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A close look at the jury instructions in Judge Hannah Dugan's criminal case

12/30/2025

Milwaukee's federal courthouse on July 18, 2024. Photograph by Margo Kirchner.

By Alexandria Staubach

Milwaukee made national headlines when Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Hannah Dugan was convicted earlier this month for obstruction of a federal proceeding.

Dugan was convicted in federal court of obstructing the administrative process of removal by the Department of Homeland Security by her actions at the Milwaukee County Courthouse on April 18, 2025. The jury found her not guilty of a misdemeanor charge of concealing an individual from arrest.

Local media provided a play-by-play account of trial during the week of Dec. 15. The jury rendered its verdict on Dec. 18.

Dugan’s attorneys have moved for additional time to argue that U.S. District Court Judge Lynn Adelman should set aside the jury’s guilty verdict—the first step in likely a lengthy post-verdict and appeal process.

The case could land in front of the U.S. Supreme Court, especially regarding Dugan’s arguments of judicial immunity from prosecution. Adelman rejected those arguments in August 2025.

If the defense’s motion for acquittal, which was filed at the close of the prosecution’s case, is any indication, Dugan is likely to mount a broad appeal, but jury instructions are an essential component of every case and, given jurors’ questions during deliberations, they could play a role in what arguments progress. Jury questions could indicate misunderstandings about the instructions.

The split verdict—guilty on the felony but not guilty on the misdemeanor—and the questions the jury asked during deliberations beg the question: What happened?

After evidence is presented at trial, the judge gives the jury a variety of instructions on how to proceed, including how to conduct deliberations, how to weigh the credibility of an expert, and, very importantly, the elements of the offenses that the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt for a guilty verdict.

It is unusual for judges to issue written opinions about jury instructions, but in this case Adelman did, giving a small window into arguments that Dugan may make going forward.

According to Adelman’s written opinion, the jury was largely given pattern instructions as “requested by the government and unopposed by the defense” regarding general matters.

Pattern jury instructions are created by committees of judges and lawyers in each jurisdiction and are designed to standardize and simplify complex legal rules for jurors, but they do not exist for every crime in every case.

Federal trial courts in Wisconsin are part of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals jurisdiction and usually start with the Seventh Circuit’s pattern rules.

According to Adelman’s opinion, the Seventh Circuit pattern rules do not include standard instructions setting forth the elements of either of the charges against Dugan.

Generally, when a pattern instruction does not exist, or a compelling reason exists to deviate from it, each side is permitted to propose an instruction. The judge then looks at the parties’ proposals, relevant law from cases that have dealt with the relevant statute, and pattern instructions in other circuits to craft an instruction. Parties can then suggest changes and object on the record if they disagree with what the judge reads to the jury.

Adelman’s opinion indicates that the parties differed over the jury instructions regarding the elements of the two crimes charged in Dugan’s case. Adelman rejected some proffered instructions from each side.

As to the misdemeanor charge of concealing an individual from arrest, Adelman instructed the jury that the government had to prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

"a federal warrant or process had been issued for the arrest of an individual;
the defendant knew that the federal warrant or process had been issued for the individual’s arrest;
the defendant actually harbored or concealed the individual; and
the defendant intended to prevent the individual’s discovery or arrest."

Adelman wrote in his opinion that the lesser concealment charge for which Dugan was acquitted had no pattern instruction but “cases from other circuits adopt the foregoing elements.”

Adelman wrote that the government argued against use of the word “actually” in the third element, arguing that “the word suggests the defendant must have actually succeeded in concealing the individual.” Adelman said he rejected that argument because the “cases include the word ‘actually’ not to require success but to make clear ‘that (the law) does not proscribe all forms of aid to a fugitive’ and that the ‘actual harboring or concealment element requires some affirmative, physical action by the defendant.’”

The defense meanwhile sought an instruction requiring “materiality” for this charge. Materiality is a legal doctrine that distinguishes minor errors from substantial issues, preventing things that are trivial from triggering major legal consequences. Adelman wrote that materiality was not an element and that such an instruction was “unnecessary” because the third element included the word “actually” and “addressed the defense concern about mere trifles.”

Adelman told the jury that a “federal warrant” includes federal administrative arrest warrants. He added statements in the instructions that “(t)he actual harboring or concealing element requires some affirmative, physical action by the defendant to hide, secrete, or keep out of sight” and that “(m)ere failure to disclose the location of a fugitive is not concealing.” The last statement was made over the government’s opposition, as Adelman found it to be “a correct statement of law.”

Adelman declined to include the government’s proposed instruction that included language about conviction “regardless of whether the action was successful in actually delaying the individual’s observation, discovery or arrest.” Adelman wrote that “while the facts of the cases cited by the government may give that implication, they did not directly support an instruction using these terms.”

Adelman excluded proposed defense instructions that “amounted to a rehash” of Dugan’s immunity arguments.

As to the felony charge of obstructing federal proceedings, Adelman instructed the jury that the government had to prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

"there was a proceeding pending before a department or agency of the United States;
the defendant knew of the pending proceeding;
the defendant endeavored to influence, obstruct, or impede the pending proceeding; and
the defendant did so corruptly, that is, with the purpose of wrongfully impeding the proceeding."

Adelman told the jury that DHS is a department of the United States and Immigration and Customs Enforcement is an agency within DHS. He told the jury that "'pending proceeding' simply means any process taking place in the manner and form prescribed for conducting business by or before a department or government agency, including all steps and stages in such an action from its inception to its conclusion.”

Adelman included a definition of “endeavored” as meaning acting “purposefully, with knowledge that an action would have the natural and probable effect of wrongfully obstructing the proceeding. An ‘endeavor’ need not be successful.”

He told the jury that “corruptly” meant “acting with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing another, including making a false or misleading statement.”

According to proposed instructions filed in November, Dugan wanted the judge to tell the jury that “an effort to arrest a person, or to execute an arrest warrant of any kind, is not a proceeding within the meaning of the crime charged.” Adelman wrote in his opinion on the jury instructions that Dugan’s proposal “defined ‘proceeding’ too narrowly.”

Adelman again rejected the defense proposal to add a materiality requirement on this count under Seventh Circuit law and because the definition of ”endeavored” that he gave “got at that same concept.” Other instructions proposed by the defense were not supported by case law or were “again a rehash of defendant’s immunity argument,” Adelman wrote.

Dugan had proposed a jury instruction requiring the jury to unanimously agree on which, if any, of her actions established that she endeavored to influence, obstruct, or impede a pending proceeding. Adelman explained in his opinion that the jury did not need to unanimously agree on the acts committed to execute the endeavor.

During their six hours of deliberations, the jury asked two key questions focused on the elements of the offenses.

The jury first asked whether Dugan needed to know the specific identity of the person ICE agents were seeking (Eduardo Flores-Ruiz) to be convicted of the concealment charge. Adelman responded that, yes, Dugan did need to know the identity of the person being sought.

The jury then similarly asked whether Dugan needed to know the specific identity of Flores-Ruiz to obstruct a federal proceeding. According to the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Adelman responded: "To know of a pending proceeding, the defendant needed to have sufficient knowledge about the nature of the proceeding." The jury then found Dugan guilty on that count. One juror told the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel that if Dugan had had to know the specifics of the proceeding at issue, the jury would have found her “not guilty” on the obstruction count.

Dugan, who is not up for reelection until 2028, has been suspended with pay since April.

Since her conviction, Republicans in the state Legislature have called for her resignation, threatening impeachment if she fails to resign. A judge has not been impeached in Wisconsin since 1853.

Dugan has until Jan. 30, 2026, to file additional post-verdict motions and argument.

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