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By Alexandria Staubach There’s some consensus among lawyers that ethics rules already cover the responsible use of generative artificial intelligence in court submissions, but a recent petition to the Wisconsin Supreme Court is asking for more. The rule change petition seeks to mandate explicit disclosure to the court and disclosure by the court when generative AI is used in the preparation of everything from court filings to opinions. The petition was filed by frequent pro se (self-represented) litigant Jay Stone. Stone’s petition “has a lot of the hallmarks of a ChatGPT document itself,” attorney Stacie Rosenzweig recently remarked to Wisconsin Justice Initiative. Rosenzweig, a partner at the law firm Halling & Cayo, specializes in legal ethics and professional responsibility. She said by email that while it would be unusual for Stone’s petition to be adopted by the Supreme Court as is, the petition “could spur some further discussion or an invitation from the Court for comments.” Rosenzweig discussed “a bit of debate” in ethics circles about the necessity of additional guidance. According to personal injury attorney Ann Jacobs, Wisconsin’s code of legal ethics should be sufficient to cover the landscape regarding AI use. Jacobs recently gave a continuing legal education presentation on the topic. She told WJI that rules regarding confidentiality, candor, and competence are sufficient to protect against the dangers of generative AI. The trouble, though, she said, is that those rules are not always followed. For example, earlier this year Kenosha County District Attorney Xavier Solis found himself in hot water after failing to disclose the use of AI in a brief he submitted to a court. The brief included hallucinated (made-up or fake) citations and ultimately resulted in sanctions. In late 2025, a misattributed citation by Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Annette K. Ziegler in a dissent regarding congressional redistricting had some speculating about the use of AI. “It looks and quacks like an AI generated error,” said Jacobs. And there are now a handful of databases tracking legal decisions in which generative AI produced hallucinated content. One demonstrates that internationally, United States judges and arbitrators are by far the most frequent offenders in this area, with 871 offenses. Canada (139 offenses) and Australia (73 offenses) are next in line. The most prolific of the watchdog projects is run by Damien Charlotin, a senior research fellow at HEC Paris, a top-ranking European business school. Another newer and less robust Charlotin database tracks legal cases in which generative AI was used as evidence to argue or prove a point. But the use of AI itself isn’t the issue. Instead, the problem is the technology’s propensity for inaccuracy. Courts across the United States have sanctioned, fined, and otherwise provided extreme consequences for attorney misuse of generative AI, primarily viewing them as ethics violations. In Wisconsin, Supreme Court Rule 20:1.1 governs attorney competence about technology: “(A) lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology,” the rule says. Other rules regarding client confidentiality and candor to the court supplement that rule. For example, using AI may involve an attorney providing sensitive client information to an unsecure system. That implicates a client’s confidentiality and triggers a lawyer’s obligation to communicate with the client, Jacobs said. Rule 20:3.3 requires candor to the tribunal. “You cannot have read a fake case, which means your work has not been thorough,” said Jacobs. In July 2024, the American Bar Association issued a formal opinion on attorney use of generative AI. It cited existing ethical obligations “such as those relating to confidentiality, communication with a client, meritorious claims and contentions, candor toward the tribunal, supervisory responsibilities regarding others in the law office using the technology and those outside the law office providing (generative AI) services and charging reasonable fees.” But what’s happening in practice is nevertheless evolving, shaped by local rules and sanctions when things go awry. Kenosha County (where petitioner Stone lives) and Waukesha County have local rules requiring disclosure to the court regarding AI use.* Complicating the issue is little specific instruction for litigants who represent themselves—which generative AI may encourage more people to do. Some, like Stone, believe that upfront disclosure of generative AI use should be a requirement moving forward. No stranger to litigation, Stone has a handful of what he calls “election integrity” cases pending in the Court of Appeals and lower courts. He used AI in many of them. “It’s a tremendous tool,” Stone said on a call with WJI. “But it can be very harmful.” Throughout his litigation, Stone observed there was no AI disclosure requirement for pro se litigants. Holding pro se litigants to the same standards and expectations of attorneys is based on caselaw. He feels disclosure is the right way to go. “I believe in full transparency,” he said. The current rule change petition would require a self-represented litigant who uses a generative AI tool in preparing any filing or other written work product submitted to a state tribunal to independently review and verify the accuracy of all statements of fact and law and the authenticity of all citations before filing. The pro se litigant would have to disclose such use in the same manner as an attorney. The proposed rule emphasizes that existing ethical duties of competence, confidentiality, candor, and supervisory responsibility apply fully to the use of AI tools, Stone wrote in the petition. For Rosenzweig, a rule applicable to pro se litigants makes more sense as a rule of civil procedure. “Perhaps disclosure rules, more generally, and applied across the board, are a good stopgap,” Rosenzweig said. “(T)hey’ll remind people—lay and lawyer—of their obligations.” But we may have already entered a world where most people use AI without even knowing it. “I think eventually we won’t need disclosure,” said Rosenzweig. “Either AI will fizzle as a fad, or will be integrated into so much that affirmative disclosures would be as useless as disclosing whether you used Google or a cloud server.” The Supreme Court has not yet taken any action on Stone's petition, known as petition 26-02. *Correction: The initial version of this story indicated that Kenosha and Waukesha counties were the only circuit court jurisdictions with a local rule about AI use. Following publication, WJI learned that Portage County, too, has a rule requiring disclosure of AI use (Portage County Circuit Court Rule 2.15). If you know of other Wisconsin circuit courts with AI disclosure rules, please let us know.  Suggested disclosure from Stone's rule change petition.
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By Margo Kirchner In last week’s Wisconsin Supreme Court candidate debate, Wisconsin Justice Initiative’s legal challenge to the spring 2020 ballot question was the foundation for one of the final questions. WISN 12 in Milwaukee held and broadcast the debate between Wisconsin Court of Appeals Judges Chris Taylor and Maria Lazar on April 2. About 10 minutes before the end, WISN moderator Matt Smith asked Taylor why she had voted against the constitutional amendment known as Marsy’s Law when she was a state legislator. Taylor served in the Wisconsin Assembly prior to appointment as a circuit court judge in 2020. After Taylor’s answer, discussing her constituents' concerns with the provision, Smith turned to Lazar. He asked her about Marsy’s Law as follows: “Judge Lazar, critics have challenged the wording on the ballot as unclear and insufficient. The court, though, in a 6-1 ruling, disagreed with that. It has led to some questions, including new debates, about what information should be made public and when. Are there negative, unintended consequences to Marsy’s Law?” Lazar first answered that the amendment “is a very good, strong law,” but admitted that “there are some issues that have come up” for the courts to decide. “I think there are some points that will have to be addressed, but overall it has been astonishingly effective and important,” she said. She attributed issues with the amendment to the drafters not knowing all the possible perspectives or effects. “It’s not like we have lawyers in our Legislature drafting most of these bills,” she said. Though Smith did not name WJI or mention the caption of the court decision, his question referenced the lawsuit WJI brought in 2019 to challenge the Marsy’s Law ballot question. WJI argued that the ballot question not only failed to fully and fairly inform voters about the contents of the amendment but, in fact, misled them. WJI argued that the ballot question failed to inform voters of the amendment’s reduction of rights of an accused. An accused's right to a fair trial, for instance, was deleted from the constitution. The Supreme Court in 2023 ruled against WJI, six to one, on a ground that had not been raised by the state defendants and that two justices sprung on the parties at oral argument. The decision gave the Legislature broad freedom to describe proposed amendments, regardless of voters being confused or misled by the ballot questions. Voters are not entitled to a fair explanation of what they are voting on. Justice Brian Hagedorn wrote for the majority that the Wisconsin Constitution “does not require any substantive discussion of the amendment in the ballot question submitted to the people. No explanation or summary is constitutionally commanded.” A ballot question is deficient “only in the rare circumstance that the question is fundamentally counterfactual such that voters were not asked to approve the actual amendment,” he wrote. Justice Rebecca Bradley concurred, saying that “(t)he constitutional purpose of a ballot question . . . is not to educate voters.” “Voters are trusted to inform themselves,” she wrote. A recent bill, AB 207, would have provided voters with significantly more information. Introduced by Republicans, it ended up with bipartisan support in the Assembly, where it passed out of committee with a unanimous vote in October 2025 and then passed the full Assembly in November. The bill would have required the Legislature to draft a one-page disclosure notice for voters with the entire text of the actual proposed constitutional amendment (not just the ballot question), a plain language summary of existing law, and a plain language explanation of the effect of the proposed amendment. The disclosure notice would be published on the Wisconsin Elections Commission’s voter registration website for at least 30 days before an election, posted on each county clerk’s website, mailed with absentee ballots, and posted at the polls on election day. Sponsor Rep. Jerry O’Connor (R-Fond du Lac) stated in written testimony in both chambers that “(n)o one likes to be at a disadvantage when asked to take a position on a crucial matter such as amending the state Constitution. Yet that is how we treat our voters when we present the voters with a referendum question on a ballot. This is unfair and unreasonable. We can and should do better.” Rep. Dan Knodl (R-Germantown) stated in written testimony urging passage, “Ballot questions are not written to explain a proposal, they’re written to implement it.” He noted that the bill "strengthens voter trust through transparency and accuracy." The Senate received the Assembly’s approved bill in November. However, the bill did not progress through the Senate’s Committee on Licensing, Regulatory Reform, State and Federal Affairs. The bill died when the Legislature adjourned in March 2026. The Senate’s version of the bill, SB 205, received a hearing in that same committee in November 2025, but the committee failed to vote on it. As for Lazar’s statement that the Legislature does not have lawyers drafting bills, in the case of the Marsy’s Law constitutional amendment, it might not have been drafted by people in Wisconsin at all. Marsy’s Law has been the personal cause of Broadcom founder, billionaire, and later convicted drug felon Henry Nicholas III, following the tragic murder of his sister. Beginning with a Marsy’s Law constitutional amendment in California in 2008, he and his organizations have advocated for substantially similar amendments in at least 20 states. Marsy’s Law for Wisconsin, LLC spent over $1.5 million from January 2017 through June 2019 lobbying the Legislature to approve the amendment and ballot question so the matter could be sent to voters in spring 2020.  Wisconsin Court of Appeals Judges Maria Lazar (L) and Chris Taylor (R) vie for an open seat on the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The election is tomorrow, Apr. 7. By Alexandria Staubach As Wisconsin prepares for a Supreme Court election between two appellate judges, examining judicial track records is helpful for understanding a candidate's potential impact on the high-court bench. Past rulings can provide insight on how the candidates approach the cases before them, reason and interpret law to get to their decisions, and explain those decisions to lower courts and the public. Court of Appeals Judges Maria Lazar and Chris Taylor vie for an open seat on the Supreme Court. The election is April 7. Voters may be familiar with some of the high-profile roles each judge held before their appellate court positions. Taylor served as the public policy director for Planned Parenthood for a decade, held a seat in the Wisconsin Legislature, then became a Dane County Circuit Court judge. Lazar worked in private practice for business clients, had a high-profile position in then-Gov. Scott Walker’s Department of Justice, and then was a Waukesha County Circuit Court judge. Voters are likely less familiar with the candidates’ tenures on the Court of the Appeals. The work of the Court of the Appeals is inherently blander than the candidates’ lawyer or trial judge work, but it is likely much more representative of what they will encounter on the high court. With 16 judges employed across four districts, the Court of Appeals resolves appeals covering every area of the law. Lazar sits in District 2 (comprising the counties surrounding Milwaukee County) and Taylor sits in District 4 (comprising Dane County and the southwest portion of the state). On average, a District 2 judge would resolve 185 cases in a year and a District 4 judge 132. Unlike the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the appeals court rarely hears oral arguments, however. Sparked by an audience question at a recent presentation by WJI about the election, WJI has examined a variety of appellate opinions authored by the two candidates and is providing a selection of them for voter information. District 2 (Lazar) is the busier of the two jurisdictions and sometimes lands high-profile cases, such as those involving the Legislature or Wisconsin Department of Justice. District 4 (Taylor) is the next busiest appellate court and includes most appeals from Dane County Circuit Court. For each judge we’ve included three opinions on which she was the lead author: one criminal case, one family law case, and one civil case. All but one are published cases. We could not find a recent published opinion by Lazar directly related to criminal law so have provided an unpublished opinion she authored. Generally, published opinions are considered precedent and can be cited as controlling law for later cases, while unpublished authored opinions may be cited only for persuasive purposes. Later this week, the Wisconsin Supreme Court will hear oral argument over another opinion Lazar authored regarding the use of state settlement funds. Below we quote short excerpts from each case and link to the full opinions for those who want to review more of the candidates’ reasoning and writing. We have removed citations for ease of reading. Italics are WJI’s additions. The candidates are presented alphabetically by last name.  Court of Appeals opinions by Judge Maria Lazar Wildwood Estate LLC v. Village of Summit — Civil An individual’s “right to maintain control over his [or her] home, and to be free from governmental interference, is a private interest of historic and continuing importance.” The “valuable rights” associated with this interest include “the right of sale, the right of occupancy, the right to unrestricted use and enjoyment, and the right to receive rents.” It is for this reason that municipalities may not pass zoning ordinances under the “guise of the police power” without following the procedural steps designed to protect citizens’ rights. Because the Ordinance changes the allowed uses of property and includes multiple indicia of traditional zoning ordinances, the circuit court correctly concluded that it was a zoning ordinance. And, as the circuit court noted, the Village’s passage of the Ordinance sidestepped the proper process to enact a zoning ordinance. We conclude that the Village did violate Wildwood’s procedural due process rights. Danielson v. Danielson – Family law The ultimate question is whether social security benefits expected for one spouse fall within the factors a trial court should consider in achieving an equitable marital property division. Clearly, the court is to consider the “contribution of each party to the marriage” and the salaries the spouses earned. The trial court should also look to the “economic circumstances of each party, including pension benefits,” even if it determines not to divide them between the spouses. Moreover, we conclude that social security benefits are “substantial assets not subject to division by the court” and count as “other factors [that] the court may in each individual case determine to be relevant.” Our supreme court has “repeatedly stated that ‘the aim of all statutory construction is to discern the intent of the legislature,’ and that a ‘cardinal rule in interpreting statutes’ is to favor a construction which will fulfill the purpose of the statute over a construction which defeats the manifest object of the act.” State v. Baker – Criminal The State charged (Ashley Rae) Baker with one count of carrying a concealed weapon without a license. Baker filed a motion to suppress the evidence, asserting that (Officer Michael) Moore did not have a legal basis to search her purse without a warrant. At the hearing on Baker’s motion, Moore was the sole witness. He testified to the facts above and stated that his search of the purse was based on the “totality of everything,” including his observation of Baker coming out of a house known for drug activity and the marijuana found in the vehicle. He expressed a concern for “the potential for any concealment of other items,” saying that “any time that someone gives us a breadcrumb” it could be “to deter finding the loaf of bread.” He further noted that he believed Baker may have had paraphernalia or drugs on her person or with her, because (in addition to the shake found throughout the vehicle) the marijuana found in the center console area “would have … been essentially under her left elbow” while she was in the front passenger seat. …. …. Baker was seen leaving a house known for active drug activity after a ten-minute visit and was riding in a car that had marijuana and drug paraphernalia throughout, including approximately one half gram of marijuana and a marijuana grinder between her and the driver—“essentially under her left elbow.” We agree with the circuit court’s assessment that this evidence is sufficient to establish a “nexus between the defendant and the drugs in the car.” This is not a case of guilt by association—which could be said if, for example, the only marijuana found prior to the search of Baker’s purse had been the marijuana blunt in her companion’s pocket—but rather a case where Moore’s belief that Baker was committing the crime of possessing marijuana was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.  Court of Appeals opinions by Judge Chris Taylor
Hubbard v. Neuman – Civil We reject Dr. (Carol) Neuman’s argument that it “would lead to absurd and unworkable results” if a physician who does not perform the procedure at issue has a duty to inform the patient about the availability, benefits, and risks of reasonable alternate treatment options. According to Dr. Neuman, this would result in discouraging “the intra-disciplinary communication and cooperation that is critically important to effective patient care.” For instance, Dr. Neuman asserts that, if this duty is not limited to the physician actually performing the surgery or procedure, then all family practitioners or primary care providers who ever refer a patient to a specialist could be liable if the referring physician fails to disclose the risks associated with the care or treatment provided by the specialist. As explained above, the allegations in the complaint, and the reasonable inferences, assert that Dr. Neuman was (Melissa) Hubbard’s treating OB/GYN, had expertise as an OB/GYN in the treatment options for pelvic endometriosis, diagnosed Hubbard’s pelvic endometriosis, was actively involved in the planning and preparations for the removal of Hubbard’s ovaries during the February 2018 surgery, initially planned to perform the removal of Hubbard’s fallopian tubes, ovaries, and uterus during that surgery, and recommended that Dr. McGauley remove Hubbard’s ovaries. Recognizing that Hubbard has alleged sufficient facts to support a claim that Dr. Neuman had a duty to inform Hubbard in this situation protects Hubbard’s ability “to intelligently exercise [her] right to consent or to refuse the treatment or procedure proposed.” J.J.D. v. M.W. – Family law To protect the rights of a parent in a TPR (termination of parental rights) case, if the parent seeks to admit to grounds supporting the termination, “[t]he circuit court must engage the parent in a colloquy to ensure that the plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” “This colloquy is governed by the requirements of WIS. STAT. § 48.422(7) and notions of due process.” …. Our supreme court has identified additional colloquy requirements to protect a person’s parental rights. A circuit court must ensure that the parent is “informed of the statutory standard the court will apply at the second stage” of the TPR proceedings; that is, that the child’s best interest will govern. The court must also ensure that the parent understands potential outcomes of the second stage, though it is not required to “‘inform parents in detail of all potential outcomes.’” Rather, the court must determine that the parent understands that a termination of parental rights or dismissal of the TPR petition are two possibilities. State v. Anderson – Criminal The caution with which we are instructed to approach juvenile confessions is with good reason. As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, “children ‘generally are less mature and responsible than adults,’” “lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them,” and “are more vulnerable or susceptible to … outside pressures.” As our supreme court has recognized, children are “more likely to want to please and believe police officers because they are authority figures” and “are incapable of fully realizing the consequences of their decisions.” Accordingly, the same police pressure that may not be coercive for an adult suspect may be coercive for a juvenile suspect. Marquette University Law School poll shows that most voters not "tuned in" to Supreme Court race2/25/2026  Marquette University Law School's Lubar Center Director Derek Mosley (left) and Marquette University Law School Poll Director Charles Franklin (right) at the recent poll results announcement on Feb. 25, 2026, at the law school. Photograph by Margo Kirchner. By Margo Kirchner
The "punchline" of the latest Marquette University Law School Poll is that Wisconsin voters just have not "tuned into the races" this year, said poll director Dr. Charles Franklin at a lunch-time event at the law school today. Two-thirds of registered voters participating in the latest poll are still undecided regarding both parties' primary candidates for governor and the Supreme Court race, said Franklin. While the lack of interest in the partisan primary races could be explained by the length of time until they occur in the second half of the year, the nonpartisan Supreme Court election is less than six weeks away. Franklin compared the public's awareness of last year's Supreme Court race to awareness of this year's race. In February 2025, 39% of registered voters polled had heard quite a bit about the April 2025 election between Susan Crawford and Brad Schimel. This year, just 6% of registered voters in the poll conducted between Feb. 11 and 19 reported having heard much about the Supreme Court race between Wisconsin Court of Appeals Judges Chris Taylor and Maria Lazar. Out of likely voters, 15% reported a likely vote for Lazar, 22% reported a likely vote for Taylor, and 62% said they were undecided. Similar percentages of respondents (23% as to Lazar and 21% as to Taylor) had no clear idea what the candidate stands for, while about 60% said they had not heard enough to know. The poll report, which includes public opinion on candidates, elected officials, data centers, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, online betting, and other topics, is available here. When Lubar Center Director Derek Mosley asked Franklin how the public stands regarding data centers specifically, Franklin responded: "We don't like 'em." The Supreme Court election is April 7. Franklin said he'll conduct another poll before then. Meanwhile, for voters wanting to know more about the Supreme Court candidates:
Current Wisconsin Court of Appeals Judges Maria Lazar and Chris Taylor vie for the open seat on the Wisconsin Supreme Court created by Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's retirement. The election is April 7. Lazar is an appellate judge in District 2 (centered in Waukesha and composed of southeastern Wisconsin counties excluding Milwaukee County) and previously was a Waukesha County Circuit Court judge. She graduated from Georgetown University Law Center in 1989. A copy of her resume/CV is here. Taylor is an appellate judge in District 4 (centered in Madison and composed of south central and southwestern Wisconsin counties) and previously was a Dane County Circuit Court judge. She graduated from the University of Wisconsin Law School in 1995. A copy of her resume/CV is here. WJI asked each of the candidates to answer a series of questions. The questions are patterned after some of those on the job application the governor uses when he is considering judicial appointments. Answers are printed as submitted, without editing or insertion of “(sic)” for errors. The candidates are presented alphabetically by last name.
 The entrance to the Wisconsin Supreme Court at the Capitol in Madison. Photograph by Margo Kirchner. By Alexandria Staubach
A hot bench of Wisconsin Supreme Court justices challenged a lawyer for the Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty during oral arguments last week about his challenge to a state technical college grant program. At issue is whether the program is a permissible targeted solution to address racial inequities or impermissible race-based discrimination. WILL attorney Luke Berg argued that all race-based state action is unconstitutional, with exceptions only for addressing race riots in prisons and remedying specific past state-sanctioned discrimination. Berg drew his argument from a 2023 U.S. Supreme Court decision regarding Harvard. That decision effectively banned race-based college admission policies across the country. Berg argued that the only question for the Wisconsin high court was “when, how, and by whom (the state grant law) gets struck down.” Justice Rebecca Dallet called Berg’s argument a “threat,” “offensive,” and “inappropriate.” The heated and unusual exchange took place during oral arguments in Rabiebna v. Higher Educational Aids Board, in which Berg's client challenges the race-based technical college retention grant statute that has been on the statute books in Wisconsin since 1985. Grants allocated by the statute range from $250 to $2,500 and are available to students who are Black, American Indian, Hispanic, and Southeast Asian (specifically individuals who fled Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia after 1975 or their descendants) and attending state technical college programs. Berg took the position that any race-based program initiated by the state is inherently unconstitutional as enacting “explicit racial discrimination into the law.” Dallet pushed back. “What if we had a maternal fetal health issue with Black babies dying at a higher rate than white babies,” she asked, adding “which, by the way, we do have significantly.” “Are you saying the state couldn’t target that because if they use the word race, if they say the word “Black,” we’re done?” Berg responded that the state would need to pass a program applicable to all babies instead. “The state can talk about that problem, (but) what it can’t do is enact into law an explicit racial discrimination,” he insisted. “They would pass a program that applies to all babies that need it and it would mostly apply to the Black babies if that’s the real problem, but there are some white babies in the world who might need that program, too, so you would make the program available to all,” he said. Other justices, too, questioned Berg on the scope of his desired result. “People of color contribute to the vitality of our state, and they are thanked by facing disparities when it comes to housing, access to medical care, transportation, incarceration, financial stability and education,” said Chief Justice Jill Karofsky. She asked Berg if he “agreed that education plays a central role in breaking the cycle of inequity.” “I think the worst form of discrimination is discrimination under the law,” Berg responded. Berg indicated that government cannot address race-based problems with targeted solutions. “Does the state have an interest in examining, addressing, and eliminating those disparities?” asked Justice Susan Crawford. “No,” said Berg. Berg suggested the law is so clearly in favor of his position that the Supreme Court should “D-I-G” the case, meaning dismiss it as “improvidently granted.” The Court of Appeals decision in Berg’s favor would then stand. Jefferson County Circuit Court Judge William Hue determined that the grant program survived WILL’s constitutional challenge. However, a unanimous District 2 appeals panel of Judges Mark Gundrum, Maria Lazar, and Shelly Grogan reversed. “(G)overnment funding or support designed to provide a benefit or cause a detriment to persons based even in part on their race, national origin, or ancestry cannot stand,” Gundrum wrote. At last week’s Supreme Court argument, Assistant Attorney General Charlotte Gibson called the District 2 decision “radical.” “I am not aware of any court in the county who has come up with a ban that would be this categorical, that would cover things like medical research that’s targeted at a particular group that is suffering from specific health outcomes,” said Gibson. She cautioned that “that is exactly the rule of law they’re looking for.” Gibson argued that the grant program is narrowly tailored to address the state’s compelling interest in improving retention rates for college students with disproportionately high attrition—a problem “race-neutral aid has failed to fix.” By Alexandria Staubach The shuttering of WisconsinEye earlier this week has left a gaping hole in the public’s ability to watch what their officials are doing. For nearly 20 years, Wisconsin advocacy groups, community organizers, and independent journalists have relied on WisconsinEye, or “WisEye.” It provided comprehensive coverage of Capitol happenings and has been the state’s only gavel-to-gavel coverage of the Legislature, Supreme Court, Elections Commission, and more. WisconsinEye shut down on Dec. 15 due to a lack of funding and failure to meet minimum fundraising goals required to take advantage of a $10 million match offered by the Legislature earlier this year. It provided unedited, live coverage of full proceedings, as well as an important archive. WisconsinEye’s coverage allowed WJI staff and citizens across the state and nationwide to analyze arguments and identify the positions of Wisconsin’s legislators, justices, and executive branch officials without filter. Its closure highlights a dangerous trend: the decline of civic infrastructure. With the coverage and archive gone, tracking what happens at the Capitol becomes exponentially harder. Fish big and small—from formal media to nonprofits to active Wisconsinites of all parties and interests—will shoulder the weight of WisconsinEye’s demise. Wisconsin Justice Initiative's small staff is located in Milwaukee. WisconsinEye’s coverage of legislative hearings allowed staff to watch them without taking an entire day to travel to Madison. WJI has already missed a public hearing on proposed legislation to increase the maximum penalty for certain controlled substance offenses occurring near a homeless shelter. Kate Duffy, the woman behind Wisconsin’s @motherhoodforgood, spoke to WJI about the importance of WisconsinEye to what she does on that social media platform. Duffy's platform, with more than 100,000 followers, aims to make individual advocacy and civic engagement accessible to its followers. “As an independent content creator and civic educator, access to WisEye is essential to my work,” said Duffy. “More people are getting their news from social media, and many of us who aim to reach these audiences don’t have access to a traditional newsroom or the ability to be at the Capitol every day,” she said. Duffy said WisconsinEye allows her "to see for myself what’s actually happening in legislative hearings and floor sessions, without filters or spin.” “At a time when trust in information is fragile, WisEye remains one of the few truly objective, public-facing sources available,” she said. “Keeping it funded is critical to transparency and public understanding.” Amanda Merkwae, advocacy director at the ACLU of Wisconsin, confirmed that importance, telling WJI, “WisconsinEye plays a vital role in keeping the public informed and holding those in power accountable through transparency.” “Watching legislative floor sessions and committee hearings, Wisconsin Supreme Court oral arguments, and other programming on WIsconsinEye is part of my near-daily routine," she said. It’s unclear whether or how WisconsinEye could continue. Earlier this week a message replacing the decades-long archive of hearings and live coverage said in part: “Without consistent annual funding . . . citizens, legislators, legislative staff, the governor’s administration, agency leadership and staff, trade associations, attorneys and the courts, local government officials, journalists and all print, cable, television and radio news outlets, businesses, nonprofit organizations — all lose the only reliable and proven source of unfiltered State Capitol news and state government proceedings.” It attributed the shuttering to “extreme competition and a complete collapse in private funding.” That message has since been replaced by one highlighting the station’s award-winning coverage and years of service:  Legislation circulated for co-sponsorship by Sens. Mark Spreitzer, Kelda Roys, and Chris Larson and Rep. Brienne Brown earlier this week may provide an answer.
A new bill proposes the establishment of an Office of the Public Affairs Network to replace WisconsinEye. According a memo regarding co-sponsorship, the proposal “creates a permanent office to operate a public affairs network that will provide full coverage of state government proceedings in Wisconsin.” The memo says the Office of the Public Affairs Network would administer a network to:
The network would be governed by a board of seven, including the governor or their designee, two additional public appointees of the governor, and four legislators—one from the majority and one from the minority caucuses in both chambers. The Legislature would appropriate $2 million annually to support eight staff positions, which, according to the memo is equivalent to WisconsinEye’s “current coverage while supporting increased access.” The bill also directs the Department of Administration to “attempt” to obtain WisconsinEye’s digital archive to be incorporated into the new network’s archive. “While WisconsinEye's current contract requires them to hand over digital archives to the Wisconsin Historical Society for ongoing public access if WisconsinEye is ever dissolved or liquidated, WisconsinEye’s current funding issues have resulted in WisconsinEye taking the archives offline without a replacement becoming available,” wrote the senators. In the memo, the senators say the bill will transform “the recording, broadcasting, and archiving of Wisconsin’s state government proceedings from a failed private venture into a reliable, nonpartisan public service.” No matter the form, WisconsinEye’s coverage is critical to effective advocacy and public access to the actions of elected officials. “WisconsinEye’s live webcasts and recordings of state legislative proceedings in Wisconsin provide transparency and critical access to democracy for residents all over the state,” Merkwae told WJI. “We hope the Legislature can come to an agreement to continue this essential service, not only for individuals and organizations engaging in legislative advocacy, local government officials impacted profoundly by state government decisions, and journalists, but for everyday Wisconsinites who have a right to an accessible way to access what is happening in state government,” she said. Note: In a normal SCOW docket post we crunch Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to manageable size. The rules for this are that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision and the “upshot” and “background” sections do not count because of their summary and necessary nature. In this post, we’re breaking down last week's unsigned order of the court in cases challenging Wisconsin's congressional districting, plus the concurring and dissenting opinions. Each justice will still receive no more than 10 paragraphs. Regular italics are in the original opinion. Italics surrounded by parentheses indicate WJI insertions. This post is slightly different than prior ones because there are actually two orders. Two separate cases challenge Wisconsin’s congressional districting, and the court issued an order in each case. The orders and opinions in each case are nearly identical and address substantively the same arguments. The quotations for this post come from Bothfeld. As usual, we’ve generally removed citations from the opinions for ease of reading. However, in this instance, some statutory citations and references to prior Supreme Court decisions are necessary to understand the opinions. Several references to the multiple Johnson opinions in particular are left in. That case concerned the challenges to Wisconsin’s redistricting maps following the 2020 census and resulted in opinions subsequently called Johnson I, Johnson II, and Johnson III. Finally, we have included both versions of one paragraph of Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler’s dissent. Following issuance of these orders on Nov. 25, journalist Mark Joseph Stern quickly posted on Bluesky and reported in Slate about Ziegler’s inaccurate quotation and interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Moore v. Harper. Stern told Wisconsin Justice Initiative last week that he asked the Wisconsin Supreme Court to correct it. Ziegler’s initial dissent was replaced by a new version eliminating the quotation marks and adding a parenthetical. We quote both versions, with the changed language in bold. The cases: Elizabeth Bothfeld v. Wisconsin Elections Commission Wisconsin Business Leaders for Democracy v. Wisconsin Elections Commission Majority: Unsigned but consisting of Chief Justice Jill Karofsky and Justices Rebecca Dallet, Janet Protasiewicz, and Susan Crawford (5 pages) Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Justice Brian K. Hagedorn (2 pages) Dissent: Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler (9 pages) Dissent: Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley (7 pages) Upshot (The court held that pursuant to state statutes it must appoint a three-judge panel and select a venue for each case to hear the challenges to congressional districting. The court chose Dane County Circuit Court as the venue for both cases and appointed the following circuit court judges: Bothfeld case: Julie Genovese, Dane County Circuit Court Mark Sanders, Milwaukee County Circuit Court Emily Lonergan, Outagamie County Circuit Court WBLD case: David Conway, Dane County Circuit Court Patricia Baker, Portage County Circuit Court; and Michael Moran, Marathon County Circuit Court) Background On July 22, 2025, this court received written notice from the Dane County Clerk of Courts of the filing of a summons and complaint on July 8, 2025, by Elizabeth Bothfeld and other individual voters (collectively, “Bothfeld”) against the Wisconsin Elections Commission et al. (collectively, “WEC”). The complaint alleges that Wisconsin’s current congressional map violates the Wisconsin Constitution in various respects. The Dane County Clerk of Courts enclosed a copy of the summons and complaint in its July 22, 2025 written notice to this court. This court opened miscellaneous Case No. 2025XX1438 to receive these filings. *** On September 25, 2025, this court entered an order requiring the parties to submit simultaneous briefs and response briefs addressing “whether Bothfeld’s complaint filed in the circuit court constitutes ‘an action to challenge the apportionment of a congressional or state legislative district’ under WIS. STAT. § 801.50(4m).” (The court granted motions by individual voters and the Wisconsin Legislature to file amici curiae (nonparty) briefs and granted a motion to intervene filed by a group of Congressmen and individual voters.)  Majority . . . . WISCONSIN STAT. § 731.035(1) states that “[u]pon receiving notice under s. 801.50(4m), the supreme court shall appoint a panel consisting of 3 circuit court judges to hear the matter. The supreme court shall choose one judge from each of 3 circuits and shall assign one of the circuits as the venue for all hearings and filings in the matter.” *** The Bothfeld plaintiffs argue that their complaint clearly constitutes “an action to challenge the apportionment of any congressional or state legislative district” for purposes of WIS. STAT. § 801.50(4m). This is so given that, in various cases over many years’ time, this court has used the terms “redistricting,” “apportionment,” and “reapportionment” interchangeably to mean redrawing Wisconsin’s congressional and state legislative districts so as to comply with state or federal law. The court’s use of these terms interchangeably comports with (the Wisconsin Constitution), which labels the state legislative redistricting process “Apportionment” in its title and describes the legislature’s task as to “apportion and district” anew. Moreover, cases interpreting an analogous federal statute, which requires appointment of three-judge panels to hear “apportionment” challenges in federal courts, consistently use the terms “apportionment” and “redistricting” interchangeably. Given the above, the Bothfeld plaintiffs argue, their complaint plainly falls within the scope of § 801.50(4m), thus requiring this court to appoint a three-judge panel and designate a circuit court venue pursuant to state law. The Congressmen, the Legislature, and the amici generally argue that Bothfeld’s complaint does not fall within the scope of WIS. STAT. § 801.50(4m) because the complaint is not an “apportionment” challenge, which they define narrowly as a challenge to the distribution of legislative seats among districts. Bothfeld’s complaint is instead a “redistricting” challenge, which they define narrowly as a challenge to district boundaries. In their view, the non-synonymous nature of the terms is confirmed by the Wisconsin Constitution, which uses the terms “apportion” and “district” in a single section, indicating that the terms have distinct meanings. Moreover, these parties argue, “apportionment” refers only to legislative action, not the remedial judicial action that this court took in Johnson II, of adopting Wisconsin’s current congressional map. Because Bothfeld’s lawsuit is not an “apportionment” challenge, these parties submit, the court should not appoint a three-judge panel. Instead, the court should employ its superintending authority and dismiss Bothfeld’s complaint, as the suit constitutes an improper collateral attack on Johnson II that a lower court is in no position to adjudicate. The defendants—WEC, its members, and its administrator—filed a statement explaining that it takes no position on the question posed. We conclude that Bothfeld’s complaint does constitute “an action to challenge the apportionment of any congressional or state legislative district” for purposes of WIS. STAT. § 801.50(4m). We acknowledge, as noted by the parties, that in (a prior case) we stated in a footnote, without citation, that “[r]eapportionment is the allocation of seats in a legislative body where the district boundaries do not change but the number of members per district does (e.g., allocation of congressional seats among established districts, that is, the states); redistricting is the drawing of new political boundaries[.]” But this statement did not address the meaning of § 801.50(4m)—a statute that did not exist until nearly 10 years after the Jensen decision. Were we to view Jensen as dispositive of the meaning of the term “apportionment” in § 801.50(4m)—such that here, the term would refer only to the allocation of congressional seats to Wisconsin—it is difficult to conceive of any state-court “action to challenge the apportionment of any congressional . . . district” to which § 801.50(4m) would apply, as “apportionment” in that sense occurs only at the federal level, not the state level. We decline to adopt such a cramped reading of the statute, particularly given that neither we nor other courts have consistently used the term “apportionment” in such a limited sense. We also reject as unsupported the suggestion in the briefing that “apportionment” refers only to legislative action, not judicial action. Because Bothfeld’s complaint constitutes an “action to challenge the apportionment of a congressional or state legislative district” within the meaning of § 801.50(4m), this court is required to appoint a three-judge panel and to select a venue for the action pursuant to (state statute).  Hagedorn Concurrence in part and dissent in part The question before us at this stage is a narrow one, and it does not involve whether the petitioners have valid claims or can obtain their requested relief. The issue is simply whether this court should appoint a three-judge panel pursuant to (state statutes). As the court’s order explains, I conclude these statutes apply to this case, and a panel must be appointed. I disagree, however, with how this court is fulfilling its statutory mandate. Wis. Stat. § 801.50(4m) provides a unique venue selection mechanism for actions challenging “the apportionment of any congressional . . . district,” and directs us to WIS. STAT. § 751.035. That section then sets forth procedures to provide both a new location and a new judicial decision-maker. These statutes are transparently designed to prevent forum shopping in disputes over where congressional lines should be drawn. To avoid litigants simply choosing their preferred venue and judge, the statute requires the appointment of a three-judge panel with each judge coming from a different judicial circuit, and then requires that venue be assigned to one of those circuits. Given the nature of this case and the statute’s implicit call for geographic diversity and neutrality, a randomly-selected panel and venue would be a better way to fulfill the statutory mandate. Instead, my colleagues have chosen to keep this case in Dane County and leave the originally assigned Dane County judge on the panel. The court has also hand-selected two additional judges rather than using a neutral process. To be clear, I am not suggesting the judicial panel will fail to do its job with integrity and impartiality. But this approach is an odd choice in the face of a statute so clearly designed to deter litigants from selecting their preferred venue and judge. I also write to respond to the entreaty from the Congressmen, the Legislature, and the amici that we use our superintending authority to seize this case from the circuit court, exercise independent jurisdiction, and dismiss it on the merits. This request is not without force given the unique posture of this case. The petitioners here make the rather extraordinary plea for the circuit court to declare a 2022 decision and order of this court unconstitutional. That said, these issues are not yet ours to decide. Our role at this stage is limited—dealing only with the statutory mandate to appoint a three-judge panel which is then empowered to adjudicate the petitioners’ claims. To be sure, the Congressmen, the Legislature, and the amici raise legal roadblocks that must be reckoned with. But setting the precedent that this court should swoop in and shut down a case before it ever gets to us is not a door we should open. The circuit court panel will consider all the relevant substantive and procedural arguments in due course, and I would give it that opportunity. I therefore concur in the court’s order appointing the panel, but I disagree with the method the court uses to appoint the panel and select venue.  Ziegler Ziegler dissent Today, my colleagues—disregarding the United States Constitution, the Wisconsin Constitution, and fundamental legal principles—approve a collateral attack of our court’s decision by a panel of circuit court judges, unsupported in the law and barred by laches. The majority not only undermines our constitutional authority and circumvents established redistricting precedent but also, again, usurps the legislature’s constitutional power. In allowing this litigation to proceed, the majority abdicates its constitutional superintending authority to Wisconsin’s circuit courts. Compounding the constitutional problems which prohibit a circuit court panel from reconsidering or overturning our decisions, the selection process for this hand-picked panel lacks even a hint of transparency. Behind closed doors, my colleagues chose three circuit court judges to consider apportioning, not redistricting, court-established congressional maps - something this panel is not constitutionally empowered to do. This action is barred by laches and is contrary to the Wisconsin Constitution and the Elections Clause of the United States Constitution. Under our state constitution and the United States Constitution, map-drawing authority lies with the legislature alone. And, our court has repeatedly declined to reconsider its adoption of Governor Evers’ congressional maps in Johnson II. While we were forced to act in the Johnson cases due to the impasse between the legislature and the governor, we are not faced with any such constitutional crisis here. This panel is not apportioning maps that the legislature drew and the governor approved. The so-called “apportionment” is of maps our court selected. The majority does not consider any of these distinctions in its order. Because these are court-created maps, the panel has no constitutional authority to revisit or change them, nor can it redefine apportionment because that too was decided in Johnson I. In Johnson I and Johnson II, the court decided apportionment, partisan gerrymandering, and congressional map districting, and those decisions remain unchanged, as do the court-selected congressional maps. Plaintiffs cite no authority to support a circuit judge panel revisiting our court’s determinations on apportionment. What the panel is to consider in addressing only apportionment is as clear as mud. If our court understands that the constitution forbids such a panel from reconsidering or overturning our court’s decision on apportionment or redistricting, then it is unclear what else the panel can do other than restate Johnson I and II. Otherwise, the court’s order has put the panel in a constitutional dilemma because the panel lacks any authority to revisit our decisions. *** I dissent without considering the merits of the case. In fact, it is impossible to know what the panel will be doing. The order ignores the many concerns that I raise, the questions to be answered by the panel, the factors to be weighed, the arguments that will be set forth, or any standards that might apply. Given Johnson I and its progeny, it is difficult to know what, if anything, this panel can or should do, and our court provides zero guidance. To me, the only constitutionally permissible action we should take is to dismiss this charade. Once again, a majority of this court engages in partisan judicial activism—this time to reshape congressional maps. This is no isolated incident; it is a pattern. As Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley recently observed: “Political forces continue to use this court to obtain what the democratic process denies them. The Wisconsin Constitution plainly prohibits a circuit court—empaneled by this court or not—from adjudicating a challenge to a final judgment of the supreme court. The majority nevertheless entertains yet another kick at the redistricting cat. “ We have heard the substance of this case before. The plaintiffs have merely returned for a second bite at the apple armed with a fresh legal theory. Even though they have cited no authority in support of their extraordinary legal theory, this court accepts their approach wholesale without demonstrating any legal analysis, critical reasoning, or attempt to reconcile this unprecedented proceeding with constitutional constraints. Not one word from the majority addressing laches. Instead, the court places this three-judge panel in the impossible position of considering “apportionment” without any authority to reconsider or overturn our precedent. *** (Original version:) Worse yet, the plaintiffs’ theory disobeys the United States Constitution’s Elections Clause which vests redistricting responsibility exclusively in “the Legislature thereof.” As the United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, the role of state courts in congressional redistricting is “exceedingly limited.” Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1, 34 (2023). This lawsuit invites the very judicial meddling that the Constitution prohibits. We see other states invoking fairly interesting procedures to address congressional maps. We do not see other state supreme courts allowing their lower courts to re-evaluate court-established congressional maps. While it may be more expedient for those in political favor to continue to turn to our court for map drawing, redrawing, and redrawing, or any of a host of “hot” political issues, that is not what the Constitution demands. And, these are federal congressional maps, but the majority does not give any weight to important federal constitutional concerns. The judiciary is to be the least dangerous branch of government. Not today, at least in Wisconsin. (Replacement paragraph:) Worse yet, the plaintiffs’ theory disobeys the United States Constitution’s Elections Clause which vests redistricting responsibility exclusively in “the Legislature thereof.” As the United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, the role of state courts in congressional redistricting is exceedingly limited. See Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1, 36 (2023) (“[S]tate courts may not transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review such that they arrogate to themselves the power vested in state legislatures to regulate federal elections.”). This lawsuit invites the very judicial meddling that the Constitution prohibits. We see other states invoking fairly interesting procedures to address congressional maps. We do not see other state supreme courts allowing their lower courts to re-evaluate court-established congressional maps. While it may be more expedient for those in political favor to continue to turn to our court for map drawing, redrawing, and redrawing, or any of a host of “hot” political issues, that is not what the Constitution demands. And, these are federal congressional maps, but the majority does not give any weight to important federal constitutional concerns. The judiciary is to be the least dangerous branch of government. Not today, at least in Wisconsin. *** (T)he majority appoints circuit court judges to do something, but provides no guidance. This panel cannot constitutionally reconsider the court’s legal conclusions regarding apportionment or the congressional maps. Allowing the abuse of WIS. STAT. § 801.50(4m) in this way runs headlong into constitutional constraints. Before we even begin to consider ordering a panel to apportion under this statute, we must start with the constitution. The majority instead starts with a facial application of the statute, completely ignoring constitutional implications of having a panel act on a matter that has been definitively decided by our court. *** Compounding the constitutional violations is the opaque process by which my colleagues selected the three-judge panel. There has been no disclosure of criteria, no explanation of procedure, and no transparency whatsoever. Not that these judges bear any fault in their selection, but there are over 260 circuit judges in our state, and we have no information on how or why these six judges were picked. The secrecy surrounding the selection process invites doubt. The public will never know what guided these choices; neither do I. *** Today is not a good day for Wisconsin’s judicial system. Our court has undermined its own constitutional authority in furtherance of affording the Democratic Party even more partisan political advantage than it already has with Governor Evers’ congressional maps in place. My colleagues ought not complain when our precedent is not taken seriously or followed. By entertaining this legal fiction, the majority jeopardizes the credibility of the judiciary and invites violation of foundational constitutional principles. Redistricting and reapportionment authority belongs to the legislature—not the judiciary. It occurs after a census. Because of the impasse after the last census, our court was the final word regarding apportionment and selecting the congressional maps. A circuit court panel simply cannot overturn or revise Johnson I and II.  Bradley Bradley dissent
The plaintiffs frame this court’s sole role in the proceedings as fulfilling a ministerial duty imposed by statute. The majority agrees. The members of this court, however, swore an oath to uphold the Wisconsin Constitution, which prohibits lower courts from reconsidering decisions of this supreme court. The Wisconsin Constitution is superior to the Wisconsin Statutes, and is dispositive. The circuit court nevertheless gave notice to this court of the WBLD and Bothfeld Complaints . . . . In response, the majority pretends this is a fresh challenge to an apportionment—rather than a collateral attack on a judgment of this court—and . . . appoints a hand-picked three-judge panel to consider plaintiffs’ challenge to this court’s adoption of Governor Tony Evers’ proposed congressional map in Johnson. None of this comports with the constitution. The Wisconsin Constitution denies the legislature any authority to empower a lower court to review the constitutionality of a final judgment of this court. The legislature itself, as amicus curiae in these matters, rejects the majority’s contrary interpretation, recognizing that the court’s constitutional superintending and appellate authority over all Wisconsin courts precludes the circuit court from adjudicating plaintiffs’ claims. The constitution itself relieves this court of any ostensible obligation to appoint a three-judge panel to perform that which the constitution forbids. Nonetheless, the majority—without even mentioning the constitution—simplistically cites the statute and says it must obey what it perceives to be a legislative command. Impermissibly interpreting statutory law to override the constitution, the majority punts to a panel of lower court judges a decision they are constitutionally unauthorized to make. In an unprecedented ruling, the majority holds that (a state statute) imposes a mandatory duty upon this court to appoint a three-judge circuit court panel for any “action to challenge the apportionment of any congressional or state legislative district” . . . . The majority says: “Because [the Bothfeld and WBLD] complaints constitute ‘actions to challenge the apportionment of a congressional or state legislative district’ within the meaning of § 801.50(4m), this court is required to appoint a three-judge panel and to select a venue for the action . . . .” (cleaned up) (emphasis added). The majority errs—gravely. Setting aside the purely political shenanigans underlying these particular cases, toppling Wisconsin’s judicial hierarchy undermines Wisconsin’s constitutional structure, damages this court’s legitimacy, and deprives the People of Wisconsin of the stability the rule of law provides. In addition to ignoring the constitution, the majority makes no mention whatsoever of the redistricting actions resolved by this court, which Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler recounts in her dissent. After the 2020 Census revealed malapportionment, the Wisconsin Legislature drew new maps, but Governor Evers vetoed them. This political impasse prompted an original action, which this court granted to remedy the unconstitutional malapportionment produced by population shifts. Thereafter, both the United States Supreme Court and this court denied multiple challenges to the constitutionality of the congressional map. This is no ordinary case in which a party brings an apportionment challenge in the first instance in circuit court; this supposedly supreme court has already spoken, and circuit court judges have no authority to revisit this court’s decision, even if the legislature purportedly gave it. The majority’s interpretation of (pertinent statute statutes) permits a panel of Wisconsin circuit court judges to reopen a final judgment of the supreme court to reconsider the constitutionality of the Johnson II congressional map adopted by this court to remedy malapportionment. The hierarchy of appellate jurisdiction under the Wisconsin Constitution is plain, and the majority’s holding is glaringly unconstitutional. The legislature cannot empower a circuit court to review a final judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, nor can the legislature require this court to appoint a circuit court panel to do so. The majority tacitly approves an impermissible collateral attack—in a lower court—on a decision of this court, but the Wisconsin Constitution prohibits such a maneuver. *** Under the Wisconsin Constitution, this court’s superintending authority is plenary and without limitation or exception. “Under the Wisconsin Constitution, [the administration of the courts is] expressly vested in this court; our authority to supervise and administer the Wisconsin court system is not created or circumscribed by the legislature.” The legislature cannot limit, invade, or strip this court’s constitutional authority. No statute can invade this court’s constitutionally-conferred appellate jurisdiction either. Under (the state constitution) “[t]he supreme court has appellate jurisdiction over all courts . . . .” While plaintiffs concede (the pertinent state statutes) leave this court’s “superintending and administrative authority” under (the constitution) intact, plaintiffs posit it would be extraordinary for the court to exercise it in this case. Hardly. Allowing a panel of circuit court judges to adjudicate a challenge to a supreme court decision impermissibly gives lower court judges appellate jurisdiction over the state’s highest court. That is extraordinary. (The constitution) gives circuit courts “such appellate jurisdiction in the circuit as the legislature may prescribe by law.” The supreme court is, of course, beyond the realm of any circuit. *** This court has accepted procedural statutes like (those in this case), but under the original understanding of the Wisconsin Constitution, this court retains its ultimate authority over court procedure. Assertion of that authority is particularly imperative if a statute appears to elevate a circuit court to a position of appellate review over the supreme court—a constitutional impossibility. Legislative interference with the authority constitutionally conferred on the judiciary has long been recognized to violate the Wisconsin Constitution. . . . “A collateral attack on a supreme court judgment” like these “would ordinarily be dismissed upon arrival.” (Citation to her own dissent in a prior case.) Political forces continue to use this court to obtain what the democratic process denies them. The Wisconsin Constitution plainly prohibits a circuit court—empaneled by this court or not—from adjudicating a challenge to a final judgment of the supreme court. The majority nevertheless entertains yet another kick at the redistricting cat. Unlike Schrödinger’s cat, this one most assuredly has been dead for years. I dissent. By Alexandria Staubach
Legislation in response to the temporary suspension of Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Hannah Dugan quietly made its way through public hearing and voting in the Assembly’s Judiciary Committee. Bill AB380/SB381 would require judges who are suspended for misconduct to receive no pay. However, the law would not apply retroactively. So whether or not it passes, it will not apply to Dugan. The bill passed out of committee on Oct. 1 on a party-line vote: four Republicans for and three Democrats against. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in April suspended Dugan, who was charged criminally in federal court for allegedly helping an undocumented immigrant evade federal law enforcement. In doing so, the court invoked its “superintending and administrative authority over all courts in the state.” The Supreme Court did not impose additional sanctions or conditions beyond the temporary prohibition on Dugan from exercising the powers of a circuit court judge. She continues to be paid. At the public hearing on the bill on Sept. 25, Rep. Andrew Hysell (D-Sun Prairie) highlighted that the bill may not address the conduct that its proponents seek to censure. He pointed out that if a judge was subsequently found innocent, there was no mechanism to redress backpay. Hysell is one of the few attorneys in the Legislature, The bill was then amended to permit back pay from the date of suspension if ultimately the Supreme Court imposes no discipline on a judge and to clarify that the temporary suspension must be for criminal misconduct. The bill appears aimed at Dugan's actions rather than any wider issue that the Legislature otherwise would have addressed. In written testimony, bill sponsor Rep. Shae Sortwell (R-Two Rivers) said that “Wisconsin taxpayers must be protected from the misconduct and/or commission of a crime by rogue judges.” At the public hearing and before the committee vote, Sortwell focused on Dugan’s specific case. He characterized her suspension as a “taxpayer-funded vacation” and said he found it “mind-boggling . . . that some people are OK with judges helping criminals escape law enforcement officers.” He said he thought the Supreme Court was “obviously predisposed to be more favorable of the actions of Judge Dugan for their policy positions.” Judicial suspensions are rare. Legislative materials associated with the bill indicate only 15 judges have been suspended since 1978. The Senate’s version of the bill has been referred to its Committee on Judiciary and Public Safety and has not yet been scheduled for public hearing. Jury selection in Dugan's case is set to begin Dec. 11. Former Chief Justice Ziegler is outraged by changes to Supreme Court's internal operating procedures9/9/2025 By Alexandria Staubach
Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler says the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has abandoned two-year-old internal operating procedures that took power from the chief justice and gave more decision-making authority to an administrative committee controlled by the court's majority. Ziegler discussed the recent procedural changes in her dissent to a July 2025 decision declining to establish a permanent specialty court for complex business litigation. “The public will not know what occurred behind closed doors for this about-face to take place,” said Ziegler about the changes in procedure, which occurred since Ziegler was replaced as chief justice. Wisconsin Watch in 2023 published the heated emails exchanged between justices when the majority formed by Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, Rebecca Dallet, Jill Karofsky, and Janet Protasiewicz changed internal operating procedures shortly after Protasiewicz took her seat on the court. The changes took power away from the chief justice—at that time Ziegler. Ziegler served two two-year terms as chief justice, from 2021-2025. This spring, the same majority that changed the rules in 2023 voted in two new chief justices, first Walsh Bradley, whose term on the court expired at the end of July, and now Karofsky. Ziegler was the only chief justice to deal with the more liberal majority’s internal operating procedures. Ziegler complained in her dissent that "these four justices embrace process when it is convenient and disregard process when it is not." Back in 2023, she said, "(t)he 'court of four,' unlike any majority in history, ensured that it would completely control what had always been understood as the constitutional authority of the chief justice." Ziegler wrote in her dissent that “almost immediately" after her ouster as chief, the court “reverted to the original practices and procedures that had been in place for over four decades.” The “nearly two-year-old changes to our administrative practices and procedures relating to the constitutional role of the chief justice were undone.” Ziegler called the about-face “the exercise of sheer will to undo the constitutional role of the chief justice, when convenient, and reinstate it, when opportune,” calling it a “power grab” and “complete disregard for process.” As for the matter of the business courts, Ziegler criticized the court’s decision to terminate the nearly decade-old pilot project for specialty business courts. She said the decision to end the business court project was a disservice to the memory and work of former Chief Justice Patience Roggensack, who led the court from 2015 to 2019. “The majority does this without any regard to the fact that former Chief Justice Roggensack viewed this initiative as of upmost importance.” Ziegler did not acknowledge in her opinion that conservatives also have a history of changing court procedure when it suits them. Ten years ago, Republicans used a constitutional amendment to replace the 126-year-old practice of the longest-serving justice serving as chief. At the time, Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson was the longest-serving chief justice in the state’s history, having taken the helm in 1996. Some felt then that conservatives were attacking the liberal Abrahamson. A campaign backed by $600,000 from the state’s largest business group resulted in passage by voters in April 2015 of a constitutional amendment allowing the justices to vote for chief justice. Abrahamson sued over the amendment but lost. Roggensack became chief on May 1, 2015, having been voted in shortly after the amendment passed. When the new majority of justices in August 2023 passed internal operating procedures to take away certain powers of the chief justice, Dallet said in a statement that they “were primarily made to ensure that any one person could not hold up the work of the entire court.” The statement came at the opening of the court’s 2023-2024 term, during which the court issued a record low of 14 opinions. The court’s productivity is up, with 23 cases decided in the 2024-2025 term. However, the numbers still lag behind the average of 50 decision cases in the previous decade, according to a report from University of Wisconsin’s State Democracy Research Initiative. |
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