The Ziegler dissent

This deal was sealed on election night. Four justices remap Wisconsin even though this constitutional responsibility is to occur every ten years, after a census, by the other two branches of government. The public understands this. Nonetheless, four justices impose their will on the entire Assembly and half of the Senate, all of whom are up for election in 2024. Almost every legislator in the state will need to respond, with lightning speed, to the newly minted maps, deciding if they can or want to run, and scrambling to find new candidates for new districts. All of this remains unknown until the court of four, and its hired "consultants," reveal the answer. The parties' dilatory behavior in bringing this suit at this time should not be rewarded by the court's granting of such an extreme remedy, along such a constrained timeline. Big change is ahead. The new majority seems to assume that their job is to remedy "rigged" maps which cause an "inability to achieve a Democratic majority in the state legislature." These departures from the judicial role are terribly dangerous to our constitutional, judicial framework. No longer is the judicial branch the least dangerous in Wisconsin.
 
Redistricting was just decided by this court in the Johnson litigation (the court’s redistricting litigation in 2021 and 2022). This court was saddled with the responsibility to adopt maps because the legislative and executive branches were at an impasse, and absent court action, there would be a constitutional crisis. As a result of Johnson, there are census-responsive maps in place. Nonetheless, the four robe-wearers grab power and fast-track this partisan call to remap Wisconsin. Giving preferential treatment to a case that should have been denied, smacks of judicial activism on steroids. The court of four takes a wrecking ball to the law, making no room, nor having any need, for longstanding practices, procedures, traditions, the law, or even their co-equal fellow branches of government. Their activism damages the judiciary as a whole. Regrettably, I must dissent.
 
The court of four's outcome-based, end-justifies-the-means judicial activist approach conflates the balance of governmental power the people separated into three separate branches, to but one: the judiciary.  Such power-hungry activism is dangerous to our constitutional framework and undermines the judiciary. When four members of this court "throw off constraints, revise the rules of decision, and set the law on a new course," it is prudent for all of us to "question whether that power has been exercised judiciously" or whether it is instead an exercise in judicial activism. Today is the latest in a series of power grabs by this new rogue court of four, creating a pattern of illicit power aggregation which disrupts, if not destroys, stability in the law.
 
                                                                                                              ***

Unfortunately, this latest unlawful power grab is not an outlier, but is further evidence of a bold, agenda-driven pattern of conduct. To set the stage, recall that these four members of the court came out swinging, when they secretly and unilaterally planned and dispensed with court practices, procedures, traditions, and norms. Preordained and planned even before day one of the new justice's term on August 1, 2023, but unknown to the other members of the court, the four acted to aggregate power, meeting in secret as a "super-legislature." They met behind closed doors, at a rogue, unscheduled and illegitimate meeting, over the protestations of their colleagues, in violation of longstanding court rules and procedures. Even before day one of the newest justice's term, and before the court term started in September, they met, in secret, to carry out their plan, only known to them, to dispense with over 40 years of court-defined precedent. They even took the unprecedented action to strip the constitutional power of the chief justice, which had been understood for decades of chief justices and different court membership, instead usurping that role through an administrative committee. For nearly four decades and five chief justices, every member of the court had respected the power the people of Wisconsin constitutionally vested in the chief justice to administrate the court system.

                                                                                                            ***
 
(J)ust last year in Johnson, the court determined, and all agreed, that the maps complied with the contiguity requirement. "Contiguity for state assembly districts is satisfied when a district boundary follows the municipal boundaries. Municipal  'islands' are legally contiguous with the municipality to which the 'island' belongs." Even the parties now arguing that the maps are not contiguous recognize that the contiguity requirement has been deemed satisfied not only in the maps the parties submitted in the Johnson litigation, but also in the maps the state has relied on for the last 60 to 70 years.
 
Moreover, every person who wished to have a say or participate in the Johnson litigation was welcome to do so and did. No one sought reconsideration of the Johnson litigation while it was within their power to do so. Johnson went all the way to the United States Supreme Court and back. Some of the litigants now were part of the Johnson litigation, some chose not to engage. But the law imposes consequences for those who choose to sit out of litigation entirely, and for those who stipulate to or do not make an argument in litigation. Finality of litigation does not endow one with the authority to wait to see what happens in that litigation cycle, forego timely filing a motion for reconsideration, and then bring arguments years after the fact, with the only intervening change being the court's composition. Four members of this court choose to not let pesky parameters like finality or other foundational judicial principles, or even the constitution, stand in the way of the predetermined political outcome which they seem preordained to deliver. Given the new court of four's conduct so far, we can expect more such judicial mischief in the future. On their watch, Wisconsin is poised to become a litigation nightmare. What is next?
 
                                                                                                              ***
  
(T)his original action is wrongly taken and decided for a host of heretofore understood and respected legally-binding tenets. However, the court of four glosses right over them.

• For starters, this original action fails as it amounts to nothing more than an untimely motion for reconsideration of this court's decision in Johnson, which is now time-barred.
  
• The proponents of this case and the majority fail to meaningfully address stare decisis. This legal principle demands a "respect for prior decisions" such as this court's decisions throughout the Johnson litigation "[as] fundamental to the rule of law."
  
• It overlooks that parties such as the Governor and the Citizen Mathematicians and Scientists28 are judicially estopped from advancing different positions now from the positions they took in the Johnson litigation.
  
• Similarly, laches bars these claims, as "equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights."
• The majority's analysis turns a blind eye to the fact that "[i]n order to have standing to sue, a party must have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy," a personal stake not met by those who do not reside in these alleged municipal islands and especially for those who merely border these "municipal islands" of which more than a third contain zero residents.
• And, this case is barred by claim and issue preclusion principles, which "are designed to limit the relitigation of issues that have been actually litigated in a previous action" and "extends to all claims that either were or could have been asserted in the previous litigation."

 
                                                                                                               ***

To be clear, this case is nothing more than a now time-barred motion to reconsider Johnson. An honest look at the plain law would require that this petition be dismissed. Instead, the creative legal machinations engaged in by the masters of this lawsuit, emboldened and encouraged by the new court of four, requires mind-boggling contortion of the law to achieve a particular political outcome. Sadly, judicial activism is once again alive and well in Wisconsin, creating great instability.

                                                                                                              ***
 
(R)ejecting the Johnson I dissent's assertion that the task of adopting remedial maps required this court to rule as a partisan actor, we adopted "[a] least-change approach[, which] is the most consistent, neutral, and appropriate use of our limited judicial power to remedy the constitutional violations in this case." Least change, as a framework this court put forward throughout the Johnson litigation, properly reflects the limited role the judicial branch plays in redistricting, as it is the legislature, not the judiciary, which is granted constitutional authority to redistrict. Least change remains the law. Until today. Now, the majority, citing to nothing, declares instead that the standard this court implemented barely two years ago "is unworkable in practice," simply so that they can overrule it, and move this institution down the darkened path of outcome-based judicial activism.
 
                                                                                                             ***

Ziegler then discusses at length the issues of stare decisis (adherence to precedents), standing (ability to sue), judicial estoppel (a party asserting inconsistent positions during litigation), issue preclusion (barring an argument that was previously decided, claim preclusion (barring an argument that could have been previously decided), laches (sitting on one’s rights), and due process.
 
                                                                                                            ***

In the issue preclusion discussion:
As a side note, the parties attempted to backdoor considerations of "partisan fairness" or "partisan gerrymandering" back into the court's analysis by way of at least initially confining it to the remedy phase. The majority continues that ill-fated venture of taking up an issue that both this court and the United States Supreme Court have determined is non-justiciable,67 by attempting to wrap it up in the perhaps more pleasant euphemism of "partisan impact," which the majority "will consider. . . . when evaluating remedial maps." Never mind figuring out how exactly the majority plans to go about evaluating "partisan impact" or determining how much "partisan impact" is permissible and how much is too much. They provide no measurable standard for calculating it. Apparently then, it is for them to know, and for us to find out! "The fact that the majority imposes its own unique and undefined standard further demonstrates that it exercises its will rather than its judgment."

                                                                                                         ***
 
This court must not allow a non-justiciable, political question like partisan fairness to be camouflaged into the majority's decision. The majority declines to put forward a measurable standard by which this court is supposed to define or determine "partisan impact," demonstrating that they "exercise[]. . . . [their] will rather than [their] judgment." Their standard-deficient approach evokes recollections of the "eyeballing" tests from bygone legal eras encapsulated in "we'll know it when we see it" terminology. This court has already addressed the issues of partisan gerrymandering and political fairness, as well as contiguity. Issue preclusion bars us now from allowing these relevant parties to relitigate what has already been litigated.

                                                                                                         ***
 
In the laches discussion:
This court had a different composition two years ago, but that fact alone cannot be why these parties chose not to actively participate in that litigation at that time. To the dispassionate observer, such contortions of the law appear questionable and should come with consequences. Surprisingly, the parties are forthright enough to tell us themselves that this is in fact their reason for bringing this claim now—after waiting two years in alleged ongoing state of harm—to ensure that this case coincided with the changed composition of the court. It defies reason for parties to sit out litigation, obtain the benefit of seeing how arguments are presented, and then with that benefit of hindsight, bring their now modified claims over the same issues, with the same legal representation, at their leisure, years later. It further defies reason that given those same facts, and the fact that the respondents would not have had knowledge of the parties bringing new claims over the same maps a year later, that the parties can now demand that this court provide them an extraordinary remedy (overturning decades of precedent and the votes of millions of Wisconsinites), and do so in a constrained timeframe of mere months before another round of elections gets underway. Such unnecessary fast tracking due to the parties' own inexplicable delay may rightfully raise questions of intrusion on the opposing party's rights to fully litigate the claims presented.

                                                                                                        ***
In the due process discussion:
The parties interested in Justice Protasiewicz's election are intricately involved with, and beneficiaries of, the case they filed directly before her in this original action right after she was sworn in. Their timing of selecting her as their judge and then bringing this petition is irrefutable. Now, the four members of the court have fast-tracked this litigation, bypassing and rushing the traditional court steps, processes, and the law.

                                                                                                       ***
 
In conclusion:
This original action should never have been accepted. It is nothing more than a motion for reconsideration, which is time-barred; ignores stare decisis, standing, judicial estoppel, issue preclusion, claim preclusion, and laches. Not only is this a fundamentally legally flawed proceeding for these preceding listed reasons, but it also raises serious question regarding . . . whether this proceeding is a violation of litigants’ due process rights. What’s next? Pre-selected “consultants” who will decide the fate of Wisconsin voters even though the Wisconsin Supreme Court already decided these issues conclusively in the Johnson litigation? Will these “consultants” be endowed with the authority to reach all factual and legal conclusions necessary to draw the maps, while evading review and the constitutional protections due the parties? The four rogue members of the court have upended judicial practices, procedures, and norms, as well as legal practices, procedures, and precedent, yielding only to sheer will to create a particularized outcome which will please a particular constituency. At a minimum, this is harmful to the judicial branch and the institution as a whole. I dissent.

The court provided additional examples with images.​

                                                                                                              ***

In total, at least 50 assembly districts and at least 20 senate districts include separate, detached parts. That is to say, a majority of the districts in both the assembly and the senate do not consist of "contiguous territory" within the meaning of Article IV, Section 4, nor are they "of convenient contiguous territory" within the meaning of Article IV, Section 5. Therefore, we hold that the non-contiguous legislative districts violate the Wisconsin Constitution.

                                                                                                              ***

As we declared above, the current legislative maps contain districts that violate Article IV, Sections 4 and 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution. At least 50 of 99 assembly districts and at least 20 of 33 senate districts contain territory completely disconnected from the rest of the district. Given this pervasiveness, a remedy modifying the boundaries of the non-contiguous districts will cause a ripple effect across other areas of the state as populations are shifted throughout. Consequently, it is necessary to enjoin the use of the legislative maps as a whole, rather than only the non-contiguous districts. We therefore enjoin the Wisconsin Elections Commission from using the current legislative maps in all future elections. Accordingly, remedial legislative district maps must be adopted. We recognize that next year's legislative elections are fast-approaching, and that remedial maps must be adopted in time for the fall primary in August 2024. With that in mind, the following section first describes the role of the court in the remedial process. Second, we articulate the principles the court will follow when adopting remedial maps. . . .

It is essential to emphasize that the legislature, not this court, has the primary authority and responsibility for drawing assembly and senate districts. Therefore, when an existing plan is declared unconstitutional, it is "appropriate, whenever practicable, to afford a reasonable opportunity for the legislature to meet constitutional requirements by adopting a substitute measure." There may be exceptions to this general rule, but we decline Petitioners' request to apply one here. Should the legislative process produce a map that remedies the contiguity issues discussed above, there would be no need for this court to adopt remedial maps.

We remain cognizant, however, of the possibility that the legislative process may not result in remedial maps. In such an instance, it is this court's role to adopt valid remedial maps. The United States Supreme Court has specifically recognized the ability of a state judiciary to remedy unconstitutional legislative districts by crafting new remedial maps. And this court has exercised such authority in the past when faced with unconstitutional maps. If the legislative process does not result in remedial legislative maps, then it will be the job of this court to adopt remedial maps.

                                                                                                              ***
The court then rejected and overruled the “least change” approach used in the Johnson cases (meaning that remedial maps should reflect the least change from the prior maps) because the court had failed to agree on what "least change" meant and the method was shown to be “unworkable in practice.”

The following principles will guide our process in adopting remedial legislative maps. First, the remedial maps must comply with population equality requirements. State and federal law require a state's population to be distributed equally amongst legislative districts with only minor deviations. When it comes to population equality, courts are held to a higher standard than state legislatures as we have a "judicial duty to 'achieve the goal of population equality with little more than de minimis variation.'" 

Second, districts must meet the basic requirements set out in Article IV of the Wisconsin Constitution. Assembly districts must be (a) bounded by county, precinct, town or ward lines; (b) composed of contiguous territory; and (c) in as compact form as practicable. Senate districts must be composed of "convenient contiguous territory." Additionally, districts must be single-member districts that meet the numbering and nesting requirements set out in Article IV, Sections 2, 4, and 5.

                                                                                                            ***
 
Third, remedial maps must comply with all applicable federal law. In addition to the population equality requirement discussed above, maps must comply with the Equal Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

Fourth, the court will consider other traditional districting criteria not specifically outlined in the Wisconsin or United States Constitution, but still commonly considered by courts tasked with formulating maps. These other traditional districting criteria include reducing municipal splits and preserving communities of interest. These criteria will not supersede constitutionally mandated criteria, such as equal population requirements, but may be considered when evaluating submitted maps.

Fifth, we will consider partisan impact when evaluating remedial maps. When granting the petition for original action that commenced this case, we declined to hear the issue of whether extreme partisan gerrymandering violates the Wisconsin Constitution. As such, we do not decide whether a party may challenge an enacted map on those grounds.

However, that does not mean that we will ignore partisan impact in adopting remedial maps. Unlike the legislative and executive branches, which are political by nature, this court must remain politically neutral. We do not have free license to enact maps that privilege one political party over another. Our political neutrality must be maintained regardless of whether a case involves an extreme partisan gerrymandering challenge. As we have stated, "judges should not select a plan that seeks partisan advantage—that seeks to change the ground rules so that one party can do better than it would do under a plan drawn up by persons having no political agenda—even if they would not be entitled to invalidate an enacted plan that did so." Other courts have held the same.

It bears repeating that courts can, and should, hold themselves to a different standard than the legislature regarding the partisanship of remedial maps. As a politically neutral and independent institution, we will take care to avoid selecting remedial maps designed to advantage one political party over another. Importantly, however, it is not possible to remain neutral and independent by failing to consider partisan impact entirely. As the Supreme Court (has) recognized . . . "this politically mindless approach may produce, whether intended or not, the most grossly gerrymandered results." As such, partisan impact will necessarily be one of many factors we will consider in adopting remedial legislative maps, and like the traditional districting criteria discussed above, consideration of partisan impact will not supersede constitutionally mandated criteria such as equal apportionment or contiguity.

The dissent

Ballot question challenges have been few and far between in the history of our state. Such a challenge reached this court in State ex rel. Ekern v. Zimmerman (1925). There, the court established a test for our review of a ballot question challenge: "it must reasonably, intelligently, and fairly comprise or have reference to every essential of the amendment."

Yet rather than respecting the precedent of a nearly century-old unanimous opinion, the majority charts a new course not requested by either party. Instead of applying the test established in Ekern, the majority conjures its own test, never before stated, much less applied.

Specifically, the majority sets forth that "[a] ballot question could violate [the] constitutional requirement only in the rare circumstance that the question is fundamentally counterfactual such that voters were not asked to approve the actual amendment." In addition to being created by the majority from whole cloth, this new test is unnecessary for the simple reason that we already have a test from Ekern.

The majority arrives at its newly discovered test by tossing precedent to the wind and engaging in an unconvincing search for the "original meaning" of the state constitution's command that the legislature "submit" a proposed amendment to the people. As Justice Dallet's concurrence aptly explains, the endeavor of divining the "original meaning" of a constitutional provision is largely a futile endeavor.

But even setting this aside, the majority's analysis rests on an infirm foundation. It erroneously dismisses the Ekern test, and instead creates and applies a newly-minted test, resulting in an overly permissive approach that risks giving the legislature carte blanche in crafting ballot questions.

I would follow our precedent set forth in Ekern. Applying the Ekern framework, I determine instead that the ballot question here failed to convey "every essential" of the amendment as is required. From the ballot question only, voters would have no idea that the proposed amendment diminishes the rights of criminal defendants in addition to bolstering the rights of crime victims. In my view, the diminution of a defendant's rights previously protected by law, constitutes an "essential" element of the amendment. Because the ballot question failed to accurately represent an essential element of the law to the voters who approved it, I respectfully dissent.

                                                                                                             ***

This court in Ekern set forth what the parties refer to as the "every essential" test. It requires that a ballot question "must reasonably, intelligently, and fairly comprise or have reference to every essential of the amendment." As the court of appeals observes in its certification in the present case, this court has not expanded on what it really means for a ballot question to include "every essential" and this case presents an opportunity for the court to explain and apply this court's statement in Ekern.
​
But instead of taking that opportunity, the majority simply dispenses with Ekern. In the majority's view, the "every essential" test is no test at all, but is instead just an "explanatory statement." Such a characterization would be news to the court in State ex rel. Thomson v. Zimmerman (1953), who noted (although did not decide) a controversy over whether a ballot question "fairly comprised every essential of the amendment." And it most certainly is news to the parties here, who both argued their positions in terms of the "every essential" framework Ekern set forth.

                                                                                                            ***

Of note is that no party here asked us to overrule Ekern. Indeed, WEC argued within the confines of Ekern that the ballot question at issue provided "every essential" of the amendment. We have thus been provided no special justification for overruling Ekern. As such, I would maintain the Ekern test. Doing so not only respects the precedent established by the courts who came before us, but in this case furthers the aims of democratic governance. Making sure that a ballot question includes "every essential" of an amendment ensures that the public is informed and can "vote intelligently." This is critical to maintaining a democracy.

                                                                                                           ***
 
. . . (T)he ballot question here fails. I begin my analysis with the essential fact, recognized by the circuit court, that the victim's rights amendment does more than just increase the rights of crime victims. The majority fails to acknowledge this. Instead, it opines: "all of the provisions of Marsy's Law relate to expanding and defining victim's rights and tend to effect and carry out this general purpose."

Several provisions of the amendment do, in fact, decrease the rights afforded to criminal defendants. For example, the amendment limits the rights of criminal defendants in the following ways:

• Where the previous version of § 9m stated that "[n]othing in this section, or in any statute enacted pursuant to this section, shall limit any right of the accused which may be provided by law," the new version protects only the federal constitutional rights of the defendant, not the broader protection of "any right . . . provided by law." The change allows for a limitation of the defendant's rights that are provided by statute, or by the Wisconsin Constitution, which may afford greater protections than its federal counterpart.
• The amendment adversely impacts the defendant's ability to obtain discovery, giving victims the constitutional right "[t]o refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request made by the accused or any person acting on behalf of the accused."

• The circuit court's ability to sequester a victim witness where "sequestration is necessary to a fair trial for the defendant" has been removed.

                                                                                                          ***

Shouldn't the voters be informed that a constitutional amendment diminishes the rights of criminal defendants before voting on it? In light of these provisions, it is apparent that the amendment serves dual "purposes," both expanding the rights of victims and diminishing those of the accused.
 
By any definition of the word, such a change is an "essential" aspect of an amendment. Accordingly, a voter would need to be informed of the change before voting "intelligently." Its lack of inclusion has the significant potential to mislead voters as to the consequences of their votes. 

                                                                                                         ***
. . . (T)he ballot question is the only text that all voters are guaranteed to see. Those voters who do not research a proposed amendment beforehand will see the ballot question, and only the ballot question, prior to casting their vote. This gives the framing provided by the ballot question considerable power in shaping how voters think about and understand the question presented.

That ballot question language possesses this power to frame the issue in turn dictates that the language provide an accurate picture of the measure that is placed before the voters. To this end, we should maintain the vitality of judicial review in the ballot question context, rather than essentially surrendering our responsibility for judicial review to the legislature. Democracy works best when voters are fully informed. The majority opinion takes a step backward in this endeavor.

When we arrived in Crivello’s courtroom we were seated by number. The space was cramped with 30 prospective jurors, two people at the defendant’s table, two people at the prosecution’s table, a court reporter, two clerks, and a bailiff.

The judge introduced the parties and the charges. The defendant was charged with two counts of recklessly endangering safety and one count of felon in possession of a firearm. I was surprised to see he was dressed in an orange jumpsuit and was “pro se” (representing himself). On multiple occasions Crivello explained that these were his choices, and his choices alone.

Next came questioning called “voir dire,” which Crivello informed the panel meant “to speak the truth.” Crivello asked about disabilities, hearing, our collective ability to remain objective, and any experiences with the criminal justice system that might make us unfit for this jury. Despite grumbling outside the courtroom, every prospective juror was fully on board to participate. No one attempted lame excuses about why they couldn’t be there; no one cited dubious bias that would prevent them from participating. Having conducted many jury trials as a lawyer, I was surprised and impressed by the genuine and full responses given to the judge. Then we broke for lunch, which included an additional hour of unanticipated waiting.

When we finally returned to the courtroom, the defendant had changed out of his jumpsuit and put on a dress shirt and slacks. We were each asked to stand and tell the court our first name, occupation, marital status and spouse’s occupation, the name and age of any children, where in the county we resided, and a hobby. Once everyone had completed this, the state was permitted to ask questions of individuals. There was significant follow-up for those in the medical field – whether they’d dealt with trauma and gunshot wounds – curious given a lack of charge for assault or anything resulting in bodily injury.

Finally, the defendant asked us questions. Instead of asking questions of individuals, he asked the group whether we would be fair to him, whether we would hold it against him that he was representing himself, and whether we thought we could make the effort to understand him, even though everyone else in the courtroom was professionally trained. On more than one occasion Crivello corrected him or reminded him what was and was not permissible, cutting him short whenever he asked to make a record. With that, we were excused from the courtroom.

Next came a final stretch of waiting. I suspect from experience that the defendant was likely permitted to make whatever record he wanted and the parties then haggled over who would be kicked for cause (because they indicated they could not be unbiased or had some other impediment to service) and who would be each side’s peremptory strikes (Wisconsin law permits each side to eliminate four jurors without reason). Fourteen jurors (twelve impaneled and two alternates) were selected from the first 26 of us. I was last in the box, number 30, so the math to be selected was never in my favor. That was it. We were released and again sent back to jury management at 4 p.m.

Jury duty is a lot of waiting, and nearly everyone complained. For most people it’s also a lot of wondering about the many conversations taking place behind closed doors. In the end, though, I enjoyed it and I suspect – deep down – a lot of other people did too. The stakes are high. Everyone treats everything with reverence and respect. In an age when that’s difficult to come by, it was refreshing to know that decorum and civil duty live on in the Milwaukee County Courthouse, at least on this day. ​

By Margo Kirchner
 
A judge denied JusticePoint’s motion for a preliminary injunction to maintain its contract providing services to low-income individuals facing citations in Milwaukee Municipal Court.
 
Milwaukee County Circuit Judge J.D. Watts issued his ruling in writing after hearing arguments on Thursday afternoon. He stayed his decision for a month to allow JusticePoint time to appeal and ask the court of appeals for a longer stay.
 
JusticePoint has run Milwaukee’s Municipal Court Alternative Services Program (MCAP) since 2015. Some of the organization’s staff have worked on the MCAP for four decades.
 
The goal of the MCAP is to help low-income municipal court defendants comply with alternatives to forfeiture payments (such as community service) and find needed social services like mental health or drug abuse treatment. JusticePoint is paid by the city for running the MCAP; those using the MCAP services pay nothing.
 
In spring 2023, Milwaukee Municipal Court officials told JusticePoint that judges were troubled by how JusticePoint was sharing citations with Legal Action of Wisconsin attorneys who represented municipal court defendants. The citations are public records that the attorneys would be entitled to receive upon request. JusticePoint stated at a public meeting in June that the practice of sharing citations was discussed with city officials years ago and no one objected to it until recently.
 
In May, city officials notified JusticePoint that its contract would terminate effective July 11. The city cited a contract provision allowing termination for “convenience.” Otherwise, the contract would have continued through Dec. 31, 2023, with a remaining one-year renewal allowing extension through 2024.
 
JusticePoint sued the city on July 10, moving for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to keep the contract in place. JusticePoint alleged that the termination on short notice without a right to cure violated the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law (WFDL).
 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Hannah Dugan granted a TRO on July 10, keeping JusticePoint’s contract alive until Thursday’s hearing.
 
Attorney Jeffrey Mandell represented JusticePoint at the hearing. Attorney Kathryn Block represented the city.
 
Mandell noted a lack of any evidence submitted by the city regarding the motion and walked through the WFDL statutory provisions and caselaw.
 
Under the WFDL, a dealership exists when a person or entity “is granted the right to sell or distribute goods or services” or use a trademark, and when a “community of interest” exists. Mandell argued that JusticePoint distributes city services to the individuals using the MCAP and that JusticePoint had invested in the program, meeting the definition.
 
Watts questioned Mandell about the lack of financial payment by those using JusticePoint’s services and discussed several cases regarding distribution of services.
 
The city did not dispute that a municipality may be considered the grantor of a dealership under the WFDL. Block instead focused her comments on city contracting requirements. Watts indicated that city rules on contract procurement had no bearing on whether the WFDL applied in the case. 
 
After a brief recess, Watts returned to court with a written decision finding that JusticePoint’s relationship with the city was not a dealership under the WFDL. He said that JusticePoint’s argument was “a bridge too far” regarding application of the WFDL.
 
In the written decision Watts found that JusticePoint distributes its own services, not those of the city. “The City did not have these services. The City had to go out and contract with JP to obtain them. The services that JP provided were uniquely JP’s,” he wrote.
 
He also found no community of interest between the parties because JusticePoint received no money from the individuals served. Money it invested in the contract services was done on its own behalf, not on the city’s, he said. 
 
Watts set a hearing on Nov. 8 to discuss lifting the stay of his decision if JusticePoint has not appealed and sought a stay from the court of appeals by that date. The stay means that the JusticePoint contract remains in place for another month unless JusticePoint chooses not to appeal.
 
Mandell said he needed to discuss the issue of appeal with his client.
 
Judge Molly Gena did not take office until May 1, 2023, and in a public meeting in June said she was not involved in the decision to terminate JusticePoint’s contract. Milwaukee Municipal Court Administrator Sheldyn Himle stated publicly in June that the decision to terminate the contract was made by the two other Milwaukee municipal judges, Phil Chavez and Valarie Hill. 
 
The city in its brief on the motion for preliminary injunction said no other vendor is in place to take over from JusticePoint. The city said it was “confident that another competitive procurement” will draw other vendors and that “[i]n the interim, Judges are able to make direct referrals to social service agencies without the need for a vendor intervening in the process.”