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Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The rule for this is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision. The “upshot” and “background” sections do not count as part of the 10 paragraphs because of their summary and necessary nature. We’ve also removed citations from the opinion for ease of reading but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. Italics indicate WJI insertions except for case names, which are also italicized. Case: State v. Luis A. Ramirez  Grassl Bradley Majority: Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley (17 pages), joined by Justices Annette Ziegler and Brian Hagedorn in full and by Justices Rebecca Dallet and Jill Karofsky except as to one paragraph and one footnote Concurrence: Chief Justice Ann Walsh Bradley (9 pages), joined by Justice Janet Protasiewicz Concurrence: Dallet (1 page), joined by Karofsky Concurrence: Karofsky (4 pages) Upshot The State sought this court’s review of a single issue: Whether Ramirez’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. We conclude it was not and reverse the court of appeals. Background Ramirez, an inmate at Columbia County Correctional Institution, stabbed a corrections officer in the head and neck with a sharpened pencil on May 5, 2015. At the time of the attack, Ramirez had already served 17 years of a 40-year sentence for armed robbery and battery to law enforcement officers. On February 1, 2016, the State filed a complaint charging Ramirez with battery by a prisoner and disorderly conduct. Delays in appointing counsel, then the replacement of counsel and requests by newly appointed defense counsel for adjournments meant the preliminary hearing was not complete until August 2016. Arraignment occurred in October 2016, and trial was set for April 2017. However, the state requested a continuance, and the trial was reset for September 2017. Because of a conflict with another trial (the Columbia County courthouse can support only one jury trial at a time), trial was rescheduled for April 2018. Further delay occurred. Defense counsel needed a continuance because of the need for health records from the Department of Corrections, so scheduling conferences were set for May 2018 and then August 2018. On September 26, 2018, almost 32 months after charges had been filed against him, Ramirez made a pro se speedy trial demand. The circuit court held an off-the-record telephone conference on October 3, 2018. Less than a week later, Ramirez’s counsel notified the court that October 11 was the earliest date on which he could meet with Ramirez, and that counsel would “report on the status of the case after that conference.” Nothing in the record indicates when counsel met with Ramirez or if counsel updated the court on the case’s status. On November 1, the court set a scheduling conference for December 5. On that date, the court scheduled a two-day jury trial to begin on April 3, 2019. On March 26, 2019, the State requested adjournment of the April 3 jury trial because the prosecutor was retiring and the newly assigned prosecutor needed additional time to prepare. Neither the defendant nor the victim objected to that request. The circuit court rescheduled the trial for December 3, 2019. On April 15, 2019, Ramirez filed a pro se motion to dismiss, alleging, among other things, that his speedy trial right had been infringed. The circuit court held a hearing to address Ramirez’s motion to dismiss on June 17 and denied it. On December 3, 2019, the jury trial began and Ramirez was convicted. Ramirez filed a postconviction motion to vacate the judgment of conviction and dismiss the case, alleging the 46-month delay in bringing him to trial after charges were filed violated his constitutional speedy trial right. The court denied Ramirez’s motion, and Ramirez appealed. On balance, the court of appeals decided Ramirez’s speedy trial right was violated. The court acknowledged the State did not deliberately seek to delay the trial, defense counsel did not object to the State’s requests for continuances, and Ramirez was “somewhat delayed” in asserting his right to a speedy trial. On the other hand, the court claimed that 46 months was “the longest total delay in any published constitutional speedy trial case in Wisconsin,” more than 31 months of the total delay was attributable to the State, and the State failed to explain sizable portions of the delay attributed to it. Additionally, the court noted that Ramirez asserted his speedy trial right twice, did not deliberately seek delay, and it took the State 14 months after Ramirez’s initial assertion to finally bring him to trial. Guts The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The United States Supreme Court has pronounced a four-factor balancing test (the Barker test) to determine whether a speedy trial right has been violated. Those factors include (1) the overall length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the speedy trial right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Like any balancing test, it requires the court to consider the totality of circumstances particular to the case. *** Based on the overwhelming weight of both binding and persuasive authority, the delay in this case—46 months—was considerably less than what courts generally require before finding prejudice as a matter of law. Even if the length of Ramirez’s delay was, as the court of appeals put it, “extreme”, it should not have been weighed “heavily” against the State until the other Barker factors—the reasons for the delay, whether the defendant asserted his speedy trial right, and whether the defendant experienced any prejudice from the delay—were considered. *** Delays attributable to the State are not limited to delays caused by the prosecution, and can include delays attributable to the court system itself. Delays attributable to the State are categorized as valid, neutral, or deliberate. A delay caused by the State for a “valid” reason is not weighed against it. Valid reasons for delay are those considered “intrinsic to the case itself,” such as adjournments required for competency evaluations or the absence of an essential witness. Periods of delay explained by neutral reasons are weighed against the State, but not heavily. Neutral reasons include the State’s negligence, overcrowded courts, inadequate judicial resources, and mounting caseloads. Periods of delay caused by deliberate or bad-faith conduct are weighed heavily against the State. *** … (W)e need not scrutinize every period of delay attributed to the State by the court of appeals. It is clear from the facts that, at worst, the periods of delay caused by the State were for neutral reasons. Consequently, we weigh the second Barker factor against the State, but not heavily. A defendant’s assertion of the speedy trial right is “entitled to strong evidentiary weight,” because it “is in itself probative of prejudice.” Although a defendant cannot waive his right to a speedy trial by failing to assert it, the “failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.” A defendant’s “delay in demanding a speedy trial will be weighed against him.” In this case, Ramirez’s delay in requesting a speedy trial was significant. Ramirez made his first pro se speedy trial request on September 26, 2018, nearly 32 months after charges were filed against him. On April 15, 2019, Ramirez filed a pro se motion to dismiss, in which he again asserted his right to a speedy trial. Ultimately, it took the State just over 14 months to bring Ramirez to trial after his first speedy trial request. Ramirez requested a speedy trial, which should weigh against the State. Because of the significant delay in asserting his speedy trial right, however, we weigh Ramirez’s assertion of the right only slightly in his favor. We consider three interests in assessing whether a defendant suffered prejudice due to a prolonged delay before trial: oppressive pretrial incarceration; anxiety and concern; and the possibility the defense will be impaired. In Barker, the third interest was described as “the most serious.” However, the Court has also described the impairment of liberty as a “core concern” of the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial protections. Ramirez was unable to establish any one of those three interests. While a defendant already incarcerated for a separate crime may be able to show he suffered prejudice in fact from a prolonged delay, Ramirez does not even argue this point on appeal, and the trial court rejected Ramirez’s generalized claims of anxiety and stress. Ramirez mainly contends he suffered prejudice as a matter of law simply from the length of the delay itself. While “the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time,” even the most generous reading of the facts favoring Ramirez— 958 days of neutral reasons for delay—alone does not warrant dismissal. We conclude the prejudice factor does not weigh in Ramirez’s favor. The paragraph and footnote that Dallet and Karofsky did not join discussed Walsh Bradley's concurrence.  Walsh Bradley Walsh Bradley Concurrence In view of the specific facts of this case, I agree with the majority that Ramirez’s speedy trial claim is ultimately unsuccessful due to his 32-month delay in asserting his speedy trial right and his failure to persuade that the remaining 14-month delay on its own constitutes a constitutional violation. However, I write separately because the majority creates a precedent that is too exacting on defendants seeking to demonstrate a speedy trial violation. Indeed, under the majority opinion’s analytical shortcut, it is difficult to imagine any determination of a speedy trial violation absent a delay of over six years or intentional dilatory tactics by the State. Especially in the current moment and considering the systemic challenges we face, such a result is untenable. *** Even though the majority correctly states the dual role of the first factor, this appears to be mere lip service. As the court of appeals observed, this case represents “the longest total delay reflected in any published constitutional speedy trial case from Wisconsin” in the last 50 years. Nevertheless, the majority casts aside the 46-month delay as “generally not long enough to declare a defendant prejudiced as a matter of law.” *** Is the majority creating a bright-line rule that anything under five to six years is not prejudicial? If so, that would appear to run counter to the United States Supreme Court’s instruction that speedy trial analyses must be conducted on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, “any inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case.” And if so, why draw the line there? In addition to being excessively long, a period of five to six years is wholly arbitrary. Why not four years? Why not three? This makes a mockery of the word “speedy.” Despite the significant length of the delay, the majority still says, “no matter,” because the reasons for the delays were “neutral.” It says that delays fall into one of three categories, “valid, neutral, or deliberate,” and then are “weighed accordingly.” Consequently, in contrast to the court of appeals’s thorough approach, which splits up and examines each time period of delay to determine the cause and attribution, the majority opinion states in a conclusory manner that “we need not scrutinize every period of delay attributed to the State by the court of appeals.” *** I fear that the rule arising from the majority’s analysis appears to be that as long as the delays are at least for “neutral” reasons, then there cannot be a speedy trial violation. Yet, delays caused by “neutral” reasons can drag on and on and on and on and on. *** In 2022, the state public defender opined that it would “take several years to clear a backlog of roughly 35,000 cases because of a shortage of public defenders.” In Wisconsin’s vast rural areas, especially in the northern part of the state, the problem has reached crisis levels. Although the data is admittedly at least seven years old, an article published in 2018 describes how “[o]ver 60% of the state’s attorneys practice law in major urban areas, leaving some counties in rural Wisconsin with attorney-to-resident ratios as high as 1:4,452.” In comparison, the statewide ratio is about 1:389. Additionally, the population that is practicing law in the rural north is rapidly aging. As of 2018, “[a]cross the northern half of the state, only six of the forty attorneys in Vilas County are under the age of fifty, and Florence and Pepin counties have no lawyers under fifty. Oconto County has two, and no new attorneys have moved into the county in the last decade.” In total, as of that time, “[n]ine counties in northern Wisconsin ha[d] ten or fewer active attorneys.” Although this data is now seven years old, the problem has certainly not abated. In fact, it has only worsened. As of 2024, the number of active attorneys in Wisconsin had dropped four percent over the last four years, while the number of attorneys in rural Wisconsin had plummeted by seven percent. Eight counties have no certified private bar attorneys to take cases when the state public defender cannot represent a defendant. Such a shortage “not only impacts the constitutional rights of defendants—it also affects victims and our communities.” Despite intervening attempts to address the root causes of the shortage, the problem persists. The shortage of lawyers in rural areas is a systemic problem, not an intentional one, putting it at risk of being termed “neutral” in the parlance of the majority’s speedy trial analysis. It is possible that a defendant could spend months or even years awaiting the appointment of an attorney, a necessity for any trial, much less a speedy one. And as the majority opinion demonstrates, when a delay is termed neutral, good luck to a defendant in succeeding on a speedy trial claim.  Dallet Dallet Concurrence Although I agree with and join nearly all of the majority/lead opinion, I do not join paragraph 37 and footnote 6. These portions of the opinion, which levy criticism against Chief Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and her concurrence, are unnecessarily dismissive and adversarial in tone, and they detract from what is otherwise a well-written and well-reasoned opinion. In our opinions, as in life, we must strive to disagree without being disagreeable. Because the majority/lead opinion fails to do so, I respectfully concur.  Karofsky Karofsky Concurrence
I agree with the majority opinion and join it. I write separately, however, to emphasize that our constitution and statutes require a court to balance the rights of victims alongside those of the State and defendants in speedy trial cases. . . . . In Barker v. Wingo, the United States Supreme Court set forth a four-part test to assess whether a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right has been violated. Under Barker, a court balances (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the speedy trial right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. "[N]one of the four factors identified above a[re] either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process." (Emphasis is Karofsky's.) *** Concurrent to the rights of a defendant, our constitution and statutes guarantee each victim a range of rights, which are to be protected “by law in a manner no less vigorous than the protections afforded to the accused.” The importance of protecting a victim’s rights is echoed again in a statute: “[T]he rights extended in this chapter to victims and witnesses of crime are honored and protected by law enforcement agencies, prosecutors and judges in a manner no less vigorous than the protections afforded criminal defendants.” (Emphasis is Karofsky's.) The Wisconsin Constitution provides that a victim is to “be treated with dignity, respect, courtesy, sensitivity, and fairness.” These rights are consistent with the federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act, and are mirrored in most states. Under the constitution, a victim also has a right to a timely disposition that is protected from “unreasonable delay.” These rights, echoed in our statutes, protect a victim from the stress of unresolved matters. This makes sense: a “lengthy pretrial delay might force a victim of violent crime to continually relive the trauma of the crime in trial preparation . . . .” When a court is deciding whether to grant a motion for a continuance or a motion for a dismissal, it needs to consider the victim. In the context of a motion for continuance, a court should consider that a victim’s right to “[f]airness requires, for example, that the victim be given the opportunity to be heard on the matter of a delay requested by the defendant, especially in light of the victim’s right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.” A court must also ensure a victim has been consulted and heard prior to granting a motion for dismissal. The rights afforded to a victim are not at odds with the Barker test. Instead, these rights reflect additional considerations to be weighed by a court, so that a victim’s rights are protected alongside the State’s and a defendant’s rights. A court tasked with analyzing speedy trial cases needs to balance the constitutional and statutory rights of all involved. As it relates to Barker’s “difficult and sensitive balancing process” a court must consider the crime victim. The four factors of Barker cannot be treated as talismanic; a victim’s rights must always be part of any judicial balancing.
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