 By Alexandria Staubach and Margo Kirchner
For privacy protection we will refer to a sexual assault victim as Jane Doe. This story briefly recounts a sexual assault. Iron County Circuit Court Judge Anthony Stella Jr. is refusing to release records of what he and a prosecutor said at a court hearing in a criminal sexual assault case. Stella and his staff refuse to allow the victim to purchase a transcript of the sentencing hearing of her assailant. Meanwhile, the judge and his staff have refused Wisconsin Justice Initiative’s attempt to purchase a digital audio recording of the hearing. In both instances, the judge claims only parties to the case are entitled to the records, relying on his blanket policy. Jane Doe contacted WJI about the case and said both Stella and Iron County District Attorney Matthew Tingstad made unsavory comments about her and to her during the June hearing in her assailant’s case. According to Doe, they focused more attention on her line of work as an exotic dancer than the defendant’s conduct in assaulting her. Although WJI generally does not give legal advice or represent individual clients, litigants upset by particular judges or procedures do reach out. Doe contacted WJI to report how she was treated by the court and prosecutor and to ask whether their comments violated any rules of professional conduct. WJI attempted to confirm the statements attributed to Stella and Tingstad by reviewing the court recording or transcript before considering whether to publish anything about the hearing. But the court was quick to deny WJI access. WJI reviewed the criminal complaint, which says the defendant, Brandon Frazer, inappropriately touched Doe during a private dance and orally penetrated her vagina. According to the complaint, Frazer confessed, admitting that “he stuck his tongue out and licked VICTIM.” It also says security cameras recorded the incident and officers reviewed and preserved the footage. Frazer was identified through ATM records subpoenaed from the strip club. Court records confirm that Frazer pleaded no contest to third-degree sexual assault—a felony—in exchange for a one-year deferred sentence at the hearing. The court ordered Frazer to pay a fine, commit no new crimes during the deferment period, avoid Iron County, and notify the DA of any change in address within five days. If Frazer successfully completes the requirements, after one year his conviction will be reduced to misdemeanor disorderly conduct. Doe told WJI she was “blindsided by the light sentence” and the opportunity for the sexual assault crime to be reduced to a nonsexual misdemeanor, without treatment or other conditions from the court. Doe told WJI that she lodged her dissatisfaction with the court and the DA directly and through her victim impact statement. According to Doe, the light sentence was imposed because the judge and DA felt the case was mitigated by the nature of Doe’s work. At sentencing, Stella allegedly said that “hypervigilance might be the appropriate state of mind” for Doe in her line of work, the nature of Frazer’s crime was “different” than other sexual assault offenses, and a felony would “lump” Frazer in with other sexual assailants. The hypervigilance comment was reported by a Michigan news outlet that had a reporter present for the hearing. The reporter was unwilling to speak to WJI for this story. According to Doe, Tingstad made additional comments to her before the hearing about a jury’s unwillingness to take her case seriously. Doe told WJI that Stella said on the record he would not want his family members in her line of work. To verify Doe’s assertions, WJI sent an open records request to Stella and the Iron County Circuit Court court reporter seeking the hearing’s digital audio recording. Recordings from a court’s digital audio recording—DAR—system are supposed to be available to the public upon payment of $10, after the court redacts any confidential or attorney-client discussions. Nevertheless, the court clerk denied WJI’s request for the reasons given in an attached policy of Stella that says “(i)t is the policy of the Iron County Circuit Court to deny the general public access to DAR recordings.” In the policy, Stella says that “only parties to a case who have a right to a transcript have the right to obtain copies of these recordings.” “Anyone who wishes to do so may attend a public hearing and see and hear first-hand what is taking place,” his policy states. Around the same time that WJI asked for a copy of the DAR recording, Jean Bock, the Iron County Circuit Court court reporter, told Doe in an email (provided to WJI), “After review of Supreme Court Rules and speaking with the Judge, only parties can request transcripts in cases.” As a victim, Doe is not a party to the criminal case. Her status as a victim has not mattered regarding the transcript, notwithstanding the Marsy’s Law constitutional amendment, which was supposed to raise a victim’s rights to a level commensurate with a defendant’s rights. Iron County Circuit Court is limiting access to transcripts and DAR recordings to only the parties in a case. In doing so, Stella is blocking the public’s ability to confirm what he says at hearings. Stella says in his policy that his position is based on his interpretation of Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules regarding transcripts and that those rules, not public records statutes, govern access to transcripts. Such a reading would result in an exception to an otherwise valid open records request under public records statutes. WJI could locate no such exception to open records law in statute, the Supreme Court rules, or case law. Regarding transcripts, Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 71.04 provides that the verbatim record of a hearing “need not be transcribed unless required by this rule, any statute or court order,” the court reporter generally must prepare a transcript for a party, and “(e)xcept when requested by a party or by a guardian ad litem appointed in the proceedings, the verbatim record of a proceeding under ch. 48, 767 or 938, stats., shall be transcribed only upon order of the court.” (Emphasis added by WJI.) The chapters of law referenced in the above quote concern juveniles, family proceedings, or when a person is appointed to represent someone who cannot advocate for themselves (mainly children, but also the very elderly and those with mental health issues). Many states, Wisconsin included, have statutes that protect access to juvenile records, ensuring that sensitive information is not disclosed to unauthorized people. It makes sense that the Wisconsin Supreme Court would limit access to a transcript in a proceeding involving one or that was otherwise confidential. According to Stella’s written policy, SCR 71.04 means that “a court reporter is only required to make transcripts for parties to a proceeding, and that under no circumstances should a transcript be made for someone who is not a party or GAL in cases under Chapters 48, 767 or 938 without court approval.” Notably, Doe and Frazer are not juveniles, nor is any other person involved in the case. Stella’s stance denying hearing transcripts and audio recordings to nonparties seems unique to Iron County. WJI spoke with court reporters in Waukesha and Milwaukee circuit courts. They confirmed there is no restriction in their courts on nonparties obtaining transcripts or requesting digital audio recordings. Multiple jurisdictions, including Ozaukee County use a form that has no “party to the case” requirement. In Portage County, while a transcript request from the public costs more to produce, there’s also no mandate that the requester be party to a case. DAR records are not official records of proceedings for purposes of appeal, but are nevertheless records held by the court. The Supreme Court’s rules on DAR recordings are brief and instruct the Director of State Courts to “develop policies for copying and charging a fee for an audio recording.” The Supreme Court’s guiding principles on DAR recordings (adopted in March 2023) say: “Duplicates of the electronic record may be purchased by parties to whom a transcript would be available with the approval of the court official. Care should be taken with confidential proceedings, as only certain parties are entitled to a recording or transcript without approval of the court official.” The use of the word “parties” in these principles appears broader than litigants alone, as the principles thereafter state: “(I)f a member of the public wishes to purchase a copy of the digital audio recording in a matter that a transcript would be available to them, they may do so.” The court reporter is to allow the judge to review and redact privileged conversations but then provide the DAR recording to the requester unless the hearing falls under other rules for confidentiality. According to experts contacted by WJI and a court reporter who has been practicing in Wisconsin for more than 20 years, DAR recordings are subject to judicial review to filter protected information like attorney-client privileged conversations, which the recordings sometimes pick up. As reported to the Wisconsin Judicial Council by various sources, the availability of DAR recordings to the public has caused judges hours of extra work to make sure confidential or privileged statements are redacted before release. The Director of State Courts Office convened a committee to study what might be done. In March and May 2026, Director of State Courts Audrey Skwierawski and committee member Judge Eugene Gasiorkiewicz (Racine County Circuit Court) presented the Wisconsin Judicial Council with a proposed rule revision regarding public access to DAR recordings. The proposal confirms that the current rules permit the release of both transcripts and DAR recordings to the public. The possible rule change would limit disclosure of a DAR recording primarily to parties for use in the litigation, the Office of Lawyer Regulation, and the Judicial Commission. Anyone else would have to file a motion in the underlying proceeding, with the burden of showing why a transcript cannot be obtained. Such a rule change would not be required if the current rules already prohibit nonparties from obtaining transcripts and recordings, as Stella asserts. Gasiorkiewicz told WJI by email that DAR committee’s “unanimous opinion is that (at present) DAR recordings are public records under Wisconsin law and anyone (without giving a reason) can obtain a digital download recording (usually a CD) after the sitting judge reviews and if appropriate redacts the content." Wisconsin public records law states that "(e)xcept as otherwise provided by law, any requester has a right to receive from an authority having custody of a record which is in the form of a comprehensible audio recording a copy of the recording substantially as audible as the original. The authority may instead provide a transcript of the recording to the requester if he or she requests." As declared in Wisconsin’s public records law, the public policy of this state is “that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those officers and employees who represent them.” The law is to be construed with a presumption of complete public access, and access should be denied only in an exceptional case. Blanket prohibitions on nondisclosure are generally prohibited by state law. Requests for records should be considered on a case-by-case basis. WJI has complained to Stella’s supervisory judge, Tenth Judicial District Chief Judge John P. Anderson, about Stella’s blanket policy and asked Anderson to direct the Iron County Circuit Court to provide the DAR recording to WJI and the transcript to the victim.
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 By Alexandria Staubach
A popular bill to restore awards of attorney’s fees in public records cases is making its way through the Wisconsin State Assembly after having passed unanimously in the Senate … again. AB190/SB194 would allow those suing public authorities over failure to comply with public records requests to recover reasonable attorney’s fees when the authority discloses records after the record seeker files the lawsuit. The statute is consistent with how courts awarded attorney's fees awards until recently and comes as backlash to a 2022 Wisconsin Supreme Court decision. In Friends of Frame Park. v. City of Waukesha, the Supreme Court said plaintiffs could recover attorney's fees only upon securing a court order or judgment in a public records case. If the public authority released the records requested at any time during the court proceedings before the court directed disclosure, it would not be on the hook for the plaintiff’s attorney's fees. Written testimony in support of the bill submitted by the ACLU of Wisconsin points out that “courts had previously recognized if the government actor was only ‘voluntarily’ releasing documents because of the lawsuit filed against them, they should still have to pay the requestor’s legal fees.” Friends of Frame Park rejected that interpretation. The bill’s author, Rep. Todd Novak (R-Dodgeville), told fellow legislators that “a dangerous trend may arise where government entities have increased power to withhold records, as the public will need to weigh whether the litigation costs are worth expending to compel the release of the records.” Novak testified to a sparsely attended Assembly Committee on Senate Affairs hearing late last month. “You shouldn’t have to get to a point where you go to court, before a municipality or whoever turns over the records,” he said. The bill enjoys broad bipartisan support and is embraced by advocacy groups often opposed on other topics. Both the ACLU of Wisconsin and the conservative litigation center Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty support the measure. “The inability to obtain attorney’s fees upon prevailing in an open records lawsuit can make it prohibitively expensive for Wisconsinites to challenge the denial of requests or excessive delays in response times,” wrote Luke Berg, WILL deputy counsel, in support of the bill. Berg cautioned that under the present interpretation, “fewer attorneys will be willing to bring open records cases on a contingent fee basis, putting greater transparency and accountability at risk.” The bill duplicates one introduced during the last legislative session. That bill, too, enjoyed bipartisan support and passed unanimously in the Senate. However, Speaker Robin Vos failed to bring the issue to a vote in the Assembly. At last month’s hearing, Novak said he hopes to bring the current bill “over the hump.” On July 8, the current bill passed unanimously in the Assembly Committee on State Affairs and was referred to the Committee on Rules. Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The rule for this is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision. The “upshot” and “background” sections do not count as part of the 10 paragraphs because of their summary and necessary nature. We’ve also removed headings, citations, and footnotes from the opinion for ease of reading but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. Emphasis by the court is underlined. Italics indicate WJI insertions except for case names, which are also italicized.  Protasiewicz The case: Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Secord Majority: Justice Janet Protasiewicz (11 pages in a new slip opinion format), joined by Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, Rebecca Dallet, Jill Karofsky, and Brian Hagedorn Concurrence: Hagedorn (8 pages) Dissent: Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley (2 pages), joined by Chief Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler Upshot The Wisconsin Voter Alliance filed identical petitions for writ of mandamus against the registers in probate for 13 circuit courts around Wisconsin demanding access to Notice of Voting Eligibility forms ("NVE forms") under Wisconsin's public records law. In the first case to reach the court of appeals, District IV issued a unanimous, published opinion holding that public records law and WIS. STAT. § 54.75 exempt NVE forms from disclosure, so the Alliance is not entitled to them. Shortly after, District II issued a split opinion in this case. The majority reached the opposite conclusion, holding that public records law and § 54.75 do not exempt NVE forms from disclosure, so the Alliance is entitled to them with possible redactions. *** While this appeal raises an important issue regarding public records law, we do not reach it due to District II’s patent violation of the precedential case of Cook v. Cook. . . . When the court of appeals disagrees with a prior published court of appeals opinion, it has two and only two options. It may certify the appeal to this court and explain why it believes the prior opinion is wrong. Or it may decide the appeal, adhering to the prior opinion, and explain why it believes the prior opinion is wrong. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to District II with instructions to follow the Cook case. Background This appeal concerns the petition for writ of mandamus that the Alliance filed against Kristina Secord, the register in probate for the Walworth County Circuit Court. The petition asserts that when a court finds an individual incompetent to vote, the clerk of court completes an NVE form indicating the individual’s name, address, finding of incompetency to vote, and other personal information. The clerk sends the completed NVE form to the Wisconsin Elections Commission (“WEC”), which maintains a public database of registered voters in Wisconsin called WisVote. According to the Alliance, WEC is required to identify individuals who are ineligible to vote due to incompetency on WisVote, in order to prevent them from registering to vote and voting in elections. The Alliance sought access to NVE forms that Secord “sent to the Wisconsin Elections Commission anytime.” At a minimum, the Alliance wanted the names and addresses of the individuals declared incompetent to vote. Citing public records law, the Alliance claimed that it needed this information in order to prove WEC was not always updating WisVote to show individuals found incompetent to vote in Wisconsin elections. Secord moved to dismiss the Alliance’s petition for writ of mandamus . . . . Secord argued that WIS. STAT. § 54.75 exempts NVE forms from disclosure under public records law. Therefore, the Alliance was not entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling disclosure of the NVE forms. The circuit court agreed with Secord and dismissed the Alliance’s petition for failure to state a claim. The Alliance appealed to the court of appeals, District II. By this point, the Juneau County Circuit Court had already dismissed an identical petition for writ of mandamus that the Alliance had filed against Terry Reynolds, the Juneau County register in probate. The Alliance had appealed to the court of appeals, District IV. In Reynolds, District IV held that the Alliance was not entitled to the NVE forms under public records law and § 54.75 and affirmed the Juneau County Circuit Court’s dismissal of the Alliance’s petition. The Alliance did not petition this court for review of Reynolds. District II issued its decision in this case after the Reynolds decision. Guts The parties agree that NVE forms are “court records.” They dispute whether NVE forms are “pertinent to the finding of incompetency” under the first sentence of § 54.75. They also dispute whether the Alliance is entitled to the NVE forms under the second sentence of § 54.75, which authorizes disclosure of limited information to a person who demonstrates a “need” for it. In Reynolds, the Alliance’s initial brief presented this issue to District IV: “Whether [an NVE form] used to communicate to election officials or an agency the circuit court’s determination of a person’s competency to register to vote or to reinstate the right to vote is subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act.” In a unanimous, published opinion, District IV held that NVE forms are exempt from disclosure under the first sentence of § 54.75 because they are court records “pertinent to the finding of incompetency.” They are created during proceedings where a court determines incompetency for purposes of establishing a guardianship, and they contain information drawn directly from this proceeding. *** We turn to District II’s opinion in this appeal. The Alliance’s initial brief in the court of appeals presented the identical issue as in Reynolds. But District II issued a split opinion, including a majority, a concurrence, and a dissent. The majority opinion acknowledged that it was bound by Reynolds “to the extent it is not distinguishable.” Then it distinguished Reynolds. The majority noted that in Reynolds the circuit court granted the motion to dismiss the Alliance’s petition for writ of mandamus without waiting for a response or full briefing. This prevented the Alliance from clarifying its records request and defending its position. By contrast, in this case the circuit court had the benefit of full briefing and argument. The majority also reasoned that while the Alliance seeks “the very same records” in both cases, “that is neither dispositive nor a basis upon which to avoid ruling on an issue previously not decided. The question is whether the issues vary. And they do.” The majority opinion did not address whether NVE forms are “pertinent to the finding of incompetency” under the first sentence of § 54.75. It reserved that analysis for the concurring opinion. Instead, the majority opinion began by performing a public policy balancing test and found that the policy of protecting an incompetent person’s dignity and privacy “is expressly outweighed by the legislature’s mandate that voting ineligibility determinations are to be publicly communicated to the local officials or agencies through WEC (as directed by the Court System) and the public in general.” *** The two judges in the majority also filed a concurring opinion. The concurrence construed the first sentence of § 54.75 and declared: “[W]e disagree with the analysis in [Reynolds] with respect to the definition of the phrase ‘pertinent to the finding of incompetency.’” The concurrence reasoned that circuit court records and forms “leading up to” the finding of incompetency are “pertinent” to the finding of incompetency. But the determination that an individual is ineligible to vote does not “lead up” to the finding of incompetency. It is a “consequence” of that finding. Therefore, NVE forms are not pertinent to the finding of incompetency. As an initial matter, we find the District II majority’s attempt to distinguish Reynolds unpersuasive. In both cases, the Alliance filed identical petitions for writ of mandamus demanding access to NVE forms. In both cases, the registers in probate moved to dismiss the Alliance’s petitions for failure to state claim upon which relief could be granted. In both cases, the circuit courts dismissed the Alliance’s petition because NVE forms are confidential under § 54.75. The Alliance appealed both decisions. In both appeals, the Alliance sought “the very same” records and presented—verbatim—the same issue of law. In both appeals, the register in probate argued that NVE forms are exempt from disclosure under § 54.75. On the facts and the dispositive legal issue, the two appeals are virtually indistinguishable. District II simply disagreed with Reynolds. Cook v. Cook instructs the court of appeals how to proceed when it disagrees with one of its prior published opinions. We explained that while the court of appeals is comprised of four districts that sit in different parts of the state, it is a unitary court, not four separate courts. Officially published opinions of the court of appeals are precedential and have statewide effect. Therefore, only the supreme court may overrule, modify, or withdraw language from a published court of appeals opinion. *** We reject the District II majority’s effort to skirt Cook by drawing fine distinctions between arguments and assuming additional or different facts. If we were to ignore or approve what the District II majority did, we would gut Cook. Like the Alliance, future litigants would feel encouraged to litigate issues “multiple times in the four districts.” Why not? Like the Alliance, if they lose in one district they might win in another.   Hagedorn Concurrence The majority holds that the decision of the court of appeals below contravened a prior published decision of the court of appeals, and therefore violated Cook v. Cook. Indeed it did, and I join the court’s opinion. I write separately, however, to address two issues. First, I write to clarify the role of mandamus in public records cases. Both parties, and the court of appeals below, discuss the mandamus requirements in ways that are inconsistent with the law and likely to confuse matters further. Second, I write to discuss the reasoning of Cook v. Cook, and question whether the rules it announces rest on a solid legal foundation and are worth reexamination. First, it is important to clarify the unique way mandamus applies in public records cases such as this. We have described the common law writ of mandamus as an extraordinary legal remedy that may issue only when a party can show: (1) a clear legal right; (2) a positive and plain duty; (3) substantial damages; and (4) no other adequate remedy at law. Both parties in this case and the court of appeals misunderstand how these requirements apply in public records cases, however. Secord suggests, for example, that WVA failed to meet the fourth requirement for mandamus because it could obtain the records another way—such as requesting a court order for the records under Chapter 54. The parties also debate whether the records should be released on the grounds that WVA failed to establish the third mandamus requirement—substantial damages. Secord appeals to the public goods and harms that could result from releasing or protecting the documents. WVA counters that it would not be able to carry out its investigatory purposes without the records, and is therefore harmed. And the court of appeals entertains these arguments and concludes the third mandamus requirement is met because voter integrity and public confidence in our elections support WVA’s claim of substantial damages. This reasoning reflects a mistaken understanding of the law . . . . *** . . . Our cases teach that the only inquiry that matters in public records mandamus actions is whether the requester has a legal right to the records. This step is where a court determines whether the documents are records at all, whether any statutory or common law exceptions apply, and whether the balancing test would preclude release. All of this is appropriately part of whether a requester has a right to the records in the first place. If records have wrongly been withheld, the custodian must turn them over to the harmed requester, and a writ of mandamus ordering the custodian to do so is the prescribed remedy. The second issue concerns the basis for the decision in the majority opinion. In 1997, 20 years after the court of appeals was created, we considered “whether the court of appeals has the power to overrule, modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals.” We answered that it did not. But the reasoning offered was sparse, and rested predominantly on pragmatic and policy concerns. *** . . . It is true that this court has a primary role in clarifying the law in Wisconsin. And it is true that error correction is a primary role of the court of appeals. But throughout its history, the court of appeals has decided high profile cases of first impression. And it was right to do so. Both the court of appeals and this court have an important role to play in clarifying the law. That’s why the published decisions of both courts have statewide precedential effect. Thus, while most of the cases the court of appeals handles fall in the category of error correction, and most of our cases involve issues of statewide importance, this fact does not implicate the power of a court to overrule itself. The Cook court’s reliance on the different roles between the court of appeals and this court does not provide a sound basis for its conclusions. *** In the end, while the rules Cook establishes may be a permissible and reasonable exercise of our constitutional authority, it is not a decision commanded by the constitution itself. Over the years, it has had the regrettable effect of expanding the power of this court, and minimizing that of the court of appeals. I encourage my colleagues in the bench and bar to consider whether alternatives might better serve the people of Wisconsin.  Grassl Bradley Dissent
The parties presented two issues to this court: Whether the court of appeals violated Cook v. Cook, by contradicting its own precedent, and whether Notice of Voting Eligibility forms (“NVE forms”)—used to notify election officials that a court has deemed an individual incompetent to vote—are “pertinent to the finding of incompetency” under WIS. STAT. § 54.75 and thereby statutorily exempt from Wisconsin’s public records laws. One of those issues presents an opportunity for this court to analyze and resolve weighty matters of privacy, open access to public information, and election integrity. The other allows us to wag a finger in admonishment at the court below. Although both parties urged the court to resolve the substantive issue, the majority dodges it and chooses to scold the court of appeals instead. The majority could have summarily reversed in a per curiam opinion but instead forced the parties to bear the cost of fully litigating the case before us. Principles of judicial economy and fundamental fairness demand we decide the substantive issue instead of skirting it on a technicality. Judicial economy is a prudential consideration that promotes the effective use of judicial resources to avoid duplicative or unnecessary litigation and fulfills this court’s duty to clarify the law. Even if the resolution of one issue disposes of a case, “to further judicial economy and guide trial courts and litigants, we may consider additional issues which have been fully briefed and are likely to recur . . . in the interest of conserving judicial resources and clarifying an important point of law.” This principle also embodies a concern for the resources litigants must spend to resolve their disputes. Nothing compels this court to disregard these considerations and favor Cook instead. When previously confronted with conflicting court of appeals precedent, this court has chosen to decide the merits of the case while also reminding the court of appeals of Cook’s edict. The majority claims Cook commands reversal because actually deciding this case would somehow “thwart the ‘principles of predictability, certainty and finality relied upon by litigants, counsel and the circuit courts.'” While those are indeed important principles, a new majority of this court did not hesitate to thwart them repeatedly last term. Setting aside the new majority’s newfound regard for the principles of predictability, certainty, and finality, none of them preclude us from deciding the merits of this case. A reversal premised on Cook, if warranted, should have been done summarily and promptly after the petition for certiorari was filed. Instead, by order of this court, both parties filed a complete set of briefs fully addressing the merits of the substantive issue in this case. The court accepted amicus briefs from three separate non-parties, each of whom explored various substantive legal issues. At oral argument, both parties agreed a decision on the merits was appropriate notwithstanding Cook. Nevertheless after ordering both parties to expend considerable time and resources and bear the substantial costs of appellate litigation—the majority deprives not only the parties but the people of Wisconsin of a decision on the merits. Perhaps the majority agrees with District IV and disagrees with District II. Then say so. By dodging the core issue, the majority not only burdens the litigants with its own inefficiency, it also leaves unresolved issues of great importance to voters, election officials, and people from whom courts have removed the right to vote due to incompetency. Because the time for resolving this matter under Cook has long since passed, I respectfully dissent. |
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