By Alexandria Staubach
The Wisconsin Supreme Court on Wednesday approved the State Bar of Wisconsin’s petition seeking recognition of a special continuing legal education (CLE) credit for courses concerning cultural competency and reduction of bias. Attorneys must complete 30 hours of CLE every two years. The State Bar successfully argued that attorneys could credit up to six hours of cultural competency courses toward those 30 hours. “If a result is that one attorney in this state is more attuned to the marginalized communities in this state, that is good enough for me,” said Justice Jill Karofsky at the Supreme Court’s open conference on Wednesday about the proposed rule change. Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, Rebecca Dallet, Karofsky, and Janet Protasiewicz approved the State Bar’s petition. Chief Justice Annette Ziegler and Justices Rebecca Grassl Bradley and Brian Hagedorn opposed it. The court has a history with the issue. The State Bar sought a similar rule change in 2023. At that time, former Chief Justice Patience Roggensack joined with Ziegler, Grassl Bradley and Hagedorn to deny the State Bar’s petition. At Wednesday’s conference, Grassl Bradley called the new petition a thinly veiled “rebrand” and said education in cultural competency is “coercive.” In a heated statement of opposition, she accused the four justices approving the petition of “virtue signaling.” Grassl Bradley's comments suggested that the country was “thankfully” moving away from diversity, equity and inclusion education, as demonstrated by the results of the most recent election. In her concurrence to the 2023 decision, Grassl Bradley cited conservative political commentators to say that diversity, equity and inclusion education panders to identity politics and “poses a threat to republican self-government by corroding patriotic ties, fostering hatred, promoting cultural separatism, and demanding special treatment rather than equality under the law.” Hagedorn on Wednesday said that although cultural competency was “well intentioned,” he thinks such education is “wrong-headed and likely counterproductive.” He cited the actions of major corporations like Disney and Amazon to move away from diversity, equity, and inclusion education. Zeigler took issue with the fact that more than half of CLE credit hours could be satisfied by “nonsubstantive” education, in a state where attorneys from Wisconsin’s law schools do not have to take a bar exam. Six hourly credits are allowed for educational programs regarding mental wellness and another six are allowed for law practice management. The Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty opposed the petition. In a letter to the court, WILL argued that “DEI training has been shown to increase bias,” citing a Harvard Law Review article, which in reality says “we’ve seen that companies get better results when they ease up on control tactics” and “people often rebel against rules to assert their autonomy.” The new rule will not require that any CLE credits come from cultural competency training; it merely permits attorneys to obtain credits within the category. The court voted in favor of the State Bar’s petition without making the trainings mandatory. At least some, however, would have preferred a rule that required at least one hour of cultural competency education. During oral argument before the court’s open conference, Legal Action of Wisconsin attorney Jacob Haller expressed concern that only already interested attorneys would opt for the courses and that “a single mandatory course will help raise awareness.” Haller argued that such education is “the very least we can do” to reduce negative bias, calling the work “critical.” “For me this is the Sermon on the Mount,” said Walsh Bradley. Exactly when the new rule will take effect is not yet determined. It could have taken effect as soon as this summer, but discussion during open conference resulted in the justices’ agreement on a pause until the next cycle of CLE reporting turns over. Attorneys are to complete CLE requirements and file a report certifying attendance by Jan. 31 every other year. The two-year cycle depends on the year of admission to the bar. A written order is expected before the end of the court’s 2024-2025 term, a condition on which Dallet predicated her vote.
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By Margo Kirchner
As of Aug. 1, 2025, Brad Schimel will either be a Wisconsin Supreme Court justice or out of the Wisconsin judiciary. Schimel is currently a Waukesha County Circuit Court judge, with a term ending July 31, 2025. On Dec. 19, he filed a “notification of noncandidacy,” confirming that he will not run for his Waukesha County seat as a back-up if he loses to Susan Crawford in the Supreme Court race. Schimel was appointed to the bench by then-Gov. Scott Walker in late 2018, following Schimel’s loss to Josh Kaul in the November 2018 attorney general race. Schimel won election to a full six-year term in April 2019. Crawford is a Dane County Circuit Court judge with a term ending July 31, 2030. She won reelection in April 2024 to a six-year term. She had won a contested race for an open seat in the April 2018 election. If Crawford wins the Supreme Court race, Gov. Tony Evers will be able to appoint a replacement for her on the Dane County bench. Schimel and Crawford are running for an open seat on the Supreme Court. Justice Ann Walsh Bradley announced months ago that she would not run for reelection and confirmed that by filing her notification of noncandidacy on Dec. 13. Other judges who have filed notices of noncandidacy and created open seats for the April 2025 election:
Nomination papers and valid signatures for April 2025 judicial candidates are due Jan. 7. By Alexandria Staubach and Margo Kirchner
The Wisconsin Supreme Court on Tuesday voted to deny a rule change petition brought by Wisconsin Justice Initiative that sought to require municipal court judges to use professional interpreters in all municipal court proceedings. Although all justices said they believed the issue raised by WJI was important and one said she did not want to “kick the can down the road,” the court voted to refer the issue to the Wisconsin Judicial Council for its consideration, while acknowledging that the Judicial Council presently has no funding or staff. WJI’s proposed rule change would have eliminated the practice of municipal courts using a defendant's family member or friend, a police officer, Google Translate, or even other defendants present in the courtroom to interpret court proceedings for individuals who do not speak or understand English. A survey WJI conducted in August 2023 and presented to the justices during briefing showed that at initial appearances, a whopping 49% of municipal court judges who responded to the survey have defendants bring a friend or family member or use Google Translate to interpret courtroom proceedings. Even at evidentiary hearings and trials, which include testimony, 21% of municipal judges responding to the survey said they use a defendant’s friend or family member or Google Translate. Professional interpreters are currently required in municipal courts only for juveniles who meet poverty requirements. During argument on the petition Tuesday, the justices made much of the unknown scope of the problem, unknown costs associated with such a rule change, and competition with circuit courts for interpreters. While interpreters are already scarce in Wisconsin, WJI’s proposed rule mandated using such scarce resources in only very limited circumstances. WJI’s proposed rule change would have required “qualified interpreters,” meaning interpreters trained for court proceedings and who meet circuit court standards, only for evidentiary hearings and trials. Those occur in just a small percentage of the 400,000 to 450,000 municipal court cases per year—and under state statutes those qualified interpreters could appear by video or telephone. WJI attorney Parker White calculated on the fly during oral argument that such qualified interpreters would likely be needed in “less than 300 cases a year, spread over 219 courts throughout Wisconsin.” That means in less than 0.1% of municipal court cases. White and Evan Bondoc, both of the Foley & Lardner law firm, represented WJI in written briefs on the petition and oral arguments before the court. For the bulk of municipal court proceedings, municipal judges would have been allowed to use an audio or audio/visual service such as LanguageLine or Swits for interpreter services. “The vast majority would be satisfied by LanguageLine,” White told the court. According to several municipal judges, LanguageLine is simple and easy to use. WJI’s attorneys argued that it is also low cost, and the cost would be appropriate for the benefits gained by limited-English proficiency (LEP) defendants understanding their court proceedings. “Why don’t they just do that?” asked Chief Justice Annette Ziegler at the hearing. “Because it’s not required,” she then said, answering her own question. Seven organizations filed written comments supporting the petition. Five of them also appeared in person to argue their support: the ACLU of Wisconsin Foundation, Legal Action of Wisconsin, Judicare Legal Aid, the Wisconsin Hispanic Lawyers Association, and the Wisconsin Muslim Civic Alliance. Even the two organizations and one individual opposing the petition acknowledged the importance of the issue. “All parties agree that LEP individuals have a right to meaningfully participate in the proceedings brough against them,” said Bondoc during oral argument. Tim Muth, senior staff attorney for the ACLU of Wisconsin Foundation, argued that the issue raised by WJI is “a question of fundamental fairness and due process.” Susan Lund of Legal Action Wisconsin stated that “in an era of mass incarceration, . . . if we cannot meet basic fairness standards, perhaps we are not utilizing the court system appropriately.” Megan Lee of Judicare, Nancy Cruz of the Wisconsin Hispanic Lawyers Association, and Fauzia Qureshi of the Wisconsin Muslim Civic Alliance spoke in favor of the petition, highlighting the need for proper interpreter services in municipal courts. During oral arguments, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley expressed great concern for the western part of the state, noting that in some towns 50% of schoolchildren come from homes where English is not the primary language. She also highlighted large populations of individuals who do not speak English, work in agriculture, and commonly find themselves before municipal courts for operating without a license. But the court failed to find its way around the unknown costs and lack of precise data on the scope of the interpreter problem WJI presented. Justice Jill Karofsky asked repeatedly for “hard numbers,” which, because record keeping of the number of friends or family members used as interpreters is not required in municipal courts, were virtually impossible for WJI to cite. She asked Muth how to weigh the petition against the court system’s already strained interpreter resources. “There could be unintended consequences,” said Ziegler during the oral argument. At an open conference following the arguments, Justice Brian Hagedorn moved quickly to deny WJI’s petition. Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley seconded the motion. She argued that the matter should be left for the Legislature to address. Ziegler said "there's nothing wrong with having interpreters in municipal court. Probably is a good thing." But she questioned whether it was feasible and said it was a matter for the Legislature. She later indicated her position that the petition should be denied outright. "I would do nothing further," Ziegler said. The court’s remaining justices, referred to as “the four” at one point by Grassl Bradley, wrestled with options other than denying the petition completely. Justice Janet Protasiewicz recognized that "there's an obvious need, and you look at people coming from all corners of the community to speak in favor of this." Nevertheless, she had concerns about unanswered questions and was "not in support of this today." She suggested sending the issue to a committee to review. Justice Rebecca Dallet said she did not want to deny the petition without referring the matter somewhere for additional review. Dallet recognized the importance of the problem raised by WJI and the desire for the court to do something about it. She suggested a rule recommending that municipal judges whenever possible use a professional interpreter service such as LanguageLine. "What can we do to maybe not solve the whole problem, but what can this court do? . . . Something lesser, that's still important, she said." Walsh Bradley discussed the history of the Judicial Council, its work regarding municipal courts in prior years, and its ability to recommend changes to both the Supreme Court and Legislature. Walsh Bradley said that if the court would not refer the matter to the Judicial Council she might vote to grant the petition. Karofsky said she did not like the feeling of “kicking this can down the road,” but she did not see granting or modifying WJI's proposed rule at this time. She at first hesitated sending the issue to the Judicial Council because it was unstaffed, the problem is complex, and the solution is unclear. In agreeing to a court referral she emphasized that she did not want to require the Judicial Council to take up the question but rather, as set forth in the council’s enabling statute, leave it to the council’s discretion. Hagedorn said that he wanted WJI, whose attorneys and representatives remained in the courtroom during the open conference, to know that the court indeed considers the issue of municipal court interpreters to be an important one. "I hope the petitioners understand . . . (that) we don’t think this is the right solution, but we appreciate that you raised the problem, and maybe we should see if there are other solutions to the problem," he said Following the court’s vote to deny the petition with a referral to the Judicial Council, White told WJI that he nevertheless was encouraged “to see all members of the Court recognize and grapple with the serious problems LEP individuals face in Wisconsin municipal courts today, even if we were disappointed with the Court's apparent disposition on the petition itself. Even the parties who spoke to oppose us uniformly acknowledged the need for some sort of action comparable to what we proposed. I'm hopeful our petition, and any forthcoming related work by the Judicial Council, will help close the gaps of due process and access to justice that hundreds of thousands of Wisconsinites face today." Any action by the Judicial Council could take substantial time, as it has lacked staff since 2017, when it was defunded by the Supreme Court and Legislature. Legislation will take significant effort and substantial time as well. Nevertheless, WJI intends to continue pursuing the matter, whether with the Judicial Council, the Wisconsin Legislature, or the Supreme Court in a future revised petition. “We think everyone in municipal courts, not just indigent juveniles, deserves to understand the proceedings,” said WJI's Kirchner. “Access to justice requires at its heart that the person charged with a violation accurately communicate with the judge and at the very least understand the court proceedings,” she said. “We don’t have that with friends or family members—sometimes children—or even strangers in the courtroom interpreting,” Kirchner said. In municipal courts, where almost all defendants represent themselves, “add a language barrier and you have a double disadvantage,” she said. WJI Board Member Jim Gramling, a retired Milwaukee Municipal Court judge who was involved in WJI’s prosecution of the rule petition, stated that “if you accept, as you must, that municipal courts are a component of the state court system, you wouldn’t hesitate to require interpreters.” “Providing the means for basic understanding of legal proceedings is a requirement of having a court,” he said. A written order regarding the denial of the petition and referral is expected at some point in the future. The Judicial Council was created by statute in 1951 to study the rules of court practice and procedure and recommend changes to the Supreme Court and Legislature. Its 21 members come from all three branches of government, the state's two law schools, and the State Bar of Wisconsin. (Note: WJI Executive Director Margo Kirchner is a Judicial Council member representing the State Bar.) WJI extends many thanks to White and Bondoc and the Foley & Lardner law firm for their excellent pro bono representation of WJI in this matter. By Amy Rabideau Silvers An obituary in The New York Times called her “an indefatigable jurist known for her activist voice and tart dissents.” The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel’s obituary called her someone who crashed through barriers for women, earning “a national reputation as a leader in liberal judicial thought.” Others called Shirley Abrahamson a mentor and a friend. Abrahamson was the first woman appointed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, serving 43 years on the bench, including 19 years as chief justice. At retirement, she was the longest-serving state court justice in the country, and she certainly remains the longest serving in Wisconsin history. Appointed by Gov. Patrick Lucey* in 1976, she went on to win four 10-year terms. For many of those years, she was the only woman on the bench. By the time she retired in 2019, five of the seven justices were women, later to be joined by a sixth. “Among jurists I have encountered in the United States and abroad, Shirley Abrahamson is the very best,” declared Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in a videotaped tribute as Abrahamson retired. “The most courageous and sage, the least self-regarding. “She has been ever mindful of the people—all of the people—the law exists, or should exist to serve,” Ginsburg said. “As a lawyer, law teacher and judge, she has inspired legions to follow in her way, to strive constantly to make the legal system genuinely equal and accessible to all.” An early dream Abrahamson was born Shirley Schlanger, the daughter of Manhattan grocers Leo and Ceil Schlanger. Her parents were immigrants from Poland, and as the family story goes, little Shirley was 4 when she decided that she wanted to be president. At 6, she changed her mind and decided to become a lawyer. She later told the story of wanting a library card after the family moved for a time to New Jersey, while she was in grade school. “My mother and I went to the public library, but I couldn’t get a card because my parents didn’t own property,” Abrahamson recalled. “You see, your family had to own property to get a library card.” Her father ended up taking off work to find the landlord and persuaded him to write a letter. The situation left her feeling “that my family was put into this second-class position. … My father was running a successful grocery business, paid his bills, and why I couldn’t get a library card. … It just didn’t make sense … and it didn’t seem fair.” Fair was something she felt everybody deserved. Facing other challenges She graduated from high school at 16. She next graduated from York University in Manhattan, magna cum laude, and married Seymour Abrahamson. Together they relocated to Indiana University in Bloomington. There she graduated first in her law school class in 1956. She received no job offers. “She was a woman and she was Jewish,” said Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, speaking in an interview with Wisconsin Justice Initiative. “The dean of the law school told her she wouldn’t get a job, but he’d try to get her a job as a law librarian.” Instead, Shirley and Seymour—he earned a doctorate in genetics—moved to Madison. There Abrahamson studied with J. Willard Hurst, a UW law school professor and pioneer in legal history, earning a doctorate in 1962. That same year she was hired at La Follette, Sinykin, Doyle & Anderson—the first woman hired by a private law firm in Madison. Within the year, she became a named partner. Abrahamson soon began teaching at the law school. In 1966, she was offered a professorship in tax law. She accepted on the condition that the other woman on the faculty, Assistant Professor Margo Melli, also receive tenure. A master at mentoring Along the way, she offered encouragement to countless others. Angela Bartell, now retired as a Dane County Circuit Court judge, remembers going to the UW Law School to meet with Abrahamson before enrolling in 1968. “She was one of two women professors—Margo Melli was the other,” Bartell told WJI. “My husband graduated from law school in 1968 and there were only four or five women in his class. And so I met with the two women on the faculty and said, ‘How did you do this?’ and they were both very encouraging.” The few women students found support with each other—and in the one women’s restroom in the old section of the law building, complete with a fainting-style couch. “You knew you could likely find women there,” she said. “It was a shelter—that’s really the only word for it—from the battle that was going on outside.” Women found an even bigger challenge at graduation, especially if they wanted to join a private practice. Bartell experienced that firsthand in 1971. “There was the question of whether clients would be comfortable with a woman lawyer. Would women lawyers be a viable economic resource? Were women tough enough to fight in an adversarial system? This is sounding quite quaint,” she said, with a laugh. “I had only one offer, though I graduated first in my class,” Bartell said. “So the profession was not open. I ended up joining the law firm where Shirley was a named partner, so I had a woman colleague. “It became a ritual for law firms to take the new woman and introduce her to Shirley Abrahamson,” she said. “It was a long and bumpy road, and Shirley was this high-performing, welcoming mentor to all, and that was for decades. She was such a pioneer.” Abrahamson was a founder of the Legal Association for Women, which began in 1974, for women in law in the Dane County area. “She was a mentor to women all over the state,” said former Justice Janine Geske, who joined her as the second woman on the Supreme Court in 1993. “Male attorneys would bring their daughters to meet her.” Queen of court outreach Abrahamson championed judicial outreach, helping to create programs that included the award-winning Court with Class program. Tens of thousands of students have visited the State Capitol to hear oral arguments and meet with a justice. Abrahamson also believed that the courts could go to the people, promoting the Justice on Wheels effort. That, too, continues. “Pick a county—from Kenosha to Superior, Door County to Rock County—and we go there and have legal arguments and meet with people in the community,” Bradley said. Then there’s the Tootsie the Goldfish lesson, in which kids get to “think like a judge.” “She was the queen of outreach for the courts,” Bradley said. Geske agreed. “She was always thinking of ways to connect people to the courts,” Geske said. That included traveling to speak to any group interested in the legal system. Her friends quipped that no distance was too great and no group too small to talk about the courts. “Before we were close friends, she called and asked if I would go speak because she was snowed in at JFK,” said Geske, who agreed to fill in. “There were maybe 12 people there.” Once while traveling in northern Wisconsin, she ended up in a boat with musky fishermen. “She caught the winning musky,” Geske said. “And she had it stuffed and hung on the wall of her chambers.” Creating change and connections In other noteworthy efforts, Abrahamson served on the citizens’ committee studying how to reorganize the state courts in the 1970s. That resulted in the creation of the Court of Appeals. Study committee meetings were being held throughout the state, with one scheduled at the Madison Club. There was only one problem with that plan. “The club had no women members,” Bartell said. “And no women were allowed at the bar level. Shirley Abrahamson was not going to be allowed to attend the meeting. She took that up like a tigress. The committee pulled out of that location and they met elsewhere. “She fought not only so many battles herself but she served as a shield for other women coming up behind her,” said Bartell. Abrahamson was involved in writing Madison’s equal-opportunity law and served as director of the local American Civil Liberties Union chapter from 1967 to 1974. And, later as a justice, she partnered with tribal leaders, including the Wisconsin Tribal Judges Association, to hold the first conference for tribal and state court officials. “She had the first state courts conference ever in the nation,” Bradley said. “I remember sitting at a table with someone from a tribe in Alaska. People came from that far.” Time on Wisconsin Supreme Court During her long years on the court, Abrahamson participated in more than 3,500 cases, authoring 535 majority opinions, 493 dissenting opinions, and 326 concurring opinions. She did not mince words in her dissents. In a 1992 case, State v. Mitchell, the court ruled that an increased penalty in a hate crime case was unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court later reversed that decision. Wrote Abrahamson: “Bigots are free to think and express themselves as they wish, except that they may not engage in criminal conduct in furtherance of their beliefs. The state’s interest in punishing bias-related criminal conduct related only to the protection of equal rights and the prevention of crime, not to the suppression of free expression.” A 2015 case involved whether Gov. Scott Walker had illegally coordinated with conservative groups during a recall effort. A divided Supreme Court decision ended the investigation. “Lest the length, convoluted analysis and overblown rhetoric of the majority opinion obscure its effect, let me state clearly,” she said in her dissent. “The majority opinion adopts an unprecedented and faulty interpretation of Wisconsin’s campaign finance law and of the First Amendment.” Some of her writing was for in-house reading only. “We used to circulate proposed decisions among the justices and conference those opinions,” Geske said of their shared time on the state Supreme Court. “Shirley would issue three-page, single-spaced memos on an opinion. I learned to appreciate what she was doing. She wanted my opinion to be as clear as possible, and her memos helped me write a better decision. She was the smartest and hardest working person I ever met.” Abrahamson began serving as chief justice in 1996, when she became the most senior member of the court. That changed in 2015, with a constitutional amendment to allow justices to select their own chief justice. Conservative justices quickly picked Justice Patience Roggensack. Abrahamson sued in federal court—lost and then appealed—before deciding the case would take too long. Instead, she vowed to remain “independent, impartial and nonpartisan, and help the court system improve.” She retired in 2019, a year after being diagnosed with cancer. She died of pancreatic cancer in 2020. Abrahamson was 87. And beyond Wisconsin Abrahamson earned a reputation throughout the country and internationally, especially well known for what has been called new federalism. “She was among a handful, not even a full handful, of judges and justices in the country really leading the charge of revitalizing state constitutions, and she was at the head of that,” Bradley said in an interview with the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel after Abrahamson’s death. Abrahamson concluded a 1982 law review article on new federalism by invoking the words of an 1855 decision (Attorney General ex rel. Bashford v. Barstow 4 Wis. 567, 758 (1855)) by the Wisconsin Supreme Court: “The people then made this constitution, and adopted it as their primary law. The people of other states made for themselves respectively, constitutions which are construed by their own appropriate functionaries. Let them construe theirs—let us construe, and stand by ours.” “The idea,” Bradley told WJI, “is that state constitutions may provide individual rights in excess of those given by the federal Constitution. Not fewer rights but more.” Abrahamson was considered for appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court as early as 1979 by President Jimmy Carter to fill a possible vacancy by Justice William J. Brennan Jr. (Brennan continued serving until 1990.) In 1993, Abrahamson was on the short list to replace Justice Byron R. White. President Bill Clinton instead chose Ginsburg. Setting the bar on ethics Abrahamson did more than talk about judicial ethics and independence. Judges, she believed, needed to be absolutely beyond reproach. “As a judge, you are not supposed to endorse partisan candidates,” Geske said. Abrahamson did not endorse any candidates or accept any gifts. “She had a hard-and-fast rule,” Geske said. “I could not buy her a cup of coffee. Ann (Walsh Bradley) and I would take her out for her birthday, and she would pay the check. No one could question her ethics.” Should any question of ethics arise, “I would think, ‘What would Shirley do?’” she said. Geske said Abrahamson would have been deeply concerned about questions involving judicial integrity, including the recent decision regarding presidential immunity. “She’d be going nuts at what’s going on right now, especially with the U.S. Supreme Court, at the partisanship and the bias,” Geske said. “That would have really bothered her.” Continuing a legacy Friends and colleagues believe that Shirley Abrahamson’s legacy has the power to inspire others to care about the judicial system. Toward that goal, they began the Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson Legacy Committee. Projects include annual awards for law students committed to “social justice, an independent judiciary, and equal rights for all.” The reading room at the Wisconsin Historical Society has been dedicated in her honor. There’s a website about her with everything from a timeline and family photos to resources regarding her opinions. Committee members are exploring the possibility of a documentary about her life and influence. Should anyone think that Shirley Abrahamson was all serious business, just remember that Toostie the Goldfish is still teaching kids to think like a judge. “Shirley was fun,” Bradley said of her friend. “She had an absolute commitment to maintaining and restoring public trust in the judiciary,” said Bradley. “She believed in justice and equal justice for all.” Whatever the topic, Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson had a way with words. Here are a few quotes, taken from the website dedicated to her legacy. More quotes may be found at www.shirleyabrahamson.org/quotes/.
*Note: This story was updated on Aug. 22, 2024, to correct the name of the governor who appointed Abrahamson. We apologize for the error. (Thank you careful readers!) This project is supported by grants from
By Alexandria Staubach
For the past decade, one individual has screened all judicial complaints in Wisconsin. He is equipped with unilateral authority to determine what complaints merit further investigation. Whether initiated by a litigant, member of the press, or other interested party, a complaint about a judge goes to the Wisconsin Judicial Commission as an “initial inquiry.” According to the commission’s most recent annual report, in 2023, there were 644 reports of judicial misconduct or disability. Most of these inquiries were resolved solely by the commission’s staff, which includes the commission’s executive director and a paralegal. Attorney Jeremiah C. Van Hecke has served as executive director since 2013. “Commission staff reviews all allegations against judicial officials to determine whether they are within the jurisdiction of the Commission and are not patently frivolous or unfounded. Allegations that do not meet these criteria may be administratively dismissed by the Commission’s Executive Director with an appropriate referral, when possible,” says the 2023 report. Of the 644 initial inquiries in 2023, all but 42 resulted in dismissal by staff. Wisconsin law does not provide a mechanism for appeal of such dismissals. According to the 2023 report, “a sample” of the dismissed inquiries are reviewed by the commission’s screening committee. In an email, Van Hecke verified to WJI that “there is not an appeals process regarding the dismissal of an initial inquiry made to the Commission,” and “(o)nce a year, the Commission's chair appoints Commission members to the Screening Committee, which reviews a random sample of decisions made by Commission staff regarding initial inquiries for appropriateness and consistency.” According to Van Hecke, “initial inquiries include, but are not limited to, complaints of judicial misconduct filed with the Commission. They could also include initial substantive contacts that do not result in the actual filing of a complaint." He added that “(t)o the extent that initial inquiries amount to a complaint against a judicial official,” dismissal decisions regarding those inquiries are primarily made” by him as executive director, though on occasion some are addressed by the Screening Committee. All Wisconsin judges, from the Supreme Court to former judges who serve in a reserve capacity and municipal judges, are subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct. Since 1978, the commission has existed as an independent agency within the judicial branch to oversee adherence to that code. Court commissioners also came under the commission’s jurisdiction in 1992. The Judicial Commission consists of nine members: one circuit court judge, one court of appeals judge, and two attorneys, all appointed by the Supreme Court, plus five nonlawyer members nominated by the governor and appointed with the Senate’s consent. Initial inquiries are confidential by law unless the judge who is the subject of a complaint waives confidentiality. Under Wisconsin law, if an individual or entity “breached the confidentiality of the investigation, the commission may dismiss the allegation, admonish the person or take other action.” Last year, former state courts’ director Randy Koschnick made national headlines after going public with a complaint he filed against four Wisconsin Supreme Court justices, including then-newly elected Justice Janet Protasiewicz, related to his firing. Three of the justices wrote a letter to the commission accusing Koschnick of a publicity stunt and criticized the commission for failing to admonish Koschnick for going public. So what happens to initial inquires that survive Van Hecke’s screening? The commission opens an investigation and requests more information from the judge or others. The executive director then prepares a report for the commission to consider. The complaint can be dismissed at that point, too, based on what the inquiry shows, whether the complaint involves a disappointed litigant questioning the merits of a judge's decision, whether the allegation involves a single and minor violation, or whether the judicial official has already taken corrective action or no longer holds office. Of the 42 cases that survived Van Hecke’s screening in 2023, 33 were dismissed after preliminary investigation. If the commission decides the matter should continue after preliminary investigation, the judge is notified and permitted to respond. The commission may then dismiss the complaint or initiate a public disciplinary action in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. In the public disciplinary action the commission presents its case to a three-judge panel (including at least two appeals court judges), and the panel reports its conclusions and recommendations to the Supreme Court for final decision. Since 1978, only 34 complaints have resulted in public disciplinary cases. Just two public disciplinary cases have occurred in the last five years. Prior to his appointment as Judicial Commission executive director in 2013, Van Hecke was a Milwaukee County assistant district attorney. This afternoon WJI petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court to require trained interpreters in municipal court proceedings involving low-English-proficiency (LEP) individuals.
WJI’s proposed new rule of procedure would bring municipal courts more in line with circuit courts, which are required to use “qualified” interpreters in proceedings involving LEP individuals. Qualified interpreters must meet certain requirements regarding their capabilities and accuracy. The current rule requires qualified interpreters in municipal courts only in matters involving juveniles. Otherwise, municipal judges are allowed to ask a party to bring a friend or family member—sometimes even a minor child—to court to interpret legal proceedings. “I’ve even seen a judge ask the gallery—the defendants awaiting their own cases to be called—if anyone spoke Spanish and could interpret proceedings when a woman did not bring someone with her to court,” said WJI Executive Director Margo Kirchner. The proposed new rule for municipal courts tracks the circuit court rule, with a major difference. The proposed rule divides proceedings into 1) evidentiary hearings that involve testimony and 2) other proceedings. Qualified interpreters would be required for all evidentiary hearings, including trials. In other proceedings, such as initial appearances or status conferences, the municipal court could use a telephonic, video, or computerized service approved by the director of state courts. Interpretation of legal proceedings by untrained friends, family members, or strangers would no longer be permitted. WJI wrote in its brief supporting the petition that “LEP individuals in Wisconsin today are not receiving proper access to qualified interpreters in municipal court proceedings.” Family members and friends acting as interpreters may not be proficient in the languages being used and may have conflicts of interest. “Even assuming they are proficient, these individuals almost certainly lack professional training as interpreters, let alone the specialized legal training necessary for properly interpreting court proceedings,” WJI wrote. “The ability to understand the words of the judge and the opposing party during a legal proceeding is a crucial element of due process. Without the help of a qualified interpreter, LEP individuals cannot meaningfully participate in their own legal proceedings This deprivation of due process rights has serious legal and practical consequences,” WJI wrote. WJI added that holding proceedings without providing qualified interpreters may also amount to national origin discrimination. “Very few defendants in Wisconsin's municipal courts have attorneys. This problem is compounded for those who do not understand the language being spoken in the courtroom,” said WJI board member and former Milwaukee Municipal Judge Jim Gramling about the need for the petition. “Municipal courts handle drunk driving cases, building and health code violations, charges of disorderly conduct, vandalism, marijuana possession, assault and battery. Forfeitures can reach into the thousands of dollars. Defendants in these cases deserve full interpreter services,” Gramling said. “Every court in Wisconsin, by law, must provide full interpreter services for defendants with one exception—the 230 municipal courts which handle over 400,000 cases every year,” Gramling said. “Municipal courts fly under the radar for the public and media, but that is where many people interact with the court system. As we say in our brief, municipal court cases involve real charges and real consequences," Kirchner said. “Those charged with offenses in municipal court, just as in circuit court, should be able to understand what is said and argue their case to the judge with accurate interpretation.” The petition is part of WJI’s broader effort to improve municipal court outcomes for defendants, especially low-income and minority individuals. “Since 2016, WJI has educated the public about municipal courts, monitored municipal court proceedings, and advocated for an end to jail and driver’s license suspension in response to unpaid municipal court forfeitures,” said Kirchner. “While monitoring municipal courts, we saw the frequent use of friends and family members when interpreters were needed,” said Kirchner. WJI has published public education information to help defendants understand municipal court proceedings. The materials include a Spanish-language video and pocket guide. Under the proposed rule, interpreters would be provided at municipal expense. WJI argues that the cost is reasonable and necessary in light of the important interests at stake. WJI awaits review of the petition by the Supreme Court. Wisconsin Supreme Court declines request to determine maps for recall and special elections4/3/2024 The Wisconsin Supreme this morning denied a motion by the Wisconsin Elections Commission seeking clarification on what maps apply to recall and special elections.
The court issued the order in the Clarke redistricting case. The court stated in the order that “(o)n December 22, 2023, we enjoined the ‘Elections Commission from using [the prior] legislative maps in all future elections’ because the maps violated the Wisconsin Constitution.” The Legislature then passed redistricting maps proposed by Gov. Tony Evers. On Feb. 19, 2024, Evers signed them into law as 2023 Wisconsin Act 94. Act 94 states that the new maps go into effect for seats up in the 2024 fall general election, leaving a question about what maps apply between now and then for special and recall elections. The old maps are unconstitutional, but do the new maps apply yet? The Legislature has ended its session so a legislative clarification looks unlikely. The general election is on Nov. 5, 2024, with a primary on Aug. 13, 2024. A special election is due for Senate District 4. The seat is vacant after Sen. Lena Taylor resigned her seat to become a Milwaukee County Circuit Court judge. Meanwhile, a second effort to recall Rep. Robin Vos (R-Rochester) is underway. The court said that weighing in on what maps apply to special and recall elections would be an impermissible advisory opinion. “Act 94 is not before us in the Clarke case and any examination of these maps departs from the relief requested in Clarke v. WEC,” the court wrote. The court said it would not "make a pronouncement based on hypothetical facts," adding that the Wisconsin Elections Commission bears statutory responsibility for administering elections. Wisconsin Justice Initiative recently asked the Wisconsin Supreme Court, director of state courts, and members of the State Capitol and Executive Residence Board (SCERB), to display new artwork in the State Capitol courtroom to reflect diversity in the judiciary, bar, and public. SCERB is the state board that controls renovations and installations of fixtures, decorative items, and furnishings in the Capitol building. The Wisconsin Constitution and opinions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court apply to all Wisconsinites and shape the state's legal system and citizens’ rights. Yet the chamber in which the Supreme Court sits to interpret the state’s constitution and statutes reflects an outdated world that fails to include more than half of Wisconsin's population. None of the courtroom’s murals includes a woman, and the only people of color are defendants in a murder trial and some possibly mixed-race men as jurors. Of note, in that murder trial the judge's decision was based on his belief that the primary defendant, Chief Oshkosh, was not “an intelligent conscious being" under the law. All of the portraits and busts in the courtroom’s vestibule are of white men. This year marks the 150th anniversary of admission of the first woman, Lavinia Goodell, to law practice in Wisconsin. In its letters to SCERB and the court, WJI urged them to recognize the anniversary by adding to the vestibule walls portraits of the court’s female chief justices — Shirley Abrahamson, Patience Roggensack, and Annette Ziegler. WJI also asked SCERB and the court to commission two new busts for the vestibule or hearing room: one of a woman and one of a person of color. WJI suggested Goodell and William T. Green. Green was the first Black lawyer in Milwaukee and fought for civil rights through legislation, court cases, and community organizing. WJI published blog articles about Goodell and Green as part of its “Unsung Heroes” series about women and people of color who contributed to Wisconsin legal history but whose stories have not adequately been heard and acknowledged. Supreme Court hearing room murals and vestibule. Photographs by Margo Kirchner.
Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The general rule for WJI's "SCOW docket" posts is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision, and all parts of the decision (majority, concurrences, dissents) are contained in one post. This one is a little different, though. This time, with this case, we are doing it in three parts: first the majority decision, then the longest dissent, then the remaining two dissents. Why? Because this package of writings is extremely important: redistricting of the Legislature. In addition, the opinions are extremely long—229 pages in all. Due to the size of the opinions, we are giving the majority opinion writer 18 paragraphs and each other opinion writer up to 15. Other than that, the rules remain the same. The "upshot" and "background" sections do not count as part of the paragraph restrictions because of their summary and very necessary nature. We've removed citations from the opinion for ease of reading (except, in this particular case, regarding some dictionary definitions), but may link to important cases cited or information about them. Italics indicate WJI insertions except for case names and emphasis added by the opinion writer, all of which also are italicized. Read part 1 (majority opinion) and part 2 (Ziegler dissent). The case: Rebecca Clarke v. Wisconsin Elections Commission Majority: Justice Jill J. Karofsky (51 pages), joined by Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, Rebecca Dallet, and Janet Protasiewicz Dissents: Chief Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler (89 pages), Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley (56 pages plus an appendix of 11 pages), and Justice Brian Hagedorn (22 pages) ![]() Grassl Bradley dissent Riding a Trojan horse named Contiguity, the majority breaches the lines of demarcation separating the judiciary from the political branches in order to transfer power from one political party to another. Alexander Hamilton forewarned us that "liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have everything to fear from its union with either of the other departments." With its first opinion as an openly progressive faction, the members of the majority shed their robes, usurp the prerogatives of the legislature, and deliver the spoils to their preferred political party. These handmaidens of the Democratic Party trample the rule of law, dishonor the institution of the judiciary, and undermine democracy. The outcome in this case was preordained with the April 2023 election of a candidate who ran on a platform of "taking a fresh look" at the "rigged" maps. As promised just two days after Protasiewicz's election, petitioners filed this case only one day after she joined the court. The majority chooses contiguity as a convenient conduit by which to toss the legislative maps adopted by this court in 2022 as a remedy for malapportionment, but any issue grounded in state law would suffice in order to insulate the majority's activism from review by the United States Supreme Court. The majority's machinations do not shield it from the Court vindicating the respondents' due process rights, however. Litigants are constitutionally entitled to have their cases heard by a fair and impartial tribunal, an issue of primary importance the majority absurdly dismisses as "underdeveloped." The parties fully briefed the due process claim, which Protasiewicz unilaterally rejected. While this court is powerless to override her recusal decision, the United States Supreme Court is not. The majority's treatment of the remaining issue sophomorically parrots the petitioners' briefing and undermines the rule of law. The Wisconsin Constitution requires assembly districts "to consist of contiguous territory" and senate districts "of convenient contiguous territory." For fifty years, maps drawn by both Republican and Democratic legislative majorities contained districts with detached territory. State and federal courts uniformly declared such districts to be "legally contiguous even if the area around the island is part of a different district." Just last year, three members of the majority in this very case adopted maps containing districts with detached territory. This well-established legal conclusion having become politically inconvenient, the same three justices now deem the existence of such districts "striking." If this creative constitutional "problem" were so glaringly obvious, then the attorneys who neglected to raise the issue over the last five decades committed malpractice, and the federal and state judges who adopted maps with districts containing detached territory should resign for incompetency. No one is fooled, however. The members of the majority refashion the law to achieve their political agenda. The precedent they set (if anything remains of the principle) devastates the rule of law. The Wisconsin Constitution commands redistricting to occur once every ten years. Both state and federal courts have always respected "the command in the Wisconsin Constitution not to redistrict more than once each 10 years." The majority's machinations in this case open the door to redistricting every time court membership changes. A supreme court election in 2025 could mean Clarke (this case) is overturned, Johnson (the court’s prior redistricting case, with three decisions known as Johnson I, Johnson II, and Johnson III) is restored, and new maps adopted. In 2026 or 2027, Johnson could be overturned (again), Clarke resurrected, and new maps adopted. This cycle could repeat itself in 2028. And in 2029. And in 2030. *** Upon completion of the 2020 census, the governor vetoed the redistricting plans passed by the legislature, so the court in Johnson enjoined the 2011 legislative maps that had become unconstitutionally malapportioned due to population shifts. Political impasse left the judiciary as the only branch able to act. There is absolutely no precedent for a supreme court to enjoin its own remedy one year later. Perhaps if the majority focused on studying the law rather than rushing to set its political machinations on a ridiculous fast track, it would avoid such embarrassing errors. *** Every party in Johnson stipulated before we decided Johnson I that the contiguity requirements under Article IV, Sections 4 and 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution permit municipal islands detached from their assigned districts. We agreed. So did the dissenters. Every party—including the Governor—submitted maps containing municipal islands. A majority in Johnson II, selected the Governor's proposed legislative maps, municipal islands and all; three justices in this current majority blessed those maps as constitutional. *** After the court decided Johnson I, the Governor, or any other petitioner who participated in the case, could have filed a motion for reconsideration on contiguity, asking the court to correct the allegedly flagrant constitutional error somehow repeatedly overlooked by countless lawyers, federal judges, and justices of this court for five decades. To no one's surprise, they instead waited for the Clarke petitioners to file this suit immediately after the makeup of the court changed, courtesy of an election bought and paid for by the Democratic Party of Wisconsin. *** Grassl Bradley then discusses how the majority misused dictionary definitions regarding the meaning of “contiguous.” The majority does not seem to recognize the limits of dictionaries, or the importance of acknowledging and weighing different definitions. The majority resorts to fabrication with its obviously false claim that all dictionaries define the term "contiguous" the way the majority prefers. The remarkable power to declare something unconstitutional—and forever remove it from democratic decision making—should be exercised carefully and with humility. The majority's drive-by dictionary citations exhibit a slipshod analysis. *** If the current maps were unconstitutional, the only proper exercise of this court's power would be a remedy that respects the legislature's and the governor's constitutionally prescribed roles in the redistricting process. If the members of the majority were acting as a court rather than a super legislature of four, they would modify the maps only to the extent necessary to comply with the law. Specifically, if the majority wished to remedy only detached municipal islands, as it professes, it would adopt the respondents' proposal and redraw only those districts containing detached territory. The majority refuses to do so, with nothing more than a single sentence explanation in which the majority says a more modest remedy would "cause a ripple effect across other areas of the state" so new maps are "necessary." The majority offers zero support for this conclusory assertion because none exists. The majority instead dispenses with the existing maps in order to confer an advantage on its preferred political party with new ones. *** The majority abandons the court's least-change approach adopted in Johnson I in order to fashion legislative maps that "intrude upon the constitutional prerogatives of the political branches and unsettle the constitutional allocation of power." The least-change approach in Johnson I guaranteed the court would ground any reapportionment decisions in the law alone, leaving the political decisions of redistricting to the political branches where they belong. The majority's decision to discard the judicially restrained methodology of Johnson I unveils its motivation to redraw the legislative maps for the benefit of Democratic state legislative candidates. By design, the majority's transparently political approach will reallocate political power in Wisconsin via a draconian remedy, under the guise of a constitutional "error" easily rectified by modest modifications to existing maps. *** As the respondents proposed, any contiguity violation could be remedied by simply dissolving municipal islands into their surrounding assembly districts. The majority dismisses the idea without explaining why the maps must instead be redrawn in their entirety. To say the quiet part out loud, confining the court's remedy to districts with municipal islands would deprive the majority of its desired political outcome. Its overreach flouts not only Johnson I but also black-letter law limiting the judiciary's remedial powers. *** Buried at the end of its opinion, the majority identifies "partisan impact" as the fifth and last "redistricting principle" it will consider in reallocating political power in this state. Its placement disguises the primacy this factor will have in the majority's schemes. The majority neglects to offer a single measure, metric, standard, or criterion by which it will gauge "partisan impact." Most convenient for the majority's endgame, there aren't any, lending the majority unfettered license to design remedial maps fulfilling the majority's purely political objectives. In considering "partisan impact," the majority acts without authority. Unlike other state constitutions, "[n]othing in the Wisconsin Constitution authorizes this court to recast itself as a redistricting commission in order 'to make [its] own political judgment about how much representation particular political parties deserve——based on the votes of their supporters——and to rearrange the challenged districts to achieve that end.'" "The people have never consented to the Wisconsin judiciary deciding what constitutes a 'fair' partisan divide; seizing such power would encroach on the constitutional prerogatives of the political branches." *** Redistricting is the quintessential "political thicket." We should not decide such cases unless, as in 2021, we must. In this case, we need not enter the thicket. Unlike the majority, I would not address the merits. A collateral attack on a supreme court judgment, disguised as an original action petition, would ordinarily be dismissed upon arrival. Allowing petitioners' stale claims to proceed makes a mockery of our judicial system, politicizes the court, and incentivizes litigants to sit on manufactured redistricting claims in the hopes that a later, more favorable makeup of the court will accept their arguments. The doctrines of laches and judicial estoppel exist to prevent such manipulation of the judicial system. ![]() Hagedorn dissent No matter how today's decision is sold, it can be boiled down to this: the court finds the tenuous legal hook it was looking for to achieve its ultimate goal—the redistribution of political power in Wisconsin. Call it "promoting democracy" or "ending gerrymandering" if you'd like; but this is good, old-fashioned power politics. The court puts its thumb on the scale for one political party over another because four members of the court believe the policy choices made in the last redistricting law were harmful and must be undone. This decision is not the product of neutral, principled judging. The matter of legislative redistricting was thoroughly litigated and resolved after the 2020 census. We adopted a judicial remedy (new maps) and ordered that future elections be conducted using these maps until the legislature and governor enact new ones. That remedy remains in place, and under Wisconsin law, is final. Now various parties, new and old, want a mulligan. But litigation doesn't work that way. Were this case about almost any other legal matter, the answer would be cut-and-dried. We would unanimously dismiss the case and reject this impermissible collateral attack on a prior, final decision. So why are the ordinary methods of deciding cases now thrown by the wayside? Because a majority of the court imagines it has some moral authority, dignified by a black robe, to create "fair maps" through judicial decree. To be sure, one can in good faith disagree with Johnson's holding that adhering as closely as possible to the last maps enacted into law—an approach called "least change"—is the most appropriate use of our remedial powers. And the claim here that the constitution's original meaning requires the territory in all legislative districts to be physically contiguous is probably correct, notwithstanding decades of nearly unquestioned practice otherwise. But that does not give litigants a license to ignore procedure and initiate a new case to try arguments they had every opportunity to raise in the last action, but did not. Procedural rules exist for a reason, and we should follow them. As we have previously explained, "Litigation rules and processes matter to the rule of law just as much as rendering ultimate decisions based on the law. Ignoring the former to reach the latter portends of favoritism to certain litigants and outcomes." Indeed it does. The majority heralds a new approach to judicial decision-making. It abandons prior-stated principles regarding finality in litigation, standing, stare decisis, and other normal restraints on judicial will—all in favor of expediency. But principles adopted when convenient, and ignored when inconvenient, are not principles at all. It is precisely when one's principles are tested and costly—yet are kept nonetheless—that they prove themselves truly held. The unvarnished truth is that four of my colleagues deeply dislike maps that give Republicans what they view as an inappropriate partisan advantage. Alas, when certain desired results are in reach, fidelity to prior ideals now seems . . . a bit less important than before. No matter how pressing the problem may seem, that is no excuse for abandoning the rules of judicial process that make this institution a court of law. The majority's outcome-focused decision-making in this case will delight many. A whole cottage industry of lawyers, academics, and public policy groups searching for some way to police partisan gerrymandering will celebrate. My colleagues will be saluted by the media, honored by the professoriate, and cheered by political activists. But after the merriment subsides, the sober reality will set in. Without legislative resolution, Wisconsin Supreme Court races will be a perpetual contest between political forces in search of political power, who now know that four members of this court have assumed the authority to bestow it. A court that has long been accused of partisanship will now be enmeshed in it, with no end in sight. Rather than keep our role in redistricting narrow and circumspect, the majority seizes vast new powers for itself. We can only hope that this once great court will see better days in the future. I respectfully dissent. *** (T)he majority falls woefully short in supporting its conclusion that the parties met the requirements for standing. "Standing is the foundational principle that those who seek to invoke the court's power to remedy a wrong must face a harm which can be remedied by the exercise of judicial power." Courts do not have the power to "weigh in on issues whenever the respective members of the bench find it desirable." As three members of today's majority have previously opined, "standing is important . . . because it reins in unbridled attempts to go beyond the circumscribed boundaries that define the proper role of courts." *** The Governor's legal positions throughout this redistricting litigation saga are astonishing; any other litigant in any other lawsuit would be promptly dismissed from the case. In Johnson, the Governor initially argued that the constitution's contiguity requirement mandated physical contiguity, just like the petitioners argue in this case. Then, the Governor changed course and agreed with all the other parties that keeping municipalities together did not violate the contiguity requirement. We agreed and so held, and invited map proposals consistent with our decision. The Governor then submitted proposed remedial maps with municipal islands—the very thing the Governor now argues violates the constitution! And in briefing regarding the other map proposals, which also contained municipal islands, the Governor never questioned their legality—even though he was invited to address any and all legal deficiencies in those proposals. *** The Governor's flip-flopping is classic claim preclusion. The Governor came before this court to litigate how to remedy malapportionment; argued that contiguity permits municipal islands; submitted maps (that this court initially adopted) containing dozens of municipal islands; and now, in a subsequent action, complains that this court's remedy violated the constitution because its map contained municipal islands. This argument was litigated in Johnson. And even if it wasn't, it obviously could have been litigated. If the legislature's proposed maps that we ultimately adopted violated the contiguity requirements, the Governor could have said so. He did not; no one did. The Governor is barred by claim preclusion from litigating the issues before us again. *** Given this, I do not see how the court can bypass the voter standing problems by relying on the Governor's purported authority to challenge a districting plan. Even if the Governor has standing to litigate on behalf of Wisconsinites to ensure a districting plan complies with the constitution, this does not end the matter. The question the majority must answer—but does not—is whether the Governor has the right to litigate on behalf of Wisconsin voters over and over again, taking different positions each time, until he gets the result he wants. The ordinary application of claim preclusion prohibits the Governor from relitigating the issues he either raised or could have raised during the last litigation. The majority's standing decision—resting on a party that should be dismissed——once again looks like an outcome in search of a theory. Next, the majority ignores the impropriety of the court issuing an injunction on our own injunction. The majority enjoins the Wisconsin Elections Commission from using the legislative maps that we, just 20 months ago, mandated they use. I've never seen anything quite like it. The general rule is that judgments—and injunctions along with them—are final and, absent fraud, cannot be collaterally attacked. This case is exactly that—an impermissible collateral attack on a prior, final case. The majority's response is that courts regularly modify prior injunctions in redistricting cases without reopening old cases. This is true, but only because there is an intervening event every ten years: the U.S. Census. And following completion of the census, the constitution requires that population shifts be accounted for afresh. So when courts issue a new injunction in new redistricting cases, they do so because the law provides that every districting plan, whether adopted by a court or the legislature, must be updated following the census. That is not the case here. *** (T)he majority says "partisan impact" will guide its decision in selecting new remedial maps. But what does this mean? Should the maps maximize the number of competitive districts? Should the maps seek to achieve something close to proportionate representation? Should the maps pick some reasonable number of acceptable Republican and Democratic-leaning seats in each legislative chamber? I have no idea, and neither do the parties. The court nonetheless invites the submission of maps motivated by partisan goals, just as the petitioners hoped. And with a certain amount of gusto, the majority insists it is being neutral by openly seeking maps aimed at tilting the partisan balance in the legislature. The court announces it does not have "free license to enact maps that privilege one political party over another," all the while obliging the wishes of litigants who openly seek to privilege one political party over another. The irony could not be any thicker. The court does not provide any meaningful guidance to the parties on how to satisfy its "political impact" criteria. No standards, no metrics, nothing. Instead, it appears the majority wishes to hide behind two "consultants" who will make recommendations on which maps are preferable. Those consultants will presumably use some standards to make this kind of judgment,14 but the majority will not permit them to be subject to discovery or witness examination.15 Like the great and powerful Oz, our consultants will dispense wisdom without allowing the parties to see and question what is really behind the curtain. And at the end of this, the consultants will offer options from which the court can choose. This attempt at insulating the court from being transparent about its decisional process is hiding in plain sight. The court also fails to interact with the constitutional requirement that districts "be bounded by county, precinct, town or ward lines." Currently, districts that are not physically contiguous are that way because the legislature (and courts) have attempted to comply with the requirement that counties, towns, and wards not be split—thus, keeping municipal islands in the same legislative district as the rest of the municipality. The court now determines that strict compliance with contiguity is required, but it ignores how that may be in tension with the equally required constitutional command to keep county, town, and ward lines sacrosanct. While absolute compliance with the "bounded by" clause is impossible given the one-person, one-vote decisions of the United States Supreme Court, a return to a more exacting constitutional standard would likely prohibit running districts across county lines, or breaking up towns or wards (of which municipalities are composed) unless necessary to comply with Supreme Court precedent. This could conflict with strict physical contiguity. *** Although this litigation is not yet over, it is clear to me that the Wisconsin Supreme Court is not well equipped to undertake redistricting cases without a set of rules governing the process. In (a prior case), this court recognized the need for special procedures governing future redistricting cases. We received a rule petition seeking to do exactly that prior to Johnson, but this court could not come to an agreement about what such a process would look like or whether we should have one. I believed then, and am now fully convinced, that some formalized process is desperately needed before we are asked to do this again. Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The general rule for WJI's "SCOW docket" posts is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision, and all parts of the decision (majority, concurrences, dissents) are contained in one post. . This one is a little different, though. This time, with this case, we are doing it in three parts: first the majority decision, then the longest dissent, then the remaining two dissents. Why? Because this package of writings is extremely important: redistricting of the Legislature. In addition, the opinions are extremely long—229 pages in all. Due to the size of the opinions, we are giving the majority opinion writer 18 paragraphs and each other opinion writer up to 15. Other than that, the rules remain the same. The "upshot" and "background" sections do not count as part of the paragraph restrictions because of their summary and very necessary nature. We've removed citations from the opinion for ease of reading (except, in this particular case, regarding some dictionary definitions), but may link to important cases cited or information about them. Italics indicate WJI insertions except for case names and emphasis added by the opinion writer, all of which also are italicized. The case: Rebecca Clarke v. Wisconsin Elections Commission Majority: Justice Jill J. Karofsky (51 pages), joined by Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, Rebecca Dallet, and Janet Protasiewicz Dissents: Chief Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler (89 pages), Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley (56 pages plus an appendix of 11 pages), and Justice Brian Hagedorn (22 pages) ![]() The Ziegler dissent This deal was sealed on election night. Four justices remap Wisconsin even though this constitutional responsibility is to occur every ten years, after a census, by the other two branches of government. The public understands this. Nonetheless, four justices impose their will on the entire Assembly and half of the Senate, all of whom are up for election in 2024. Almost every legislator in the state will need to respond, with lightning speed, to the newly minted maps, deciding if they can or want to run, and scrambling to find new candidates for new districts. All of this remains unknown until the court of four, and its hired "consultants," reveal the answer. The parties' dilatory behavior in bringing this suit at this time should not be rewarded by the court's granting of such an extreme remedy, along such a constrained timeline. Big change is ahead. The new majority seems to assume that their job is to remedy "rigged" maps which cause an "inability to achieve a Democratic majority in the state legislature." These departures from the judicial role are terribly dangerous to our constitutional, judicial framework. No longer is the judicial branch the least dangerous in Wisconsin. Redistricting was just decided by this court in the Johnson litigation (the court’s redistricting litigation in 2021 and 2022). This court was saddled with the responsibility to adopt maps because the legislative and executive branches were at an impasse, and absent court action, there would be a constitutional crisis. As a result of Johnson, there are census-responsive maps in place. Nonetheless, the four robe-wearers grab power and fast-track this partisan call to remap Wisconsin. Giving preferential treatment to a case that should have been denied, smacks of judicial activism on steroids. The court of four takes a wrecking ball to the law, making no room, nor having any need, for longstanding practices, procedures, traditions, the law, or even their co-equal fellow branches of government. Their activism damages the judiciary as a whole. Regrettably, I must dissent. The court of four's outcome-based, end-justifies-the-means judicial activist approach conflates the balance of governmental power the people separated into three separate branches, to but one: the judiciary. Such power-hungry activism is dangerous to our constitutional framework and undermines the judiciary. When four members of this court "throw off constraints, revise the rules of decision, and set the law on a new course," it is prudent for all of us to "question whether that power has been exercised judiciously" or whether it is instead an exercise in judicial activism. Today is the latest in a series of power grabs by this new rogue court of four, creating a pattern of illicit power aggregation which disrupts, if not destroys, stability in the law. *** Unfortunately, this latest unlawful power grab is not an outlier, but is further evidence of a bold, agenda-driven pattern of conduct. To set the stage, recall that these four members of the court came out swinging, when they secretly and unilaterally planned and dispensed with court practices, procedures, traditions, and norms. Preordained and planned even before day one of the new justice's term on August 1, 2023, but unknown to the other members of the court, the four acted to aggregate power, meeting in secret as a "super-legislature." They met behind closed doors, at a rogue, unscheduled and illegitimate meeting, over the protestations of their colleagues, in violation of longstanding court rules and procedures. Even before day one of the newest justice's term, and before the court term started in September, they met, in secret, to carry out their plan, only known to them, to dispense with over 40 years of court-defined precedent. They even took the unprecedented action to strip the constitutional power of the chief justice, which had been understood for decades of chief justices and different court membership, instead usurping that role through an administrative committee. For nearly four decades and five chief justices, every member of the court had respected the power the people of Wisconsin constitutionally vested in the chief justice to administrate the court system. *** (J)ust last year in Johnson, the court determined, and all agreed, that the maps complied with the contiguity requirement. "Contiguity for state assembly districts is satisfied when a district boundary follows the municipal boundaries. Municipal 'islands' are legally contiguous with the municipality to which the 'island' belongs." Even the parties now arguing that the maps are not contiguous recognize that the contiguity requirement has been deemed satisfied not only in the maps the parties submitted in the Johnson litigation, but also in the maps the state has relied on for the last 60 to 70 years. Moreover, every person who wished to have a say or participate in the Johnson litigation was welcome to do so and did. No one sought reconsideration of the Johnson litigation while it was within their power to do so. Johnson went all the way to the United States Supreme Court and back. Some of the litigants now were part of the Johnson litigation, some chose not to engage. But the law imposes consequences for those who choose to sit out of litigation entirely, and for those who stipulate to or do not make an argument in litigation. Finality of litigation does not endow one with the authority to wait to see what happens in that litigation cycle, forego timely filing a motion for reconsideration, and then bring arguments years after the fact, with the only intervening change being the court's composition. Four members of this court choose to not let pesky parameters like finality or other foundational judicial principles, or even the constitution, stand in the way of the predetermined political outcome which they seem preordained to deliver. Given the new court of four's conduct so far, we can expect more such judicial mischief in the future. On their watch, Wisconsin is poised to become a litigation nightmare. What is next? *** (T)his original action is wrongly taken and decided for a host of heretofore understood and respected legally-binding tenets. However, the court of four glosses right over them.
*** To be clear, this case is nothing more than a now time-barred motion to reconsider Johnson. An honest look at the plain law would require that this petition be dismissed. Instead, the creative legal machinations engaged in by the masters of this lawsuit, emboldened and encouraged by the new court of four, requires mind-boggling contortion of the law to achieve a particular political outcome. Sadly, judicial activism is once again alive and well in Wisconsin, creating great instability. *** (R)ejecting the Johnson I dissent's assertion that the task of adopting remedial maps required this court to rule as a partisan actor, we adopted "[a] least-change approach[, which] is the most consistent, neutral, and appropriate use of our limited judicial power to remedy the constitutional violations in this case." Least change, as a framework this court put forward throughout the Johnson litigation, properly reflects the limited role the judicial branch plays in redistricting, as it is the legislature, not the judiciary, which is granted constitutional authority to redistrict. Least change remains the law. Until today. Now, the majority, citing to nothing, declares instead that the standard this court implemented barely two years ago "is unworkable in practice," simply so that they can overrule it, and move this institution down the darkened path of outcome-based judicial activism. *** Ziegler then discusses at length the issues of stare decisis (adherence to precedents), standing (ability to sue), judicial estoppel (a party asserting inconsistent positions during litigation), issue preclusion (barring an argument that was previously decided, claim preclusion (barring an argument that could have been previously decided), laches (sitting on one’s rights), and due process. *** In the issue preclusion discussion: As a side note, the parties attempted to backdoor considerations of "partisan fairness" or "partisan gerrymandering" back into the court's analysis by way of at least initially confining it to the remedy phase. The majority continues that ill-fated venture of taking up an issue that both this court and the United States Supreme Court have determined is non-justiciable,67 by attempting to wrap it up in the perhaps more pleasant euphemism of "partisan impact," which the majority "will consider. . . . when evaluating remedial maps." Never mind figuring out how exactly the majority plans to go about evaluating "partisan impact" or determining how much "partisan impact" is permissible and how much is too much. They provide no measurable standard for calculating it. Apparently then, it is for them to know, and for us to find out! "The fact that the majority imposes its own unique and undefined standard further demonstrates that it exercises its will rather than its judgment." *** This court must not allow a non-justiciable, political question like partisan fairness to be camouflaged into the majority's decision. The majority declines to put forward a measurable standard by which this court is supposed to define or determine "partisan impact," demonstrating that they "exercise[]. . . . [their] will rather than [their] judgment." Their standard-deficient approach evokes recollections of the "eyeballing" tests from bygone legal eras encapsulated in "we'll know it when we see it" terminology. This court has already addressed the issues of partisan gerrymandering and political fairness, as well as contiguity. Issue preclusion bars us now from allowing these relevant parties to relitigate what has already been litigated. *** In the laches discussion: This court had a different composition two years ago, but that fact alone cannot be why these parties chose not to actively participate in that litigation at that time. To the dispassionate observer, such contortions of the law appear questionable and should come with consequences. Surprisingly, the parties are forthright enough to tell us themselves that this is in fact their reason for bringing this claim now—after waiting two years in alleged ongoing state of harm—to ensure that this case coincided with the changed composition of the court. It defies reason for parties to sit out litigation, obtain the benefit of seeing how arguments are presented, and then with that benefit of hindsight, bring their now modified claims over the same issues, with the same legal representation, at their leisure, years later. It further defies reason that given those same facts, and the fact that the respondents would not have had knowledge of the parties bringing new claims over the same maps a year later, that the parties can now demand that this court provide them an extraordinary remedy (overturning decades of precedent and the votes of millions of Wisconsinites), and do so in a constrained timeframe of mere months before another round of elections gets underway. Such unnecessary fast tracking due to the parties' own inexplicable delay may rightfully raise questions of intrusion on the opposing party's rights to fully litigate the claims presented. *** In the due process discussion: The parties interested in Justice Protasiewicz's election are intricately involved with, and beneficiaries of, the case they filed directly before her in this original action right after she was sworn in. Their timing of selecting her as their judge and then bringing this petition is irrefutable. Now, the four members of the court have fast-tracked this litigation, bypassing and rushing the traditional court steps, processes, and the law. *** In conclusion: This original action should never have been accepted. It is nothing more than a motion for reconsideration, which is time-barred; ignores stare decisis, standing, judicial estoppel, issue preclusion, claim preclusion, and laches. Not only is this a fundamentally legally flawed proceeding for these preceding listed reasons, but it also raises serious question regarding . . . whether this proceeding is a violation of litigants’ due process rights. What’s next? Pre-selected “consultants” who will decide the fate of Wisconsin voters even though the Wisconsin Supreme Court already decided these issues conclusively in the Johnson litigation? Will these “consultants” be endowed with the authority to reach all factual and legal conclusions necessary to draw the maps, while evading review and the constitutional protections due the parties? The four rogue members of the court have upended judicial practices, procedures, and norms, as well as legal practices, procedures, and precedent, yielding only to sheer will to create a particularized outcome which will please a particular constituency. At a minimum, this is harmful to the judicial branch and the institution as a whole. I dissent. |
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