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By Margo Kirchner The Supreme Court of Florida on Nov. 30 held that police officers involved in shootings cannot keep their names from the public under a Florida victims’ rights constitutional provision. The constitutional provision, known as Marsy’s Law, does not guarantee to a victim a “categorical right to withhold his or her name,” the court said. Marsy’s Law has been adopted as a constitutional amendment in similar forms in several states, including Wisconsin. The Florida version provides that victims, starting at the time of victimization, have the right “to prevent the disclosure of information or records that could be used to locate or harass the victim or the victim’s family, or which could disclose confidential or privileged information of the victim.” The court concluded that protection of information that could be used to locate or harass does “not encompass the victim’s identity.” “(I)t is one thing to identify a person and another altogether to locate or harass him or her,” the court wrote. “One’s name, standing alone . . . communicates nothing about where the individual can be found and bothered.” The court noted that another constitutional provision regarding release of medical records and statutes regarding confidential informants expressly address protection of identity, while Marsy’s Law does not. In addition, an interpretation allowing withholding of identities would conflict with an accused’s rights to confront adverse witnesses at trial, said the court. The case arose from two City of Tallahassee police shootings for which officers claimed self-defense. The men shot by police did not survive. Grand juries investigated and concluded that the shootings were justified. Reporters sought the names of the officers. The city planned to release them, but the Florida Police Benevolent Association sought an injunction against release, arguing that the officers were victims of the decedents’ attacks and under Marsy’s Law could keep their names from being disclosed. Wisconsin’s version of Marsy’s Law does not contain a provision barring disclosure of information that could be used to locate or harass a victim. Wisconsin’s version instead grants victims the right to privacy. Oshkosh police and some other Wisconsin police departments with officer shootings involving self-defense claims have been citing that right to privacy as a basis for withholding officers’ names from the press and public. The Florida case is City of Tallahassee v. Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc. 
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As we await opinions from the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's new term, we've gone back to a few decisions from last term to crunch them down to size. Note: This one is a little different. WJI's "SCOW docket" pieces generally include decisions, dissents, and concurrences all in one post. This time, with this case, we are doing it in three: first the decision, then the dissent, then the concurrences. Why? Because this package of writings is extremely important for future ballot questions regarding state constitutional amendments. Besides that, the SCOW decisions are unusually long – 111 pages in all, not counting the cover sheets. Plus, it's a case that WJI cares a lot about. Instead of allowing each writing justice 10 paragraphs, we are giving the majority opinion writer 18 and each other opinion writer 15. Other than that, the rules remain the same. The "upshot" and "background" sections do not count as part of the paragraph restrictions because of their summary and very necessary nature. We've removed citations from the opinion for ease of reading, but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. Italics indicate WJI insertions except for case names and emphasis added by the opinion writer, all of which also are italicized. The case: Wisconsin Justice Initiative, Inc., et al. v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, et al. Majority opinion: Justice Brian Hagedorn (42 pages), joined in full by Chief Justice Annette Ziegler and Justices Patience Roggensack and Rebecca Grassl Bradley, joined in part by Justices Rebecca Frank Dallet and Jill J. Karofsky Concurrence: Grassl Bradley (14 pages), joined by Ziegler and Roggensack Concurrence: Dallet (32 pages), joined in full by Karofsky, joined in part by Justice Ann Walsh Bradley Concurrence: Hagedorn (9 pages), joined in part by Dallet Dissent: Walsh Bradley (14 pages)   Grassl Bradley Grassl Bradley Concurrence I join the majority opinion and write separately to explain why the "every essential" test is incompatible with the political question doctrine. As the majority holds, whether a ballot question states "every essential" of a proposed amendment is non-cognizable. Nevertheless, three justices cast themselves as legal writing professors with the power to grade the legislature's work. Justice Rebecca Frank Dallet, joined by Justice Jill J. Karofsky, writes in concurrence to give the legislature's work a passing grade, while Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, in dissent, gives the legislature an F. This court lacks the authority these justices would usurp from the legislature. The "every essential" test is incompatible with the political question doctrine for at least two reasons. First, Article XII, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution assigns the legislature, not the judiciary, the power to determine the manner by which a proposed amendment is submitted to the people. It states, in relevant part: “[I]t shall be the duty of the legislature to submit such proposed amendment . . . to the people in such manner and at such time as the legislature shall prescribe; . . . provided, that if more than one amendment be submitted, they shall be submitted in such manner that the people may vote for or against such amendments separately.” Self-evidently, while this provision requires the legislature to submit a proposed amendment to the people, it also gives the legislature, not the judiciary, the power to determine how that submission occurs. The constitution imposes only one textually-expressed limitation on the legislature's power to determine the manner of submission: "if more than one amendment be submitted," the people must be able to vote on each separately. The judiciary does not have the authority to compel the legislature to exercise its power over the manner of submission in a particular way. As explained more thoroughly below, this court possesses the power to determine whether a proposed amendment was even submitted to the people, but such a claim is distinguishable from a complaint about an unartful manner of submission. This case accordingly presents a separation of powers issue. As one amicus curiae explains, "[i]f affirmed, the circuit court's decision could force the [l]egislature to use new language that no longer expresses the [l]egislature's desired meaning. . . . [T]he [l]egislature presumptively chose those words for a reason[.]" Challenges to the manner of submission are therefore "beyond the purview of judicial review" because they present purely political questions. The desire of Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, Dallet, and Karofsky to entertain these political questions would likely spawn "defensive" ballot question drafting. The legislature could, for example, quote the proposed amendment verbatim on the ballot, perhaps satisfying the values-based concerns of the aforementioned justices. The Wisconsin Constitution, however, does not impose such a cumbersome requirement. Second, the "every essential" test is not a "manageable standard[]" by which the judiciary could objectively evaluate the manner of submission. The judicial power vested in this court by Article VII, Section 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution, like the judicial power vested in the United States Supreme Court, "is the power to act in the manner traditional for English and American courts. One of the most obvious limitations imposed by that requirement is that judicial action must be governed by standard, by rule." These standards and rules must be "'principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions' found in the . . . law[]." Otherwise, "intervening courts—even when proceeding with best intentions—would risk assuming political, not legal, responsibility[.]" Whether a particular characteristic of a proposed amendment is "essential" sounds a lot like the "I know it when I see it" test. The judiciary, however, must make decisions based on reason, not instinct. *** Recognizing the inherent vagueness of the "every essential" test, Justice Dallet "acknowledge[s] . . . that this rule doesn't always provide clear answers." In actuality, the "every essential" test is incapable of providing any answers whatsoever. The test is based purely on subjective perception, not objective rule. As Justice Dallet reasons, "[b]ecause a summary . . . will always be incomplete and isn't meant to take the place of the text of a proposed amendment, judgment will always be required. But that is okay. We trust judges to make judgment calls all the time[.]" Her view invites judicial overreach because it is based on the rule of judges rather than the rule of law. Embracing a standardless test would empower a single circuit court judge in a single county to toss the results of a statewide election based on little more than subjective predilections. This court would become the final arbiter of every proposed constitutional amendment, without any express grant of constitutional authority to second guess the legislature's work. As the majority notes, only once in Wisconsin's 175-year history has this court declared a proposed amendment was not ratified based on a challenge to the wording of a ballot question—despite the Wisconsin Constitution having been amended nearly 150 times. *** Similar to Justice Dallet, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley never defines an "essential," instead concluding "[b]y any definition of the word" the ballot question in this case was legally inadequate. The definition, however, matters a great deal, largely because the difficulty in defining the word demonstrates that judges should not be defining it in the first place. *** Unlike the "every essential" test, the counterfactual test this court adopts is consistent with the text of Article XII, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution and is justiciable. While the legislature has the power to decide the manner by which a proposed amendment is submitted to the people, the legislature has the "duty . . . to submit such proposed amendment[.]" That duty is not fulfilled when the ballot question misidentifies the proposed amendment with counterfactual information. A challenge alleging the presence of counterfactual information takes issue not with the "manner" of submission but with whether submission even occurred. Applying the counterfactual test therefore does not usurp the legislature's authority but rather ensures the legislature has fulfilled its constitutional duty. *** The counterfactual test is straightforward and capable of judicial review: Did the ballot question contain clearly false information? Whether a statement is true or false is simply a factual determination, and while factual determinations are not always easy, they do not turn on personal beliefs. A factual determination is difficult only to the extent that evidence is lacking or conflicting. In contrast, the "every essential" test is largely indeterminate, even if the evidence is clear, precisely because it requires a judge to form a political opinion. *** . . . . Justice Dallet suggests that determining whether a test is objective is itself a subjective determination and therefore cannot be done properly. Obviously, subjectivity and objectivity exist on a spectrum, just like the colors white and grey. Just as a reasonable person can look at a color and determine whether it is white or grey, a reasonable person can look at a legal test and determine whether it is subjective or objective. No one can seriously question the objectivity of the counterfactual test, even if it may be difficult to apply in some cases (although not in this one), or the subjectivity of the "every essential" test. The former is indeterminate only to the extent a factual determination is impossible, but the latter is indeterminate even when the facts are undisputed. Notably, Justice Dallet never argues the "every essential" test will constrain judges acting in good faith to the same extent as the counterfactual test. *** Unlike the "every essential" test endorsed by three justices, the counterfactual test safeguards democracy by preserving the prerogatives of the people's representatives in the legislature to decide political questions. Three justices would instead supplant the legislature's constitutionally assigned role, arrogate the power to set aside the not- particularly-close results of a lawfully-conducted election, and embrace a judicially invented test never before applied in the history of Wisconsin. None of these justices defines with any particularity the test they propose to determine whether such an undemocratic remedy is warranted, much less identify the source of their authority to impose it. Without elaboration on the "every essential" test, judges are licensed to inject their political will into the analysis, potentially substituting their will for the will of the people. Ironically, these justices suggest that if the judiciary is denied the power to discard election results at will, democracy will suffer. Their concerns arise from both a misunderstanding of the constitutional purpose of a ballot question and a distrust of voters. For example, the dissent complains, "[t]hose voters who do not research a proposed amendment beforehand will see the ballot question and only the ballot question prior to casting their votes." Dissent, ¶189. The constitutional purpose of a ballot question, however, is not to educate voters. As indicated by the historical analysis discussed in the majority opinion, a ballot question merely identifies the particular proposed amendment the voters will decide to ratify——or not. Second, as the Wisconsin Elections Commission explains, "[v]oters are expected to review . . . election notices and apprise themselves of public debate, and educate themselves on the substance and implications of a proposed amendment." By analogy, a ballot for President of the United States does not describe the candidates or their platforms. Voters are trusted to inform themselves.  Dallet Dallet Concurrence
I agree with the majority that Marsy's Law was validly adopted because the amendment complied with Article XII, Section 1's requirements that proposed constitutional amendments be "submit[ted] to the people" and not contain "more than one amendment." Evaluating whether Marsy's Law was submitted to the people requires us to balance two competing interests reflected in Article XII, Section 1: (1) the legislature's authority to specify the time and manner in which amendments are to be submitted, and (2) the people's right to evaluate and vote on proposed constitutional amendments. Doing so leads to the conclusion that Marsy's Law was submitted to the people because the summary of the amendment that appeared on the ballot accurately summarized the significant changes the amendment would make to the constitution. The majority uses a similar interest-balancing approach, but arrives at a rule that is too narrow. And it does so only after a ten-page digression extolling the virtues of originalism, which it then tacitly abandons as futile. Because I reject both originalism and the majority's narrow conception of what it means for a proposed amendment to be submitted to the people, I respectfully concur. *** I disagree with (the court’s adherence to originalism) for three reasons. First, the majority's claim that originalism is somehow our settled approach to constitutional interpretation is incorrect. In fact, many of our recent cases use a more inclusive approach to constitutional interpretation that considers more than merely text and history. Second, the majority's two defenses of originalism—(1) that originalism is simply how we interpret any written law, and (2) that originalism constrains judges to their proper role by providing a basis for decisions different than a judge's personal views—are both unconvincing. In my view, a more pluralistic method is needed to interpret faithfully the Wisconsin Constitution (or the United States Constitution for that matter). Under such an approach text and history of course matter, but so do precedent, context, historical practice and tradition. And third, an earlier court's choice of an interpretive methodology like originalism does not bind later courts to use that same methodology. *** (The majority’s claim that the court has consistently used and has doubled down on originalist interpretation) is incorrect. In fact, in a number of recent cases the court has taken a more pluralistic approach to constitutional interpretation that takes into account more than just text and history. (Citing cases) (T)hese decisions and others like them were criticized by some justices as non-originalist, or at least not sufficiently originalist. Thus, the majority cannot claim that originalism is somehow our consensus approach to constitutional interpretation. *** Most of our constitution . . . was written broadly, and for good reasons. Indeed, the Wisconsin Constitution—now the sixth oldest in the nation—came about only after a prior, more specific proposed constitution was rejected by the people, largely because it tried to settle too many then-contemporary policy disputes. No doubt part of the reason our constitution has endured so long is because its breadth gave the people of our state the room needed to adapt to new problems. The breadth and adaptability of our constitution is evident in its many clauses declaring broad principles in general terms. The Wisconsin Constitution contains, for example, a guarantee of "a certain remedy in the law for all injuries, or wrongs," a prohibition against "control of, or interference with, the rights of conscience," and a pronouncement that "[t]he blessings of a free government can only be maintained by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality and virtue, and by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles." And our framers recognized that by writing these provisions broadly it would be up to future judges and interpreters to decide what they meant. As the state constitutional convention's president put it, the framers of our constitution sought to declare "those great principles which characterize the age in which we live, and which, under the protection of Heaven, will—nay, must—guard the honor, promote the prosperity, and secure the permanent welfare of our beloved country." They weren't trying to write specific rules settling difficult questions for all time. Instead, they were—like the framers of the United States Constitution—trying to "provide a political platform wide enough to allow for considerable latitude within which future generations could make their own decisions." Simply observing, as the majority does, that the constitution was written down does not demonstrate that originalism is the best way to make those decisions. *** Dallet then describes why the search for original meaning is “almost always fruitless”: What these limited sources (on Wisconsin's two constitutional conventions) reveal is not one single, universally accepted original public meaning of the Wisconsin Constitution. Instead, they demonstrate that the questions that consumed the drafters of the Wisconsin Constitution—whether the document would retain the failed 1846 constitution's provisions prohibiting banking, guaranteeing property rights to married women, and creating an elected judiciary, for example—tell us nothing about how to resolve contemporary cases. They also show that, when it came to the document's more open-ended provisions, the drafters left little evidence of what they thought these clauses meant. The same is true of many of the constitution's more specific provisions like the one about how to amend the constitution at issue in this case, Article XII, Section 1. As the majority acknowledges, there is no evidence from the constitutional convention or ratification debates that sheds any light on its meaning. *** . . . . (A)s the preceding discussion demonstrates, what originalism requires judges to identify—a single, objective original public meaning—is something we cannot know. And even if we do somehow identify one original public meaning, like the majority's abstract insight about Article XII, Section 1, it tells us nothing about how to resolve real cases. Without the objective answers it promises, originalism is no constraint on judges at all. Constitutional interpretation is never as simple as just "apply[ing] the constitution as it is written." That is because the constitution forces us to choose between competing interests all the time, and value-neutral judging is therefore impossible. Take, for example, Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated." What is reasonable when it comes to drone surveillance or searching cell phones isn't dictated by any original understanding. There could never be an "original understanding" on these topics because they were unimaginable at the time our constitution was written. Moreover, evaluating whether a search is "unreasonable" always requires a value judgment, balancing the interests of the government against an invasion of privacy. So too in deciding what it means for a constitutional amendment to be "submit[ted] to the people." Finally, even if the original public meaning of many provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution were discoverable, applying it would lead to intolerable results. As one scholar said, "[t]he only kind of originalism that is reasonably determinate leads to conclusions that practically no one accepts." For example, Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides that "[e]very person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws." There is no escaping that, as the use of male pronouns demonstrates, the original public meaning of this provision and many others in our original constitution didn't include women. The delegates to the constitutional convention were all men, and as mentioned previously, part of the reason the proposed 1846 constitution was rejected was because it guaranteed a modicum of autonomy to women through its provisions about married women owning property. Yet we would never say today that, because the original public meaning of this provision didn't include women, women are therefore not entitled to a "remedy in the laws." And that's not the only example. Take Article I, Section 18's guarantee of "[t]he right of every person to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of conscience." At the 1847-48 convention, a motion to strike the words "Almighty God" on the grounds that the people had the right to worship whomever or whatever they wanted was defeated as "too radical a doctrine for our God- fearing forefathers." Although this supports the conclusion that the original public meaning of Article I, Section 18's guarantee of religious liberty was inapplicable to those who didn't share our founders' belief in "Almighty God," even those who claim to be originalists would not reach such a repellent conclusion today. *** The majority disagrees with WJI's view that Ekern imposed a constitutional requirement that ballot language contain "every essential" of a proposed amendment. According to the majority, "the relevant constitutional question is whether the proposed amendment was, at a basic level, submitted to the people for ratification." And the majority concludes that the only way in which an amendment could flunk that test is "in the rare circumstance that the question is fundamentally counterfactual such that voters were not asked to approve the actual amendment." Because the ballot language about Marsy's Law does not fit within that narrow category, the majority concludes that the amendment was validly adopted. Before getting to why I think the majority's proposed rule is too narrow, it's important to note one thing. Despite the majority's purported allegiance to originalism, this analysis is anything but originalist. The text of Article XII, Section 1 doesn't tell us what it means for an amendment to be "submit[ted] to the people." Indeed, it's plausible to read the text as allowing the legislature to do whatever it wants when it comes to describing constitutional amendments on the ballot. And knowing that early legislatures used to provide no descriptions on the ballot at all doesn't help us answer whether an amendment submitted with a misleading or incomplete description is submitted to the people either. *** The problem is that the new rule the majority derives from Ekern and our other cases regarding the submission-to-the-people requirement is still too narrow. Although the majority is certainly correct that a "fundamentally counterfactual" ballot question doesn't comply with the constitution, that's not the only way to violate the requirement that an amendment be submitted to the people. An amendment that is described in a way that is so incomplete as to be misleading is also not submitted to the people. For example, if the legislature had described Marsy's Law on the ballot as merely "an amendment to expand the definition of 'victim' contained in Article I, § 9m of the Constitution," that description wouldn't violate the majority's rule. This statement is accurate, it's not fundamentally counterfactual. But the description would also be misleading because Marsy's Law made many more significant changes to Article I, Section 9m. And if the people voted to adopt the amendment in reliance on such a description, it can't be said that all of those more significant changes were submitted to the people for ratification. This, I think, is what Ekern was referring to when it said the ballot must describe "every essential" of the proposed amendment. Thus, I conclude that a ballot description, if the legislature chooses to provide one, must accurately summarize the significant changes the proposed amendment would make to the Constitution. I acknowledge, of course, that this rule doesn't always provide clear answers. Because a summary that appears on the ballot will always be incomplete and isn't meant to take the place of the text of a proposed amendment, judgment will always be required. But that is okay. We trust judges to make judgment calls all the time, and doing so in this context is the only way to preserve both the legislature's authority to specify the manner in which amendments are to be submitted to the people and the right of the people to decide whether to change the constitution. Indeed, the majority's approach also requires judgment to determine what questions are "fundamentally counterfactual." As the use of the word "fundamentally" implies, superficially counterfactual ballot questions would pass the majority's test. But the majority offers no principled way of distinguishing between superficially counterfactual and "fundamentally" counterfactual ballot questions. In this case, the legislature's summary was sufficient and Marsy's Law was thus validly submitted to the people. Although WJI points to some of the amendment's particulars that weren't described specifically in the ballot language, as I said before, a summary always leaves some details out. The legislature's description of Marsy's Law is accurate, and the expanded definition of "victim," and arguable changes to the state constitutional rights of the accused and this court's jurisdiction weren't so significant that they needed to be described on the ballot. In short, the legislature gave voters the gist of Marsy's Law, and in an accurate way, and that is all that is required. Accordingly, I respectfully concur. The SCOW docket: Giving the Legislature free rein on constitutional amendments, part 2 (the dissent)10/25/2023
As we await opinions from the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's new term, we will go back to a few decisions from last term and crunch them down to size. Note: This one is a little different. WJI's "SCOW docket" pieces generally include decisions, dissents, and concurrences all in one post. This time, with this case, we are doing it in three: first the decision, then the dissent, then the concurrences. Why? Because this package of writings is extremely important for future ballot questions regarding state constitutional amendments. Besides that, the SCOW decisions are unusually long – 111 pages in all, not counting the cover sheets. Plus, it's a case that WJI cares a lot about. Instead of allowing each writing justice 10 paragraphs, we are giving the majority opinion writer 18 and each other opinion writer 15. Other than that, the rules remain the same. The "upshot" and "background" sections do not count as part of the paragraph restrictions because of their summary and very necessary nature. We've removed citations from the opinion for ease of reading, but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. Italics indicate WJI insertions except for case names and emphasis added by the opinion writer, all of which also are italicized. The case: Wisconsin Justice Initiative, Inc., et al. v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, et al. Majority opinion: Justice Brian Hagedorn (42 pages), joined in full by Chief Justice Annette Ziegler and Justices Patience Roggensack and Rebecca Grassl Bradley, joined in part by Justices Rebecca Frank Dallet and Jill J. Karofsky Concurrence: Grassl Bradley (14 pages), joined by Ziegler and Roggensack Concurrence: Dallet (32 pages), joined in full by Karofsky, joined in part by Justice Ann Walsh Bradley Concurrence: Hagedorn (9 pages), joined in part by Dallet Dissent: Walsh Bradley (14 pages)   Walsh Bradley The dissent
Ballot question challenges have been few and far between in the history of our state. Such a challenge reached this court in State ex rel. Ekern v. Zimmerman (1925). There, the court established a test for our review of a ballot question challenge: "it must reasonably, intelligently, and fairly comprise or have reference to every essential of the amendment." Yet rather than respecting the precedent of a nearly century-old unanimous opinion, the majority charts a new course not requested by either party. Instead of applying the test established in Ekern, the majority conjures its own test, never before stated, much less applied. Specifically, the majority sets forth that "[a] ballot question could violate [the] constitutional requirement only in the rare circumstance that the question is fundamentally counterfactual such that voters were not asked to approve the actual amendment." In addition to being created by the majority from whole cloth, this new test is unnecessary for the simple reason that we already have a test from Ekern. The majority arrives at its newly discovered test by tossing precedent to the wind and engaging in an unconvincing search for the "original meaning" of the state constitution's command that the legislature "submit" a proposed amendment to the people. As Justice Dallet's concurrence aptly explains, the endeavor of divining the "original meaning" of a constitutional provision is largely a futile endeavor. But even setting this aside, the majority's analysis rests on an infirm foundation. It erroneously dismisses the Ekern test, and instead creates and applies a newly-minted test, resulting in an overly permissive approach that risks giving the legislature carte blanche in crafting ballot questions. I would follow our precedent set forth in Ekern. Applying the Ekern framework, I determine instead that the ballot question here failed to convey "every essential" of the amendment as is required. From the ballot question only, voters would have no idea that the proposed amendment diminishes the rights of criminal defendants in addition to bolstering the rights of crime victims. In my view, the diminution of a defendant's rights previously protected by law, constitutes an "essential" element of the amendment. Because the ballot question failed to accurately represent an essential element of the law to the voters who approved it, I respectfully dissent. *** This court in Ekern set forth what the parties refer to as the "every essential" test. It requires that a ballot question "must reasonably, intelligently, and fairly comprise or have reference to every essential of the amendment." As the court of appeals observes in its certification in the present case, this court has not expanded on what it really means for a ballot question to include "every essential" and this case presents an opportunity for the court to explain and apply this court's statement in Ekern. But instead of taking that opportunity, the majority simply dispenses with Ekern. In the majority's view, the "every essential" test is no test at all, but is instead just an "explanatory statement." Such a characterization would be news to the court in State ex rel. Thomson v. Zimmerman (1953), who noted (although did not decide) a controversy over whether a ballot question "fairly comprised every essential of the amendment." And it most certainly is news to the parties here, who both argued their positions in terms of the "every essential" framework Ekern set forth. *** Of note is that no party here asked us to overrule Ekern. Indeed, WEC argued within the confines of Ekern that the ballot question at issue provided "every essential" of the amendment. We have thus been provided no special justification for overruling Ekern. As such, I would maintain the Ekern test. Doing so not only respects the precedent established by the courts who came before us, but in this case furthers the aims of democratic governance. Making sure that a ballot question includes "every essential" of an amendment ensures that the public is informed and can "vote intelligently." This is critical to maintaining a democracy. *** . . . (T)he ballot question here fails. I begin my analysis with the essential fact, recognized by the circuit court, that the victim's rights amendment does more than just increase the rights of crime victims. The majority fails to acknowledge this. Instead, it opines: "all of the provisions of Marsy's Law relate to expanding and defining victim's rights and tend to effect and carry out this general purpose." Several provisions of the amendment do, in fact, decrease the rights afforded to criminal defendants. For example, the amendment limits the rights of criminal defendants in the following ways:
*** Shouldn't the voters be informed that a constitutional amendment diminishes the rights of criminal defendants before voting on it? In light of these provisions, it is apparent that the amendment serves dual "purposes," both expanding the rights of victims and diminishing those of the accused. By any definition of the word, such a change is an "essential" aspect of an amendment. Accordingly, a voter would need to be informed of the change before voting "intelligently." Its lack of inclusion has the significant potential to mislead voters as to the consequences of their votes. *** . . . (T)he ballot question is the only text that all voters are guaranteed to see. Those voters who do not research a proposed amendment beforehand will see the ballot question, and only the ballot question, prior to casting their vote. This gives the framing provided by the ballot question considerable power in shaping how voters think about and understand the question presented. That ballot question language possesses this power to frame the issue in turn dictates that the language provide an accurate picture of the measure that is placed before the voters. To this end, we should maintain the vitality of judicial review in the ballot question context, rather than essentially surrendering our responsibility for judicial review to the legislature. Democracy works best when voters are fully informed. The majority opinion takes a step backward in this endeavor. As we await opinions from the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's new term, we will go back to a few decisions from last term and crunch them down to size. Note: This one is a little different. WJI's "SCOW docket" pieces generally include decisions, dissents, and concurrences all in one post. This time, with this case, we are doing it in three: first the decision, then the dissent, then the concurrences. Why? Because this package of writings is extremely important for future ballot questions regarding state constitutional amendments. Besides that, the SCOW decisions are unusually long – 111 pages in all, not counting the cover sheets. Plus, it's a case that WJI cares a lot about. Instead of allowing each writing justice 10 paragraphs, we are giving the majority opinion writer 18 and each other opinion writer 15. Other than that, the rules remain the same. The "upshot" and "background" sections do not count as part of the paragraph restrictions because of their summary and very necessary nature. We've removed citations from the opinion for ease of reading, but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. Italics indicate WJI insertions except for case names and emphasis added by the opinion writer, all of which also are italicized. The case: Wisconsin Justice Initiative, Inc., et al. v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, et al. Majority opinion: Justice Brian Hagedorn (42 pages), joined in full by Chief Justice Annette Ziegler and Justices Patience Roggensack and Rebecca Grassl Bradley, joined in part (seven paragraphs at the end on the multiple-question issue) by Justices Rebecca Frank Dallet and Jill J. Karofsky Concurrence: Grassl Bradley (14 pages), joined by Ziegler and Roggensack Concurrence: Dallet (32 pages), joined in full by Karofsky, joined in part by Justice Ann Walsh Bradley Concurrence: Hagedorn (9 pages), joined in part by Dallet Dissent: Walsh Bradley (14 pages)  Hagedorn The upshot We . . . hold that WJI's challenges to Marsy's Law fail. The ballot question was not submitted to the people in violation of the process outlined in the Wisconsin Constitution. Therefore, absent challenge on other grounds, the amendment has been validly ratified and is part of the Wisconsin Constitution. *** Through the Wisconsin Constitution, the people of Wisconsin have given the legislature broad authority to determine how proposed constitutional amendments may be submitted to the people for ratification. WJI argues that the ballot question for Marsy's Law was constitutionally deficient under Article XII, Section 1 on multiple grounds. We disagree. We conclude that the ballot question was not fundamentally counterfactual such that voters were not afforded the opportunity to approve the actual amendment. Rather, Marsy's Law was validly submitted to and ratified by the people of Wisconsin, as the constitution requires. WJI further argues Marsy's Law should have been split into more than one amendment, each receiving a separate vote. However, the constitution did not require that here. We conclude the amendment had the single general purpose of expanding and protecting victims' rights, and all provisions of the proposed amendment furthered this purpose. For these reasons, WJI's constitutional challenges to the ratification of Marsy's Law do not succeed, and we reverse the circuit court's judgment to the contrary. Background When the Wisconsin Constitution was adopted in 1848, it included a process enabling amendments — an act the people of Wisconsin have seen fit to do almost 150 times. A proposed amendment must be approved by a majority of both houses of the legislature in two successive legislative sessions. Once it passes that test, the proposed amendment is submitted to the people. If a majority vote yes, it becomes part of our constitution. A victim's rights amendment termed "Marsy's Law" by its sponsors (a term we also use in this opinion) was ratified by the people in April of 2020. In this case, Wisconsin Justice Initiative, Inc. and several citizens (collectively "WJI") argue that Marsy's Law was adopted in violation of the process spelled out in the constitution. . . . . The relevant constitutional text governing the claims here is found in Article XII, Section 1. It provides that the legislature has a duty "to submit such proposed amendment or amendments to the people in such manner and at such time as the legislature shall prescribe." And, "if more than one amendment be submitted, they shall be submitted in such manner that the people may vote for or against such amendments separately." The Legislature in consecutive sessions passed a joint resolution setting forth the Marsy’s Law amendment, which among other things, expanded the definition of "victim," provided that enumerated victims' rights vest at the time of victimization and must "be protected by law in a manner no less vigorous than the protections afforded to the accused," eliminated language stating that victims could be barred from the courtroom before testifying if "necessary to a fair trial for the defendant," provided that victims may refuse discovery requests made by an accused, eliminated a provision from the prior victims' rights constitutional provision that "(n)othing in this section, or in any statute enacted pursuant to this section, shall limit any right of the accused which may be provided by law," and created rights for victims to seek appellate court review of certain decisions. The legislature directed that this amendment, informally known as "Marsy's Law," be submitted for ratification at the April 7, 2020 election. The legislature determined that the ballot question should state as follows: "Question 1: Additional rights of crime victims. Shall section 9m of article I of the constitution, which gives certain rights to crime victims, be amended to give crime victims additional rights, to require that the rights of crime victims be protected with equal force to the protections afforded the accused while leaving the federal constitutional rights of the accused intact, and to allow crime victims to enforce their rights in court?" Several months before the April election, WJI brought suit against the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) alleging the ballot question failed to satisfy the requirements of the Wisconsin Constitution. WJI sought declarations that the ballot question violated Article XII, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution on various grounds, and requested both a permanent injunction and a temporary injunction preventing submission of the question to voters while the litigation was pending. The circuit court denied WJI's motion for a temporary injunction, and Wisconsinites ratified the amendment at the April 7, 2020 election by a vote of 1,107,067 to 371,013. Several months later, the circuit court granted declaratory judgment in favor of WJI, concluding the ballot question failed to meet all the requirements with respect to content and form. The circuit court, on its own motion, stayed judgment pending appeal. WEC appealed, and the court of appeals certified the appeal to this court, which we accepted. WJI argued before the Supreme Court that the ballot question for Marsy's Law violated the Wisconsin constitutional requirements for amendments by failing to contain "every essential" of the proposed amendment as required by prior Wisconsin Supreme Court caselaw, in particular by failing to state that the definition of "victim" was being expanded and that the constitutional rights of those accused of crime were being diminished. Further, WJI argued that the ballot question misstated the contents of the amendment and was misleading because it stated that victims' rights would be equal to the rights of an accused, while the language of the amendment actually provided that victims' rights could exceed the rights of an accused. Further, the question told voters that the federal rights of an accused would remain intact, misdirecting voters and failing to tell them that state constitutional and statutory rights of an accused were being eliminated. WJI's argument on these points relied on Wisconsin Supreme Court cases from 1925 (Ekern) and 1953 (Thomson), which no party to the case, including the defendants-appellants in their briefs to the Supreme Court and lower courts, had questioned. Finally, WJI argued that Marsy’s Law contained more than one amendment, requiring multiple ballot questions. The guts
Just as the purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what the statutory text means, the purpose of constitutional interpretation is to determine what the constitutional text meant when it was written, commonly called the original public meaning or original understanding. Although constitutional language is at times written with less precision, that fact does not fundamentally change the nature of our charge. We must similarly focus on the constitutional text, reading it reasonably, in context, and with a view of the provision's place within the constitutional structure. Other sources such as the debates and practices at the time of adoption, along with early legislative enactments, may prove helpful aids to interpretation. Just as we leave policy choices to the legislature in statutory interpretation, we must leave policy choices to the people in constitutional interpretation. *** This court has doubled down on this approach in recent years. In State v. Roberson, for example, we overruled our prior decision in State v. Dubose, which had adopted new requirements for the admissibility of out-of-court identification evidence under the Wisconsin Constitution. We did so, however, not based on the policies reflected in this decision, but based on our assessment of the "original meaning of the Wisconsin Constitution." We recognized that while state constitutions may provide further protection to citizens than the federal Constitution, "the question for a state court is whether its state constitution actually affords greater protection." Critically, we held, "A state court does not have the power to write into its state constitution additional protection that is not supported by its text or historical meaning." *** Our constitutional analysis begins with the text. As relevant to this dispute, following initial adoption in the legislature and other procedural requirements, the constitution requires "the legislature to submit such proposed amendment or amendments to the people in such manner and at such time as the legislature shall prescribe." This language commands only two things: First, the amendment must be "submitted" to the people; and second, it must be done in the manner and at the time prescribed by the legislature. . . . Hagedorn then discusses how in the early years after adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution, ballot questions were submitted as simple up or down votes. Thus, no ballot question in the first 22 years after the constitution was adopted contained any substantive description of the amendment at all. So far as we can tell, no one questioned the validity of this process. If in fact the constitution requires the content of a proposed amendment to be included in the ballot question, the inescapable conclusion is that every one of these amendments was submitted to the people in an unconstitutional manner — with no one batting an eye. That is highly unlikely. The overwhelming, indeed, uniform teaching of the text and history surrounding Article XII, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution is that an amendment only needs to be submitted to the people for ratification. It need not — as a constitutional prerequisite — contain any kind of description of the amendment's substance. Hagedorn then discusses how the Legislature beginning in 1870 added a general subject area to the ballot question and in 1874 presented a longer, more substantive question to voters, "immediately followed by a return to ballot questions without subject matter." The first case to address the manner of the legislature's submission to the people occurred in 1925. The question before this court in Ekern was whether the legislature complied with the constitution when it delegated the drafting of a ballot question to the secretary of state. We held that this was permissible. The constitution requires that the legislature determine the "manner" of submission to the people, and we concluded this language was broad enough to encompass directing the secretary of state to determine the content of the ballot question. Although extraneous to the issue in the case, the court engaged in an extended digression regarding the content and design of ballot questions. Because this language is the genesis for the proposed "every essential" test we are asked to breathe life into in this case, we quote the discussion at length and in context: ". . . . Had the framers of the constitution intended that the legislature should prescribe the form, it might easily have done so by using a few additional words, or it might have so worded the provision that the idea of form would have been necessarily included by implication. This, however, was not the case, and it is highly probable that the framers had in mind the vital distinction existing between matters of substance and matters of mere form. Had the legislature in the instant case prescribed the form of submission in a manner which would have failed to present the real question, or had they by error or mistake presented an entirely different question, no claim could be made that the proposed amendment would have been validly enacted. In other words, even if the form is prescribed by the legislature it must reasonably, intelligently, and fairly comprise or have reference to every essential of the amendment. This demonstrates quite clearly the fact that the form of submission is after all a mere form, and that the principal and essential criterion consists in the submission of a question or a form which has for its object and purpose an intelligent and comprehensive submission to the people, so that the latter may be fully informed on the subject upon which they are required to exercise a franchise." (Emphasis added by Hagedorn.) Reviewing this discussion, the "every essential" language does not read as a separate test. Rather, it comes as an explanatory statement (phrased as "[i]n other words") for the comment that the real question, not an entirely different question, must be submitted to the people. Therefore, an effort to infuse constitutional significance into this language is not an accurate reading of Ekern on its own terms. The relevant discussion in Ekern simply does not set forth a substantive, explainable "every essential" test at all. And why would it? The content of the ballot question was not challenged and was not at issue. There was no need to create, much less apply, a new substantive constitutional test. Therefore, we do not understand Ekern as adopting or creating a new, undefined, and strict constitutional test for detail and accuracy in constitutional amendment ballot questions. Rather, Ekern's discussion is best read as affirming the unremarkable proposition that the real question of the amendment must be submitted to the people. This is consistent with the constitutional requirement that a proposed amendment must be "submitted" in order to be validly ratified. Where a question is not the real question at all, such a proposal cannot be said to be submitted to the people. *** The ballot question in Thomson stated that, if approved, "the legislature shall apportion senate districts along" certain municipal lines — using mandatory language. The problem, we explained, is "the actual amendment . . . has no such mandate at all and under it the legislature is uncontrolled except that the territory inclosed shall be 'contiguous' and 'convenient.'" The question given to the voters was the opposite of what the amendment actually provided. We concluded the question was misinformation and not "in accord with the fact." We cited Ekern and concluded that the "question as actually submitted did not present the real question but by error or mistake presented an entirely different one." Accordingly, there was "no valid submission to or ratification by the people." To this day, Thomson remains the only case in state history where a constitutional amendment was deemed invalid because it was not "submitted" to the people. *** Hagedorn then states that these principles of law follow from his discussion of the ballots and caselaw. First, Article XII, Section 1 does not require any substantive discussion of the amendment in the ballot question submitted to the people. No explanation or summary is constitutionally commanded. Second, the constitution requires that the amendment be "submitted" to the people for ratification. We held in Thomson, borrowing language from Ekern, that an amendment has not been "submitted" to the people when the ballot question fails to present the real question or is contrary to the amendment itself. In other words, voters have not been given the opportunity to vote for or against a proposal when the ballot question is fundamentally counterfactual. When a ballot question is factually inaccurate in a fundamental way, it cannot be said that the amendment was actually submitted to the people for ratification. But given the unique facts of Thomson and the broad authority given to the legislature in the constitution, this requirement is narrow and will be triggered only in rare circumstances. Third, this court has never, in a single case, developed or applied an "every essential" test for review of proposed constitutional amendments. Nowhere in our two cases that use this language have we established, defined, or utilized such a test. And finally, because it is our solemn obligation to follow the original meaning of the constitution, we will not design, invent, or breathe life into the so-called "every essential" test without a constitutional command to do so. Insofar as the content of a proposed ballot question is concerned, the relevant constitutional question is whether the proposed amendment was, at a basic level, submitted to the people for ratification. A ballot question could violate this constitutional requirement only in the rare circumstance that the question is fundamentally counterfactual such that voters were not asked to approve the actual amendment. These principles in hand, we examine WJI's argument that the ballot question at issue here failed to satisfy this constitutional requirement. *** First, WJI argues that the ballot question fails because it does not mention the new section creating a constitutional definition of a "victim." In an amendment of this length and complexity, the legislature had to make choices of what to include and how to phrase it. We must give significant deference to the legislature in making these choices because the constitution affords the legislature substantial discretion in submitting an amendment to the people. While the legislature could have decided that more be said, WJI's legal argument depends on its erroneous contention that the constitution demands a more exacting review of the legislature's choices. It does not. A constitutional definition of "victim" fits comfortably within the statement that crime victims are given certain or additional rights, as the ballot question states. Nothing here is fundamentally counterfactual such that voters were not asked to approve the actual amendment. Second, WJI contends the ballot question failed to correctly capture how the rights of the accused would change. It offers several arguments in this regard. WJI asserts the ballot question is misleading because it requires "that the rights of crime victims will be protected with equal force to the protections afforded the accused," while the text of the amendment says victim rights will "be protected by law in a manner no less vigorous than the protections afforded to the accused." While the parties debate the import of this wording choice, we again emphasize the deference owed to the legislature in explaining the proposal to the people. Minor deficiencies in a summary (and all summaries will, by necessity, be incomplete) do not give rise to the kind of bait-and-switch we struck down in Thomson. This does not rise to the level of a fundamentally counterfactual question such that voters were not asked to approve the actual amendment. WJI additionally suggests the ballot question is misleading because the amendment reduces the rights of the accused. Prior to Marsy's Law, Article I, Section 9m stated, "Nothing in this section, or in any statute enacted pursuant to this section, shall limit any right of the accused which may be provided by law." Marsy's Law struck this sentence and added: "This section is not intended and may not be interpreted to supersede a defendant's federal constitutional rights or to afford party status in a proceeding to any victim." WJI says the ballot question was misleading because this change in its view could reduce the rights of the accused in some situations, yet voters were told "the federal constitutional rights of the accused" would be left intact. We once again return to the relevant question: the issue is not whether the amendment was explained, but whether it was "submitted" to the people. Nothing in the constitution requires that all components be presented in the ballot question. The constitution leaves the level of detail required to the legislature, which may impose more or less requirements on itself. The failure to raise an issue in a summary or describe it with precision does not amount to the kind of wholesale inaccuracy of Thomson or suggest the amendment was not submitted to the people. This as well does not rise to the level of a fundamentally counterfactual question such that voters were not asked to approve the actual amendment. *** Hagedorn then turns to the issue of whether multiple ballot questions were required. Our most recent formulation of the test was in . . . a case challenging the adoption of Article XIII, Section 13, governing marriage. There, we articulated the test as follows: "It is within the discretion of the legislature to submit several distinct propositions as one amendment if they relate to the same subject matter and are designed to accomplish one general purpose. The general purpose of an amendment may be deduced from the text of the amendment itself and from the historical context in which the amendment was adopted. And all of the propositions must tend to effect or carry out that purpose." Applying this test, we concluded a single amendment was appropriate because "the general purpose of the marriage amendment is to preserve the legal status of marriage in Wisconsin as between one man and one woman. Both propositions in the marriage amendment relate to and are connected with this purpose." The parties do not dispute that this is the governing test. And we see no reason to question the textual and historical analysis . . . . Employing this test, we have no difficulty concluding Marsy's Law did not violate the constitutional prohibition on submitting multiple amendments as one. The amendment broadly protects and expands crime victims' rights. This is plain from the text and history of its adoption. In so doing, it amends only Section 9m of Article I. Even if WJI is correct that it will impact those accused of crimes as well (an issue we need not decide), all of the changes relate to the same, general purpose of expanding and protecting the rights of crime victims. All of the propositions are aimed at this goal, and tend to effect or carry this out. We hold that WJI's challenge to Marsy's Law on the ground that it was required to be submitted as separate constitutional amendments fails. The Wisconsin Supreme Court today upheld the 2020 victims’ rights constitutional amendment. In doing so, the court tossed out a standard for assessing constitutional questions in place since 1925 and created a new standard never argued by the parties.
The majority decision and two concurrences used more ink on debates about how to interpret the constitution and the place of originalism—a theory of constitutional interpretation aimed at discerning the intent of a provision at the time it was adopted—than on the arguments raised by the parties in the case before it. Justice Brian Hagedorn wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Annette Ziegler, Justice Patience Roggensack, and Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley. Hagedorn also wrote a concurrence to his own majority opinion. Grassl Bradley wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Ziegler and Roggensack. Justice Rebecca Dallet wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Jill Karofsky. Justice Ann Walsh Bradley dissented. No justice denied that the victims' rights amendment diminished the rights of an accused under the state constitution. In her dissent, Walsh Bradley expressly noted that it did. The state defendants, who filed the appeal, never raised any question about the applicable legal standard in their briefs or at oral argument. As noted by Walsh Bradley in her concurrence, they confirmed at oral argument that they were not asking the court to overturn any prior decision. The precedent at issue was the Supreme Court's 1925 decision in State ex rel. Ekern v. Zimmerman. The parties argued their case in the trial court and appellate briefs under the language of Ekern and another case from 1953. The Supreme Court never asked the parties to re-brief the appeal to address whether the standard in Ekern should be rejected, what a new test might be, and how the 2020 ballot question fared against the new standard. Nevertheless, the majority threw out the Ekern test as unsupported by the text of the constitution and its original meaning. The constitution requires only that an amendment be “submitted” to the people without “any explicit obligations regarding form or substance,” Hagedorn wrote. “The text simply requires that the people must have the opportunity to ratify or reject a proposed amendment.” He pointed to early ballot questions from 1850s and 1860s that asked voters merely whether they were voting for or against amending the constitution, without any indication of the amendment’s contents at all. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Ekern had stated that a constitutional amendment question presented to voters “must reasonably, intelligently, and fairly comprise or have reference to every essential of the amendment” and that the “essential criterion” is “an intelligent and comprehensive submission to the people, so that the latter may be fully informed on the subject upon which they are required to exercise a franchise.” After tossing any standard from Ekern, the court adopted its new standard: a ballot question is invalid “only in the rare circumstance that the question is fundamentally counterfactual such that voters were not asked to approve the actual amendment.” Telling voters in the question that crime victims and those accused of crime would have rights protected “with equal force,” while the amendment actually provides that crime victims’ rights are protected “no less vigorous(ly)” than an accused’s was not “fundamentally counterfactual,” said the court. WJI had argued that “equal to” and “equal or greater than” were not equivalent. Failing to tell voters that the amendment deleted a sentence of the constitution ensuring that victims’ rights provisions in the constitution or state statutes would not limit any right of an accused, while diverting voters with a phrase indicating that federal constitutional rights were not impacted by the amendment, did not rise to the level of a fundamentally counterfactual question, said the court. “(T)he issue is not whether the amendment was explained, but whether it was ‘submitted’ to the people. Nothing in the constitution requires that all components be presented in the ballot question. The constitution leaves the level of detail required to the Legislature, which may impose more or less requirements on itself,” Hagedorn wrote. The ballot question need not under the constitution present any kind of description of the amendment’s substance to voters at all, he wrote. Grassl Bradley in her concurrence included significant disagreement with Dallet over constitutional interpretation. She also opined that voters are expected to review in advance and educate themselves about proposed constitutional amendments. “By analogy, a ballot for President of the United States does not describe the candidates or their platforms. Voters are trusted to inform themselves,” she wrote. Dallet and Karofsky would have retained the Ekern test, but found that the ballot question satisfied it. Walsh Bradley would have retained the Ekern test, and she agreed with WJI and the four individual plaintiffs that under Ekern the 2020 ballot question was invalid. She agreed that the provisions of the vicitms’ rights amendment “do, in fact, decrease the rights afforded to criminal defendants,” and remarked on the majority’s failure to recognize it. “From the ballot question only, voters would have no idea that the proposed amendment diminishes the rights of criminal defendants in addition to bolstering the rights of crime victims. In my view, the diminution of a defendant’s rights previously protected by law, constitutes an ‘essential’ element of the amendment,” she wrote. Walsh Bradley noted that the Ekern test furthered the aims of democracy: “Making sure that a ballot question includes ‘every essential’ of an amendment ensures that the public is informed and can ‘vote intelligently.’ This is critical to maintaining a democracy.” The majority’s test “risks giving the Legislature carte blanche in crafting ballot questions,” while Ekern provided a safeguard for the public against being misled, she wrote. “(R)ather than respecting the precedent of a nearly century-old unanimous opinion, the majority charts a new course not requested by either party. Instead of applying the test established in Ekern, the majority conjures its own test, never before stated, much less applied,” she wrote. “In addition to being created by the majority from whole cloth, this new test is unnecessary for the simple reason that we already have a test from Ekern.” Walsh Bradley recognized that the new test would be “news to the parties here, who both argued their positions in terms of the ‘every essential’ framework Ekern sets forth.” Updated
The 2020 crime victims’ amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution stands. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has rejected Wisconsin Justice Initiative’s challenge to the amendment. WJI challenged the amendment, known as "Marsy's Law," on the grounds that the question put to voters for approval on the April 2020 ballot failed to properly inform them of the amendment’s contents and, in fact, misled them about the elimination of state-law rights of those accused of crimes. In addition, WJI argued, more than one ballot question was needed because the amendment had multiple parts, WJI argued. The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed, through a majority decision and multiple concurrences. Justice Brian Hagedorn wrote on behalf of the court. Justice Ann Walsh Bradley dissented. (Details on the decision to follow in a separate blog post.) Attorney Dennis Grzezinski, representing the plaintiffs, responded to the decision. “The trial court, in a careful and well-reasoned decision, had found the ballot question to be inadequate to inform Wisconsin voters of the contents of the amendment, and we were hopeful that that decision would be affirmed by the Supreme Court,” he said. “WJI and the individual plaintiffs are disappointed by the Supreme Court’s decision.” WJI and four individual plaintiffs brought the case in December 2019 and won at the trial-court level. In November 2020, Dane County Circuit Court Judge Frank D. Remington declared that the April 2020 ballot question used to pass what is known as “Marsy’s Law” failed to fully and fairly inform the public of the essential components of the amendment, misstated the contents and impact of the amendment, and improperly encompassed more than one subject, in violation of constitutional requirements. Remington stayed his decision pending appeal, so the changes went into effect. Attorney General Josh Kaul appealed Remington’s decision to District III of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, located in Wausau. Kaul appealed on behalf of himself, the Wisconsin Elections Commission, its chair, and then-Secretary of State Douglas LaFollette. The case skipped from the Court of Appeals to the Wisconsin Supreme Court on certification by the District III panel of judges. In certifying the appeal, the court of appeals remarked that the case involved “significant questions of state constitutional law, the resolution of which will have a sweeping effect on our criminal justice institutions and those operating within them, including victims, defendants, prosecutors, defense attorneys, law enforcement officials, and our courts.” The Supreme Court heard oral argument on September 6, 2022, and issued its decision on May 16, 2023. “WJI agrees with Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's dissent,” said WJI executive director Margo Kirchner. “The Supreme Court has given the Legislature permission to frame and word referendum questions that leave out important information for voters and even mislead them. The Wisconsin Constitution is the foundation of our state’s laws; changes to it should not occur on the basis of insufficient and misleading ballot questions.” WJI is disappointed with the outcome, but also with how the majority reached it, said Kirchner. The court decided an issue that the parties never argued in the trial court or on appeal. The court threw out the legal standard from a century-old case, which the state defendants did not challenge, and created a new standard. The parties were not asked to re-brief the case under the new standard. During the three years the victims' rights amendment has been in effect, it has created significant challenges for criminal courts and their participants, said WJI president Craig Johnson, a criminal defense attorney and another plaintiff in the case. "Unfortunately, the Court's decision does not fully recognize the chaos and confusion that this amendment has ushered into the day-to-day workings of our criminal courts,” said Johnson. “The amendment is a story of arguably good intentions that produced confusing and unanticipated results.” “Further appeals can be expected, as various aspects of Marsy's Law are challenged in trial courts,” said Johnson. “I don't think we've heard the final verdict on Marsy's Law." In addition to WJI and Johnson, plaintiffs in the case included criminal defense attorney Jerome Buting, attorney Jacqueline Boynton, and former Wisconsin Sen. Fred Risser. Revised 2/6/23
By Gretchen Schuldt The Milwaukee County District Attorney’s Office is appealing a contempt of court finding against a prosecutor who defied a judge's ruling barring a victim from watching the trial of her alleged assailant until after the victim testified. The prosecutor, Assistant District Attorney Thomas L. Potter, sent an email to the primary victim in the case – there were two victims – acknowledging that Circuit Judge Kori Ashley issued the sequestration order, then added, “I am nevertheless inviting you to attend the opening statement because I believe Judge Ashley’s order to be inconsistent with Wisconsin law, and wish to have it reviewed by an appellate court.” Potter argued before Ashley that state law and “Marsy’s Law,” a victims' rights amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution adopted by voters in April 2020, gave victims the right not to be physically excluded from the courtroom, according to a brief filed Wednesday by District Attorney John Chisholm and Assistant District Attorney Julie Knyszek. Specifically, Marsy’s Law gives victims the right to “attend all proceedings involving the case” if they ask to do so. It also states that rights given to victims will not infringe on defendants’ federal constitutional rights, such as the right to due process. Defendant Arielle A. Simmons, represented by attorney Colleen Cullen, argued that sequestration was justified because the victims were criminal defense lawyers and would be more likely to shape their testimony to fit the state’s theory of the case, according to the brief. Simmons was charged with misdemeanor assault and misdemeanor disorderly conduct in the case. Ashley, according to the brief, ruled that the “defense theory of the case” made sequestering the victims until after they testified necessary. After Potter sent the email, he assured Ashley that he was simply trying to preserve the issue for appeal and did not mean to show disrespect. She found him in contempt, as he wanted her to do, and fined him $500. She stayed the fine pending the appeal, according to online court records. Ashley, the brief said, did not rule on the exclusion issue until right before the start of the trial. “Only through the finding of contempt was an opportunity for review of victim exclusion made available,” Chisholm and Knyszek wrote. “The release of incriminating information at trial cannot be undone; likewise the improper exclusion of a victim causes irreparable harm, regardless of the outcome of that trial.” The reason Ashley gave for sequestering the victims was not specific enough, the brief said. “The only basis for these assertions was that both victims were criminal defense attorneys who have tried cases and were thus aware of the court system,” Chisholm and Knyszek wrote. “Their knowledge and experience in trying criminal cases somehow meant they could not be trusted to testify truthfully. As Potter would argue, the fact that the victims were officers of the court was hardly reason to deny their right to attend the trial; such an ‘employment status’ argument presumed bad faith and made no sense.” State law also gives victims certain rights to attend proceedings during the testimony of others, they said. Physical sequestration, while it can be useful, “has been strictly limited for excluding victims.” “Neither Simmons nor the circuit court cited to a single case, from any court, which held that a witness sitting through a trial, and then testifying, violated a defendant’s federal constitutional right to due process,” they said. No opposing brief has yet been filed. Simmons ultimately took her case to trial. A jury acquitted her of misdemeanor battery and convicted her of disorderly conduct, also a misdemeanor. Ashley fined her $400 and made her record eligible for expungement. Wisconsin Supreme Court takes appeal of WJI's legal challenge to the Marsy's Law amendment2/17/2022 The Wisconsin Supreme Court on Thursday accepted the appeal in Wisconsin Justice Initiative’s challenge to the victims’ rights constitutional amendment. The Supreme Court’s acceptance of the appeal includes consideration of all issues in the case. The parties will be notified of an oral argument date “in due course,” said the court’s order. WJI and four individual plaintiffs won the case at the trial-court level. Dane County Circuit Court Judge Frank D. Remington declared that the ballot question used in April 2020 to pass what is known as the Marsy’s Law amendment failed to fully and fairly inform the public of the essential components of the amendment, misstated the contents and impact of the amendment, and improperly encompassed more than one subject. Remington enjoined implementation of the amendment but stayed his injunction pending appeal. Attorney General Josh Kaul appealed the judgment to District III of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, located in Wausau. Kaul appealed on behalf of himself, the Wisconsin Elections Commission and its chair, and Secretary of State Douglas LaFollette. The appeal was fully briefed in District III in April 2021 but the appeals court judges asked the Supreme Court to take the case (skipping a court of appeals decision) because WJI’s challenge to the constitutional amendment involves “significant questions” the answers to which “will have a sweeping effect on our criminal justice institutions and those operating within them.” Thursday’s Supreme Court order allows the parties to submit new briefs or to stand on the briefs already filed. Any new briefing is scheduled to finish by mid-April 2022. Attorney Dennis Grzezinski, representing the plaintiffs, responded to the certification by saying that the plaintiffs “look forward to the Wisconsin Supreme Court's review of the Dane County Circuit Court's well-reasoned and thorough decision protecting the right of all Wisconsin voters to be presented with adequate ballot questions when they are faced with voting on proposed amendments to the Wisconsin Constitution. Judge Remington properly found that the ballot question regarding the Marsy's Law amendments was legally inadequate — more than one ballot question was needed, and the single question on the ballot misled and misstated how the amendments changed our Constitution.” After learning of the Supreme Court order WJI President Craig Johnson, also an individual plaintiff in the case, remarked “we've argued since the beginning that voters were not informed of the far-reaching effects this law would have on the justice system. We've now seen the chaos and confusion that has resulted. We look forward to making the case to the Supreme Court that the referendum failed to fully and fairly inform the voters what they were voting on." "We look forward to making the case to the Supreme Court that the referendum failed to fully and fairly inform the voters what they were voting on."  By Margo Kirchner
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals said Tuesday the State Supreme Court should decide the fate of the victims’ rights constitutional amendment known as Marsy’s Law that voters approved last year. A District III Court of Appeals panel on Tuesday certified the appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court because Wisconsin Justice Initiative’s challenge to the amendment involves “significant questions,” the answers to which “will have a sweeping effect on our criminal justice institutions and those operating within them.” WJI, three individual voters, and Sen. Fred Risser successfully challenged the wording of the ballot question presented to voters for amendment approval. Dane County Circuit Judge Frank Remington ruled in November 2019 that the question failed to fully and fairly inform the public of the essential components of the amendment, misstated the contents and impact of the amendment, and improperly encompassed more than one subject. He stayed his ruling pending appeal, which allowed the question to appear on the ballot. Marsy’s Law, WJI President Craig Johnson said Tuesday, “runs the risk of negatively affecting the constitutional rights of the accused in a way that the original proponents always denied was their intention. Yet that's the stark reality, and voters were never informed about this. The ballot question did not explain the issue fully and fairly, and left people to vote in the dark." Johnson also is an individual plaintiff in the case. The Supreme Court now must choose whether to decide the appeal itself (skipping the Court of Appeals) or tell District III to consider the matter first. The District III panel judges were Lisa K. Stark, Thomas M. Hruz, and Jennifer E. Nashold, who usually occupies a seat on the District IV appeals court. Tuesday’s 20-page explanation of the certification was issued without an identified author. The appeals court said that certification would speed up the important final decision. It would be in the best interests of those involved in the criminal justice system and Wisconsin voters generally “to have a timely and final decision on the sufficiency of the ballot question producing the amendment to our state constitution,” the court wrote. The appeal has been fully briefed before District III since early April 2021. Attorney General Josh Kaul appealed the trial court’s judgment on behalf of himself, the Wisconsin Elections Commission and its chair, and Secretary of State Douglas LaFollette. The defendants chose to venue the appeal in District III. Dennis Grzezinski, lawyer for the plaintiffs, noted the court of appeals’ summary of WJI’s arguments that the ballot question was misleading and legally insufficient, “which led the Circuit Court to rule that the proposed amendments to the Wisconsin Constitution were not validly ratified.” “We look forward to having the Wisconsin Supreme Court address these issues,” said Grzezinski. By Margo Kirchner The state relied on the wrong legal standard in arguing that the “Marsy’s Law” ballot question approved by voters a year ago was proper, the Wisconsin Justice Initiative said in a new court filing. “Marsy’s Law” is a victims’ rights amendment approved by voters in April 2020. The amendment itself is more than twice as long as the U.S. Bill of Rights. It was presented to voters, however, as a single, short question on the ballot. WJI and four individuals successfully challenged the amendment in Dane County Circuit Court, arguing that the ballot question violated constitutional requirements. On Nov. 3, Circuit Judge Frank D. Remington agreed, finding that the ballot question failed to fully inform voters of the changes being proposed, was inaccurate and affirmatively misleading, and encompassed more than one amendment so multiple questions were needed. Remington declared the amendment invalid due to the ballot question’s defects. However, he stayed the effect of his ruling in case the defendant state officials appealed, which they did on Dec. 2, 2020. Attorney Josh Kaul appealed on behalf of the Wisconsin Elections Commission and its chair, Ann Jacobs; Secretary of State Douglas La Follette; and himself. Kaul filed the appeal in District III of the Court of Appeals, which is located in Wausau. Attorney Dennis Grzezinski, representing the plaintiffs, argued in his appellate response brief that Remington was correct and his ruling should be affirmed. “What is at stake in this case is the right of Wisconsin voters to be properly informed, and to not be misled by a ballot question when voting on proposed amendments to the Wisconsin Constitution,” Grzezinski wrote. After pointing out errors the defendants made regarding the legal standard the court should apply, Grzezinski homed in on important language the amendment deleted from the state Constitution. Prior to April 2020, the Wisconsin Constitution’s victims’ rights section provided that victims must be given “an opportunity to attend court proceedings unless sequestration is necessary for a fair trial for a defendant.” Marsy’s Law deleted the italicized phrase. Further, the prior language concluded with the sentence that “[n]othing in this section, or in any statute enacted pursuant to this section, shall limit any right of the accused which may be provided by law.” Marsy’s Law deleted that sentence as well. By striking the first provision the amendment “deleted a defendant’s right to have a victim witness sequestered, and it deleted the only reference in the state Constitution to a defendant’s right to a ‘fair trial....’ Striking the final sentence...altered the balance between victims’ rights and the rights of the accused under the State Constitution....”  The Wisconsin Constitution specifies that if two or more amendments are submitted to voters, they must be submitted in such a way that voters may consider each amendment separately. The Marsy’s Law ballot question asked voters to approve an amendment “to give crime victims additional rights” beyond those already in the Constitution. Voters were not presented with a second question asking whether they also approved of the reduction in the rights of an accused. WJI and the other plaintiffs argued that a second question was constitutionally required because, as Remington wrote, “[s]ubtracting from the defendants’ rights is fundamentally different than adding to victims’ rights.” In fact, the plaintiffs argued, three questions were required, because Marsy’s Law also contains a third subject creating a victim’s right to Supreme Court mandatory review of any circuit court decision. |
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