature or helped with yard signs with campaigns in the distant past, but I can't accurately specify them. I know that I was very active with the campaigns of Sandy Williams (district attorney and judge), Tom Wolfram (Judge) and Steve Cain (Judge). Previous runs for public office: Ozaukee County District Attorney, appointed in 2009 and elected in 2012, 2016 and 2020 All judicial or non-partisan candidates endorsed in the last ten years: I never maintained a list of endorsements that I’ve made. I tried to be accurate with this question by checking my email accounts and researching internet history for cached versions of relevant campaign websites. With that caveat, I believe this list is complete. I would add that it’s likely that I endorsed Brian Hagedorn for the Supreme Court. I don’t believe I ever endorsed Daniel Kelly. Jennifer Dorow, Wisconsin Supreme Court, 2023 Maria Lazar, Court of Appeals, 2022 Shelly Grogan, Court of Appeals, 2021 Steve Cain, Circuit Court Judge, 2019 Annette Ziegler, Wisconsin Supreme Court, 2016 Brian Hagedorn, Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 2017 Michael Screnock, Wisconsin Supreme Court, 2017 Professional or civic and charitable organizations: Wisconsin District Attorneys Association, roles including president, 1994-present Rotary International, 2008-2021 Habitat for Humanity, board member, 2008-2014 Ozaukee County Jail Advisory Board, 2009-present Wisconsin Bar Association, district governor, 2016-2018 Joint Legislative Councils, various committees and dates Significant pro bono legal work or volunteer service: While in private practice I helped numerous people with various concerns without charging a fee. Since becoming a prosecutor, Wis Stat. Sec. 978.06 places restrictions on the ability of a prosecutor to perform other legal services. That said, I helped create the current incarnation of the Grafton dog park in the early 1990s and helped when they had problems with their regulatory filings. I also provided informal assistance when I volunteered with Habitat for Humanity, assisting with grants and contracts. Quotes: Why I want to be a judge: I have had a fulfilling career in litigation, which has given me an excellent legal education. However, it has also made me aware of many flaws in our court system. One that demands resolution is the cycle of never-ending status conferences in court calendars. These frustrate litigants immensely, leading many to settle their cases arbitrarily. These calendars ultimately leave judges with less time to focus on the crucial aspects of cases. This inevitably has a corrosive effect on the whole judicial process. My first goal is to change this dynamic. As an advocate, I've built where I could. Ozaukee County has an efficient district attorney's office that studies its cases, excels at providing complete discovery to litigants, and works hard to obtain fair outcomes. Thousands of cases, hundreds of trials, and dozens of appeals have built a strong foundation in the letter of the law. My resume reflects how I've also tried to serve the broader legal system. Our justice system isn’t just about laws. It's about people. I've never lost sight of the human side of my cases. Every case represents a significant turmoil in someone's life, and few people choose to become embroiled in the legal system. They find themselves trapped within a court system that is daunting, confusing, and often appears capricious. They're forced to rely on the advice of strangers. Their relationship with their attorney is frequently marked by caution and occasionally suspicion. Almost everyone is afraid. My understanding of the legal system extends beyond my professional experiences. It's deeply personal, shaped by the victims I encounter, the clients I've represented, and my family's experiences with the law. All of this has reinforced my belief in the importance of empathy, patience, and communication in the justice system. People deserve a court system that will treat them fairly, respectfully, and honestly. This is my commitment. The key is to understand the people in our courtrooms. Judges must have the ability and the desire to engage with people in a way that allows them to leave the courtroom understanding what has occurred. There is nothing more critical to the integrity of the entire justice system. In every case, there will be litigants who will not agree with the outcome. However, when a judge follows the law and explains how it applies to the facts that have been proven, the fairness of that outcome – no matter how unwelcome it might be – will resonate. As a judge, I want to accomplish all of these things and am dedicated to making this a reality. I am deeply rooted in this community and committed to using my skills and knowledge to ensure a fair, honest, and trusted court system. For the past 35 years, I have had the privilege of observing many great judges across southeastern Wisconsin, and I am eager to apply those lessons in this courthouse that is so important to me. Describe which case in the past 25 years by the Wisconsin Supreme Court or U.S. Supreme Court you believe had a significant positive or negative impact on the people of Wisconsin. State v. Johnson, 2023 WI 39, 407 Wis.2d 195, 990 N.W.2d 174 was the most significant triumph for victim rights in Wisconsin in the last 25 years. The modern world has made great strides in destigmatizing mental health concerns. We encourage every sexual assault victim to seek therapy immediately. But since 1993, in State v. Shiffra,175 Wis.2d 600, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993), our courts have provided a legal strategy to force victims to either surrender their privacy interests in their counseling records or watch the prosecution get dismissed. Shiffra motions became the standard of practice in every sexual assault case, with defendants commonly asking trial courts to inspect victims' private counseling records for exculpatory information. In the Shiffra sexual assault prosecution, the defendant claimed that the victim's history of psychiatric issues could have affected her ability to perceive and convey truthful information. The Court of Appeals held that the victim’s psychiatric history and the records from any doctors, hospitals, or counselors that may have treated her could be obtained if the defendant made a preliminary showing that such documents might be relevant and helpful at trial. They created a standard, and if the trial court made the requisite finding and the victim did not consent to release the treatment records for an in-camera inspection, the remedy would be suppressing the victim's testimony. I've prosecuted the most sensitive crimes in Ozaukee County for the last 30 years, and I know just how upset victims become when told that the defendant is trying to access their counseling records. The fact that only the judge will do the initial review does not comfort them. Johnson rejected this entire scheme. In a logical and reasoned fashion, Johnson set aside an ill-crafted mechanism that had the natural effect of retraumatizing sexual assault victims. "… in the past thirty years, because of Shiffra, countless sexual assault victims who reported their victimization have been on the horns of a dilemma, forced to choose between either disclosing their mental health records or not testifying in the trials of their perpetrators. Neither option was tenable, leaving victims with no choice but to have their suffering compounded by the system meant to administer justice." Johnson, ¶80. Johnson explained the “special justification” to reverse Shiffra and why the doctrine of stare decisis supported this outcome. The Supreme Court explained why the Shiffra line of cases was wrongly decided, unworkable, and inapplicable in light of the constitutional amendments enshrining victim's rights. Johnson recognized how Shiffra had ignored statutory protections, ran roughshod on the sensitivities of people who had been grievously harmed, and "allowed perpetrators to harass victims into silence." Johnson was a vindication of the rights of victims and a rejection of outmoded thinking about the presumed behavior of people who had been sexually assaulted. Two or three judges whom I admire and why: Perhaps drawing from his experience as a small-town lawyer and judge, Justice Jon Wilcox crafted ‘useable’ opinions that were direct and straightforward. He was committed to ensuring that the law was easily understood to all who needed to apply it. A prime example of this can be seen in his concurrence in Carney-Hayes v. NW Wis. Home Care, 2005 WI 118, 284 Wis.2d 56, 699 N.W.2d 524: "I write separately to set forth some clear rules regarding the analysis to be employed in applying the expert privilege, in hopes of providing guidance to litigants and judges dealing with this seemingly difficult area of the law." Carney-Hayes, ¶ 63. Justice Wilcox believed in judicial restraint, stare decisis, and the judiciary's limited role. This was particularly stressed when approaching matters of public policy – something Justice Wilcox emphasized should be left for the legislature. That’s not to say that he would always agree with what the legislature had done, once writing: "… I write separately, however, to address the serious concerns raised by the broad language in Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6) ... and I strongly urge the legislature to take a hard look at the practical consequences of this subsection. …" State v. Moran, 2005 WI 115, ¶ 59, 284 Wis.2d 24, 700 N.W.2d 884. Justice Wilcox never recited a principle just to say it. When dissenting, there was never anything ad hominem in his words. Even his most strident objections could be read as a fair exchange of opinion, leaving for the reader – or perhaps later courts – to further consider who was correct. Judge Joseph McCormack of Ozaukee County was the finest judge I have ever practiced before. He was never concerned with impressing others or demonstrating the breadth of his intellect. He only made his presence known at trial if a ruling was necessary. During his tenure, some of the most complicated cases in Ozaukee County were tried in his court. Whether it was a products liability case involving a 'big 3' automaker, a horrible medical malpractice claim, or an aggravated felony, he would immediately seize the essential thread of a subject. He always looked for the established standards that should apply to any question. Perhaps gained from his years as a social worker, Judge McCormack had a unique ability to connect with the people before him quickly. No litigant, victim, or defendant ever left his courtroom wondering what had occurred or with a lingering doubt that the outcome was anything other than well-considered. Judge McCormack was the first presiding judge in Ozaukee County to reach out to other justice system partners to improve local practices. I will always credit him for consolidating criminal calendars so prosecutors and public defenders could organize their time. He mentored young lawyers and was always willing to offer advice to those who showed interest. He was highly respected and known for his genuine concern for others. The proper role of a judge: Every society throughout history has expressed its thoughts on the proper role of a judge. 2,500 years ago, Socrates said, "Four things belong to a judge: to hear courteously, to answer wisely, to consider soberly, and to decide impartially." All of these remain true today. The best judges have the same qualities: They listen, they grasp the issues presented, they apply the law fairly, and they are respectful to the litigants. Today, the best judges are also mindful of the public’s perception of the court. Society must have confidence in their justice system. A judge must always consider that their behavior and demeanor affect the public's opinion of the judiciary. Everyone in the courtroom must perceive the judge as unbiased, unaffected by any familiarity with the litigants or by personal feelings toward the subject matter. A judge should go to great lengths to demonstrate that they approach the record objectively, guided solely by statutes and common law. Any deviation from this principle fosters contempt for the judicial system because it allows people to remain skeptical of the outcome. The law is a sacred thing, bequeathed to us by thoughtful, wise individuals who refined a system of resolving disputes. Every judge should acknowledge that precedent holds a superior understanding of the law than anything they might choose to invent. Respect for stare decisis is the most compelling of judicial virtues and a guiding principle for a trial court judge. A judge's calendar should prioritize the prompt resolution of cases rather than fostering a system that might pressure litigants into settling for the sake of convenience or cost. Fair compromises uphold the interests of justice, but when a case is settled for the wrong reasons, it breeds resentment. Someone will feel let down or perceive the justice system as manipulable, inevitably eroding respect for the legal system. When a judge's calendar offers a genuine opportunity for a case to be tried promptly, and where litigants know there will be no 'penalty' for doing so, few will leave the courtroom feeling that the outcome was forced upon them. A judge can't force anyone to resolve anything, and stern messaging by frustrated judges is soon forgotten. There’s nothing to be gained from status conferences where little will occur except for scheduling yet another date. Consequently, the client will be billed for another hour's work, which could have been put to better use. A judge should default to trusting the lawyers to advance their own cases. Before a jury trial, a judge should encourage litigants to discuss the expected testimony so that rulings can be anticipated. In a trial, a judge should avoid becoming an active participant whenever possible because that behavior is too easily misunderstood. In the eyes of jurors, the judge should appear to be the most neutral party in the courtroom. Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The rule for this is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision. The “upshot” and “background” sections do not count as part of the 10 paragraphs because of their summary and necessary nature. We’ve also removed headings, citations, and footnotes from the opinion for ease of reading but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. Italics indicate WJI insertions except for case names, which are also italicized. In this case, emphasis included in the dissent has been underlined.  Walsh Bradley The case: Priorities USA v. Wisconsin Elections Commission Majority: Ann Walsh Bradley (23 pages), joined by Justices Rebecca Frank Dallet, Jill J. Karofsky, and Janet C. Protasiewicz Dissent: Rebecca Grassl Bradley (24 pages), joined by Chief Justice Annette Ziegler and Justice Brain Hagedorn The upshot The pertinent Wisconsin statute (§ 6.87(4)(b)1.) allows the use of ballot drop boxes. . . . (W)e determine that the court's contrary conclusion in Teigen (v. Wisconsin Elections Commission) was unsound in principle, and as a consequence, we overrule it. Our decision today does not force or require that any municipal clerks use drop boxes. It merely acknowledges what the statute has always meant: that clerks may lawfully utilize secure drop boxes in an exercise of their statutorily-conferred discretion. Background In 2022, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held in the Teigen case that statute § 6.87 precludes the use of drop boxes for the return of absentee ballots to municipal clerks. The petitioners (in the present case) challenged several election procedures. Part of their claim was a contention that "the Wisconsin Supreme Court should revisit its decision in Teigen and confirm that the statute allows the use of drop boxes consistent with the statutory text and constitutional principles." WEC and the legislature moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the petitioners did not state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The circuit court denied the motion in part and granted it in part. As relevant here, it agreed with WEC and the legislature and granted dismissal with respect to the drop-box claim. Specifically, the circuit court determined that it "doesn't have the authority to revisit the soundness of the statutory interpretation in Teigen." It continued: "Even if I agree that Teigen was incorrectly decided, I must follow the Teigen precedent and I leave any revisiting of that decision to the Wisconsin Supreme Court." The petitioners appealed and asked the supreme court to take the case, skipping the court of appeals. The supreme court granted the petition to bypass the court of appeals on the single issue of whether to overrule Teigen. The pertinent statute, entitled "Absent voting procedure," sets forth requirements for the return of absentee ballots and the envelopes containing those ballots. The statutory language at the center of this case . . . is not extensive: "The envelope shall be mailed by the elector, or delivered in person, to the municipal clerk issuing the ballot or ballots." There is no assertion here that using a drop box is "mailing" a ballot, so we focus on the requirement that the ballot be "delivered in person, to the municipal clerk issuing the ballot or ballots." In Teigen, the majority interpreted this provision to ban drop boxes, concluding that "[a]n absentee ballot must be returned by mail or the voter must personally deliver it to the municipal clerk at the clerk's office or a designated alternate site." Specifically, the Teigen majority highlighted the phrase "to the municipal clerk," determining that "[a]n inanimate object, such as a ballot drop box, cannot be the municipal clerk. At a minimum, accordingly, dropping a ballot into an unattended drop box is not delivery 'to the municipal clerk[.]'" The guts We begin our independent analysis of the language of the statute by observing that the statute requires that a completed absentee ballot be "mailed by the elector, or delivered in person, to the municipal clerk issuing the ballot or ballots." In the petitioners' view, delivering a ballot to a drop box is a means of delivering it in person "to the municipal clerk." Taking a contrary position, the Teigen court drew a distinction between an inanimate object like a drop box and a "municipal clerk," a person to whom delivery must be made. Yet, it also dismissed a distinction of even greater import—the distinction our statutes make between a "municipal clerk" and the "municipal clerk's office." *** . . . . Synthesizing . . .information regarding the "office" of the clerk with the statutory definition of "municipal clerk" leads to the conclusion that the two terms are distinct. Put simply, the "municipal clerk" is a person, while the "office of the municipal clerk" is a location. *** By mandating that an absentee ballot be returned not to the "municipal clerk's office," but "to the municipal clerk," the legislature disclaimed the idea that the ballot must be delivered to a specific location and instead embraced delivery of an absentee ballot to a person—the "municipal clerk." Given this, the question then becomes whether delivery to a drop box constitutes delivery "to the municipal clerk" within the meaning of the statute. We conclude that it does. A drop box is set up, maintained, secured, and emptied by the municipal clerk. This is the case even if the drop box is in a location other than the municipal clerk's office. As analyzed, the statute does not specify a location to which a ballot must be returned and requires only that the ballot be delivered to a location the municipal clerk, within his or her discretion, designates. *** Reading "to the municipal clerk" to reference a person rather than a location entrusts some discretion to municipal clerks in how best to conduct elections in their respective jurisdictions. Such discretion is consistent with the statutory scheme as a whole, under which Wisconsin's 1,850 municipal clerks serve the "primary role" in running elections via our "decentralized" system. By endorsing a one size-fits-all approach, the Teigen court arrived at a conclusion that runs counter to the statutory scheme as a whole. *** Had the legislature wanted to impose a rule of statutory construction on the absentee balloting statutes, it certainly knows how to do that. In several other areas of the law, the legislature has explicitly directed that statutes should be either liberally or strictly construed. . . . The legislature did nothing of the sort with regard to absentee balloting, and it would be error to read in such a restriction where none is present. *** "Fidelity to precedent ensures that existing law will not be abandoned lightly. When existing law is open to revision in every case, deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable results." Accordingly, any departure from stare decisis (the principle that requires courts to stand by their prior decisions) requires "special justification." However, stare decisis is "neither a straightjacket nor an immutable rule." It is not an "inexorable command." Indeed, "[w]e do more damage to the rule of law by obstinately refusing to admit errors, thereby perpetuating injustice, than by overturning an erroneous decision." *** An underlying purpose of strong adherence to stare decisis where a statute is involved is to protect reliance interests attendant to a precedential opinion. Here, no such reliance interests counsel in favor of upholding an erroneous interpretation of the statute. Teigen has neither fostered reliance nor created a settled body of law. Accordingly, we determine that the court's conclusion in Teigen that the subject statutes prohibit ballot drop boxes was unsound in principle, and as a consequence, we overrule it. Because the complaint sets forth allegations, which if true, would entitle the plaintiff to relief, the motion to dismiss the drop-box claim was wrongly denied.   Grassl Bradley The dissent
The majority again forsakes the rule of law in an attempt to advance its political agenda. The majority began this term by tossing the legislative maps adopted by this court in Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, for the sole purpose of facilitating "the redistribution of political power in the Wisconsin legislature." The majority ends the term by loosening the legislature's regulations governing the privilege of absentee voting in the hopes of tipping the scales in future elections. Just two years ago, in Teigen v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, this court held "ballot drop boxes are illegal under Wisconsin statutes[,] [and] [a]n absentee ballot must be returned by mail or the voter must personally deliver it to the municipal clerk at the clerk's office or a designated alternate site." Three of the justices making up today's majority dissented. The same dissenters, joined by the newest member of the court, form a majority in this case to overrule Teigen, converting the Teigen dissent into the new majority opinion and holding absentee ballots may be delivered virtually anywhere a municipal clerk designates. To reach this conclusion, the majority misrepresents the court's decision in Teigen, replaces the only reasonable interpretation of the law with a highly implausible one, and tramples the doctrine of stare decisis. I dissent. *** This court has declared: "'Stare decisis is the preferred course of judicial action because it promotes evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles,” and "permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals . . . ." The decision-making process of this court cannot "become a mere exercise of judicial will . . . ." When the court "frequent[ly]" and "careless[ly]" overrules its prior decisions, its credibility suffers. *** Our cases have customarily required a "special" or "compelling" justification before overturning a prior decision of this court. In the past, this court has identified five special justifications for overruling precedent: "(1) the law has changed in a way that undermines the prior decision's rationale; (2) there is a "need to make a decision correspond to newly ascertained facts;" (3) our precedent "has become detrimental to coherence and consistency in the law;" (4) the decision is "unsound in principle;" or (5) it is "unworkable in practice." Predictably, the former dissenters, who now find themselves in the majority, abuse the rule of law, replacing the majority opinion in Teigen with Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's dissent. They decree the decision "unsound in principle," emptying the phrase of any meaning and making it merely a mechanism to tip the scales of justice toward their preferred outcomes. *** Although the majority purports to "assum[e]" "'stare decisis concerns are paramount where a court has authoritatively interpreted a statute[,]'" the majority discards that principle as an inconvenient obstacle to its policy preferences. According to the majority, stare decisis receives heightened force only if reliance interests are present because "[a]n underlying purpose of strong adherence to stare decisis where a statute is involved is to protect reliance interests attendant to a precedential opinion." That is a gross misrepresentation of the principle the majority claims to apply. As Justice Brett Kavanaugh recently explained, stare decisis is "comparatively strict" for statutory interpretation cases "because Congress and the President can alter a statutory precedent by enacting new legislation." Like the United States Supreme Court, this court has said stare decisis should receive extra consideration in statutory interpretation cases because the legislature may correct any errors in this court's interpretation. Scholarly sources are in accord. *** Going forward, whether decisions that interpreted statutes receive extra stare decisis protection will depend solely on the will of four and the extent to which respecting or discarding the doctrine favors their preferred outcome. The majority may revive statutory stare decisis whenever the four find it convenient. Such manipulations of the doctrine will only prove what a "result-oriented expedient" today's decision is. *** . . . . Another election statute (§ 6.84) provides a statement of legislative policy for absentee voting: . . . . The legislature finds that the privilege of voting by absentee ballot must be carefully regulated to prevent the potential for fraud or abuse; to prevent overzealous solicitation of absent electors who may prefer not to participate in an election; to prevent undue influence on an absent elector to vote for or against a candidate or to cast a particular vote in a referendum; or other similar abuses. . . . Interpretations directly contradicting this statement that "voting by absentee ballot must be carefully regulated" are less favored than plausible interpretations of the statute in harmony with the statement. *** Aside from mischaracterizing Teigen in order to deem it "unsound in principle," the majority fails to put a dent in Teigen's interpretation of the statute. The pertinent statute requires an absentee ballot to be returned to the municipal clerk one of two ways: "The envelope shall be mailed by the elector, or delivered in person, to the municipal clerk issuing the ballot or ballots." Teigen held the statute does not allow offsite, unattended drop boxes. . . . "(M)unicipal clerk" is defined as "the city clerk, town clerk, village clerk and the executive director of the city election commission and their authorized representatives. Where applicable, 'municipal clerk' also includes the clerk of a school district." Interpreting the clear text, Teigen recognized the pertinent statute requires an absentee voter to either send the absentee ballot by mail or "deliver[]" the ballot "to the municipal clerk"—a person, not an inanimate object—"in person." To "deliver[]" something "to" another person, "in person," requires a person-to-person exchange. That is what the statute means, and what it has always been understood to mean. Requiring person-to-person transmission of the ballot . . . obviously precludes the use of unattended drop boxes. *** Nothing relevant has changed since this court decided Teigen two years ago. There have been no intervening changes in the facts or law to warrant overruling the decision. Nor has any evidence emerged demonstrating the decision is detrimental to the coherence of the law or unworkable in practice. The policy-laden arguments against this court's decision in Teigen have not changed either; the majority in this case has simply recycled the dissent in Teigen, rebranding it the opinion of a court. It does not deserve the title. *** Whatever can be said of the majority's decision, it "is not the product of neutral, principled judging." Although the majority attempts to package its disagreements with Teigen as legal, the truth is obvious: The majority disagrees with the decision as a matter of policy and politics, not law. The members of the majority believe using drop boxes is good policy, and one they hope will aid their preferred political party. Teigen upheld the historical meaning of Wis. Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1., which bars the use of offsite, unmanned drop boxes. The majority in this case overrules Teigen not because it is legally erroneous, but because the majority finds it politically inconvenient. The majority's activism marks another triumph of political power over legal principle in this court. I dissent.  By Margo Kirchner
In part 1 of this series, Wisconsin Justice Initiative described some general guidelines when considering constitutional amendment ballot questions. Now, on to the two specific ballot questions Wisconsin voters statewide will see in the August 2024 election. Wisconsin Justice Initiative urges “no” votes on the two referendum questions on the Aug. 13 ballot seeking amendments to the Wisconsin Constitution. The two proposed amendments relate to the governor’s spending of state and federal funds. One amendment would prohibit the Legislature from delegating its authority to control spending. The other would prohibit the governor from spending money received by the federal government without the Legislature’s approval or direction. Although the Wisconsin Legislature controls the spending of tax dollars through the budget process and has retained its right to approve funds received under block grants, Wisconsin Statute § 16.54 authorizes the governor to accept and allocate federal funds provided to the state “for the education, the promotion of health, the relief of indigency, the promotion of agriculture or for any other purpose.” With some exceptions, the statute authorizes the governor to designate the state board, commission or department to administer such funds, and the designated board, commission or department to then spend them. The statute permits the governor in his discretion to stipulate to conditions placed on the funds so long as he considers them to be in the public interest. Examples of such funds include the disbursement of federal aid after weather disasters, or, as occurred during the pandemic, federal pandemic-related money under the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA). The statute allows for the acceptance and use of money relatively quickly, as the governor should be able to act more swiftly than the Legislature in a crisis. Generally, the Legislature meets for about 14 or 15 months then takes several months’ break until after the next election. Further, agreement in the Legislature on use of funds would be subject to the political process. Also, the governor is responsible for and accountable to all people in the state, not just constituents in a certain district. He may have a broader perspective on a spending decision for the good of the state than those elected to look out for the interests of a smaller constituency. In the joint resolution calling for the two questions, the Legislature identified the problem it was addressing as follows (emphasis added): “Under current law under the statutes, the governor has authority to accept federal moneys on behalf of the state and to allocate federal moneys without the specific approval or participation of the legislature.” As noted in the resolution itself, the asserted problem arises from current statutes, not from constitutional necessity. Statutes can be changed through statutory amendments; constitutional provisions are not necessary. Rep. Robert Wittke (R-Racine) wrote in support of the amendments that “(b)illions of federal dollars poured into our state in the last couple of years. These supplemental federal funds were important to our state’s economic wellbeing, but only Governor Evers made the determination for allocation of all that money without legislative consideration.” The amendments will “restore a balance to how Wisconsin manages supplemental federal money we receive,” Wittke said. Sen. Howard Marklein (R-Spring Green) wrote in support that the amendments will “increase() accountability, efficiency, and transparency in the expenditure of funds received from the federal government by restoring the legislature’s role in approving those expenditures.” Marklein noted that prior to the 1930s and 1940s the Legislature had “final say over the spending of all funds in the state treasury, no matter their source.” However, as federal money became a greater share of state funds, “legislators abandoned that important responsibility” and gave authority to the governor to allocate federal funds. “I believe the only permanent solution is to have the voters in Wisconsin approve an amendment to the state constitution that will restore the legislature’s role in the allocation of federal funds,” Marklein wrote. During the 2021-2022 legislative session, Gov. Tony Evers vetoed numerous bills in which the Legislature sought to direct ARPA funding. In his veto messages, Evers stated versions of the following: I object to the bill and am vetoing it because it limits the ability to use federal funds with the flexibility necessary to confront the variety of challenges posed by recovery from the COVID−19 global pandemic and respond to Wisconsin’s changing needs over the course of the pandemic and our recovery. In Wisconsin, the role of the Governor to oversee use of federal funds under Section 16.54 of the Wisconsin Statutes is clearly established and has been in place for decades, a fact that was confirmed by legislative leadership in a letter they sent to me in April 2020. In lieu of this bill, I will continue to utilize the authority provided to the Governor under Section 16.54 of the Wisconsin Statutes to oversee use of federal funds and will allocate these funds in a manner that is transparent and consistent with both Wisconsin’s needs and federal law. Wittke’s comments and Evers’ veto statements point to the “problem” these amendments are purported to solve: the governor’s rejection of the Legislature’s attempt to control federal pandemic-related funds. When the most recent Legislature approved sending these ballot questions to voters, only Republicans voted for it. (In the Assembly, 63 Republicans voted in favor and 35 Democrats voted against; in the Senate, 22 Republicans voted in favor and 10 Democrats against.) Wouldn’t a truly good policy benefiting all Wisconsinites for decades to come have had bipartisan support? Question 1 on the August ballot reads: “Delegation of appropriation power. Shall section 35(1) of article IV of the constitution be created to provide that the legislature may not delegate its sole power to determine how moneys shall be appropriated?” Ask yourself why this is necessary. Through the state budget process, the Legislature continues to control the spending of vast amounts of state money. Regarding the delegation of power to appropriate federal money, the Legislature has not been forced to delegate its power. Prior Legislatures chose to do so. The Legislature could change the delegation of power to the governor over federal funds by changing the statute. Why does the Legislature need to prohibit in the constitution its own power of delegation? This appears to be the Legislature attempting to get around the governor’s veto of such a statutory change. Importantly, what if a future Legislature believes that it again should delegate authority to the governor or another official to spend certain money? If the ballot question passes, that future Legislature would be barred by the state constitution from doing so. Thus, this amendment can be seen as an attempt to bar future legislatures from giving power back to the governor in the event the legislature ever has a Democratic majority. Also ask how far this provision, if passed, will reach and whether its effects are known. This amendment appears to go beyond just the statute permitting the governor to direct federal funds, extending to any type of delegation. How much will the Legislature extend its reach into the other branches of government to control how executive agencies or courts spend their budgeted funds? Question 2 reads: “Allocation of federal moneys. Shall section 35(2) of article IV of the constitution be created to prohibit the governor from allocating any federal moneys the governor accepts on behalf of the state without the approval of the legislature by joint resolution or as provided by legislative rule?" This change is aimed specifically at § 16.54. Again, the change could be achieved by changing a statute rather than the state constitution. What is the Legislature’s plan for approving or making rules regarding acceptance and distribution of federal emergency aid, especially when the Legislature is not in session? Will Wisconsinites impacted while the Legislature is on break during the last 10 months of a legislative term need to just make do until the Legislature is back in session? The Legislature met just once in 2020 to address needs during the pandemic. This Legislature broke in March 2024 and is not expected to return in full until January 2025. When the Legislature returns to session, how long will Wisconsinites wait if the Legislature disagrees with the governor’s proposals and the use of funds devolves into politics? Money meant to help Wisconsinites could sit unused while people suffer. And will Wisconsin miss out entirely on federal money that has a deadline for acceptance? If the Legislature is out of session or disagrees with the governor and the deadline passes, what then? Jennifer Giegerich of the Wisconsin Conservation Voters wrote in written testimony to the Legislature before it passed these amendment proposals: The current system allows for a governor to act quickly when it is required. Voters are not asking the legislature to formally change the constitution to create a new level of oversight in these limited circumstances. While there may be a theoretical argument to be made, the reality is it will create unnecessary burden and hoops to jump through for those waiting for funds to rebuild or communities dealing with significant public health issues. On the state government website noting lobbyists’ positions on these amendments, organizations urging a “yes” vote included only the Badger Institute and Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce. Numerous organizations lobbied for a “no” vote, including, among others, the League of Women Voters of Wisconsin, Wisconsin Education Association Council, Wisconsin Association of Local Health Departments & Boards, Wisconsin Conservation Voters, Wisconsin Public Health Association, Wisconsin Democracy Campaign, The Nature Conservancy, Clean Wisconsin, and Wisconsin Farmers Union. For all of these reasons, WJI believes the answer to both ballot questions is "no."  The Wisconsin Constitution in the Capitol rotunda in Madison. Photograph by Margo Kirchner. By Margo Kirchner
Voters in the Aug. 13 partisan primary election will see two referendum questions on the ballot seeking approval of constitutional amendments. The proposed amendments relate to the governor’s spending of state and federal funds. One amendment would prohibit the Legislature from delegating its authority to control spending. The other would prohibit the governor from spending money received by the federal government without the Legislature’s approval or direction. Some general rules are helpful to keep in mind whenever you see constitutional amendment ballot questions, as there have been several recently with more to come (seven constitutional amendment questions just between April 2023 and November 2024). First, in a 2023 decision the Wisconsin Supreme Court gave the Legislature free rein to describe proposed amendments vaguely or misleadingly. Justice Brian Hagedorn wrote for the majority that the state constitution’s provision about amendment procedure “does not require any substantive discussion of the amendment in the ballot question submitted to the people. No explanation or summary is constitutionally commanded.” A ballot question would violate the constitution’s requirement that an amendment be submitted to the people for ratification “only in the rare circumstance that the question is fundamentally counterfactual such that voters were not asked to approve the actual amendment,” he said. In a concurring opinion, Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley wrote that the test boils down to “Did the ballot question contain clearly false information?” She said that the “constitutional purpose of a ballot question . . . is not to educate voters.” “Voters are trusted to inform themselves,” she wrote. (WJI published portions of the justices’ opinions in blog posts here, here, and here. Full disclosure: WJI brought the case at issue, arguing unsuccessfully that the April 2020 ballot question was invalid because voters were insufficiently informed and even misled by its wording.) As a result, voters must beware and must assess proposed amendments carefully. Voters need to know what the constitutional amendments are before they walk into the polls, because the questions themselves may be confusing or misleading. Second, know that constitutional amendment referendum questions are framed and worded for a “yes.” The Legislature has passed these provisions, and the legislators who passed them want you to approve them as well. The question may make you think that voting "yes" is common sense. But what do you think about the Legislature? Do you generally agree or disagree with what it does? Third, look for other reasons why a question is on the ballot. One big reason is an attempt to get around the governor when the Legislature and governor are not from the same party. When the governor and Legislature are in accord, statutes are easier to enact. When the parties differ, the governor can block legislation through veto. Constitutional amendments bypass the governor. What is passed by the Legislature goes to the people rather than to the governor. The governor has staff to vet and analyze proposed laws; the people do not. Today, Republicans in the Legislature may be using the constitutional amendment process to accomplish policy changes in a way that avoids or essentially overrides a veto by Democratic Gov. Tony Evers. But the same could be true if the parties were reversed. Another reason for an amendment ballot question may be an effort by the Legislature to draw voters to the polls in certain elections. By focusing on attention-grabbing issues, the proposed amendment may cause certain people to be sure to vote. So look for the reason for the constitutional amendment. Is there an actual problem being fixed? If the problem isn’t clear or as set forth makes you skeptical, maybe there isn’t a problem to be fixed at all. Fourth, consider whether the state constitution should be filled with provisions that exist better as statutes than in the legal document that is the very base for state law. Constitutions often set forth broad rights, principles, and policies, while statutes get into the finer details. When those finer details are in the state constitution they take longer to reverse if unforeseen problems arise or times change. Constitutional amendments must be approved with identical language by two consecutive Legislatures and then wait for an election. Nothing requires that constitutional amendments be approved by the Legislature only after a study of the long-term impacts or the difficulty of reversing course. The April 2024 amendments changing election law come to mind, as elections officials have recently grappled with whether ballot printing can be outsourced and who exactly can work at polling locations. Look for the next post on the two specific ballot questions voters statewide will see in the August election. Read part 2 here. "Evers' judges" is our effort to present information about Gov. Tony Evers' appointees to the bench. The information is taken from the appointees' own judgeship applications. Italics indicate direct quotes from the application. Typos, including punctuation errors, come from the original application even though we have not inserted “(sic)” after each one. WJI has left them as is.  Name: Peggy L. Miller
Appointed to: Marinette County Circuit Court Appointment date: March 21, 2024, effective July 31 2024 (term ending July 31, 2025) Education: Law School – Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin Undergraduate – Concordia University, Appleton, Wisconsin Associate – Northeast Wisconsin Technical College, Green Bay, Wisconsin High School – Ashwaubeon High, Green Bay, Wisconsin Recent legal employment: January 2019-present – Family Court commissioner/court commissioner/register in probate, Oconto County, Oconto, Wisconsin May 2015-August 2019 – Attorney, DiRenzo & Bomier, LLC, Neenah, Wisconsin January 2011-May 2015 – Attorney, Peterson, Berk & Cross, S.C., Appleton, Wisconsin October 2011-June 2015 – Paralegal Program chair, Globe University, closed January 1999-January 2011 – Attorney, Stellpflug Law, S.C. (now known as One Law Group, S.C.), Green Bay, Wisconsin Bar and administrative memberships: State Bar of Wisconsin U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin General character of practice: While in private practice I represented clients in the following areas: All aspects of family law, such as divorce, post divorce matters, legal separation, annulment and paternity matters. I served as Guardian ad Litem for children in placement disputes, and as Guardian ad Litem for adults in guardianship matters. I represented clients in small claims matters, including landlord/tenant disputes and money judgment claims. I was appointed by the Wisconsin Department of Justice to handle foreclosure mediation matters, and appointed by the Eastern District of Wisconsin to handle bankruptcy mediation. Additionally, I served as a private mediator at the request of attorneys to assist in settlement of contested divorce personal property matters. Describe typical clients: My typical client would be involved in a paternity, divorce or post judment family matter. I also represented the best interests of children and adults while serving as their Guardian ad Litem. I represented clients as litigants in small claims and restraining order matters. Number of cases tried to verdict: None List up to three significant trials, appeals, or other legal matters in which you participated as a judge or lawyer in the past seven years: As Family Court Commissioner of Oconto County, from March 8, 2019 to February 28, 2022, I heard four motion hearings, two contempt hearings, held four status conferences and presided over one placement trial involving the same parties. . . . (T)he Respondent was pro se. I had been informed before the very first hearing on March 8, 2019 that the Respondent is often difficult and had threatened one of our Judges. I was to never conduct a hearing without security present. Unfortunately, we were experiencing a security officer shortage and it was not possible for me to have security present at all times. The Guardian ad Litem made several complaints during the hearings about the Respondent's attitude toward her. I made it a point to treat the Respondent with respect throughout each hearing and trial, and expressed empathy with his difficulty to manuever through the legal process without counsel. 1 complimented Respondent on his respectful demeanor and ability to adequately represent himself during the hearings and trial. I made the most of opportunities to educate the Respondent on the legal process without providing legal advice. While extremely challenging at times, I believe my calm demeanor and respectful attitude with the pro se Respondent aided in the hearings being conducted without incident. The Respondent made a point of thanking me for treating him fairly, and informed me on several occasions that he and the opposing party were getting along better. The experiences with this Respondent are significant to me because it verified the way you treat a litigant can make a difference in how they view the judiciary, the legal process and the legal profession. A second significant trial occurred in 2020. As the Family Court Commissioner of Oconto County, I conducted a post judgment placement trial. The parties were both pro se . . . . The Mother had primary placement of the minor child for several years. The Father had infrequent contact with the child. The Mother felt it was unfair to award the Father any placement since he'd had little contact prior to the commencement of the legal matter. The Father had obtained stable employment and residence, and was now emotionally mature enough to understand the significance of being a parent. I awarded a graduated placement schedule to the Father. I was able to develop a placement schedule that increased Father's time at a pace that allowed the Mother to ease into the idea of no longer being the only responsible parent for the child. At the same time I was able to recognize the Father's signficiant emotional and financial strides toward becoming a responsible parent, while at the same time considering the best interests of the child. A few months after the trial, the Mother thanked me and informed me that the new placement schedule was going well. The Mother's comments made this case significant to me because it confirmed my belief that making it known you are addressing everyone's concerns while delivering a decision can make a difference to the parties acceptance of and compliance with the decision. Experience in adversary proceedings before administrative bodies: I represented a litigant in one adversary proceeding before a Department of Natural Resources Administrative Law Judge. My client was losing part of his shoreline to erosion which made ingress and egress to his property unsafe. After consultation with a local DNR Agent, my client planted specific and approved plants on the shoreline. There were complaints by boaters on the lake regarding the ugliness or the client's plantings. The DNR Agent ordered my client to remove the plantings. The client refused, A citation was issued and we went to trial. After a full day trial, the Administrative Law Judge ruled in my client's favor. Describe your non-litigation experience (e.g., arbitration, mediation). While in private practice, I handled child custody/placement mediation for Kewaunee County for several years. I handled many small claims mediation matters for Winnebago County. I was appointed by the Wisconsin Department of Justice to perform foreclosure mediation in nine northern Wisconsin counties when the homeowner requested mediation. I was also appointed by the State of Wisconsin, Eastern District to perform mediation in bankruptcy cases when requested by a filing party. Finally, I have acted as a private mediator in divorce actions regarding division of personal property, when requested by attorneys. Position or involvement in judicial, non-partisan, or partisan political campaign, committee, or organization: None Previous runs for public office: n/a All judicial or non-partisan candidates endorsed in the last ten years: None Professional or civic and charitable organizations: From 1/2001 until 12/2018 I represented parties in pro bono divorce actions for both Brown County and Winnebago County. As I completed each case I would accept a new case. I completed and filed necessary paperwork to establish a non-profit organization for Green Bay Elite. This is an all-star cheerleading competition organization that did various fund raising events to alleviate the cost of uniforms, cheerleading competition fees and travel expenses. Significant pro bono legal work or volunteer service: Planning and Public Advisory Committee, member, March 2023-present OLR, Special Preliminary Review Committee, member, January 2022-present Family Court Commissioner Association, treasurer, January 2023-present Family Law Section Board, board member, January 2012-December 2020 State Bar Board of Governors, board member, January 2002-December 2006 CLE Committee, member, January 2002-December 2006 YWCA of Greater Green Bay, board member, September 2001-August 2005 Quotes: Why I want to be a judge: I want to serve the people of Wisconsin as a Judge because I want to make a difference in the way the general public views the court system and the judiciary. I want to show litigants that the Judge can treat them with respect and express empathy, even while making a difficult decision. Serving as Judge of any County is a privilege that must be taken seriously. This is a privilege I want to extend beyond the bench with community involvement. Speaking and volunteering within the community I serve, as allowable by the judicial ethical rules. It is my belief that the more the public has access to the court system and the judiciary, the better the public will understand, have confidence in, and respect the legal profession as a whole. Describe which case in the past 25 years by the Wisconsin Supreme Court or U.S. Supreme Court you believe had a significant positive or negative impact on the people of Wisconsin. Obergefill v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) U.S. Supreme Court decision which made same-sex marriage allowable in all states was, in my view, one of the most significant positive decisions made affecting the entire country. This is a positive stride in recognizing human equality, no matter race, religion, or sexual orientation. Not only did this case allow people of the same sex to legally marry, but it began a flood of cases to extend the rights beyond just marriage. It remains to be seen how many changes the Obergefill decision will cause, but further antidiscrimination protections are likely. This case is a definite win for diversity. Two or three judges whom I admire and why: I admire former Justice Shirley Abrahamson as the first female to be appointed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. I had the pleasure of meeting her in person during a State Bar event. She was kind, responsive and very unpretentious. She served a long and distinguished career. But, beyond her legal career she was a wonderful and engaging speaker on many topics. I consider myself lucky to have heard her speak on numerous occasions, as well as having met her in person. Her inception of the Court with Class program for high school students was, in my opinion, an amazing way to get a new generation involved and interested in the legal system. I knew Judge Marc A. Hammer prior to my attending law school. During law school I began working for Marc Hammer as a law clerk. Immediately upon graduation, I was hired by the same law firm and was lucky to call Marc Hammer my mentor and friend. Marc was a wonderful teacher. He exhibits compassion, kindness, patience and an amazing ability to think on his feet. I will forever be grateful to the tutelage I received from Judge Marc Hammer who continues to be my friend. The proper role of a judge: I would describe the proper role of a Judge to be a person with better than average oral writing and analytical skills. A person who can apply the law with strength and compassion. A person who strives to stop personal, societal and political bias from entering a decision. A person who joins the community he/she serves for the good of the legal profession and the public. By Alexandria Staubach An employer wants him, he has the skills to do the job, and he passed the required courses and test required for a mortgage-lending-originator license. Yet he is barred from obtaining that license—and related employment and career—because of felony convictions for conduct unrelated to the financial industry or matters of trust. “Collateral consequences” are the various restrictions that affect people convicted of crime even after they have served their sentences. Such restrictions can impact access to employment, licensing, and housing, and myriad other things. They may not directly relate to the crime of conviction, and they can apply without consideration of the person’s rehabilitation or risk. The struggle to find employment after a felony conviction is well documented and studied. A September 2023 report conducted by the Internal Revenue Service states “that (criminal) records may be preventing about one third of working-age males from contributing to the formal economy.” The same study found negative effects on employment prospects “even in cases where charges did not lead to convictions.” WJI recently sat down with a formerly incarcerated person who is putting in serious work to obtain gainful employment, to discuss the roadblocks he has faced in a system that just won’t get out of his way.  Stuart Parker Arthur Stuart Parker Arthur, 26, grew up in south central Wisconsin. When he was in his late teens, he relocated to Missouri to work for his biological father in his business.
Shortly after Arthur arrived, he threw a large party. Arthur was young. The police came. The police found drugs. The police found a gun. According to Arthur, the drugs were trace quantities of cocaine and the gun was disassembled. Missouri court records indicate that on Jan. 26, 2019, Arthur was charged with possession of a controlled substance other than marijuana, a Class D felony, and unlawful use of a weapon, a Class E felony. Missouri felonies are graded on an A-E scale, with Class E felonies carrying the least significant penalties. Arthur told WJI he felt his best option was to take a plea deal that avoided a prison sentence because his then-fiancée was pregnant with their first child. Court records indicate that Arthur pleaded guilty to the two charges on July 25, 2019, and received a suspended sentence, meaning the charges would ultimately be dismissed if he successfully completed five years of supervised probation. Arthur told WJI that his fiancée suffered from a drug addiction and in the winter of 2020, after the birth of their child, she overdosed in a hotel room on a combination of drugs including fentanyl and heroin. “It happens a lot more than people think,” said Arthur. Arthur said he went to the hotel room with his infant child and met with police. The overdose was fatal. Initially, Arthur was not charged with any crime. Court records do not reflect any probation violations, either. Six months later, on June 27, 2020, Arthur was charged with endangering the welfare of a child involving drugs, as a result of bringing his child to the scene of his fiancée’s drug overdose. “I had completed drug rehabilitation” pursuant to his supervised probation, said Arthur. “I voluntarily went to inpatient treatment to deal with potential relapse from the grief,” he told WJI. Consistent with the new charges, court records of July 15, 2020, reflect the first violation of probation filed in his original case. Nearly two years later, on May 2, 2022, Arthur pleaded guilty to the child endangerment charge, again feeling the pressure of having a child on the way and hoping to avoid a lengthy prison sentence. On the new charges, Arthur was sentenced to 120 days of inpatient treatment while incarcerated and two years of supervised probation that included random blood, breath, and urine testing, despite any indication that ongoing drug use was an issue. Court records reflect no subsequent probation violations, and he was discharged from probation on the child endangerment charge as of May 28, 2024. However, as a result of the second offense, his earlier drug and gun possession suspended sentence was revoked and a new sentence was imposed. He served 120 days of additional incarceration and was sentenced to another five years of supervised probation. Supervision on the drug and firearm case will terminate in August 2027, though they could terminate as early as winter of 2025 with time credits for good behavior, said Arthur. Arthur told WJI he has otherwise met the obligations of his sentence. Following release, Arthur relocated to Wisconsin, where his mother lives. Among other stipulations, Arthur was required to obtain housing and employment. He initially found work as a car salesman. But he was unable to find housing (look for part 2 on the housing issue). Because he could not find housing, Arthur reached out to a mortgage lender with the hope of eventually purchasing a home. In the process, he discovered he was good at deciphering what he needed to qualify and what rates and programs would be available to him. “I had done my homework,” Arthur said. Sue Foley, Arthur’s mortgage lender, also thought he had a knack for the work. She remains “impressed by his efforts to turn his life around.” “His credit score is in the 700’s, he owns a home” Foley told WJI. Foley encouraged Arthur to come work for her at Nations Lending, even though they had never hired anyone with a felony conviction. She believed he could be licensed in Wisconsin if they could get him through her company and its attorneys. In Wisconsin, the license for a mortgage loan originator is obtained through the Department of Financial Institutions (DFI). According to the Nationwide Multistate Licensing System (NMLS), the license is required of anyone who takes or negotiates the terms of a residential mortgage loan. According to NMLS, the license requires completion of 20 hours of precertification training and passage of a test. Wisconsin law further requires that "(a)n applicant shall not have been convicted of, or pled guilty or no contest to, a felony in a domestic, foreign, or military court during the 7-year period preceding the date of the application or, for a felony involving an act of fraud, dishonesty, breach of trust, or money laundering, at any time preceding the date of the application. This paragraph does not apply with respect to any conviction for which the applicant has received a pardon." However, the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act (WFEA) prohibits discrimination against individuals and “certain licensed activities” on 14 protected traits, including records of arrest or conviction. Storm Larson, a Madison based employment attorney, wrote in an article in Wisconsin Lawyer that employers and licensors have “leeway to consider an employee’s record of conviction” and “the general rule is that conviction records cannot be considered in making an employment decision unless ‘the circumstances of the [the conviction] substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job or licensed activity’” (emphasis in original). The Wisconsin Supreme Court in a 2022 decision muddied the waters and caused employer and licensors to deploy a “fact-intensive inquiry into the circumstances of the job and conviction itself,” wrote Larson. Now, “the supreme court specifically notes that the length of time between the conviction and the application for employment can be relevant to determining the likelihood of recidivism,” he wrote. Previously that was not a factor. Despite the law and the costs, Arthur completed the necessary course work and testing to obtain his license. He applied at Nations Lending and was hired by the firm. When Arthur submitted his license application to DFI, Nations Landing backed him. Arthur supplied additional letters of support from his employers at two car dealerships. Foley told WJI that Arthur even obtained a letter of support from the warden of the Missouri prison where he had been incarcerated. Nevertheless, DFI rejected Arthur’s license application because of his felony convictions. DFI wrote that its legal staff had reviewed case law about the WFEA and that the law governing licensure for mortgage loan originators “does not give the Division discretion to consider those facts and circumstances, unless the crimes have been expunged or pardoned or are older than seven years.” “(E)ven if the Division could consider those facts and circumstances for these offenses, it would not find licensure appropriate at this point given the recency of the offenses. Your subsequent life changes are more consistent with holding a position of financial trust, but establishing a longer post-offense track record is required to provide adequate assurance that the applicant meets the requirements for licensure,” DFI wrote. Arthur attempted to dispute DFI’s decision, but there is no formal appeal process under Wisconsin law. Ultimately, on May 29, 2024, Arthur withdrew his application so it would not later show up as a denial. “They’re making me give up a job that that I am good at, a job that could give me a better life,” Arthur told WJI. “There are people who want something better when they get out of prison,” said Foley. “We shouldn’t throw away the baby with the bath water.” WJI reached out to DFI and spoke with the agency’s Chief Legal Counsel, Matthew Lynch. Lynch said DFI has no official position and that the agency cannot comment on specific cases. Lynch acknowledged the tension between state licensing requirements and WFEA. Lynch told WJI that in his analysis, federal law drove Wisconsin’s adoption of the statue governing mortgage lending and sets minimum requirements, including the provision requiring seven years between conviction and licensure. According to Lynch, states that run afoul of the federal standards would be subject to federal intervention and control over licensing in the area. Lynch said the “agency would be happy to take another direction but it would likely run afoul of federal law.” Lynch further told WJI that his analysis of the legislative intent behind the mortgage lender licensing statue also drives their decision making. In 2013 the Legislature added language to the mortgage licensing statue that permits them to use the discretion described in WFEA for convictions that have been expunged or pardoned, Lynch said. The 2013 addition “can’t make sense” if the agency had the ability to use the mitigation factors under WFEA in every case, he said. "Evers' judges" is our effort to present information about Gov. Tony Evers' appointees to the bench. The information is taken from the appointees' own judgeship applications. Italics indicate direct quotes from the application. Typos, including punctuation errors, come from the original application even though we have not inserted “(sic)” after each one. WJI has left them as is.  Name: Jane E. Bucher
Appointed to: Green County Circuit Court Appointment date: March 15, 2024, effective April 5, 2024 (term ending July 31, 2025) Education: Law School – University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin Undergraduate – New College of Florida, Sarasota, Florida High School – Burlington High, Burlington, Wisconsin Recent legal employment: August 2021-present – Senior associate, Russell Law Offices, S.C., Shullsburg, Wisconsin August 2011-August 2021 – Assistant state public defender, Wisconsin State Public Defender, Madison, Wisconsin June 2011-August 2011 – Associate, Kittelsen Law Firm, Monroe, Wisconsin Bar and administrative memberships: State Bar of Wisconsin General character of practice: Currently I practice approximately 40% Criminal Law, 40% Family Law and 20% a mix of forfeiture, traffic, injunction, CHIPS and guardianship cases. I also do some Guardian ad Litem work and I take some court-appointed criminal cases. Prior to entering private practice, I was a public defender for nearly 10 years. Describe typical clients: Currently I represent working class clients who live in rural Wisconsin and need help with divorce, child custody and placement, criminal cases, or traffic cases. Prior to entering private practice, I served as an Assistant State Public Defender, representing indigent criminal defendants as well as youth, individuals with developmental disabilities, individuals suffering from active mental illness, children who were the victims of abuse, and individuals committed pursuant to ch. 980. Number of cases tried to verdict: I've tried seven to a jury (some with co-counsel); dozens to the court List up to three significant trials, appeals, or other legal matters in which you participated as a judge or lawyer in the past seven years: In December 2017 (I cannot find the exact date) in Green County Wisconsin, before Judge Thomas Vale, I tried a Petition for Discharge in a Ch. 980 case to the court. Opposing counsel was Devra Ayala of WI DOJ. My client had been committed pursuant to the ch. 980 law for approximately 20 years after serving his prison sentence. The case required careful and thorough attention to a large volume of records dating back to the original trial on the underlying charge. Additionally, the case required a thorough understanding of the actuarial science used to predict a sex offender's likelihood to re-offend. There were multiple expert witnesses involved and the trial lasted for two days. I had previously litigated, with co-counsel and unsuccessfully, a Petition for Discharge for the same individual in 2014 before a jury. The second time around, there were new developments in the science that assisted the defense. The client was released just prior to the holidays. He had been incarcerated since before cell phones or internet access were commonplace. This case was significant in my career because it was, originally, my first jury trial as a public defender and it involved a very steep learning curve regarding the actuarial science. The second time around, it involved becoming up-to-date on the latest developments in the science. Additionally, the outcome for the client was significant as he was able to go home to his family after having been incarcerated indefinitely. On May 28, 2019 I litigated a one day OWI 5th jury trial in front of then-judge Judge Karofsky in Lafayette County. The prosecutor was DA Jenna Gill. The case involved an automobile accident and the defendant was found on the side of the road some time after the accident. The outcome was a hung jury. Prior to the jury trial I had also litigated a suppression motion. This case was significant as the effect of the hung jury ultimately resulted in a negotiated non-prison resolution for my client who was able to get treatment in the community and has since successfully completed probation, is a productive member of society and continues to be in recovery. On March 14-15, 2019 I litigated a two day criminal jury trial involving charges of Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, and Misappropriation of ID. The judge was Judge Duane Jorgenson and the prosecutor was DA Jenna Gill. My client was pregnant at the time of the trial. We lost, bail was revoked and my client went to jail until her sentencing hearing. We proceeded to an argued sentencing hearing where the State asked for prison. My client had young children at home in addition to being pregnant. I successfully argued for probation with conditional jail time and the option for my client to have some of her conditional jail time stayed if she were to complete an ARC program for expectant mothers where she was able to keep her baby with her and also have her other young children visit her. This case was significant as it involved a young mother of color who had two young children at home at the time. Despite having fought hard and lost the trial, I was able to obtain a just outcome for her, one that allowed her see her children and have her baby with her. She successfully completed probation in 2023. Experience in adversary proceedings before administrative bodies: I have represented approximately 100 individuals in revocation of probation and revocation of extended supervision cases. I have represented a handful of individuals in administrative appeals of their revocation decisions. I also represented an individual in an Unemployment Appeal hearing. Describe your non-litigation experience (e.g., arbitration, mediation). I have participated in formal and informal mediations in divorce proceedings as well as in a small claims case. Position or involvement in judicial, non-partisan, or partisan political campaign, committee, or organization: I have knocked doors for Democractic candidates over the years. I do not recall each specific candidate or specific dates. I do recall volunteering for the Obama campaign in 2008 and for the Clinton campaign in 2016, however, there were others as well. Previous runs for public office: Green County Judge Branch 1, won primary February 2021 with 40% of vote; lost general election April 2021 with 48%. All judicial or non-partisan candidates endorsed in the last ten years: None listed Professional or civic and charitable organizations: State Bar of Wisconsin, president-elect, June 2023-present State Bar of Wisconsin, governor, District 12, served on Policy Committee, June 2018-June 2022 Green County Bar Association, member, 2014-present; president, 2015 Family Promise of Green County, board member, 2021-2023 MultiCultural Outreach Program, co-chair and founding member, approximately 2018-2021 Green County Big Brothers Big Sisters, volunteer, 2018-2021 Green County CJCC, member, 2017-2021 Significant pro bono legal work or volunteer service: Pro Bono Service: Generally speaking, while at the Public Defender's Office, I was required to request permission to take on extra legal work while serving as an Assistant State Public Defender. I usually reserved these permissions for “ancillary representation.” For example on a couple of occasions, I represented my criminal clients in injunction proceedings if those proceedings were related to their criminal case. Additionally, on two occasions, I had clients who were at risk of losing their liberty for failing to pay child support for a child that was not biologically their child. One of these such cases involved a client who had been extradited from another state on felony non-support charges. In each of these cases, I moved to re-open the underlying paternity judgment as a means of achieving dismissals in the other proceedings. Additionally, I volunteered at an Expungement Clinic in 2019. Although my volunteer work is not strictly considered Pro Bono, it did serve to address improving the justice system or reducing disparate impacts of the justice system. For example, I served on a Green County Latino Advisory Committee that discussed various legal issues facing undocumented individuals, including the inability to obtain drivers licenses. I also served on two statewide subcommittees both aimed at improving the justice system for children and youth: The Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention Board Chapter 48 subcommittee and the Youth Justice Statewide Assessment Implementation Policy and Document Development Subcommittee through DCF. Since entering private practice, I have served the community by accepting GAL appointments and Dean appointments. Volunteer Service: From 2002 to 2006 I volunteered at Cambridge Family and Children's Service as a mentor for a child who had recently emigrated from Liberia. From July 2005- January 2006 I volunteered at the Living Center of Boston serving meals to individuals living with HIV/AIDS. From 2006 to 2008 I was a Peace Corps Volunteer in Senegal where I spoke primarily in French and in Pulaar, a local indigenous language. While in Law School I volunteered at the YWCA providing drop in child care to unhoused women and at the Canopy Center providing drop in child care for parents attending therapy sessions. From 2018-2021 I was a Big Sister for the Big Brother Big Sisters program in Green County. From 2021-2023 I was a volunteer board member for Green County Family Promise, a non-profit that serves unhoused families and children. From 2017 to 2021 I served as a volunteer for the MultiCultural Outreach Program and was co-chair for some of that time. We organized events that offered some legal information, including "Know Your Rights" events as well as cultural education events. Quotes: Why I want to be a judge: My desire to serve the people of Wisconsin as a judge is rooted in my commitment to making the criminal justice system more just and equitable, improving access to justice, and my belief that good judges can have an incredibly positive effect within the criminal justice system and throughout the broader community. Over the course of my life and career, I have seen the power of the law to right wrongs as well as to enshrine disparity. I have witnessed how misunderstandings about the fundamental pillars of America’s system of justice can tear at the social fabric of our communities and erode understanding about our courts. I have practiced in front of outstanding judges whose example I keep in mind every day. Unfortunately, I have also practiced in front of judges whose temperament, ability to apply the law fairly, and respect for the people before them is sorely lacking. Let me provide a couple of the experiences that have helped form my approach and beliefs. As a Peace Corps volunteer, I taught health education in a village in Senegal with no running water and no electricity. The well would frequently run dry and it was a great deal of work to get water each day. For members of the village, bringing running water to their homes was a major goal. As we explored that goal, it became clear to me that a lack of water was a health problem and it was also a legal problem. That is when I realized that the law was for me. As a public defender and now as an attorney in private practice, I have seen firsthand that Judges have the power to engender resilience in victims and in young offenders. Many of the youth I represented in delinquency proceedings as a public defender were intimidated by the court process and tended to view the whole world as against them. The manner in which they were treated by the presiding judge often had a huge impact on their view of the role of the law in their life. If they were treated fairly, they tended to engage with the process and view the court proceedings as an opportunity to show the court what they were capable of accomplishing. In private practice, I have represented domestic violence victims in restraining order proceedings. In these cases, I have seen how a judge’s ability to create a safe and controlled courtroom can assist individuals in summoning the strength to proceed with a difficult and potentially traumatizing process. Judges are the face of justice in their local communities. They are, de facto, the leaders in the legal community. As a judge, I want to serve the people of Green County and the legal profession in the same ways I have tried to serve in all facets of my life and career: with humility, compassion, an appreciation for diversity, and a deep and abiding belief that we can make the world a better place. Describe which case in the past 25 years by the Wisconsin Supreme Court or U.S. Supreme Court you believe had a significant positive or negative impact on the people of Wisconsin. Obergefell v. Hodges has had a significant positive impact on the people of Wisconsin, and the nation, and will continue to do so for generations to come. The magnitude of the decision cannot be overstated and the benefits are manifold. First, the decision ended the exclusion of same sex couples from one of the most basic legal statuses in the United States. Second, the decision served as a culmination of other gay rights decisions such as Lawrence v. Texas that slowly began to correct the many, and decades-long, state sanctioned harms against LGBTQ individuals. Third, it strengthened the legal bonds within countless families by creating pathways for the recognition of legal rights between children and their non-biological parent. Obergefell also provides same sex couples rightful access to a host of other benefits that derive from marriage, including immigration benefits, inheritance rights, and the right to visit a loved one in the hospital. In addition to the significant good for society in general, I have seen firsthand the positive effects of this decision on individual lives. Over the course of my career, I have represented many LGBTQ youth and have seen how rejection by family members or being alienated from their peers can lead to justice system involvement. There has been steady improvement in the acceptance and representation of the LGBTQ community in the rural areas in which I work. If young people who are concerned about coming out are able to see images of, and reporting about, LGBTQ people getting married, they are more likely to feel accepted in their communities and less likely to suffer from fear or isolation. In Green County just last year the County Board ratified PRIDE week and we have a PRIDE parade as well. All of these positive changes are due, in part, to a landmark Supreme Court decision which, at its heart, asserts what we know is true: a person has a right to love whomever they love. Two or three judges whom I admire and why: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Shirley Abrahamson, and Judge Margaret Koehler. Justice Ginsburg: I cannot think of a justice who served as a greater exemplar of justice and equality. The decision that she penned in United States v. Virginia was groundbreaking. I can only imagine that decision was informed by her own experience as a trailblazing female lawyer. Additionally, her work ethic and her collegial relationships with ideologically diverse justices are also a source of inspiration. Justice Shirley Abrahamson. I admire Justice Abrahamson for her leadership of the Wisconsin Supreme Court as well as for her work ethic, intellect, innovative work to take the courts to the people, and for her steadfast commitment to maintaining the decorum of the court through turbulent times. I also appreciate her allegiance to the idea that states have the ability to grant rights over and above those granted by the federal constitution, which is obviously very significant given the curtailing of certain rights by the United States Supreme Court. Judge Margaret Koehler: Closer to home, in the counties in which I practice, I have had the opportunity to appear in front of some of the first female judges to take the bench. When I see photographs from bar association meetings just 30 years ago, some of these women, such as Judge Koehler, are among the only women in the photo. It reminds me of the scores of Wisconsin women attorneys who paved the way for myself and other female attorneys. I also think of Judge Koehler in terms of her exemplary work as a judge in a rural county. In one or two judge counties, judges are visible and well-known figures in the community. They work more closely than judges in larger counties with the county board and the clerk of courts on policy and budget items. Judge Koehler was in tune with the local community and ran an efficient and organized court. One further note: Having spent the majority of my legal career as a public defender for the state of Wisconsin, I am in awe of Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson who brings to the bench her experience representing indigent individuals while also achieving the milestone of being the first black woman justice. The proper role of a judge: Judges must be impartial and fair. Their role is more complex than serving as “umpires” who simply call balls and strikes. Judges are called on to interpret the law. They must show respect and compassion for individuals on all sides of a case. They must be mindful of the challenges in our criminal justice system and intentional in being a part of efforts to improve the system. In addition, Judges have specific roles depending on the case or scenario in front of them. In criminal trial settings, a judge decides what evidence comes in and what evidence stays out and instructs the jury on the law. Judges are also charged with protecting witnesses and victims and ensuring that defendants get a fair trial before an unbiased jury. In court trials, judges must make factual findings and apply the law to those factual findings. They must weigh the credibility of the witnesses, assess any bias a witness may have and determine who to believe regarding a particular issue, and then apply the correct burden of proof. To my earlier point about the complexity inherent in being a judge, there are many situations where a judge must exercise her discretion and where her role is nuanced. Judges often have to balance conflicting interests. In treatment courts, a judge must participate in a collaborative decision-making process with an interdisciplinary team, engaging participants with motivational interviewing, and administering incentives and sanctions. In cases involving children and youth, the role of the judge includes ensuring that the administration of justice is trauma-informed because so many of the youth who come before the court are likely to have experienced adverse childhood experiences. Since 1848, judges in Wisconsin have been elected to the role. If appointed, I am ready and eager to run a proactive, well-resourced and winning campaign that will reach voters throughout Green County. Finally, as I observed elsewhere in the application, a judge is the face of justice in her community. Judges must be active, visible, and engaged in the broader community. Judges have a significant role to play in efforts to help inform the public about how Wisconsin courts work and how they are being, and can be, improved. Equal justice under the law is, and perhaps always will be, aspirational. The ultimate role of a judge is to do all she can, in all the ways she can, to root out inappropriate biases in order to move our courts closer to achieving that goal every single day. By Alexandria Staubach
For the past decade, one individual has screened all judicial complaints in Wisconsin. He is equipped with unilateral authority to determine what complaints merit further investigation. Whether initiated by a litigant, member of the press, or other interested party, a complaint about a judge goes to the Wisconsin Judicial Commission as an “initial inquiry.” According to the commission’s most recent annual report, in 2023, there were 644 reports of judicial misconduct or disability. Most of these inquiries were resolved solely by the commission’s staff, which includes the commission’s executive director and a paralegal. Attorney Jeremiah C. Van Hecke has served as executive director since 2013. “Commission staff reviews all allegations against judicial officials to determine whether they are within the jurisdiction of the Commission and are not patently frivolous or unfounded. Allegations that do not meet these criteria may be administratively dismissed by the Commission’s Executive Director with an appropriate referral, when possible,” says the 2023 report. Of the 644 initial inquiries in 2023, all but 42 resulted in dismissal by staff. Wisconsin law does not provide a mechanism for appeal of such dismissals. According to the 2023 report, “a sample” of the dismissed inquiries are reviewed by the commission’s screening committee. In an email, Van Hecke verified to WJI that “there is not an appeals process regarding the dismissal of an initial inquiry made to the Commission,” and “(o)nce a year, the Commission's chair appoints Commission members to the Screening Committee, which reviews a random sample of decisions made by Commission staff regarding initial inquiries for appropriateness and consistency.” According to Van Hecke, “initial inquiries include, but are not limited to, complaints of judicial misconduct filed with the Commission. They could also include initial substantive contacts that do not result in the actual filing of a complaint." He added that “(t)o the extent that initial inquiries amount to a complaint against a judicial official,” dismissal decisions regarding those inquiries are primarily made” by him as executive director, though on occasion some are addressed by the Screening Committee. All Wisconsin judges, from the Supreme Court to former judges who serve in a reserve capacity and municipal judges, are subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct. Since 1978, the commission has existed as an independent agency within the judicial branch to oversee adherence to that code. Court commissioners also came under the commission’s jurisdiction in 1992. The Judicial Commission consists of nine members: one circuit court judge, one court of appeals judge, and two attorneys, all appointed by the Supreme Court, plus five nonlawyer members nominated by the governor and appointed with the Senate’s consent. Initial inquiries are confidential by law unless the judge who is the subject of a complaint waives confidentiality. Under Wisconsin law, if an individual or entity “breached the confidentiality of the investigation, the commission may dismiss the allegation, admonish the person or take other action.” Last year, former state courts’ director Randy Koschnick made national headlines after going public with a complaint he filed against four Wisconsin Supreme Court justices, including then-newly elected Justice Janet Protasiewicz, related to his firing. Three of the justices wrote a letter to the commission accusing Koschnick of a publicity stunt and criticized the commission for failing to admonish Koschnick for going public. So what happens to initial inquires that survive Van Hecke’s screening? The commission opens an investigation and requests more information from the judge or others. The executive director then prepares a report for the commission to consider. The complaint can be dismissed at that point, too, based on what the inquiry shows, whether the complaint involves a disappointed litigant questioning the merits of a judge's decision, whether the allegation involves a single and minor violation, or whether the judicial official has already taken corrective action or no longer holds office. Of the 42 cases that survived Van Hecke’s screening in 2023, 33 were dismissed after preliminary investigation. If the commission decides the matter should continue after preliminary investigation, the judge is notified and permitted to respond. The commission may then dismiss the complaint or initiate a public disciplinary action in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. In the public disciplinary action the commission presents its case to a three-judge panel (including at least two appeals court judges), and the panel reports its conclusions and recommendations to the Supreme Court for final decision. Since 1978, only 34 complaints have resulted in public disciplinary cases. Just two public disciplinary cases have occurred in the last five years. Prior to his appointment as Judicial Commission executive director in 2013, Van Hecke was a Milwaukee County assistant district attorney. By Alexandria Staubach
Today the Milwaukee Common Council voted to effectively suspend during the Republican National Convention local requirements that typically govern private security personnel. A substitute ordinance “deems security personnel who hold a private security permit or license, a private detective permit or license, or a reasonably similar credential issued by any United States state, territory, or municipality as in compliance with the provisions of the Milwaukee Security Personnel License ordinance.” The substitute ordinance modifies requirements that have been on the books only since March 2024, when the Common Council voted to require security personnel to obtain a license and execute a bond agreement. Under the March rules, to obtain a license an applicant must not:
Private security firms have proliferated in the United States recently. There are “roughly twice as many security guards employed in the U.S. than there were 20 years ago,” according to an investigation by TIME. In 2021, Allied Universal, an international security company, was the third largest employer in the United States behind Walmart and Amazon. The industry is largely unregulated. Variation from state to state is near limitless. No national body governs private security, and 21 states have no training requirements for private security personnel who are unarmed, says a 2021 report from the National Association of Security Companies. In Wisconsin, unarmed private security personnel are not required to complete a mandated number of training hours, while armed private security personnel are required to complete 36 hours of training. Meanwhile, the District of Columbia requires 98 hours of training for armed private security personnel, New Hampshire requires 4 hours, and Kansas requires none. Per today's new temporary ordinance in Milwaukee, accepting “reasonably similar credentials” from any state or any municipality is necessary because “convention organizers estimate that as many as 1,000 private security personnel may be present,” and if each were required to be locally licensed, the volume of applications would “hamper the License Division’s ability to perform its regular business.” The new ordinance does not identify how credentials will be verified for out-of-state private security personnel or what “reasonably similar” means. The substitute ordinance will be in effect from July 13-20 “or as further required for the completion of the Republican National Committee’s presidential nominating process.” |
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