Milwaukee Municipal Court set to record every hearing following contempt finding earlier this month8/27/2025 By Alexandria Staubach
Monday, Milwaukee Municipal Court filed an affidavit affirming MMC will record all hearings moving forward. The move follows Milwaukee Circuit Court Judge David L. Borowski’s contempt finding earlier this month. In his contempt finding, Borowski threatened to sanction MMC $1,000 per day if it failed to implement a policy for recording all hearings by Aug. 25. The affidavit, signed by MMC’s Chief Court Administrator Tea Norfolk, says Norfolk “personally conducted training with all municipal court clerks wherein they were instructed to record every hearing before the City of Milwaukee Municipal Court regardless of type of hearing and with no exceptions.” The affidavit “complies with and upholds the law,” Norfolk told WJI in an email. “Many other municipal courts in Wisconsin already voluntarily record all hearings,” attorney Susan Lund told WJI. Lund, who represents the petitioner in the lawsuit underlying Borowski’s contempt finding also told WJI that “recording all hearings is best practice for ensuring there is an appropriate record for appeal.” Nearly nine months ago, Borowski ordered MMC to develop a policy for recording certain hearings, especially those in which a defendant’s indigency is in question. Despite the December 2024 order, between May 5 and May 19 MMC failed to record more than half of 54 hearings where indigency was relevant, which has tangible consequences for Lund’s clients. “In Milwaukee Municipal Court, missing a due date often results in the judge automatically imposing a driver’s license suspension or warrant,” Lund told WJI. Lund wants municipal court defendants to know that municipal court judges must give defendants options to prevent or resolve warrants and driver’s license suspensions when an inability to pay is caused by poverty. If a municipal court defendant requests that a presiding judge reopen their case and grant an affordable payment plan or community service in lieu of payment because that defendant is unable to pay due to poverty, it creates an appealable decision, according to Lund. A record of that determination is essential to any appeal. “We hope this development means that Milwaukee Municipal Court defendants will find it easier to appeal determinations about ability to pay and decisions on motions to reopen going forward,” said Lund. The new policy takes effect just as MMC is set to sunset its Municipal Court Alternatives Program. “Next week, for the first time in over 40 years, there will be no formal programming provided by Milwaukee Municipal Court to help defendants resolve warrants caused by poverty, mental health conditions, homelessness, and substance use,” said Lund, who also cautioned, “It's more important than ever that defendants know their rights.” WJI reached out to Milwaukee City Attorney Evan Goyke, whose office represented MMC throughout litigation, as well as the five alderpersons on the Common Council’s Judiciary & Legislation Committee for comment. None responded prior to this post.
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 Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The rule for this is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision. The “upshot” and “background” sections do not count as part of the 10 paragraphs because of their summary and necessary nature. We’ve also removed citations from the opinion for ease of reading but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. Italics indicate WJI insertions except for case names, which are also italicized.
The case: State of Wisconsin v. Jobert L. Molde Majority: Justice Brian J. Hagedorn delivered the unanimous opinion of the court (10 pages) Concurrence: Justice Jill J. Karofsky (5 pages) The Upshot Under the Haseltine rule, witnesses may not testify that they think another witness is telling the truth. Vouching for the credibility of another witness is impermissible under the rules of evidence because it invades the province of the trier of fact—here, the jury. The question in this case is whether an expert witness violated the Haseltine rule when she testified that only around one percent of child sexual assault disclosures are false, but did not offer an opinion on whether the victim in this case was telling the truth. We conclude she did not. We hold that statistical evidence alone on the likelihood of false reports does not violate the Haseltine rule. The defendant here alleges his counsel was constitutionally deficient for not raising a Haseltine objection to this testimony. Because such an objection would have failed, the defendant’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel fails as well. Background The issues in this case arose following allegations that, sometime between January 2011 and January 2012, Lauren was sexually assaulted by her father, Jobert Molde. This came to light in 2017 when Lauren—now age thirteen—attempted suicide. After Lauren’s claims were investigated, Molde was charged with one count of first-degree sexual assault of a child who had not attained the age of twelve and one count of incest with a child. The crucial evidence against Molde was Lauren’s in-court testimony recounting the assault and a recording of her forensic interview. The circuit court granted the State’s motion to have the nurse practitioner who conducted the forensic interview testify as an expert at trial. However, she was unavailable, and the circuit court permitted Dr. Alice Swenson—a licensed child abuse pediatrician who supervised Lauren’s forensic interview and examination—to testify instead. The record is unclear about what her supervision entailed other than it was in real time; but Dr. Swenson did not personally conduct an evaluation of Lauren. Dr. Swenson testified about her background and work as a licensed child abuse pediatrician, how child forensic interviews tend to proceed, what sort of evidence they look for in a physical forensic exam, background about how children’s memories work, Lauren’s admission to the hospital, and the possibility of intercourse between an adult and child. She did not testify about Lauren’s truthfulness or how likely it is that Lauren was telling the truth during the interview. After Dr. Swenson’s testimony, one juror submitted two questions, which the circuit court previously instructed was permissible. Following a sidebar, Molde’s counsel did not object to the questions being read to the witness: THE COURT: Doctor, it says how frequent is it for children to make up a story of sexual abuse? THE WITNESS: False disclosures are extraordinarily rare, like in the one percent of all disclosures are false disclosures. THE COURT: Second part of that is why would they do that? THE WITNESS: I don’t think I really have an answer to that. Molde’s attorney did not object or otherwise challenge Dr. Swenson’s answers. The court then permitted Molde’s counsel to ask a follow-up question: [MOLDE’S COUNSEL]: Are there particular studies that have been conducted regarding the reporting of false accusations? THE WITNESS: There are that I’ve read, yes. I don’t know the names of them off the top of my head. The trial proceeded and the jury found Molde guilty on both counts. Following his conviction, Molde moved for postconviction relief. He contended that his trial counsel should have objected to Dr. Swenson’s testimony as impermissible vouching, and this failure constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the motion, in part because Dr. Swenson did not comment “on the credibility of the victim in this case as to whether she was telling the truth or not.” Relying on its prior published decisions, the court of appeals held that Dr. Swenson’s testimony constituted impermissible vouching, and that Molde’s attorney was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object. The state petitioned for review, which we granted. The Guts In Wisconsin, the trier of fact—often a jury—is entrusted with the duty to make factual determinations at trial. As part of that role, the jury must decide for itself whether to believe a witness’s testimony in whole, in part, or not at all. In State v. Haseltine, the court of appeals considered the testimony of a psychiatrist in a case likewise involving a father’s sexual assault of his daughter. The psychiatrist, who was qualified as an expert, testified regarding typical patterns of behavior for victims of incest. But the court also permitted the psychiatrist to offer his professional opinion that the victim fit the typical case, and that he had “no doubt whatsoever” that the father sexually assaulted his daughter. The court of appeals held that this was error, and laid out some basic principles that continue through our cases today. First, the expert’s opinion that the victim was telling the truth went too far. The foundation for this is WIS. STAT. § 907.02 which then, as now, states in relevant part that an expert witness’s testimony must “assist the trier of fact.” Because the jury is the ultimate arbiter of credibility, “[n]o witness, expert or otherwise, should be permitted to give an opinion that another mentally and physically competent witness is telling the truth.” This principle—that vouching for the credibility of another witness is impermissible—has since become known as the Haseltine rule. Even so, expert testimony that helps the jury assess credibility or understand the victim’s testimony is permitted. The court explained that expert evidence regarding why incest victims might delay in reporting or recant accusations could aid the jury, which might otherwise “regard such behavior as an indication that the victim was not telling the truth.” Thus, the key principle is this: expert testimony may assist the jury in determining the credibility of another witness, but it may not supplant the jury’s role by opining on the witness’s credibility. To be sure, any expert testimony should be properly admitted under the appropriate rules. And of course, it is subject to thorough vetting and cross-examination by opposing counsel. The jury can then weigh the credibility of the expert testimony and consider that along with other evidence to determine the credibility of the victim and other testifying witnesses. This rule preserves the jury’s exclusive role as the trier of fact, while permitting the jury to consider all relevant information in making its ultimate determinations. … (T)he main question is whether the testimony assists the jury in assessing the credibility of witnesses, or whether it functionally usurps the jury’s fact-finding role. Generally, expert testimony describing typical behavior by those in similar circumstances can serve to assist the jury. Provided it meets the other evidentiary requirements for admissibility, generalized evidence and personal observations do not, by themselves, run afoul of the Haseltine rule. Witnesses cross the line, however, when they take the extra step of implicitly or explicitly opining on whether the complainant is telling the truth. This usurps rather than assists the jury. Whether this has occurred will necessarily be dependent on the facts of a given case. The main question presented here is whether expert testimony regarding the likelihood of false reporting, particularly when the evidence demonstrates that false reports are extremely rare, constitutes impermissible vouching. Molde says it does. The court of appeals agreed in a recent case where it held that expert testimony impermissibly vouched for the victim’s credibility when two experts testified that 99.2% and 99.33% of victims are truthful. It reasoned in part that those percentages amounted to near-mathematical certainty “that false reporting simply does not occur.” This violated Haseltine, the court of appeals ruled, because the jury would inevitably understand this testimony as a statement that the victim was telling the truth. Applying this holding (as it was bound to do), the court of appeals in this case held that Dr. Swenson’s testimony that false reports in these circumstances happen around 1% of the time—meaning 99% of child sexual assault reports are true—violated Haseltine. We see it differently. Statistical evidence alone is precisely the kind of generalized evidence that might assist the jury, not usurp its role. It does not matter that typical behavior helps one side or another. Statistical evidence by itself does not tell the jury which category—truthful or untruthful—a particular witness belongs to. The jury still must assess the credibility of the statistical evidence and that of the expert, and then weigh that along with the other evidence in the case. The Haseltine rule is not violated simply because generalized or typical evidence strongly suggests a complainant is telling the truth. A Haseltine violation requires the “extra step” of the expert actually opining on the truthfulness of the complainant. We stress that our conclusion does not mean all such evidence should be admitted or is impervious to attack. The circuit court still must determine such evidence is admissible—including that the expert is qualified and that her conclusions are “the product of reliable principles and methods” that have been applied “reliably to the facts of the case.” Expert testimony is also subject to other normal evidentiary rules such as the exclusion of evidence that, although otherwise admissible, raises too great a danger of unfair prejudice. Molde did not challenge the admissibility of Dr. Swenson’s testimony on these grounds, nor does he raise any similar challenge here. In addition, defendants can always challenge the accuracy of statistical evidence and otherwise attack the credibility of expert witnesses through cross-examination, competing experts, and other means. The adversarial process is designed to assist the trier of fact. We are not persuaded that statistical evidence which strongly supports a complainant’s story necessarily interferes with the fact-finder’s prerogative to determine that witness’s credibility. Concurrence I write separately to elevate the voice of Lauren, the victim in this case whose courage and perseverance allowed her to overcome the “herculean task of reporting sexual abuse.” Lauren’s father, Jobert Molde, sexually assaulted her when she was eight or nine years old. Lauren found her voice five years later, after a suicide attempt, when she reported the crime. Lauren found her voice again during her forensic interview when she relayed details of the assault. And at trial, in front of a jury of strangers, she found her voice yet again to testify about the abuse. Lauren managed to state, in open court, that after her father told her “to be his big girl for daddy,” he “had sex” with her by putting his penis in her vagina, which “hurt.” The jury believed her. The court of appeals did not. The court of appeals overturned Molde’s conviction of first-degree sexual assault of a child, relying in large part on its determination that Lauren lacked credibility. The court reached this conclusion because “[t]he sexual assault allegation was not independently corroborated by other evidence; there was no physical evidence; there was only one sexual assault that occurred during a one-year period roughly four to five years prior to Lauren’s accusation; and some aspects of Lauren’s story changed over time.” These assertions are as disconcerting as they are misguided. They are predicated upon damaging and victim-blaming misperceptions. Disregarding a child victim’s testimony because of delayed reporting, small variations in her narrative, and most alarmingly, the total number of assaults she reported, defies what we know about how child sexual assault victims behave and report. … First, delayed disclosure and a lack of corroborating evidence are the norms in child sexual assault cases. (Emphasis in original.) The court of appeals deemed Lauren less credible because she reported the incident four or five years after Molde assaulted her, and there was no corroborating evidence. Delayed disclosures are not uncommon. In fact, “70–75% of child sexual abuse victims wait five years or more before disclosing the abuse.” Studies show that only about 30% of those who have experienced child sexual abuse disclosed it during childhood. There are many reasons for these delays, including “an inability to recognize or articulate sexual abuse, an uncertainty about which adults are safe, a lack of opportunities to disclose, fear of not being believed, trauma … and institutional power dynamics.” … Second, victims often cannot perfectly recall and recite their trauma. (Emphasis in original.) The court of appeals deemed Lauren less credible for omitting a detail from her forensic interview, changing the timing of a conversation with her younger sister, and being unsure whether Molde was clothed when she first entered his bedroom, even though the rest of her account remained notably consistent. These minor inconsistencies do not necessarily suggest a credibility problem. Rather, they illustrate how most victims report after enduring a traumatic event. Finally, the number of assaults reported has absolutely nothing to do with credibility. (Emphasis in original.) The court declared that Lauren lacked credibility because she suffered only one assault. It is difficult to even begin to respond to such a baseless statement, especially because, as noted above, most sexual assault victims underreport, or never report, their abuse. It would be completely unreasonable to require robbery victims to suffer two or more robberies before believing them. Why place such a burden on child sexual assault victims? And even if such a credibility threshold exists—to be clear it should not—is there a magic number of sexual assaults that a child must endure in order to be credible? Is it two or three or ten? One can only imagine the compounded chilling effect this elevated credibility standard would have on the already delayed and limited reporting of child sexual assault. Lauren defied the odds in reporting her abuse. The court of appeals discredited her for reasons that either fail to account for commonplace behaviors of child sexual assault victims or ignore logic and common sense. Child sexual assault victims must overcome near-insurmountable barriers to reporting abuse and achieving justice. When these brave children speak, courts must ensure they are heard.  By Alexandria Staubach Milwaukee Municipal Court has been held in contempt for its failure to comply with an order directing it to record hearings. Milwaukee County Circuit Judge David L. Borowski on Monday found that Milwaukee Municipal Court (MMC) made “insufficient attempts” to comply with his December 2024 order instructing MMC to record certain proceedings as required by municipal court procedural law. Borowski admonished MMC for its failure to comply with his order, calling the violations “egregious,” especially given MMC’s special position as a court charged with enforcing law. He said the failure to comply was “exacerbated by the fact that the only burden imposed on MCC to record during a hearing, is for someone to simply press ‘record.’” Borowski said the facts demonstrated conduct that was “so consistently lacking and preposterous” that MMC’s failure to comply exceeds the intentionality standard for contempt and “might very well be a knowing—and intentional—disregard of this court’s orders.” Saying that MMC was "clearly only capable of following" the statute requiring recording of certain hearings by being forced to record everything, Borowski ordered MMC "to RECORD ALL COURT HEARINGS moving forward." (Caps in original.) Borowski sanctioned MMC with a fine of $1,000 per day if it fails to comply with the new order requiring recording of all hearings, but gave the court 14 days before fines would start. He also ordered MMC to pay all reasonable attorney’s fees of Legal Action of Wisconsin for counsel's efforts since December 2024 to force compliance. Since December, Borowski has rejected as insufficient two policies proffered by MMC. In April, Borowski set forth an exact list of hearings that MMC must record. At that time, Borowski told the municipal court to develop a new policy that “must explicitly require electronic recording of ALL of the following”:
In Monday’s order, Borowski laid out how despite MMC’s failed attempts to develop a policy, it has still been subject to his order to record the enumerated hearings. Nevertheless, MMC persists in failing to record them. Petitioner’s attorney Susan Lund sought proof of compliance after the December order. In the documents MMC provided to show its response, Lund found that between May 5 and May 19 MMC held 54 hearings where a defendant’s indigency was relevant and thus required recording. MMC recorded fewer than half of those hearings. MMC “has admitted they have the capacity to record EVERY hearing that they hold, with the only inconveniences involved in doing so being, charitably, hitting a ‘record’ button, and uncharitably, more easily being held accountable for the content of their hearings,” wrote Borowski. "Respondents, by their conduct following this court's December summary judgment order, have shown what is at least a complete inability to follow, if not a calculated disregard, for this court's orders," he wrote. Wisconsin law defines contempt of court as intentional disobedience, resistance or obstruction of the authority, process or order of a court. Because of judicial rotations, Judge Paul Van Grunsven will decide the exact amount of attorney's fees MMC will owe Legal Action of Wisconsin. "Evers' judges" is our effort to present information about Gov. Tony Evers' appointees to the bench. The information is taken from the appointees' own judgeship applications. Italics indicate direct quotes from the application. Typos, including punctuation errors, come from the original application even though we have not inserted “(sic)” after each one. WJI has left them as is.  Photo by Lesa Ann Molitor from the Spooner Advocate. Name: Angeline E. Winton
Appointed to: Washburn County Circuit Court Appointment date: Aug. 13, 2019 (elected in April 2020 to term ending 2026) Education: Law School – William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota Undergraduate – University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire High School – Hayward High, Hayward, Wisconsin Recent legal employment: January 2017-present – District attorney, Washburn County January 2009-December 2016 – Half-time shared assistant district attorney for both Burnett and Washburn counties October 2008-December 2016 – Self-employed attorney, Angeline E. Winton, Attorney at Law, Hayward, Wisconsin October 2008-December 2016 – Associate, Winton Law Offices, Hayward, Wisconsin Bar and administrative memberships: State Bar of Wisconsin Lac Courte Oreilles Tribal Court, Hayward, Wisconsin General character of practice: Since January of 2017, I have served Washburn County as full time District Attorney. Focusing solely on criminal matters, my days are spent reviewing police reports, making charging decisions, attending Drug Court when scheduled, meeting with victims, reviewing files and/or meeting with defendants and defense attorneys to discuss settlement. Additionally, a significant part of my time is spent meeting with victims, preparing for contested hearings, writing legal briefs, appearing on behalf of the State in bond hearings, initial appearances, preliminary hearings, motion hearings, sentencing hearings, preparing for trial and trying jury trial cases. From January 2009 to the end of December 2016, I served both Washburn County and Burnett County in the capacity as their half-time shared Assistant District Attorney. The other half of my time was spent running a successful private practice in Hayward, Wisconsin, working in the family firm alongside my father, Ward Wm. Winton. In this capacity I handled a wide variety of civil matters and municipal prosecutions as Municipal Attorney for the Village of Siren in Burnett County and the Village of Birchwood in Sawyer County. Describe typical clients: Although not clients per se, as District Attorney I serve the people of Washburn County, and take that responsibility extremely seriously. With an overarching goal of protecting the community, I encourage rehabilitation of amenable, low-risk offenders such as with treatment of those struggling with drug addictions. When time allows, I have an open door policy and encourage victims, citizens and other interested parties to meet with me and share any special concerns they may have, or to provide me with information they believe is crucial to my role as District Attorney. Until December of 2016, my civil private practice focused primarily on real estate, estate planning, guardian ad litem work, probate and family law. My typical clients were honest, hardworking people who simply needed someone to guide them through the often confusing steps of the legal process. Number of cases tried to verdict: At least 25 jury trials and countless court trials. List up to five significant trials, appeals, or other legal matters in which you participated as a judge or lawyer in the past seven years: State v. Brandon Scherz: Washburn County Case 16CF92/WI Court of Appeals Case 17AF730 This was a case that was initially charged by my predecessor, Thomas H. Frost as Second Degree Sexual Assault. When I took office in January of 2017, this case was set for trial on April 20, 2017. Before trial, I filed a motion in limine indicating that I intended to use the defendant's confessions. On April 13, 2017, after a Miranda/Goodchild hearing on March 15, 2017, the Honorable Judge Eugene D. Harrington rendered his oral ruling, suppressing the defendant's confessions. One of the hardest things I have had to do in my career is explain to the rape victim in this case that, in order to seek justice on her behalf, I needed to delay her case and fight to correct the Circuit Court's clear error in suppressing defendant's admissions. The victim was extremely reluctant as she wanted the stress of the trial to be over with, and we both knew seeking an appeal would mean many months of delay. Ultimately she found the strength to agree that a continuation was necessary to achieve justice in her case, After lengthy discussions with the Wisconsin Attorney General's Office, in anticipation of the court's ruling, on April 13. 2017, I requested a continuance of the trial pending an interlocutory appeal. The Circuit Court denied that request and the Attorney General's Office sought and received an immediate stay of the Circuit Court proceedings on April 17, 2017, three days before the trial was to commence. On December 28, 2017, the Court of Appeals reversed the Circuit Court's ruling and remanded the case back for further proceedings. The State filed a substitution of the Honorable Eugene D. Harrington and the Honorable John P. Anderson was assigned to the case. On March 14, 2018, a Petition for Review to the Wisconsin Supreme Court was denied. With the defendant's confessions reinstated, the case proceeded to trial on 11/28/20l8. At trial, the case focused on the use of force. After consulting with the victim, 1 asked the court to include a lesser included instruction for Third Degree Sexual Assault. The defendant was then convicted by a jury of his peers of Third Degree Sexual Assault, Possession of THC, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. The victim was extremely happy with the outcome and this was one of my most satisfying days as District Attorney. After asking the victim to have faith in me and faith in the criminal justice system, she was ecstatic and told me she was so happy that I was her DA. Shockingly, the Presentence Investigation came back with a probation recommendation. With the assistance of the victim's heartfelt victim impact statement, the State was able to convince the Honorable John P. Anderson that prison, rather than probation, was the appropriate response to Mr. Scherz' admitted rape of the victim. On February 6, 2019, Brandon Scherz was sentenced to five years imprisonment, bifurcated as two years of initial confinement, followed by three years of extended supervision. This was a significant case in my career. I was happy to see, after the long battle through the Circuit Court, that the system worked and the Court of Appeals carefully, fairly and impartially applied the law to the facts and reinstated the defendant's confession, thereby helping me attain justice for the victim. State v. Kelly Daniels: Washburn County Case 17CF89 This case involved three controlled methamphetamine buys from Kelly Daniels in February of 2017. After a lengthy 2 day jury trial in bitterly cold weather, Ms. Daniels was convicted on all three delivery counts. During trial, I played the audio from one of the controlled buys. Having had the audio transcribed in advance, I was able to let the jury read along while listening to Ms. Daniel's voice as she sold methamphetamine to the confidential informant. I believe this played a significant role in the outcome of the case. After she was convicted, although I argued the severity of Ms. Daniel's actions warranted a prison sentence, she ultimately received only an imposed and stayed prison term. Despite the sentence, many in the community took notice that prosecution of this case was a priority for my office. It is my hope that other drug dealers like Ms. Daniels will consider how vigorously my office prosecuted this case and will give a second thought before moving their operations into Washburn County. State v. Steven Stone: Washburn County Circuit Court Case 14CF'88 This was an interesting case. Steven Stone was charged with Count I - OWI-5th, Count 2- Operating After Revocation and Count 3, PAC-5th. My involvement first began when, as assistant district attorney, I second-chaired the jury trial on January 22, 2015 with then District Attorney Thomas H. Frost. During District Attorney Frost's direct questioning of Deputy Josh Christman, Mr. Frost unintentionally provoked a mistrial when Deputy Christman commented on the defendant's prior OWI-4th conviction in violation of the trial court's pretrial ruling. After a ruling from the Court of Appeals, the State was permitted to retry the case. Although I was only working one day per week at that time for Washburn County in my capacity as Assistant District Attorney, when asked by District Attorney Frost, I agreed to retry the case alone. I did so on October 5, 20I6 and successfully obtained convictions on all three counts. Although I didn't handle the sentencing, I understand that the defendant was ultimately placed on probation and ordered to serve 330 days conditional jail time on Count I, OW1-5th, consecutive to 120 days conditional jail time on Count 2, OAR. Winton’s application included discussion of two additional cases, which WJI has not included due to length. Experience in adversary proceedings before administrative bodies: For approximately a year prior to being elected District Attorney in 2017, I was appointed to serve as Sawyer County's Condemnation Commissioner. During my tenure I was never called upon to serve but stood ready to do so. Describe your non-litigation experience (e.g., arbitration, mediation). From 2008 to 2016, in my civil practice, I handled a variety of real estate matters and estate planning cases which focused primarily on drafting documents and advising clients, rather than litigation. During this time, as guardian ad litem in family law cases, I also frequently engaged in informal mediation with the parties in an attempt to reach a result consistent with the best interests of the children. Position or involvement in judicial, non-partisan, or partisan political campaign, committee, or organization: Since approximately 2000, I have volunteered to various degrees either by making phone calls, door-knocking, etc. for each U.S. presidential democratic party campaign. Prior to going to law school in 2005, for approximately a year I served as the President of the Sawyer County Democratic Party in Hayward, Wisconsin. Previous runs for public office: Washburn County District Attorney, elected November 2016 All judicial or non-partisan candidates endorsed in the last ten years: Chief Judge Lisa Neubauer, in 2018 and 2019 for April 2019 Supreme Court election Dane County Circuit Judge Jill Karofsky, in 2019 for April 2020 Supreme Court election Professional or civic and charitable organizations: Washburn, Sawyer & Rusk Tri-County Bar Association, 2008-present, president 2011 Spooner Lions Club, volunteer, 2015-present Spooner Rodeo Committee, volunteer-Rodeo, 2015-present Northwoods Humane Society, volunteer, sporadically from 2001-present Significant pro bono legal work or volunteer service: I volunteer for various organizations in my community when able but due to the nature of my restricted duties as District Attorney, I do not have significant pro bono legal work. Quotes: Why I want to be a judge: I have served the citizens of Washburn County as a prosecutor for over ten years, yet now feel called upon to serve as Washburn County's next judge. I am not tendering this application for purposes of career advancement because as for me, becoming a judge has not always been a lifelong goal. Indeed, I firmly believe the decision to become a judge should be less about a person's career aspirations and ego, and more about that person's proven track record of service to their community, their fairness and dedication, their work ethic, and their continued study of the law. I feel compelled to apply for judge because the citizens of Wisconsin deserve a hardworking, honest judge who will not become complacent, but who will recommit each day to serving her community. I was born in Washburn County and have spent most of my adult life living and working here. This is the place I call home and this is the place where I intend to live the rest of my life. I grew up in a family which encouraged a life of service. Guided by that encouragement, I have been honored to serve as District Attorney. I want to continue to serve the people of Washburn County as their judge because I want to help strengthen my community and pledge to work tirelessly, within the proper judicial bounds, to do so. 1 am concerned with the limited resources available to young people in our community and how, as a result, those who cannot get a good job, or pursue higher education, often become entangled with drugs and alcohol. I care deeply about my community and I am concerned with the rise in crime due to the spike in methamphetamine and opioid addictions. As District Attorney, I have worked excessively long hours, at night and on weekends, to keep up with the ever-expanding caseload, which is largely attributable to the spike in methamphetamine and opioids flowing through our county. As District Attorney, I have paid special attention to vigorously prosecuting child pornography cases, property crimes, sexual assaults and drug-related offenses. As a result, I have had approximately twenty jury trials in the last two and half years. I am honored to work hard to do the right thing. I am honored by the faith that Washburn County residents have already placed in me to elect me as their District Attorney. l want to serve Washburn County as their judge with that same dedication. As judge, I believe a strong message must be sent to those who intentionally seek to harm our communities. However, I will also continue to support and encourage educational programs, mentorships and treatment courts, such as the Washburn County Drug Court for low risk, first time offenders. Serving as a member of Drug Court for over the last three years has given me the unique perspective to see how earnestly community members struggle with addiction and how very essential such programs are to the survival of our communities. Describe which case in the past 25 years by the Wisconsin Supreme Court or U.S. Supreme Court you believe had a significant positive or negative impact on the people of Wisconsin. In my opinion, United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013) has had the greatest positive impact on our democracy in the last 25 years. Many, if not all of us, have been affected by U.S. v. Windsor. Although many of us are not members of a same-sex partnership, the odds are that we know someone, work with someone or love someone who is. Society has come a long way in terms of acceptance since 2013, due in large part to U.S. v. Windsor. Separate yet unequal. The Defense of Marriage Act (hereafter DOMA), embodied that philosophy. DOMA was passed in the rnid-1990s, as States were just considering same sex partnerships. The very title of DOMA made clear the federal government's outright distain for same sex partnerships and Congress's fear that if granted equality, these couples would forever tarnish the sanctity of marriage. To discourage the taboo "choice", DOMA denied same sex couples significant governmental benefits by refusing to recognize civil unions as legitimate "marriages" in the eyes of the federal government. Everything changed in 2013 with U.S. v. Windsor. In 2007 Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer were married in Ontario, Canada and their home state of New York recognized their union. Two short years later, however, Thea Spyer died leaving Windsor as sole beneficiary of her estate. Windsor attempted to claim the surviving spouse federal estate tax exemption but was barred by doing so by DOMA which specifically excluded same-sex partners from the act's definition of "spouse" and "marriage." As a result of her choice of a same-sex spouse, Windsor inherited her wife's estate but paid costly in estate taxes. Ultimately Windsor filed suit, claiming the DOMA violated her 5th Amendment Equal Protection Rights. In 2013 Justice Kennedy authored the majority's decision ruling DOMA unconstitutional, indicating; "The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States." U.S. v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013). "It also forces same-sex couples to live as married for the purpose of state law but unmarried for the purpose of federal law, thus diminishing the stability and predictability of basic personal relations the State has found it proper to acknowledge and protect." Id., 570 U.S. 744, 747. Windsor is so significant because it shows how, even decades after the civil rights era, the judiciary can apply traditional legal analysis to properly render significant change in our modern world. By doing so, the United States Supreme Court restored faith to many in our democracy who had been previously disenfranchised for the simple reason of whom they chose to love. Undeniably, there are still parts of the country where people cannot bring themselves to put aside their prejudice and accept others. However, since U.S. v. Windsor, acceptance for same-sex couples has begun to flow like a tidal wave. Two or three judges whom I admire and why: Three circuit court judges that 1 have observed over the course of my career and whom I admire greatly are former Burnett County Judge Kenneth Kutz, Bayfield County Judge John P. Anderson and Sawyer County Judge John M. Yackel. These Judges have diverse personalities, yet all possess many qualities I admire. I had the most exposure as a young lawyer before the Honorable Kenneth Kutz when he was the Burnett County Circuit Court Judge and I was serving part time as Burnett County's Assistant District Attorney from 2009 to 2016. Judge Kutz impressed me each time I appeared before him because of his great depth of legal knowledge and his remarkably calm and patient temperament. I cannot recall more than once or twice over the seven years I appeared before him when Judge Kutz ever had to raise his voice to command the respect of those in his courtroom. Judge Kutz remains one of the most respected Judges in our area not only because he is a scholar of the law, but also because he has the unique ability to render decisions and even impose harsh sentences by educating those before him and inspiring them, instead of using his power and authority to be disrespectful or disparaging. Judge Yackel is yet another judge whom l greatly admire. I first encountered Judge Yackel when he served as Sawyer County's Assistant District Attorney. In that role, he and I interacted frequently when I served as guardian ad litem in Children In Need of Protection or Services cases. When Judge Yackel took the bench in Sawyer County, he brought with him many qualities that had served him well as a prosecutor. For example, as a prosecutor John Yackel possessed a unique ability to cut to the heart of a dispute and assist others to put aside their petty differences so as to focus what was really important, such as the best interests of the child. He retains that ability now as Judge. It is also evident from watching Judge Yackel that he cares passionately about Northwestern Wisconsin. While always being fair to each side, once an offender is convicted, Judge Yackel frequently takes a strong stance against those who seek to harm his community. Finally, I greatly admire Bayfield County Judge John Anderson. Like Judge Yackel, Judge Anderson quickly analyzes a situation and focuses on the issue at the heart of whatever conflict is before him. It is my firm impression that Judge Anderson isn't swayed by private interests and is more concerned with doing what is right than what is popular. Judge Anderson uses his authority to change people's lives, often through brutal honestly in an attempt to help them realize the error of their ways. All three have unique personalities and divergent theories about how best to administer justice. The common characteristics that each possess, and which I greatly admire, however, is their tireless work ethics and their genuine desire to administer justice fairly so as improve their communities. The proper role of a judge: Over the course of my career I have seen that the legal system functions the most smoothly, provides the most just outcomes, and inspires the most public confidence, when each party and their attorneys zealously advocate for their positions and the judge functions as a neutral and detached magistrate, weighing the facts with the law and rendering a fair and impartial decision. Many times, over the course of my career I have seen the system work and I have seen the system fail. The proper role of a judge is to first and foremost be well-educated and well-informed. No matter how well-meaning, a judge cannot function efficiently if she doesn't take her job extremely seriously, prepare for her cases, have strong attention to detail, and possess a firm understanding of the law. A judge should not be complacent. The proper role of a judge is to never stop learning and never assume, just because they are wearing the black robe, that they are automatically the most informed person. A good judge should have a strong personality so as to maintain order and command authority but should also be patient. Over the course of my career I have seen justice delivered in many forms. Many times a judge can administer justice simply by allowing a party to feel as though they were respected and given an opportunity to be heard. The SCOW docket: No hearsay exception in revocation proceedings for victim's out-of-court statement8/12/2025 Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The rule for this is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision. The “upshot” and “background” sections do not count as part of the 10 paragraphs because of their summary and necessary nature. We’ve also removed citations from the opinion for ease of reading but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. Italics indicate WJI insertions except for case names, which are also italicized. Case: State ex rel. Wisconsin Department of Corrections, Division of Community Corrections v. Hayes  Walsh Bradley Majority: Justice Ann Walsh Bradley (14 pages), joined by Chief Justice Jill J. Karofsky and Justices Rebecca Dallet, Brian Hagedorn, and Janet C. Protasiewicz Concurrence: Justice Annette Ziegler (2 pages) Dissent: Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley (6 pages) Upshot The Supreme Court upheld an administrative decision not to revoke probation based on the agency administrator's determination that the Department of Corrections failed to show good cause to overcome the probationer's due process right to confront an adverse witness, and that without the witness' hearsay statement the evidence was insufficient. We conclude that under the certiorari standard of review, the administrator’s decision must be upheld because it is supported by substantial evidence and was made according to law. Background In February of 2019, Keyo Sellers was convicted of a drug offense and later placed on probation. DOC sought to revoke his probation in March of 2022 based on five alleged violations of the conditions of probation. Specifically, DOC alleged that Sellers: (1) entered K.A.B.’s home without her consent, (2) sexually assaulted K.A.B., (3) took $30 from K.A.B. without her consent, (4) subsequently trespassed on K.A.B.’s property by walking onto her porch and looking through the windows without her consent, and (5) provided false information to his probation agent. Sellers stipulated to the fifth alleged violation, and a revocation hearing on the remaining four allegations proceeded before an ALJ. Notably, . . . DOC did not present K.A.B. as a witness. Instead, DOC attempted to admit her testimony by other means, including a written statement provided by K.A.B. and the testimony of a police officer who interviewed her. Sellers’s probation agent explained the decision not to subpoena K.A.B. as follows: “[S]he told the police and she’s told me she can’t 100% ID her assailant,” so the agent “didn’t feel it was necessary to have her come in and provide testimony and go through the trauma of her assault to only say that she believes that Mr. Sellers could be the assailant, but she doesn’t know 100%.” DOC presented live testimony from three witnesses at the revocation hearing: the police officer who investigated K.A.B.’s report of sexual assault and burglary, an analyst from the state crime laboratory, and Sellers’s probation agent. The officer testified regarding his interaction with K.A.B. and relayed what she had reported to law enforcement. He stated that K.A.B. had installed security cameras after the attack, which “almost a week to the day of the original assault” recorded a man “on her front porch prowling and peering into her front living room window.” Further, the officer testified that facial recognition software had been used on that security camera footage, leading him to Sellers after the software indicated a match. Several physical features of the person in the security video matched Sellers. Although K.A.B. could not identify Sellers with certainty, the officer interviewed Sellers’s ex-wife, who according to the officer’s testimony was “absolutely sure” that the man in the video was Sellers. The crime lab analyst testified that she completed DNA testing on evidence collected from the scene and from a sexual assault examination of K.A.B. She testified that the sample collected was “consistent” with Sellers’s profile, but admitted on cross-examination that the profile would also occur in “approximately one in every 278 African American individuals.” Based on census data, this means that the profile would match 389 people in the City of Milwaukee. Finally, Sellers’s probation agent testified that . . . she viewed the security camera footage and was 99 percent sure that the man in the video was Sellers “based on his appearance, based on his walk, and based on the fact that I’ve supervised him, you know, for almost 18 months.” Sellers did not testify at the revocation hearing but provided a written statement that is in the record. He stated that he has “never been on [K.A.B.’s] property or in the property,” he is not the person in the video and he “did not sexually assault anyone.” The ALJ revoked Sellers’ probation, concluding that the first four allegations had been established by a preponderance of the evidence, and determined that incarceration was appropriate. Sellers appealed the ALJ’s decision to Administrator Brian Hayes. Hayes described K.A.B.’s account of the events as “critical to the DOC’s allegations,” found that reliance on K.A.B.’s “hearsay account" violated Sellers’ constitutional right to due process, and that without K.A.B.’s hearsay statements there was insufficient evidence on the four charges. Hayes found that for the stipulated violation of providing false information to the probation agent, revocation and confinement were not appropriate. The DOC sought certiorari review in circuit court. That court reversed Hayes' decision, but Hayes successfully appealed to the Court of Appeals. The DOC then took the case to the Supreme Court, which heard oral arguments in March.  Guts Our review is limited to (1) whether the administrator kept within his jurisdiction; (2) whether the decision was according to law; (3) whether the administrator’s action was arbitrary, oppressive or unreasonable and represented his will and not his judgment; and (4) whether the evidence was such that the administrator might reasonably make the order or determination in question. *** In regard to DOC's argument that evidence other than K.A.B.'s hearsay statement supported revocation under the fourth prong above, DOC asserts that the administrator ignored crucial non-hearsay evidence showing that Sellers committed the rule violations in question. Specifically, DOC contends that the administrator ignored two key pieces of evidence: (1) the DNA evidence and (2) the security camera footage. We are not persuaded by DOC’s argument. In essence, DOC asks us to weigh the evidence differently than did the administrator, which would contravene our established standard of review. Reasonable minds could arrive at the conclusion that the DNA evidence was far from airtight and did not weigh heavily (or at all) in DOC’s favor. DOC asks us to adopt the position of the ALJ, who weighed this evidence more heavily. Yet, the ALJ made a logical leap when she found that a DNA profile “consistent with Mr. Sellers” and almost 400 other men in Milwaukee meant that “Mr. Sellers’ DNA” was in fact “on K.A.B.” Reasonable minds could weigh this evidence less heavily, as the administrator did. Next, we turn to the security camera footage. Even assuming that the man in the video was Sellers, it was not unreasonable to conclude that the footage on its own did not establish every element of the alleged violations or tie the person in the footage to the earlier offenses. Indeed, as the court of appeals determined, it was reasonable to conclude that K.A.B.’s testimony “was necessary for DOC to prove all the elements of the alleged probation violations (e.g., non-consent, and that the person on the porch was also the person who sexually assaulted K.A.B.).” It is DOC who has the burden to prove an alleged probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence. There is a reasonable view of the evidence under which DOC has not met that burden and could not meet that burden without K.A.B.’s hearsay statements. In other words, given the evidence before him, the administrator’s determination was reasonable. Even if there is evidence supporting a contrary determination, we must affirm the administrator’s decision if substantial evidence supports the decision. *** The Court next turned to DOC's argument that good cause existed to overcome Sellers’ due process right to confront adverse witnesses and allow the hearsay testimony under the second or third prongs of the standard of review noted above. It is well-established that revocation of probation implicates a probationer’s protected liberty interest. Although a probationer is entitled to due process of law before probation may be revoked, a probationer is not entitled to the full panoply of legal rights accorded to those subject to criminal process. Among the “minimum requirements of due process” that must be afforded to probationers is “the right to confront and cross- examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation). Such a procedure serves to “protect the defendant against revocation of probation in a constitutionally unfair manner.” *** In the present case, we have no information in the record regarding any barriers to obtaining K.A.B.’s live testimony. The record reflects that the probation agent was concerned about retraumatizing her: “I didn’t feel it was necessary to have her come in and provide testimony and go through the trauma of her assault to only say that she believes that Mr. Sellers could be the assailant, but she doesn’t know 100%.” While retraumatization is certainly a serious concern, there is no indication in the record that K.A.B. herself was concerned about retraumatization or whether the agent even discussed this with her. With no specific information in the record, to accept DOC’s argument would establish a per se “retraumatization” exception to hearsay that could be asserted in every case. This would be a sea change in the law and we decline to adopt it here. There is likewise no testimony in this record from any source regarding any other “difficulty” or “expense” that K.A.B.’s testimony would have entailed. Absent any testimony on these factors that is specific to this victim, it was reasonable for the administrator to conclude, as he did, that “there was no basis to find that there was any ‘difficulty, expense, or other barriers to obtaining live testimony’ of K.A.B., which is fatal to this particular good cause test.” Because the administrator properly applied the balancing test, his determination was made according to law. *** DOC makes no detailed argument here that K.A.B.’s statement is accompanied by sufficient indicia of reliability so as to be admissible under the residual exception in the rules of evidence. In briefing, it contends that K.A.B.’s statements have “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” based on corroboration by the non-hearsay evidence referenced above. But as explained, the non-hearsay evidence is not particularly strong. Given this, and given the rarity with which the residual exception is intended to be used, we cannot say that rejecting the residual exception here was an erroneous exercise of discretion. Because the administrator did not erroneously exercise his discretion in excluding the hearsay testimony, we determine that his decision that good cause was not present was made according to law.  Ziegler Concurrence I agree with the majority that the administrator’s decision in this case is supported by substantial evidence. The standard we must apply on certiorari review is whether the administrator’s decision is invalid, not whether we like it or agree with it. Although the dissent’s arguments that the administrator’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence are not without some force, the standard we must apply requires that we review the evidence to determine whether the administrator could reasonably make the decision he made. To be clear, the administrator likely could have made the opposite determination, and if the administrator had done so, we likely would have held that there is substantial evidence supporting that decision. I am unwilling, however, to join the majority’s conclusion that the second issue in this case—whether the administrator erred by excluding hearsay testimony—is simply a question of whether the administrator acted “according to law.” It may also be appropriate, given the petitioner’s arguments, to review the issue under the third certiorari prong, which asks “whether [the administrator’s] action was arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable and represented [his] will and not [his] judgment.” Accordingly, I concur, but I do not join the majority opinion.  Grassl Bradley Dissent
Administrative Law Judge Martha Carlson presided over the revocation hearing and determined that DOC established each of the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Among other evidence, she relied on the DNA match and the lack of any “credible explanation for why Mr. Sellers’ DNA would be on K.A.B. but for the assault.” She also relied on the video footage showing Sellers on the victim’s porch days after the sexual assault. Sellers appealed. In a brief letter, Brian Hayes, the Administrator of the Division of Hearings and Appeals, reversed the ALJ’s decision, citing the inadmissibility of the victim’s hearsay statements. The administrator did not consider whether non-hearsay evidence supported the alleged probation violations. One year later, the circuit court reversed the administrator’s decision, concluding “[n]on-consent . . . can be proven circumstantially based on the totality of the evidence” and the testimony of the probation agent, the crime lab analyst, and the police officer collectively established the alleged probation violations. Another year later, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court’s decision, deferring to the administrator’s conclusion that the victim’s testimony was necessary to prove the probation violations. Three months later, a jury found Sellers guilty of second-degree sexual assault with the use of force and burglary. The majority recites the correct standard of review but errs in applying it. The majority deems the administrator’s determination “reasonable” and supported by substantial evidence. It isn’t. Only by ignoring non-hearsay evidence supporting revocation could the administrator reasonably decide not to revoke Sellers’ probation. Even without the victim’s testimony, no reasonable person would decline to revoke Sellers’ probation given the overwhelming evidence to support his multiple violations of the law. The non-hearsay evidence supporting DOC’s first two allegations—Sellers entering K.A.B.’s home without her consent and sexually assaulting her—is enough to reverse the administrator’s decision. The evidence supporting allegation four—prowling on her property a week later and looking in her windows—refutes Sellers’ claim that he had never been to the victim’s residence. Nevertheless, the administrator maintains that Sellers’ false statement “remains the only non-hearsay account of what Sellers was actually doing.” K.A.B.’s hearsay testimony, however, is not necessary to put two and two together. *** The full picture of what happened should be crystal clear to a reasonable factfinder, even without the victim’s testimony. Law enforcement went to K.A.B.’s house in the early morning hours of September 15, 2021. After a SANE exam, DNA evidence of another person was recovered from K.A.B.’s body. Within days, surveillance cameras were installed at K.A.B.’s home. Law enforcement returned to K.A.B.’s house a week later on September 22, 2021. Surveillance footage was recovered showing a man outside the home shortly after midnight. At least two individuals familiar with Sellers identified him in the video footage. Law enforcement used facial recognition software to compare a still shot from the video recording with pictures of Sellers, which yielded similarity ratings of 98.2%, 92.7%, and 85.5%. These non-hearsay facts are more than enough to justify revocation of Sellers’ probation. Based on the non-hearsay evidence alone, confinement was necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity by him. The administrator erred in ignoring all of it and in concluding DOC failed to support its request for revocation. The administrator seemed to render a decision under the misapprehension that direct evidence was necessary to support DOC’s allegations against Sellers, declaring that “K.A.B.’s account of the events is critical to DOC’s allegations.” Under fundamental and longstanding law governing the admission of evidence in a criminal case, the administrator was plainly wrong. Decades ago, this court explained that circumstantial evidence commonly supports a conviction, and may be more convincing than direct evidence; this is particularly true when the victim, like K.A.B., cannot positively identify the perpetrator . . . . *** Uncontroverted, non-hearsay evidence places Sellers on K.A.B.’s porch one week after she was sexually assaulted, but the majority posits it is somehow reasonable to pin the assault on one of “almost 400 other men in Milwaukee [with a DNA profile consistent with Mr. Sellers]” instead of Sellers. The majority peddles incredible conjectures in its mission to declare the administrator’s determination reasonable, but in reaching for reasons to defend an insupportable decision, the majority teeters toward absurdity. While it is possible a different person sexually assaulted K.A.B., all of the evidence points to the same man who was caught on camera peeping into her home a week later. A reasonable person would reject the possibility of another person matching Sellers’ DNA profile assaulting K.A.B. the week before Sellers trespassed on her property. No reasonable factfinder could conclude DOC failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Sellers trespassed on K.A.B.’s property. Video evidence corroborated by multiple individuals familiar with Sellers’ appearance and posture identified him in the video. Considering his presence at the victim’s home a week after the sexual assault puts the evidence of the assault in its proper context. No reasonable factfinder could conclude DOC failed to prove Sellers invaded the victim’s home, sexually assaulted her, and one week later trespassed on her property. The administrator’s decision to the contrary was not supported by substantial evidence. The majority errs in upholding it. Why the court granted DOC’s petition for review is unclear. The petition did not raise any novel issues of law. In addressing the issues, the majority contributes nothing to the jurisprudence governing revocation proceedings. Instead, the majority conducts the same flawed analysis as the court of appeals, relies upon the same well-established cases the court of appeals applied, and reaches the same conclusion by also deferring to the administrator’s legally deficient decision. The court of appeals issued an unpublished, non-precedential, per curiam opinion. There was no point in taking this case only to repeat the errant work of the court of appeals. In the end, nothing about this case warranted this court’s review. The court should have dismissed the petition as improvidently granted. By issuing a decision, the majority casts a façade of importance over its analysis, despite the opinion signifying nothing. I dissent. "Evers' judges" is our effort to present information about Gov. Tony Evers' appointees to the bench. The information is taken from the appointees' own judgeship applications. Italics indicate direct quotes from the application. Typos, including punctuation errors, come from the original application even though we have not inserted “(sic)” after each one. WJI has left them as is.  Name: Reyna Morales
Appointed to: Milwaukee County Circuit Court Appointment date: Sept. 21, 2020 (elected in April 2021 to term ending in 2027) Education: Law School – Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin Undergraduate – Binghamton University, Binghamton, New York High School – Uniondale High, Uniondale, New York Recent legal employment: June 1997-present – Attorney, Wisconsin State Public Defender’s Office, Madison, Wisconsin Bar and administrative memberships: State Bar of Wisconsin U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin General character of practice: During my tenure with the State Public Defender, "SPD", I have handled thousands of cases, with a myriad of legal issues. I have had the opportunity to represent individuals in many different settings, ranging from informal diversions to extensive trials. I have experience handling juvenile, chips, guardianship, mental commitments, TPR's, misdemeanor and all level of felony cases. I never shy away from complex legal issues and I am willing to research and invest as much time as needed so that clients are zealously represented. Throughout my career I have had bench trials as well as jury trials in cases ranging from traffic matters to high profile homicides. Describe typical clients: The majority of my clientele consists of individuals who have extremely complicated lives. The vast majority of my clients come from socially marginalized communities and have had to deal with economic disadvantages all of their lives. I current represent individuals charged with serious felonies including armed robberies, sexual assaults, and homicides. I provide advice on a daily basis to clients who face life altering consequences as a result of their involvement in the criminal justice system. I have specialized in complex homicide cases focusing both in mental health issues as well as abusive head trauma litigation. I specialize in jury selection and in connecting with jury panels. Number of cases tried to verdict: 40+ List up to three significant trials, appeals, or other legal matters in which you participated as a judge or lawyer in the past seven years: State of Wisconsin v. Kervin Pierce - Milwaukee County Case #2017CF5844 I was the defense attorney for Mr. Kervin Pierce from 12/26/2017 through 12/07/2018. My client suffers from Schizophrenia, at the time of the incident Mr. Pierce had yet to be diagnosed with this serious mental illness which unraveled his life to the point where he killed his mother and attempted to kill his brother. I along with my defense team presented the case to a jury panel who agreed with our defense and we received a unanimous verdict of Not Guilty By Reason of Mental Decease or Defect. As a result of this case I was the first Latina in Wisconsin to be awarded the Hanson Memorial Advocate Prize by The Wisconsin Association Of Criminal Defense Lawyers. State of Wisconsin v. Jason Tilley - Milwaukee County Case #2018CF1047 I was the defense attorney for Mr. Tilley from 03/14/2018 through 02/12/2019. My client suffers from cyclical schizoaffective disorder. This disorder led to Mr. Tilley believing the "illuminati" was giving him commands and his mind unraveled to where he killed his landlord over a $30.00 increase in rent. Mr. Tilley had a checkered past with both State and Federal System by the time he became my client. On the date of the incident Mr. Tilley killed his landlord, disposed of his landlords car, and went to check in with his federal probation agent before reporting to work where he was arrested without incident. Mr. Tilley's case is significant as he had been interviewed by several members of my office before I was assigned to represent him. I had a very short interaction with him before raising competency in front of the Court. Mr. Tilley underwent treatment at Mendota Mental Health Institute and after months of treatment he was deemed competent to stand trial. A special plea was entered and two court appointed doctors agreed and supported the special plea of Not Guilty by Reason of Mental Disease or Defect. State of Wisconsin v. Annette Morales-Rodriguez - Milwaukee County Case 2011CF4871 I along with attorney Debra Patterson represented Ms. Morales-Rodriguez from 04/18/2012 through 12/13/2012. Ms. Morales-Rodriguez was accused of the homicide of a pregnant woman and slicing out her full-term fetus, killing both the mother and child. Ms. Morales-Rodriguez only spoke Spanish. As a native speaker I was able to use my skills both in knowledge of the law and a second language to support my client while at the same time respecting all those involved in the process. We argued several complex motions and represented Ms. Morales-Rodriguez through trial. Experience in adversary proceedings before administrative bodies: n/a Describe your non-litigation experience (e.g., arbitration, mediation). As a defense attorney I am in the unusual role of having to mediate between the different parties involved in the criminal justice system. In my position, success in most cases can only be achieved through negotiation and mediation with Judges, Prosecutors, and Clients. I have presided over mediation tournaments at Marquette Law School. Position or involvement in judicial, non-partisan, or partisan political campaign, committee, or organization: Participated in the Official Second tier Caucus on 5/1/2016 for the Democratic Party of Wisconsin to nominate Ann Jacobs to be a delegate for the 2016 presidential convention. Previous runs for public office: [No answer given] All judicial or non-partisan candidates endorsed in the last ten years: David Feiss, Circuit Court Judge, 2014 Martin “Joe” Donald, Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 2016 Martin “Joe” Donald, State Appellate Court Judge, 2019 Jean Kies, Circuit Court Judge, 2016 Thomas J McAdams, Circuit Court Judge, 2016 Janet C Protasiewicz, Circuit Court Judge, 2014 Professional or civic and charitable organizations: Wisconsin Hispanic Lawyers Association, board of directors, 2018-present Felmers O. Chaney Advocacy Board, board member, 2019-present Marquette University Law School Alumni Association, board member, 2010-2018 MUHS-Mother’s Guild, Hospitality Team, 2020-present Significant pro bono legal work or volunteer service: [No answer given] Quotes: Why I want to be a judge: I grew up in Guatemala in the middle of a civil war and was able to come to the United States in my teens. I was the first in my family to graduate from college in the United States and the first to go to Law School. I have the ability to communicate with, and work along with others with a clear understanding of the different roles we all hold in the judicial system. I want to use my life experience as a bi-cultural individual to serve the people of my community. Throughout my career I have worked with underprivileged individuals and have noticed the difference in their demeanor when they have a sense of belonging. I want to use my life experiences, knowledge, and background to have an active role in the judiciary. I understand the importance of diversity in the bench and I have learned throughout my career how important it is for underprivileged individuals to see other people of color in active roles in the court system so they feel heard. I have had to assist clients with the difficult decision as to which cases to take to trial and which cases require a resolution where they are exposed to a lengthy sentence in the prison system. I have met people at their best and worst and I have had the privilege to stand beside them waiting for the judge to deliver a sentence that will impact the rest of their life. In representing individuals I understand the great power a judge has in the life of others and the impact following the law can have in the community. In exercising this role, all you can do is to try and understand the issue before you and then decide it in the best way you know how. Describe which case in the past 25 years by the Wisconsin Supreme Court or U.S. Supreme Court you believe had a significant positive or negative impact on the people of Wisconsin. I belong to the immigration specialty group in my office. I participated in the Leadership project where I prepared a presentation to our agency on the critical issues raised on Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (20210) Padilla has had great impact in how cases are handled in our office. Padilla brought to light the need for collaborative representation in cases where the consequence of a criminal conviction could result in the deportation and ultimate exile of a client to a foreign land. I alongside other attorneys in our office created a screening form to ensure proper representation of individuals who need a specialized immigration assessment. I participated in panel discussions and training of others both at a CLE put together by WHLA and at the annual SPD conference on the duties of counsel and the need to properly advise clients of the devastating collateral consequences in criminal matters which must be taken into consideration both by prosecutors and defense counsel alike Two or three judges whom I admire and why: I had the opportunity to meet Supreme Court Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson. The idea of interacting with someone as brilliant as Justice Abrahamson was intimidating, however she had the ability to listen to you and make you feel as the only person in a crowded ballroom. Justice Abrahamson gave me one of the best experiences in my legal career by letting me know that she loved the law and that family is important. I had the opportunity to attend a live argument and Justice Abrahamson's questions showed she had taken the time to be prepared and treated all those involved with a level of respect which had a calming effect on a lawyer that needed reassurance in the middle of a tough oral argument. Justice Abrahamson was the first woman to be appointed as Chief Justice to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, I often read her decisions and it is clear from her writings the profound respect she has for the law and the application of law to all those involved in the judicial system and the vast repercussions of her decisions. Sonia Sotomayor - United States Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor is a true inspiration and a pioneer in the legal system. She is the first Latina to be appointed to the highest court in the United States. Justice Sotomayor has an impressive legal background with experience as a prosecutor and a corporate litigator. Justice Sotomayor's credentials have been recognized by both republican and democratic presidents. Justice Sotomayor was originally appointed to the bench by President Clinton. Before her appointment to the Supreme Court by President Obama, she had been appointed to the appellate bench by President George H.W. Bush. Justice Sotomayor is the only current justice with experience as a trial judge. The proper role of a judge: Judges have a privileged position in society. The most important role of a judge is to always be aware of the law's impact on society and everyday life. A judge must probe factual and legal details when deciding legal matters in order to uphold the rule of law. The rule of law requires a judge to be thoughtful and consistent when applying the law to cases and facts on a consistent basis. By Margo Kirchner
Gov. Tony Evers just vetoed a bill that would have required the Department of Corrections to recommend revocation if a person on extended supervision, parole, or probation is charged with a new crime. In his veto message, Evers wrote that he objected "to the unfunded mandate that such revocation would impose on the Department of Corrections, which would move Wisconsin in the wrong direction on criminal justice reform without improving public safety. This bill is estimated to have a fiscal impact of more than $330 million in just the first two years and hundreds of millions of dollars in unknown, ongoing costs to state taxpayers in the years to follow. This significant price tag does not include construction costs to build additional state correctional facilities, which would likely be needed, or take into account the fiscal impact on local governments. This fiscal impact is particularly untenable on the heels of the legislature significantly underfunding existing operations at the Department of Corrections in the most recent state budget." Evers wrote that "Wisconsin should be investing in data-driven, evidence-based programming that addresses barriers to reentry, enhances educational and vocational opportunities for individuals who will be released after completing their sentence, and provides treatment for mental health and substance use issues, which will help to reduce recidivism and save taxpayer money while improving public safety." Wisconsin Justice Initiative and Wisconsin Justice Initiative Action wrote to Evers on Wednesday, urging him to veto the bill, AB 85. Currently, the DOC has discretion to pursue revocation when a person on release is charged with a new crime. Revocations are then decided by administrative law judges, rather than sentencing judges. AB 85 would have taken away the DOC’s discretion and required that the department recommend revocation, even though new charges are based only on probable cause and could later be dropped or defeated at trial. The Assembly passed AB 85 in March along party lines with the exception of cross-over votes by one representative from each side. The Senate passed the bill in June along party lines. The bill was sent to Evers yesterday. As of today, Wisconsin holds 23,346 people in prison. The most recent available number of people on probation or parole, from May 31, is 63,420. Estimates indicated that if the bill became law, more than 4,600 additional people would end up in Wisconsin prisons each year, with a price tag of $250 million annually once the additional population was in place. In written testimony in the Legislature, even the Badger State Sheriffs’ Association and Wisconsin Sheriffs and Deputy Sheriffs Association questioned the bill, expressing concern about its cost and impact on jails and prisons. WJI and WJI Action's letter to the governor said that “the bill turns the long-standing American concept of ‘innocent until proven guilty’ on its head. The bill would require that a person on supervision is presumed guilty of a violation of the terms of release merely upon accusations of other, as yet unproved, conduct, which are made on only probable cause.” Further, WJI and WJI Action wrote, “individuals on supervision or parole already face overwhelming odds against making it to the finish line. . . . People on release face a long list of behavior controlled by the DOC, and for more than a decade, the Department of Corrections has failed to develop rules and guidance implementing 2013 Wisconsin Act 196 to provide those on release with guidance.” As WJI reported recently, Act 196 calls for DOC to develop a list of sanctions that may be imposed for the most common violations, offering “clear and immediate consequences for violations.” The law also mandates that any rule developed by DOC take into account the impact of revocation on an offender’s employment and family. WJI and WJI Action pointed out that Wisconsin’s prisons are already at capacity and that this bill sends that number higher, at great fiscal and societal cost. The organizations also questioned the removal of discretion from the DOC. Minister Roy Rogers, executive director of The Onesimus Group Milwaukee and a WJI board member with personal experience in the justice system, had this to say about the bill: "Assembly Bill 85—though cloaked in the language of accountability—is, in truth, a reactionary measure. It weakens due process, disrespects the discretion of our criminal justice professionals, and burdens our communities with costly, ineffective incarceration." "Out of the 6,280 individuals charged with new crimes while under supervision in 2019, we must ask: how many of those charges ended in actual convictions? According to the Department of Corrections and the Badger Institute, more than half did not. Yet this bill would treat every charge as though it were already a conviction—punishing men and women based solely on an accusation." "That’s not justice," he told WJI. "That’s preemptive punishment—a direct threat to the constitutional principle of 'innocent until proven guilty.' . . . Charges can stem from false accusations, mistaken identity, or insufficient evidence. And in historically over-policed, marginalized communities, we know all too well that it doesn't take much to find yourself charged." Rogers, too, noted that the bill stripped discretion from DOC agents and administrative law judges, who "weigh the severity of the violation, the individual's risk level, and history. That’s what smart justice looks like. AB 85 would remove all that wisdom and replace it with a blunt, one-size-fits-all mandate—rooted in fear, not facts." "Public safety is essential," Rogers told WJI. "But AB 85 did not offer real safety—it offered mass disruption under the guise of accountability. We cannot incarcerate our way into healthy neighborhoods. We need wiser strategies that reduce harm, restore people, and invest in transformation."  By Alexandria Staubach The Wisconsin Court of Appeals recently reversed a man’s conviction because the attorneys and court all failed to realize until too late that two charges sent to the jury were not separate offenses; instead, one was a lesser-included offense of the other. Wisconsin Court of Appeals District IV remanded the case to Columbia County Circuit Court for a new trial.  Blanchard Judge Brian Blanchard wrote for the panel, joined by Presiding Judge JoAnne Kloppenburg and Judge Chris Taylor.
Samuel Osornio was charged with both delivery of heroin and first-degree reckless homicide by delivery of heroin. A jury found Osornio guilty on both charges, exposing him to potential punishment on both. But the charges arose from the same conduct of delivering heroin and the elements for one count were all included in the other count as well. The legal name for such situations is “multiplicity.” It happens when charges require the same elements to prove an offense to a jury, stemming from the same facts—here that Osornio delivered heroin and that he delivered heroin which resulted in death. Because the reckless-homicide charge added death to the elements of heroin delivery, the delivery charge was a “lesser-included” offense of the reckless-homicide charge. The prosecutor, defense attorney, and Columbia County Circuit Judge Todd Helper all failed to appreciate that the delivery and reckless homicide charges required proof of the same elements until the jury was well into lengthy jury deliberations after a two-day trial. Helper had not given any jury instruction about considering a lesser-included offense. Three hours into deliberations, the jury informed the court that it could not reach a verdict as to the reckless homicide offense but that it had consensus on the delivery offense. Helper then ordered the jury to continue its deliberations, still unaware of the multiplicity issue and without giving a lesser-included instruction. The lesser-included instruction would have told the jury that if it had already made every reasonable effort to decide the greater offense of reckless homicide, it could proceed to resolve the lesser-included charge of heroin delivery. The appeals court found that counsel for Osornio’s counsel failed to notice this multiplicity issue in a timely manner, which resulted in prejudice and ineffective assistance of counsel. The question for prejudice resulting from deficient performance of counsel is “whether it is reasonably likely the result would have been different,” Blanchard wrote. Here, he said, “there is a substantial, not merely a conceivable, likelihood that a jury that was properly instructed from the start would have reached a more favorable result for Osornio.” While Helper ultimately sentenced Osornio on only the reckless-homicide charge, the appeals court found that “the missed potential benefit to Osornio should have been obvious from the time the case was charged through to the time of trial.” “(A)pplying the objective standard of reasonableness, the three overlapping elements in the two counts should have prompted double jeopardy concerns by defense counsel before trial,” Blanchard wrote. Report compares Milwaukee County juvenile justice numbers and offenses to pre-pandemic data8/4/2025 By Heidi von Helms, WJI intern Youth referrals in the juvenile justice system are back up to their pre-pandemic levels, and the severity of offenses, number of weapons offenses, and transfers to adult court increased significantly. The data comes from the Wisconsin Policy Forum’s report in May on the state of youth justice in Milwaukee County. The report compared recent statistics with pre-pandemic data. The report indicates that during the pandemic the number of youth referrals to the Milwaukee County Department of Health and Human Services’ Children, Youth, and Family Services Department (CYFS) dropped significantly across every category. However, by 2024, referrals had returned to their pre-pandemic numbers. The report shows a notable 50% increase between 2018 and 2024 in referrals for certain felonies, including armed robbery, terrorist threats, taking and driving a vehicle without consent, and first-degree recklessly endangering safety with a firearm. Felony weapons offenses more than tripled and misdemeanor weapons offenses grew by 73%.  Graph from the report showing the increase in severity of offenses. Source: "Youth Must Be Served: The Post-Pandemic State of Youth Justice in Milwaukee County," Wisconsin Policy Forum, May 2025. While this data suggests an increase in violent crimes committed by youth, victim and suspect data from fatal and nonfatal shootings in the City of Milwaukee show some recent progress in reducing shootings. Milwaukee Police Department and Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission data show that from 2023 to 2024, the number of youths suspected of homicide or nonfatal shootings decreased by 51%, and the number of fatal and nonfatal shooting victims age 17 or younger decreased by 25%. The report states that from 2018 to 2024, the majority of youth referred were ages 15 and 16 (61%). Boys made up 80% of referrals. Black youth made up 80% of referrals, Hispanic youth made up 11%, and white youth made up 7%. The table below compares these percentages to Milwaukee County’s youth population demographics, highlighting how Black youth are overrepresented in the justice system.  Table comparing demographic and ethnic data between CYFS referrals and general population. Source: "Youth Must Be Served: The Post-Pandemic State of Youth Justice in Milwaukee County," Wisconsin Policy Forum, May 2025. An overwhelming proportion—78%—of referred youth had a mental health condition, an alcohol and other drug abuse condition, or both.  Infographic showing percentage of youth in CYFS with mental health and AODA addictions. Source: "Youth Must Be Served: The Post-Pandemic State of Youth Justice in Milwaukee County," Wisconsin Policy Forum, May 2025. From 2018 to 2023, significantly fewer youth were placed in detention facilities. However, more youth have been moved up to adult court, perhaps corresponding with the increase in referrals for violent offenses noted above. The Vel Phillips Youth and Family Justice Center includes a short-term detention facility for youth pending court disposition when detention is deemed necessary. As shown in the chart below, the number of youths detained at the center was significantly higher in 2024 than pre-pandemic, and since 2021 the facility has faced significant capacity issues. Additionally, the average length of stay increased by more than 14 days from 2018 to 2024.  Graph showing population of youth at Vel Phillips Youth and Family Justice Center from 2018 to 2024. Source: "Youth Must Be Served: The Post-Pandemic State of Youth Justice in Milwaukee County," Wisconsin Policy Forum, May 2025. The Wisconsin Policy Forum also reviewed the Milwaukee County Accountability Program, created in 2012 as a longer-term detention alternative to Lincoln Hills and Copper Lake, which have faced abuse allegations for years. MCAP is designed for youth considered high risk for reoffending and involves intensive supervision, structure, support, and skill building for up to 180 days before the youth transitions to at-home supervision and behavioral management. The report indicates that MCAP has contributed to consistently fewer youth being sent from Milwaukee County to Lincoln Hills and Copper Lake. However, MCAP has only 24 beds, and some youth spend up to 12 weeks in detention before they can begin the program. The county plans to replace the 24 beds at Vel Phillips currently used for MCAP with a new, 32-bed facility by 2026, with the hope that the new facility will fully replace the use of state youth detention facilities.  Chart comparing Milwaukee County youth detention in MCAP and Lincoln Hills and Copper Lake. Source: "Youth Must Be Served: The Post-pandemic State of Youth Justice in Milwaukee County," Wisconsin Policy Forum, May 2025. CYFS in recent years has emphasized programs designed to keep youth from becoming involved in the justice system altogether. These include the Credible Messenger Program, created in 2021, which serves as a prevention influence for youth at risk of becoming involved or further involved in the justice system, and Advance Peace Fellowship, created in 2024, which pairs youth identified to be at high risk for gun violence with support for their development, health, and well-being. In 2023, 78% of youth in the Credible Messenger Program had no referral to CYFS or re-offense. The report notes that the success of various CYFS programs is hard to determine, CYFS does not have a framework to track recidivism and does not follow any of its programs’ participants after they reach the age of 17. The report states that without better data collection, the Wisconsin Policy Forum cannot determine whether the youth justice system is operating better and producing better outcomes than before the implementation of these programs. |
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