Department of Corrections battles with Division of Hearings and Appeals in Supreme Court argument4/2/2025 By Alexandria Staubach
A Wisconsin Department of Corrections lawsuit that could change evidentiary requirements in probation revocation hearings landed in the Supreme Court for oral arguments in late March. Whether and to what extent probationers maintain minimal rights to confrontation is at stake. The case concerns the overturning by the Division of Hearings and Appeals (DHA) of an administrative law judge’s decision to revoke Keyo Sellers’ probation. Attorney Clayton Kawski represented the DOC at oral arguments before the Supreme Court. Attorney Elizabeth Pierson appeared on behalf of the DHA at the hearing. Attorney Daniel Drigot appeared on behalf of Sellers. The DHA is a quasi-judicial, independent entity within the Department of Administration that oversees a panel of administrative law judges, including those who preside over probation revocation hearings. In the DHA’s opinion, the judge had revoked Sellers’ probation on scant, inadmissible evidence. In June 2019, Sellers was placed on probation for a drug conviction. Almost three years later, the DOC initiated revocation proceedings after Sellers was charged with sexual assault and other violations. According to the allegations described in court filings, Sellers, while masked, sexually assaulted an unnamed victim, stole $30 from her, and returned to her home a week later as shown on home security footage. The victim could not identify him definitively, but both his probation officer and ex-wife identified him in the home security footage and made out-of-court statements. Sellers denied the sexual assault and trespass on the victim’s property. At the probation revocation proceedings, the ALJ considered Y-STR DNA evidence. Y-STR DNA evidence is inherently less specific that usual DNA evidence, as it compares DNA location on the Y chromosome exclusively. DNA collected from the victim after the sexual assault indicated that one out of 278 African American males would have a consistent profile, meaning that in Milwaukee, based on census data, 389 African American males would match the profile. According to Kawski, the DOC declined to call the victim to testify at the revocation proceeding, and did not even ask her to testify, out of concern that testifying would “re-traumatize” her and because she could not definitively identify Sellers as her assailant. The ALJ presiding over the hearing believed that the Y-STR DNA evidence coupled with the out-of-court, “hearsay” statements of the probation officer and ex-wife were sufficient to find it more likely than not that Sellers committed the crimes and therefore revoked Sellers' probation. Sellers appealed the ALJ’s decision to DHA, which found that without testimony from the victim, the only credible evidence of nonconsent to the trespass and sexual assault was inadmissible hearsay, which deprived Sellers of his constitutional right to confrontation. The DHA believed that the DOC’s decision not to call the victim as a witness was not due to any “difficulty, expense, or other barrier to obtaining live testimony,” as required under the legal standard of “good cause” for not calling her. The good-cause standard protects an individual’s limited right to confrontation in probation revocation cases. The revocation proceedings before the administrative law judge occurred separately from proceedings on the merits of the charges in court. Ultimately, Sellers was convicted at trial and sentenced to more than 30 years in prison. “So why are we here?” asked Justice Jill Karofsky about the appeal on the revocation matter. “He owes the state more time,” said Kawski. He added that the case in front of the Supreme Court was the only thing maintaining the DOC’s supervision of Sellers on the old drug case. Kawski also argued that the Supreme Court had not opined about the standard governing evidence at probation revocation hearings in more than a decade. “Without relying on the hearsay evidence of the victim, which (the administrative law judge) couldn’t do without violating Mr. Sellers’ constitutional rights, the rest of the allegations did not prove DOC’s allegations,” Pierson argued in response. “To show good cause . . . they have to show that there is a difficulty, expense, or other barrier and then that gets balanced against the constitutional rights of the accused,” said Pierson. Oral arguments focused heavily on the sufficiency of the evidence and whether the DOC had good cause for not calling the victim to testify at the revocation hearing. Chief Justice Ziegler and Justices Rebecca Dallet, Janet Protasiewicz and Jill Karofsky are all former prosecutors. Dallet and Karofsky said the “unfamiliar” DNA evidence probably cut against DOC. “You’re putting a lot of weight in the reliability of the proffered evidence,” Karofsky said to Kawski. However, she also remarked that avoiding re-traumatization of the victim “feels like that fits the exception” for good cause. Kawski repeatedly insisted on the sufficiency of the DNA evidence and said “the more reliable the evidence is, the less is necessary for the state to show.” Pierson said the DHA relied on the fact that the victim was never even asked to testify. “There was nothing to suggest that she was asked and declined,” Pierson said. “We need something more than DOC’s word,” she said. Pierson insisted that however the court applies the standard governing good cause, “it cannot be that low.” Drigot insisted at oral argument that the DOC was asking the court to create an exception for out-of-court statement use at probation revocation hearings that does not currently exist. A finding that good cause excused the DOC from calling or even asking the victim to testify would be “an opinion on whether that’s what the law should be, but not the rule right now,” said Drigot. The justices gave no hints on where they will land, though Justice Brian Hagedorn said he was “not convinced we need to change (the standard) in any way.”
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By Alexandria Staubach
The Supreme Court recently voted 4-3 to increase an annual assessment on Wisconsin attorneys that funds civil legal services for those who cannot pay. A $50 public interest legal services assessment has been on the books since 2005 as part of annual fees for Wisconsin attorneys. The assessment will increase to $75 for two years then to $100. Retied Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Richard Sankovitz spoke on behalf of the petitioners, eight legal service providers or supporters, at a March 13 hearing on the request for the increase. He stressed that a steady stream of revenue to those providing free or reduce cost civil legal services is essential to continuity of service. The reliability of the funds from the attorney assessment is one of its essential features, especially in a landscape where groups otherwise rely on discretionary grants that vary from year to year, he said. At least 3,000 people are aided by the funds from the assessment each year, Sankovitz said. He described how the funding provides direct legal services for individuals on matters ranging from access medical care coverage to temporary restraining orders for domestic violence victims. There was near unanimous agreement in the Supreme Court hearing room that the Legislature should be doing more to support legal services for those who cannot afford attorneys. But the Legislature has appropriated funds only once in the assessment’s 20-year history, Sankovitz said. At the recent hearing, as in 2005, some justices questioned whether such a fee is constitutional. At oral arguments, Justice Brian Hagedorn said he was “sympathetic to the idea that this is an unconstitutional tax.” “What limits are there on our power to raise funds?” he asked. Hagedorn also expressed concerns that some of the nonprofits that receive funds provided from the assessment may have ideological stances that attorneys disagree with. Are we not “asking attorneys to subsidize work they may not agree with?” he asked. “There is no stopping point,” said Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley. She said she was sympathetic to the cause because her family could not afford needed civil legal services when she was young. But “we went without,” she said. At the justices’ open conference following oral arguments, Justice Janet Protasiewicz moved to adopt the measure. The assessment will address “a pressing need,” she said. A court majority then determined that in the absence of Legislative funding it was appropriate to continue the assessment and approve the increase. Justice Ann Walsh Bradley was the only current justice on the bench when the rule was originally adopted in 2005. She said she was voting for the measure because the bench and bar have “an ethical obligation” to ensure “the quality of legal representation.” While Chief Justice Annette Zeigler ultimately voted against the petition, she said “on a personal level I can’t say I am disappointed that these services will continue to be funded.” Wisconsin Justice Initiative submitted written support of the petition to increase the assessment, and WJI Board member James Gramling spoke on behalf of WJI at the hearing on the petition. Gramling said “the pro bono efforts that are made by members of the State Bar are huge, but they are not enough to address the need.” In its letter, WJI highlighted that legal representation “assists the court by streamlining proceedings, providing otherwise pro se litigants with explanations of procedures and law, reducing the need for law clerks and judges to conduct research, and getting to the heart of a case and to judgment more quickly.” Many other organizations and individuals shared WJI’s support for the petition in writing or at the hearing. Waukesha Circuit Court Judge William Domina, who had testified against the introduction of the assessment in 2005, appeared at the hearing now in support. He said that in his 40 years as a Wisconsin attorney and 15 years on the bench he has observed both “an increase in demand” and an “increase in the self-represented.” Domina urged the court to consider “that costs have increased over time and ours will as well.” In written submissions on the petition for the fee increase, only one writer, an attorney, opposed the measure, while 33 supported it. Another entity, the State Bar of Wisconsin, submitted a response that did not take a “binary position” entirely for or against the petition. Instead, the State Bar presented the results of a survey of its 18,000 members. The survey, to which roughly 17% of Wisconsin attorneys responded, showed that 65% opposed the increase. “(A)s an organization representing Members with divided opinions on this subject,” though, the State Bar also presented in its written submission some of the arguments its members expressed for and against. State Bar President Ryan Billings appeared at the hearing on the petition as well and highlighted the views of State Bar members opposing the petition. He said that funding civil legal services was the right to thing to do but that it was a “question of what is the appropriate mechanism.” Billings, and the court’s more conservative justices, thought funding for civil legal services was the responsibility of the Legislature. Susan Crawford and Brad Schimel vie for the open seat on the Wisconsin Supreme Court created by Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's retirement. The election is April 1. Crawford is a trial judge on the Dane County Circuit Court. She graduated from the University of Iowa College of Law in 1994. Schimel is a trial judge on the Waukesha County Circuit Court. He graduated from the University of Wisconsin Law School in 1990. WJI asked each of the candidates to answer a series of questions. The questions are patterned after some of those on the job application the governor uses when he is considering judicial appointments. Crawford responded to WJI's questionnaire. Schimel did not. Answers are printed as submitted, without editing or insertion of “(sic)” for errors. ![]() Susan Crawford Why do you want to become a justice on the Wisconsin Supreme Court? As a prosecutor, private-practice attorney, and now as a judge, I have always worked to protect the basic rights and freedoms of Wisconsinites under our laws and Constitution, and to use my legal training and experience to have a positive impact on people and communities. I have broad legal experience, including arguing before the Wisconsin Supreme Court in both criminal and civil cases. I know how important it is to have Wisconsin Supreme Court justices who are fair and impartial and who will reject efforts to politicize the Court and undermine our constitutional rights. Describe which U.S. Supreme Court or Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion in the past 25 years you believe had a significant positive or negative impact on the people of Wisconsin and explain why. The Court’s decision in Clarke v. Wisconsin Elections Commission is particularly significant because it upheld the Wisconsin Constitution and our democratic principles. I agree with the majority's decision in this case, which found the state’s legislative maps unconstitutional. As a result of this decision, the legislature and the governor agreed to new maps that comply with the Wisconsin Constitution. Describe your judicial philosophy. My approach to judicial decision making is people-centered and grounded in common sense. I consider myself a pragmatist. I work hard to get the facts right and to apply the law fairly and impartially. In my view, our laws are tools to protect people. It’s important to consider the purposes of the law and how it will affect the parties when applying it. My goal is always to arrive at a fair and just result. Another core component to my judicial philosophy is how I treat people in my courtroom. I want everyone who enters my courtroom, whether or not they achieve the result they were seeking, to leave feeling they were heard, treated with respect, and got their day in court. Describe two of the most significant cases in which you were involved as either an attorney or a judicial officer. As a judge, the most significant cases I have presided over involve children and families. In cases involving children in need of protection and services, I had the opportunity and privilege to reunite children with their families after the parents received court-ordered services to help them to overcome problems like mental health crises and drug addiction that had prevented them from caring for their children. As a lawyer, I litigated several high-profile public interest cases that broadly impacted the rights of Wisconsinites. One such case was Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Brad Schimel. Our team of lawyers successfully challenged an anti-abortion law that threatened doctors with the loss of their medical licenses for providing abortions to women. The law was found unconstitutional by the federal district court for the Western District of Wisconsin and the decision was upheld by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Describe your legal experience as an advocate in criminal litigation, civil litigation, and administrative proceedings. As a former prosecutor, government attorney, private-practice attorney, and now as a Circuit Court Judge, I’ve dedicated my entire career to upholding the law and protecting Wisconsinites under our laws and constitution. I started my career at the Wisconsin Department of Justice, where I prosecuted felony cases in the Wisconsin Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, prosecuted health care fraud and abuse cases in circuit courts throughout the state, and and served as director of criminal appeals, the largest legal unit at the DOJ. As chief legal counsel in the office of Governor Jim Doyle, I oversaw the fair and equal enforcement and application of our laws throughout state government. Later in my career, as a civil litigator in private practice, I advocated for Wisconsinites from all walks of life, standing up for their rights in court. Describe an instance when you were challenged and had to exhibit courage in the face of adversity or opposition and how you handled that situation. When I was in high school, my dad, an engineer, was laid off from his job. It took some time for him to find another job in his highly technical field. As a result, my family went through some tough times financially. I did my part by financing my own college education. Do you support requiring a justice or judge to recuse him/herself from cases involving donors and indirect supporters who contribute money or other resources to the judge's election? If not, why not? If so, why, and what contribution limits would you set? I am open to considering proposals to strengthen the recusal rules for judges and justices. As a judge, I make decisions on recusal after evaluating the parties and legal issues raised in the case. If I believe I am unable to be fair and impartial for any reason, I do not remain on the case. Just as I have in my current courtroom, I will look at every case that comes before me on the Wisconsin Supreme Court and make a determination as to whether it’s appropriate for me to sit on that case. What are the greatest obstacles judges face when trying to deliver true justice? What can or should be done about them? [Define “true justice” as you see fit.] The most significant obstacle is the lack of affordable legal services to people facing significant legal issues without representation. Although as a judge I take care to explain courtroom procedures to pro se litigants, many civil cases, including evictions, family court matters, and mortgage foreclosures involve complex legal issues that place unrepresented parties at a disadvantage. As a judge, I’ve seen firsthand how the lack of representation affects parties and the legal system. Low or no-cost legal representation or legal clinics, simplified court procedures and forms, and better access to quality legal research materials could help reduce these disadvantages. If elected to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, I’ll advocate for increased resources to serve Wisconsinites fairly and effectively. To me, justice means that everyone who comes into my courtroom is treated fairly and with respect, regardless of the outcome. It’s about thoroughly examining all the facts, weighing the evidence impartially, and ensuring each party has an equal opportunity to be heard. Above all, it’s about upholding the law with fairness, transparency, and accountability. I want everyone who enters my courtroom to leave feeling they were treated with respect and got their day in court. Provide any other information you feel would be helpful to potential voters deciding for whom to vote. My opponent, Brad Schimel, has spent his entire career as an extreme politician and has made it clear that he’s more interested in pushing a partisan, right-wing agenda than upholding the independence and impartiality of our courts. During his time as Wisconsin’s Republican Attorney General, he defended Scott Walker’s attacks on workers’ rights and our basic freedoms—putting politics ahead of the people he was supposed to serve. As a former prosecutor, private-practice attorney, and now as a judge, I have spent my career focused on upholding our laws and Constitution, and fighting to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of all Wisconsinites. I am committed to fairness, impartiality, and ensuring that every person enters my courtroom, whether they win or lose, gets a fair shake. Brad Schimel has also shown a troubling willingness to prejudge cases before they even reach the bench. He’s openly condemned the recent ruling overturning portions of Act 10 and continues to defend Wisconsin’s outdated 1849 abortion ban as “valid.” That’s not how justice should work. If I have the honor of serving on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, I will approach every case with an open mind—listening carefully to both sides, weighing the facts, and applying the law based on the Constitution and established precedent. That’s what fairness demands, and that’s what Wisconsinites deserve. By Alexandria Staubach
Dane County Circuit Court Judge Susan Crawford would not hint at what her position on pending cases would be if elected to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, but she wasn’t shy about a body of professional work that demonstrates her values. Crawford told a packed house at Marquette University Law School on Friday that during her tenure as a civil litigator she represented the League of Women Voters, physicians at Planned Parenthood Wisconsin, and educators fighting Act 10, the law that largely gutted collective bargaining for public employees in the state. Crawford also highlighted her work as an administrator in Wisconsin’s Department of Natural Resources in Gov. Jim Doyle’s administration. She said those fights on behalf of her civil clients led her to the judiciary in 2018. She often found success in circuit court, but then the Supreme Court “would ask questions that were not based on the law” and that “really (got) into political questions.” Crawford’s remarks occurred during a “Get to Know You” forum moderated by Derek Mosley, director of the law school’s Lubar Center for Public Policy Research and Civic Education. A recording of the forum can be found here. Crawford called out her opponent, Waukesha County Circuit Court Judge Brad Schimel, when saying she thinks “it’s really important to adhere to the judicial code and not comment on pending cases.” She accused Schimel of openly saying “there’s nothing wrong with” Wisconsin’s 1849 law on abortion. She said she has “really refrained” from taking any stance on pending litigation and skirted an audience question asking her position on the decline of diversity, equity, and inclusion at the federal level and the potential for litigation in that area. “It’s going to be up to the parties and the lawyers to decide if there is a state court role to play,” she said, calling the courts “reactive not proactive.” Crawford described her judicial philosophy as “pragmatism,” which she said allows her to “apply the laws to protect the people of the state.” Schimel claimed originalism as his judicial philosophy at a Lubar Center forum last week. Originalism is the view that a constitution or law should be interpreted by today’s jurists in a way they think the writers of the document intended; they act like historians to give the words their perceived original meaning. Three other Supreme Court justices claim originalism, meaning that Schimel's election to the court would make it the majority view. Crawford said that to her, “originalism is a starting point for analysis,” but asking “why was this law enacted” and considering its application over time informs her views. This “gives you a much deeper understanding,” said Crawford. Crawford’s civil litigation experience is coupled with a long career working in various roles for Doyle, when he was attorney general and then governor. “I always said, ‘yes sir, I will take up this new challenge,” said Crawford about her time working for Doyle. Notwithstanding that government work, Crawford told the audience that she was “not running on a partisan agenda.” No matter the issue, she promised the crowd, she will evaluate any evidence, listen to argument, perform her own legal research, and consult with her colleagues prior to rendering every decision if she’s elected. A prospective colleague, Justice Rebecca Dallet, listened from the front row. Th audience asked Crawford about donations from George Soros and J.B Pritzker, the former donating $1 million and the latter donating $500,000 to the state Democratic Party, which passed the money along to Crawford’s campaign. Crawford largely dodged the question about contributions to her own campaign but took the opportunity to say Schimel was taking Elon Musk’s money with obvious strings attached. “Elon Musk is entering the race” and “openly saying he wants Schimel on the court to advance Trump’s agenda,” said Crawford. “I never thought I would be fighting with the world’s richest man for justice in Wisconsin,” she laughed. An audience member questioned Crawford about an accusation that her election could result in a decision that would generate two U.S. House seats, based on Crawford’s appearance at a donor event earlier this year. Crawford said she did attend a video call for the group Focus on Democracy but that she never discussed congressional maps nor took any questions related to them. About congressional maps, “I have never taken a position publicly or privately and don’t know what my position would be,” she said. By Alexandria Staubach
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in mid-February heard oral arguments in four cases and issued numerous orders, including denial of a petition to skip the Wisconsin Court of Appeals regarding Dane County Circuit Judge Jacob Frost’s decision invalidating part of the public union collective bargaining law known as Act 10. The Court heard arguments in two civil cases and two criminal cases. Here’s the recap. State v. Luis A. Ramirez The Supreme Court’s many former prosecutors grilled counsel for Luis Ramirez about what constitutes a permissible delay on the part of the state and court system. Jennifer Lohr, Ramirez’s attorney, responded that the delay in Ramirez’s case was four times the minimum for presumed prejudice against a defendant. “It is the government’s duty to keep the justice system moving,” Lohr argued. The Court of Appeals found that the state acted with “cavalier disregard” for Ramirez’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. The state offered explanations for its many adjournments. Its counsel, John D. Flynn, argued that Ramirez was incarcerated on another conviction while the case was pending and that he only ever asked for a speedy trial without the assistance of counsel. The bulk of the court’s questioning centered on the meager circuit court record when it was rescheduling trial dates, but there were also differing views about the duration of delays, even if the delays were explainable. On one hand, Justice Janet Protasiewicz recalled her time as a prosecutor and said that in Ramirez’s case “the facts seem relatively simple” and should not have required much preparation to take to trial. Justice Jill Karofsky, on the other hand, recalled her time on the bench to say “the state did exactly what it should do” and that “for everyone one of the continuances for trial, there is a reason for it.” “What prejudice did your client suffer?” asked Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley. “He was going to be in prison for a very long time, his liberty interest was not even implicated,” she said. Lohr argued that the sheer duration of delay was sufficient to demonstrate prejudice to Ramirez. Ramirez, who was serving a prison sentence, was charged with battery after allegedly assaulting a correctional officer. Over the following 46 months, Ramirez saw his trial rescheduled several times, for reasons that included a prosecutor’s retirement, a courthouse remodel, scheduling conflicts, and his own pro se motions. “Pro se” representation occurs when a defendant represents himself without counsel. Columbia County Circuit Court Judge W. Andrew Voight had ruled that despite the many delays, Ramirez’s right to a speedy trial was not violated. Voight found that Ramirez’s motions, including for discovery and change of venue, were inconsistent with his expressed desire for a speedy trial. The Court of Appeals overruled Voight’s decision, stating that that while some of the delay was justified, the state acted in “cavalier disregard” for Ramirez’s right to a speedy trial. “What would you have us do with the words ‘cavalierly disregard’?” asked Justice Rebecca Dallet. “Cavalierly disregard them,” joked Karofsky in response. Dallet signaled where the court might land in its opinion, asking Flynn his thoughts on “something that was more like we focus on what the reasons for the delay are and we don’t require, as no case has required, that someone gave reasons for the length of time it took to reschedule the trial.” “I’d be perfectly happy with that,” said Flynn, smiling and then yielding the rest of his time on rebuttal. Scot Van Oudenhoven v. Wisconsin Department of Justice The Wisconsin Court of Appeals over the summer upheld the denial of Scot Van Oudenhoven’s handgun purchase application based on a previous misdemeanor domestic violence conviction that was expunged under Wisconsin law. Van Oudenhoven then took his case to the Supreme Court. In oral arguments, justices grappled with every aspect of the case. Justices Janet Protasiewicz and Jill Karofsky were passionate in their concern over whether the underlying expungement was valid in the first place, revisiting time and again Van Oudenhoven’s date of birth and date of conviction. Current state law permits expungement of an offense with a penalty of six years or less if it was not a violent felony and the defendant was under age 25, had no prior felony record, and requested expungement at the time of sentencing. At the time of Van Oudenhoven’s conviction in 1994, the age was 21, said Karofsky. She pointed out that she was at that time a prosecutor for crimes of domestic violence. Justices and parties discussed how Van Oudenhoven was older than 21 at the time of conviction and did not request expungement at sentencing. “If it were an illegal expungement, is it void?” asked Karofsky at the outset of oral arguments. Justice Brian Hagedorn grappled with the different meanings of expungement among the 50 states. At issue was whether a federal statute permitting a defendant whose criminal record has been “expunged or set aside” to obtain a handgun, covers defendants who have had their criminal records expunged in Wisconsin. Attorney Brian P. Keenan from the Wisconsin Department of Justice opposed Van Oudenhoven’s petition. He emphasized that under federal law, “all effects” of conviction must be erased. In Wisconsin, expungement only affects the court and public’s record of the crime, he said. “Here it just means that the record has been removed from the court files,” Keenan argued. “The conviction itself has not actually been expunged from anything,” he said. The court grappled with what Congress intended when including expunged crimes in the law providing restoration of firearms rights. Hagedorn cited a variety of sources, including legal website Justia Law and Black’s Law Dictionary, to say that “expungement” means something different in effectively every state. “It makes imminent sense to me,” said Hagedorn, that the Legislature used expungement to mean however a state defines expungement, as the converse effect would be that the law is “absolutely irrelevant.” Justice Rebecca Dallet asked Keenan whether the DOJ’s best argument was whether “the plain text of the statute is that the conviction actually needs to be expunged.” Keenan replied “yes.” There appeared to be no consensus among the justices regarding whether and to what extent “expungement” under Wisconsin law has the same meaning as in the federal statute. Service Employees International Union Healthcare Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission Oral argument in this case concerned whether the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act applies to the University of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics Authority (UWHCA) and gives its employees collective bargaining rights notwithstanding the public union collective bargaining law known as Act 10. UWHCA was originally included under the Peace Act in 1996, but was later removed. In a case brought by UW healthcare workers, the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission and Dane County Circuit Judge Jacob Frost concluded that the Legislature’s statutory changes in Act 10 reflected a clear intent to exclude UWHCA from the Peace Act, meaning that its employees no longer have collective bargaining rights. The Supreme Court took the case directly, bypassing the Court of Appeals. The justices and parties focused on legislative intent to include or exclude UW healthcare workers when it enacted Act 10, with a new twist: asking the Supreme Court to ignore what the Legislature may have intended at the time of enactment (originalism) and instead focusing on the plain language of the law. UW healthcare workers brought a previous case in federal court and were unsuccessful. This time, they argued that they should never have been covered by Act 10 because they are closer to private employees than public employees. “There is an element of all of this that I must confess feels a little bit like the emperor’s new clothes, where everyone has a firm grasp on reality until a new tailor comes to town and says I’m going make you a garment that only the most sophisticated people can see,” argued attorney James Goldschmidt on behalf of UWHCA, which opposed the employees’ petition. Hagedorn was vocal during oral arguments and from the start asserted that the employees’ interpretation of law was “contrary to what all our cases say, at least in the last 20 years.” Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley also voiced opposition, saying “what your argument is asking this court to do, is back track off at least two decades of recent precedent.” Justices Rebecca Dallet and Ann Walsh Bradley were more open to the argument, but even Walsh Bradley told the employees’ counsel that the “legislative history is so strong here that if applied here your clients lose.” State v. Carl Lee McAdory WJI has been following this case since the summer of 2023. The case finally made it to a hearing in the Supreme Court. In Carl Lee McAdory’s case, a Rock County Circuit Court judge disregarded an appeals court order for a new trial and instead sentenced McAdory on a charge that had previously been dismissed. Prior coverage is here and here. McAdory was charged with eighth-offense operating under the influence (OWI) and eighth-offense operating with a restricted controlled substance (RCS). Blood testing showed he had cocaine and marijuana in his system when arrested. A jury found him guilty on both counts. OWI requires a showing that drugs in McAdory's system impaired his driving. RCS law makes it illegal to drive with any detectable drug in the blood, whether or not it affects the person's driving ability. Because Wisconsin law says McAdory could only be sentenced on one of the counts arising from the same conduct, the prosecutor moved to dismiss the RCS charge. The court sentenced McAdory on the OWI count. Typically, when a court dismisses a count, it cannot be retried or revived. And in McAdory’s case there was no argument that the circuit court’s dismissal was without prejudice—a legal mechanism which would permit the count’s resurrection. McAdory appealed his OWI conviction. The Court of Appeals held that the state repeatedly misled the jury about what the state had to prove for conviction on the OWI charge. The appeals court remanded with an order for a new trial. However, McAdory did not get a new trial on remand. Instead, the prosecution asked Judge Karl Hanson to revive the dismissed RCS count and sentence McAdory on that charge, which Hanson did. During oral arguments in the Supreme Court, the justices and the state’s attorney wrestled with whether McAdory and other defendants could receive a windfall for what was characterized by the state as a mistake. The state could have asked the circuit court to dismiss the more difficult to prove OWI charge and for a sentence on the RCS charge. That could have avoided grounds for appeal, as McAdory’s appeal hinged on the state’s failure to prove the drugs his system in fact impaired his driving. The state is asking the court to “rescue it from strategic decision-making gone awry,” argued McAdory’s attorney, Olivia Garman. “While the parties disagree on just about everything in this case, there’s one thing we can agree on, that the procedural history that got us here should never happen again,” argued John W. Kellis on behalf of the state in asking the court for guidance in a muddy area of law. Justices Ann Walsh Bradley and Brian Hagedorn floated the idea of crafting an opinion that would instruct the lower court to dismiss one count, consistent with the statute, but without prejudice, which the law is currently silent about. Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradly suggested entering convictions on both counts but sentencing on only one. By Alexandria Staubach
The Wisconsin Supreme Court on Wednesday approved the State Bar of Wisconsin’s petition seeking recognition of a special continuing legal education (CLE) credit for courses concerning cultural competency and reduction of bias. Attorneys must complete 30 hours of CLE every two years. The State Bar successfully argued that attorneys could credit up to six hours of cultural competency courses toward those 30 hours. “If a result is that one attorney in this state is more attuned to the marginalized communities in this state, that is good enough for me,” said Justice Jill Karofsky at the Supreme Court’s open conference on Wednesday about the proposed rule change. Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, Rebecca Dallet, Karofsky, and Janet Protasiewicz approved the State Bar’s petition. Chief Justice Annette Ziegler and Justices Rebecca Grassl Bradley and Brian Hagedorn opposed it. The court has a history with the issue. The State Bar sought a similar rule change in 2023. At that time, former Chief Justice Patience Roggensack joined with Ziegler, Grassl Bradley and Hagedorn to deny the State Bar’s petition. At Wednesday’s conference, Grassl Bradley called the new petition a thinly veiled “rebrand” and said education in cultural competency is “coercive.” In a heated statement of opposition, she accused the four justices approving the petition of “virtue signaling.” Grassl Bradley's comments suggested that the country was “thankfully” moving away from diversity, equity and inclusion education, as demonstrated by the results of the most recent election. In her concurrence to the 2023 decision, Grassl Bradley cited conservative political commentators to say that diversity, equity and inclusion education panders to identity politics and “poses a threat to republican self-government by corroding patriotic ties, fostering hatred, promoting cultural separatism, and demanding special treatment rather than equality under the law.” Hagedorn on Wednesday said that although cultural competency was “well intentioned,” he thinks such education is “wrong-headed and likely counterproductive.” He cited the actions of major corporations like Disney and Amazon to move away from diversity, equity, and inclusion education. Zeigler took issue with the fact that more than half of CLE credit hours could be satisfied by “nonsubstantive” education, in a state where attorneys from Wisconsin’s law schools do not have to take a bar exam. Six hourly credits are allowed for educational programs regarding mental wellness and another six are allowed for law practice management. The Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty opposed the petition. In a letter to the court, WILL argued that “DEI training has been shown to increase bias,” citing a Harvard Law Review article, which in reality says “we’ve seen that companies get better results when they ease up on control tactics” and “people often rebel against rules to assert their autonomy.” The new rule will not require that any CLE credits come from cultural competency training; it merely permits attorneys to obtain credits within the category. The court voted in favor of the State Bar’s petition without making the trainings mandatory. At least some, however, would have preferred a rule that required at least one hour of cultural competency education. During oral argument before the court’s open conference, Legal Action of Wisconsin attorney Jacob Haller expressed concern that only already interested attorneys would opt for the courses and that “a single mandatory course will help raise awareness.” Haller argued that such education is “the very least we can do” to reduce negative bias, calling the work “critical.” “For me this is the Sermon on the Mount,” said Walsh Bradley. Exactly when the new rule will take effect is not yet determined. It could have taken effect as soon as this summer, but discussion during open conference resulted in the justices’ agreement on a pause until the next cycle of CLE reporting turns over. Attorneys are to complete CLE requirements and file a report certifying attendance by Jan. 31 every other year. The two-year cycle depends on the year of admission to the bar. A written order is expected before the end of the court’s 2024-2025 term, a condition on which Dallet predicated her vote. By Margo Kirchner
As of Aug. 1, 2025, Brad Schimel will either be a Wisconsin Supreme Court justice or out of the Wisconsin judiciary. Schimel is currently a Waukesha County Circuit Court judge, with a term ending July 31, 2025. On Dec. 19, he filed a “notification of noncandidacy,” confirming that he will not run for his Waukesha County seat as a back-up if he loses to Susan Crawford in the Supreme Court race. Schimel was appointed to the bench by then-Gov. Scott Walker in late 2018, following Schimel’s loss to Josh Kaul in the November 2018 attorney general race. Schimel won election to a full six-year term in April 2019. Crawford is a Dane County Circuit Court judge with a term ending July 31, 2030. She won reelection in April 2024 to a six-year term. She had won a contested race for an open seat in the April 2018 election. If Crawford wins the Supreme Court race, Gov. Tony Evers will be able to appoint a replacement for her on the Dane County bench. Schimel and Crawford are running for an open seat on the Supreme Court. Justice Ann Walsh Bradley announced months ago that she would not run for reelection and confirmed that by filing her notification of noncandidacy on Dec. 13. Other judges who have filed notices of noncandidacy and created open seats for the April 2025 election:
Nomination papers and valid signatures for April 2025 judicial candidates are due Jan. 7. By Alexandria Staubach and Margo Kirchner
The Wisconsin Supreme Court on Tuesday voted to deny a rule change petition brought by Wisconsin Justice Initiative that sought to require municipal court judges to use professional interpreters in all municipal court proceedings. Although all justices said they believed the issue raised by WJI was important and one said she did not want to “kick the can down the road,” the court voted to refer the issue to the Wisconsin Judicial Council for its consideration, while acknowledging that the Judicial Council presently has no funding or staff. WJI’s proposed rule change would have eliminated the practice of municipal courts using a defendant's family member or friend, a police officer, Google Translate, or even other defendants present in the courtroom to interpret court proceedings for individuals who do not speak or understand English. A survey WJI conducted in August 2023 and presented to the justices during briefing showed that at initial appearances, a whopping 49% of municipal court judges who responded to the survey have defendants bring a friend or family member or use Google Translate to interpret courtroom proceedings. Even at evidentiary hearings and trials, which include testimony, 21% of municipal judges responding to the survey said they use a defendant’s friend or family member or Google Translate. Professional interpreters are currently required in municipal courts only for juveniles who meet poverty requirements. During argument on the petition Tuesday, the justices made much of the unknown scope of the problem, unknown costs associated with such a rule change, and competition with circuit courts for interpreters. While interpreters are already scarce in Wisconsin, WJI’s proposed rule mandated using such scarce resources in only very limited circumstances. WJI’s proposed rule change would have required “qualified interpreters,” meaning interpreters trained for court proceedings and who meet circuit court standards, only for evidentiary hearings and trials. Those occur in just a small percentage of the 400,000 to 450,000 municipal court cases per year—and under state statutes those qualified interpreters could appear by video or telephone. WJI attorney Parker White calculated on the fly during oral argument that such qualified interpreters would likely be needed in “less than 300 cases a year, spread over 219 courts throughout Wisconsin.” That means in less than 0.1% of municipal court cases. White and Evan Bondoc, both of the Foley & Lardner law firm, represented WJI in written briefs on the petition and oral arguments before the court. For the bulk of municipal court proceedings, municipal judges would have been allowed to use an audio or audio/visual service such as LanguageLine or Swits for interpreter services. “The vast majority would be satisfied by LanguageLine,” White told the court. According to several municipal judges, LanguageLine is simple and easy to use. WJI’s attorneys argued that it is also low cost, and the cost would be appropriate for the benefits gained by limited-English proficiency (LEP) defendants understanding their court proceedings. “Why don’t they just do that?” asked Chief Justice Annette Ziegler at the hearing. “Because it’s not required,” she then said, answering her own question. Seven organizations filed written comments supporting the petition. Five of them also appeared in person to argue their support: the ACLU of Wisconsin Foundation, Legal Action of Wisconsin, Judicare Legal Aid, the Wisconsin Hispanic Lawyers Association, and the Wisconsin Muslim Civic Alliance. Even the two organizations and one individual opposing the petition acknowledged the importance of the issue. “All parties agree that LEP individuals have a right to meaningfully participate in the proceedings brough against them,” said Bondoc during oral argument. Tim Muth, senior staff attorney for the ACLU of Wisconsin Foundation, argued that the issue raised by WJI is “a question of fundamental fairness and due process.” Susan Lund of Legal Action Wisconsin stated that “in an era of mass incarceration, . . . if we cannot meet basic fairness standards, perhaps we are not utilizing the court system appropriately.” Megan Lee of Judicare, Nancy Cruz of the Wisconsin Hispanic Lawyers Association, and Fauzia Qureshi of the Wisconsin Muslim Civic Alliance spoke in favor of the petition, highlighting the need for proper interpreter services in municipal courts. During oral arguments, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley expressed great concern for the western part of the state, noting that in some towns 50% of schoolchildren come from homes where English is not the primary language. She also highlighted large populations of individuals who do not speak English, work in agriculture, and commonly find themselves before municipal courts for operating without a license. But the court failed to find its way around the unknown costs and lack of precise data on the scope of the interpreter problem WJI presented. Justice Jill Karofsky asked repeatedly for “hard numbers,” which, because record keeping of the number of friends or family members used as interpreters is not required in municipal courts, were virtually impossible for WJI to cite. She asked Muth how to weigh the petition against the court system’s already strained interpreter resources. “There could be unintended consequences,” said Ziegler during the oral argument. At an open conference following the arguments, Justice Brian Hagedorn moved quickly to deny WJI’s petition. Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley seconded the motion. She argued that the matter should be left for the Legislature to address. Ziegler said "there's nothing wrong with having interpreters in municipal court. Probably is a good thing." But she questioned whether it was feasible and said it was a matter for the Legislature. She later indicated her position that the petition should be denied outright. "I would do nothing further," Ziegler said. The court’s remaining justices, referred to as “the four” at one point by Grassl Bradley, wrestled with options other than denying the petition completely. Justice Janet Protasiewicz recognized that "there's an obvious need, and you look at people coming from all corners of the community to speak in favor of this." Nevertheless, she had concerns about unanswered questions and was "not in support of this today." She suggested sending the issue to a committee to review. Justice Rebecca Dallet said she did not want to deny the petition without referring the matter somewhere for additional review. Dallet recognized the importance of the problem raised by WJI and the desire for the court to do something about it. She suggested a rule recommending that municipal judges whenever possible use a professional interpreter service such as LanguageLine. "What can we do to maybe not solve the whole problem, but what can this court do? . . . Something lesser, that's still important, she said." Walsh Bradley discussed the history of the Judicial Council, its work regarding municipal courts in prior years, and its ability to recommend changes to both the Supreme Court and Legislature. Walsh Bradley said that if the court would not refer the matter to the Judicial Council she might vote to grant the petition. Karofsky said she did not like the feeling of “kicking this can down the road,” but she did not see granting or modifying WJI's proposed rule at this time. She at first hesitated sending the issue to the Judicial Council because it was unstaffed, the problem is complex, and the solution is unclear. In agreeing to a court referral she emphasized that she did not want to require the Judicial Council to take up the question but rather, as set forth in the council’s enabling statute, leave it to the council’s discretion. Hagedorn said that he wanted WJI, whose attorneys and representatives remained in the courtroom during the open conference, to know that the court indeed considers the issue of municipal court interpreters to be an important one. "I hope the petitioners understand . . . (that) we don’t think this is the right solution, but we appreciate that you raised the problem, and maybe we should see if there are other solutions to the problem," he said Following the court’s vote to deny the petition with a referral to the Judicial Council, White told WJI that he nevertheless was encouraged “to see all members of the Court recognize and grapple with the serious problems LEP individuals face in Wisconsin municipal courts today, even if we were disappointed with the Court's apparent disposition on the petition itself. Even the parties who spoke to oppose us uniformly acknowledged the need for some sort of action comparable to what we proposed. I'm hopeful our petition, and any forthcoming related work by the Judicial Council, will help close the gaps of due process and access to justice that hundreds of thousands of Wisconsinites face today." Any action by the Judicial Council could take substantial time, as it has lacked staff since 2017, when it was defunded by the Supreme Court and Legislature. Legislation will take significant effort and substantial time as well. Nevertheless, WJI intends to continue pursuing the matter, whether with the Judicial Council, the Wisconsin Legislature, or the Supreme Court in a future revised petition. “We think everyone in municipal courts, not just indigent juveniles, deserves to understand the proceedings,” said WJI's Kirchner. “Access to justice requires at its heart that the person charged with a violation accurately communicate with the judge and at the very least understand the court proceedings,” she said. “We don’t have that with friends or family members—sometimes children—or even strangers in the courtroom interpreting,” Kirchner said. In municipal courts, where almost all defendants represent themselves, “add a language barrier and you have a double disadvantage,” she said. WJI Board Member Jim Gramling, a retired Milwaukee Municipal Court judge who was involved in WJI’s prosecution of the rule petition, stated that “if you accept, as you must, that municipal courts are a component of the state court system, you wouldn’t hesitate to require interpreters.” “Providing the means for basic understanding of legal proceedings is a requirement of having a court,” he said. A written order regarding the denial of the petition and referral is expected at some point in the future. The Judicial Council was created by statute in 1951 to study the rules of court practice and procedure and recommend changes to the Supreme Court and Legislature. Its 21 members come from all three branches of government, the state's two law schools, and the State Bar of Wisconsin. (Note: WJI Executive Director Margo Kirchner is a Judicial Council member representing the State Bar.) WJI extends many thanks to White and Bondoc and the Foley & Lardner law firm for their excellent pro bono representation of WJI in this matter. By Amy Rabideau Silvers An obituary in The New York Times called her “an indefatigable jurist known for her activist voice and tart dissents.” The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel’s obituary called her someone who crashed through barriers for women, earning “a national reputation as a leader in liberal judicial thought.” Others called Shirley Abrahamson a mentor and a friend. Abrahamson was the first woman appointed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, serving 43 years on the bench, including 19 years as chief justice. At retirement, she was the longest-serving state court justice in the country, and she certainly remains the longest serving in Wisconsin history. Appointed by Gov. Patrick Lucey* in 1976, she went on to win four 10-year terms. For many of those years, she was the only woman on the bench. By the time she retired in 2019, five of the seven justices were women, later to be joined by a sixth. “Among jurists I have encountered in the United States and abroad, Shirley Abrahamson is the very best,” declared Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in a videotaped tribute as Abrahamson retired. “The most courageous and sage, the least self-regarding. “She has been ever mindful of the people—all of the people—the law exists, or should exist to serve,” Ginsburg said. “As a lawyer, law teacher and judge, she has inspired legions to follow in her way, to strive constantly to make the legal system genuinely equal and accessible to all.” An early dream Abrahamson was born Shirley Schlanger, the daughter of Manhattan grocers Leo and Ceil Schlanger. Her parents were immigrants from Poland, and as the family story goes, little Shirley was 4 when she decided that she wanted to be president. At 6, she changed her mind and decided to become a lawyer. She later told the story of wanting a library card after the family moved for a time to New Jersey, while she was in grade school. “My mother and I went to the public library, but I couldn’t get a card because my parents didn’t own property,” Abrahamson recalled. “You see, your family had to own property to get a library card.” Her father ended up taking off work to find the landlord and persuaded him to write a letter. The situation left her feeling “that my family was put into this second-class position. … My father was running a successful grocery business, paid his bills, and why I couldn’t get a library card. … It just didn’t make sense … and it didn’t seem fair.” Fair was something she felt everybody deserved. Facing other challenges She graduated from high school at 16. She next graduated from York University in Manhattan, magna cum laude, and married Seymour Abrahamson. Together they relocated to Indiana University in Bloomington. There she graduated first in her law school class in 1956. She received no job offers. “She was a woman and she was Jewish,” said Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, speaking in an interview with Wisconsin Justice Initiative. “The dean of the law school told her she wouldn’t get a job, but he’d try to get her a job as a law librarian.” Instead, Shirley and Seymour—he earned a doctorate in genetics—moved to Madison. There Abrahamson studied with J. Willard Hurst, a UW law school professor and pioneer in legal history, earning a doctorate in 1962. That same year she was hired at La Follette, Sinykin, Doyle & Anderson—the first woman hired by a private law firm in Madison. Within the year, she became a named partner. Abrahamson soon began teaching at the law school. In 1966, she was offered a professorship in tax law. She accepted on the condition that the other woman on the faculty, Assistant Professor Margo Melli, also receive tenure. A master at mentoring Along the way, she offered encouragement to countless others. Angela Bartell, now retired as a Dane County Circuit Court judge, remembers going to the UW Law School to meet with Abrahamson before enrolling in 1968. “She was one of two women professors—Margo Melli was the other,” Bartell told WJI. “My husband graduated from law school in 1968 and there were only four or five women in his class. And so I met with the two women on the faculty and said, ‘How did you do this?’ and they were both very encouraging.” The few women students found support with each other—and in the one women’s restroom in the old section of the law building, complete with a fainting-style couch. “You knew you could likely find women there,” she said. “It was a shelter—that’s really the only word for it—from the battle that was going on outside.” Women found an even bigger challenge at graduation, especially if they wanted to join a private practice. Bartell experienced that firsthand in 1971. “There was the question of whether clients would be comfortable with a woman lawyer. Would women lawyers be a viable economic resource? Were women tough enough to fight in an adversarial system? This is sounding quite quaint,” she said, with a laugh. “I had only one offer, though I graduated first in my class,” Bartell said. “So the profession was not open. I ended up joining the law firm where Shirley was a named partner, so I had a woman colleague. “It became a ritual for law firms to take the new woman and introduce her to Shirley Abrahamson,” she said. “It was a long and bumpy road, and Shirley was this high-performing, welcoming mentor to all, and that was for decades. She was such a pioneer.” Abrahamson was a founder of the Legal Association for Women, which began in 1974, for women in law in the Dane County area. “She was a mentor to women all over the state,” said former Justice Janine Geske, who joined her as the second woman on the Supreme Court in 1993. “Male attorneys would bring their daughters to meet her.” Queen of court outreach Abrahamson championed judicial outreach, helping to create programs that included the award-winning Court with Class program. Tens of thousands of students have visited the State Capitol to hear oral arguments and meet with a justice. Abrahamson also believed that the courts could go to the people, promoting the Justice on Wheels effort. That, too, continues. “Pick a county—from Kenosha to Superior, Door County to Rock County—and we go there and have legal arguments and meet with people in the community,” Bradley said. Then there’s the Tootsie the Goldfish lesson, in which kids get to “think like a judge.” “She was the queen of outreach for the courts,” Bradley said. Geske agreed. “She was always thinking of ways to connect people to the courts,” Geske said. That included traveling to speak to any group interested in the legal system. Her friends quipped that no distance was too great and no group too small to talk about the courts. “Before we were close friends, she called and asked if I would go speak because she was snowed in at JFK,” said Geske, who agreed to fill in. “There were maybe 12 people there.” Once while traveling in northern Wisconsin, she ended up in a boat with musky fishermen. “She caught the winning musky,” Geske said. “And she had it stuffed and hung on the wall of her chambers.” Creating change and connections In other noteworthy efforts, Abrahamson served on the citizens’ committee studying how to reorganize the state courts in the 1970s. That resulted in the creation of the Court of Appeals. Study committee meetings were being held throughout the state, with one scheduled at the Madison Club. There was only one problem with that plan. “The club had no women members,” Bartell said. “And no women were allowed at the bar level. Shirley Abrahamson was not going to be allowed to attend the meeting. She took that up like a tigress. The committee pulled out of that location and they met elsewhere. “She fought not only so many battles herself but she served as a shield for other women coming up behind her,” said Bartell. Abrahamson was involved in writing Madison’s equal-opportunity law and served as director of the local American Civil Liberties Union chapter from 1967 to 1974. And, later as a justice, she partnered with tribal leaders, including the Wisconsin Tribal Judges Association, to hold the first conference for tribal and state court officials. “She had the first state courts conference ever in the nation,” Bradley said. “I remember sitting at a table with someone from a tribe in Alaska. People came from that far.” Time on Wisconsin Supreme Court During her long years on the court, Abrahamson participated in more than 3,500 cases, authoring 535 majority opinions, 493 dissenting opinions, and 326 concurring opinions. She did not mince words in her dissents. In a 1992 case, State v. Mitchell, the court ruled that an increased penalty in a hate crime case was unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court later reversed that decision. Wrote Abrahamson: “Bigots are free to think and express themselves as they wish, except that they may not engage in criminal conduct in furtherance of their beliefs. The state’s interest in punishing bias-related criminal conduct related only to the protection of equal rights and the prevention of crime, not to the suppression of free expression.” A 2015 case involved whether Gov. Scott Walker had illegally coordinated with conservative groups during a recall effort. A divided Supreme Court decision ended the investigation. “Lest the length, convoluted analysis and overblown rhetoric of the majority opinion obscure its effect, let me state clearly,” she said in her dissent. “The majority opinion adopts an unprecedented and faulty interpretation of Wisconsin’s campaign finance law and of the First Amendment.” Some of her writing was for in-house reading only. “We used to circulate proposed decisions among the justices and conference those opinions,” Geske said of their shared time on the state Supreme Court. “Shirley would issue three-page, single-spaced memos on an opinion. I learned to appreciate what she was doing. She wanted my opinion to be as clear as possible, and her memos helped me write a better decision. She was the smartest and hardest working person I ever met.” Abrahamson began serving as chief justice in 1996, when she became the most senior member of the court. That changed in 2015, with a constitutional amendment to allow justices to select their own chief justice. Conservative justices quickly picked Justice Patience Roggensack. Abrahamson sued in federal court—lost and then appealed—before deciding the case would take too long. Instead, she vowed to remain “independent, impartial and nonpartisan, and help the court system improve.” She retired in 2019, a year after being diagnosed with cancer. She died of pancreatic cancer in 2020. Abrahamson was 87. And beyond Wisconsin Abrahamson earned a reputation throughout the country and internationally, especially well known for what has been called new federalism. “She was among a handful, not even a full handful, of judges and justices in the country really leading the charge of revitalizing state constitutions, and she was at the head of that,” Bradley said in an interview with the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel after Abrahamson’s death. Abrahamson concluded a 1982 law review article on new federalism by invoking the words of an 1855 decision (Attorney General ex rel. Bashford v. Barstow 4 Wis. 567, 758 (1855)) by the Wisconsin Supreme Court: “The people then made this constitution, and adopted it as their primary law. The people of other states made for themselves respectively, constitutions which are construed by their own appropriate functionaries. Let them construe theirs—let us construe, and stand by ours.” “The idea,” Bradley told WJI, “is that state constitutions may provide individual rights in excess of those given by the federal Constitution. Not fewer rights but more.” Abrahamson was considered for appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court as early as 1979 by President Jimmy Carter to fill a possible vacancy by Justice William J. Brennan Jr. (Brennan continued serving until 1990.) In 1993, Abrahamson was on the short list to replace Justice Byron R. White. President Bill Clinton instead chose Ginsburg. Setting the bar on ethics Abrahamson did more than talk about judicial ethics and independence. Judges, she believed, needed to be absolutely beyond reproach. “As a judge, you are not supposed to endorse partisan candidates,” Geske said. Abrahamson did not endorse any candidates or accept any gifts. “She had a hard-and-fast rule,” Geske said. “I could not buy her a cup of coffee. Ann (Walsh Bradley) and I would take her out for her birthday, and she would pay the check. No one could question her ethics.” Should any question of ethics arise, “I would think, ‘What would Shirley do?’” she said. Geske said Abrahamson would have been deeply concerned about questions involving judicial integrity, including the recent decision regarding presidential immunity. “She’d be going nuts at what’s going on right now, especially with the U.S. Supreme Court, at the partisanship and the bias,” Geske said. “That would have really bothered her.” Continuing a legacy Friends and colleagues believe that Shirley Abrahamson’s legacy has the power to inspire others to care about the judicial system. Toward that goal, they began the Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson Legacy Committee. Projects include annual awards for law students committed to “social justice, an independent judiciary, and equal rights for all.” The reading room at the Wisconsin Historical Society has been dedicated in her honor. There’s a website about her with everything from a timeline and family photos to resources regarding her opinions. Committee members are exploring the possibility of a documentary about her life and influence. Should anyone think that Shirley Abrahamson was all serious business, just remember that Toostie the Goldfish is still teaching kids to think like a judge. “Shirley was fun,” Bradley said of her friend. “She had an absolute commitment to maintaining and restoring public trust in the judiciary,” said Bradley. “She believed in justice and equal justice for all.” Whatever the topic, Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson had a way with words. Here are a few quotes, taken from the website dedicated to her legacy. More quotes may be found at www.shirleyabrahamson.org/quotes/.
*Note: This story was updated on Aug. 22, 2024, to correct the name of the governor who appointed Abrahamson. We apologize for the error. (Thank you careful readers!) This project is supported by grants from
By Alexandria Staubach
For the past decade, one individual has screened all judicial complaints in Wisconsin. He is equipped with unilateral authority to determine what complaints merit further investigation. Whether initiated by a litigant, member of the press, or other interested party, a complaint about a judge goes to the Wisconsin Judicial Commission as an “initial inquiry.” According to the commission’s most recent annual report, in 2023, there were 644 reports of judicial misconduct or disability. Most of these inquiries were resolved solely by the commission’s staff, which includes the commission’s executive director and a paralegal. Attorney Jeremiah C. Van Hecke has served as executive director since 2013. “Commission staff reviews all allegations against judicial officials to determine whether they are within the jurisdiction of the Commission and are not patently frivolous or unfounded. Allegations that do not meet these criteria may be administratively dismissed by the Commission’s Executive Director with an appropriate referral, when possible,” says the 2023 report. Of the 644 initial inquiries in 2023, all but 42 resulted in dismissal by staff. Wisconsin law does not provide a mechanism for appeal of such dismissals. According to the 2023 report, “a sample” of the dismissed inquiries are reviewed by the commission’s screening committee. In an email, Van Hecke verified to WJI that “there is not an appeals process regarding the dismissal of an initial inquiry made to the Commission,” and “(o)nce a year, the Commission's chair appoints Commission members to the Screening Committee, which reviews a random sample of decisions made by Commission staff regarding initial inquiries for appropriateness and consistency.” According to Van Hecke, “initial inquiries include, but are not limited to, complaints of judicial misconduct filed with the Commission. They could also include initial substantive contacts that do not result in the actual filing of a complaint." He added that “(t)o the extent that initial inquiries amount to a complaint against a judicial official,” dismissal decisions regarding those inquiries are primarily made” by him as executive director, though on occasion some are addressed by the Screening Committee. All Wisconsin judges, from the Supreme Court to former judges who serve in a reserve capacity and municipal judges, are subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct. Since 1978, the commission has existed as an independent agency within the judicial branch to oversee adherence to that code. Court commissioners also came under the commission’s jurisdiction in 1992. The Judicial Commission consists of nine members: one circuit court judge, one court of appeals judge, and two attorneys, all appointed by the Supreme Court, plus five nonlawyer members nominated by the governor and appointed with the Senate’s consent. Initial inquiries are confidential by law unless the judge who is the subject of a complaint waives confidentiality. Under Wisconsin law, if an individual or entity “breached the confidentiality of the investigation, the commission may dismiss the allegation, admonish the person or take other action.” Last year, former state courts’ director Randy Koschnick made national headlines after going public with a complaint he filed against four Wisconsin Supreme Court justices, including then-newly elected Justice Janet Protasiewicz, related to his firing. Three of the justices wrote a letter to the commission accusing Koschnick of a publicity stunt and criticized the commission for failing to admonish Koschnick for going public. So what happens to initial inquires that survive Van Hecke’s screening? The commission opens an investigation and requests more information from the judge or others. The executive director then prepares a report for the commission to consider. The complaint can be dismissed at that point, too, based on what the inquiry shows, whether the complaint involves a disappointed litigant questioning the merits of a judge's decision, whether the allegation involves a single and minor violation, or whether the judicial official has already taken corrective action or no longer holds office. Of the 42 cases that survived Van Hecke’s screening in 2023, 33 were dismissed after preliminary investigation. If the commission decides the matter should continue after preliminary investigation, the judge is notified and permitted to respond. The commission may then dismiss the complaint or initiate a public disciplinary action in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. In the public disciplinary action the commission presents its case to a three-judge panel (including at least two appeals court judges), and the panel reports its conclusions and recommendations to the Supreme Court for final decision. Since 1978, only 34 complaints have resulted in public disciplinary cases. Just two public disciplinary cases have occurred in the last five years. Prior to his appointment as Judicial Commission executive director in 2013, Van Hecke was a Milwaukee County assistant district attorney. |
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