By Alexandria Staubach
A rule petition to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, brought by the State Bar of Wisconsin, sought to create a new category of continuing legal education: the “Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Access” (DEIA) credit. The Supreme Court denied the petition without giving it a hearing. Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley authored a 33-page concurrence, joined in full by Justice Patience D. Roggensack and in part by Chief Justice Annette K. Ziegler, which railed against the validity of DEIA. Often, the concurrence cities dubious and deeply partisan scholarship in addition to a Justice Clarence Thomas concurrence to a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision gutting the remnants of affirmative action in college admissions. In follow up to the SCOW docket report on that order and concurrence, WJI examines a few of the authors and their writings cited by Grassl Bradley to support her argument that “DEIA courses damage human dignity, undermine equality, and violate the law.” Grassl Bradley: “Various institutions promote a lie designed to divide: ‘human beings are defined by their skin color, sex, and sexual preferences; that discrimination based on those characteristics has been the driving force in Western civilization; and that America remains a profoundly bigoted place, where heterosexual white males continue to deny opportunity to everyone else.’ ” The cite: Heather Mac Donald, The Diversity Delusion: How Race and Gender Pandering Corrupt the University and Undermine our Culture 2 (2018). The author: Mac Donald is a conservative political commentator, attorney, and author. She is a fellow at the conservative think tank Manhattan Institute for Policy Research and made a name for herself in opposition to criminal justice reform. She advocates that overemphasis on and education around white privilege and toxic masculinity on college campuses is driving racial divisiveness. She blames the “academic left and its imitators in politics and the mass media” for racial divisiveness in the U.S. and blames the left for emboldening white supremacists. Mac Donald dismisses police racism in favor of the “far larger problem: black on black crime,” and has argued in favor of racial profiling in policing. Mac Donald is deeply critical of the Black Lives Matter movement and accused President Barak Obama of “attacking the very foundation of civilization” in lending credibility to the movement. Grassl Bradley: “Nice-sounding euphemisms aside, DEIA initiatives often presuppose the existence of certain ‘universal values,’ which are not actually universally shared in an effort to stifle debate.” The cite: Ben Shapiro, How to Debate Leftists and Destroy Them: 11 Rules for Winning the Argument 22 (2014). The author and his rules: Shapiro is a conservative political commentator, author, media personality, podcast host, and attorney. In 2004 he graduated from college at UCLA and published his first book, Brainwashed: How Universities Indoctrinate America’s Youth, which argues that the ideological left generally control universities and that professors are intolerant of non-left opinions. He later graduated from Harvard Law School. Shapiro served as the editor-at-large for Breitbart News from 2012-2016. He is the author of articles with titles including “5 Times Hillary and Bernie Pandered to Blacks During the Last Debate,” “Antonin Scalia’s Death Could Mark the End of Constitution,” and “The Real Reason Republicans Love America More than Democrats.” His “11 Rules” discussed in the 2014 pamphlet begin with the following four: Rule #1: Walk Toward the Fire – “The left knows this is war. And they know you are the enemy. You will be castigated. You will get punched. That’s the way it will go because that’s how the left wins: through intimidation and cruelty. You have to take the punch, you have to brush it off. You have to be willing to take the punch.” Rule #2: Hit First – “Don’t take the first punch. Hit first. Hit hard. Hit where it counts.” Rule #3: Frame Your Opponent – “You’ve researched your opponent; you’ve game planned him. You know he’s going to call you a racist, because he always calls his opponents racists. So hit him first by pointing out his vicious tactic.” Rule #4: Frame the Debate – “The left is expert at framing debates They have buzzwords they use to direct the debate toward unwinnable positions for you. They are tolerant, diverse, fighters for social justice, if you oppose them, by contrast you are intolerant, xenophobic, and in favor of injustice. All these terms are – to be polite – a crock, if considered as absolute moral values … The left’s use of magical buzzwords places you in a corner, against supposed universal values that aren’t universal or universally held. It’s important that you neuter those buzzwords quickly, because otherwise you will be arguing against nonsense terms that can be used against you.” Grassl Bradley: “ ‘Ultimately identity politics should be rejected … because it poses a threat to republican self-government by corroding patriotic ties, fostering hatred, promoting cultural separatism, and demanding special treatment rather than equality under the law.’ ” The cite: David Azerrad, “The Promise and Perils of Identity Politics,” First Principles Essays, Jan. 23, 2019, at 1. The author: Azerrad holds a Ph.D. in politics from the University of Dallas. He has taught courses on conservative and progressive political thought at American University and is a former staffer at the conservative think tank The Heritage Foundation. In the Spring of 2021 Azerrad gave a talk at St. Vincent College on “Black Privilege and Racial Hysteria in Contemporary America,” in which he (in his own words later discussing his talk) “denounced the widespread system of preferential treatment that benefits our fellow black citizens, including the prohibition on noticing said system” and “criticized the excessive praise showered on mediocre black composers, scientists, and writers from the past.” In a September 2022 talk at the National Conservatism Conference he discussed “the LGBTQ agenda and the damage it has done to American families,” labeled Millenials and members of Generation Z as “the most coddled, mentally unstable, historically ignorant, lowest testosterone, and woke generation in history,” and said that “the left is not sending their best” but instead is represented by “incompetent diversity hires” and “overweight, ugly, mentally unstable, cross-dressing, low-IQ people.”
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By Gretchen Schuldt
A dispute over the right of an unmarried couple to adopt a child is at the center of the first case the state Supreme Court will hear in September. Most of the case, which bypassed the Court of Appeals, is confidential. But one document, a reply brief filed by attorneys representing the unmarried couple, is available. It names as a defendant Ashland County Circuit Judge Kelly J. McKnight, who rejected an unmarried couple's request to adopt a child. The couple, referred to as A.M.B. and T.G. in the brief, are appealing. McKnight, wrote the couple's lawyers, John R. Carlson and Carla J. Smith, "chooses to focus first and foremost on 'protecting marriage' – an institution in which the child does not even participate." The judge "obfuscates the core intent and interest of the legislature – the best interest of the child." McKnight, who as a judge is a state official, is represented by Assistant Attorney General Lynn K. Lodahl. "The Legislature makes its intent clear in the first few sentences of Chapter 48 (the Children's Code) – 'the best interests of the child or unborn child shall always be of paramount consideration," the lawyers wrote, emphasizing the key words. "A sentence with no qualifications, conditions, or exceptions." The law identifies the secondary, qualified goal of preserving the unity of the family "whenever appropriate," they said. "And the word 'traditional' never appears anywhere in the legislative intent section." M.M.C., as the child is called in the brief, never had a relationship with her biological father and his parental rights were terminated. There is no ability to preserve the unity of M.M.C.'s family, Carlson and Smith said. "The legislative intent of 'preserving the unity of the family' should not be mistaken for what the Court tried to do – force two unwilling participants into a marital contract – an event that was not centered on the child or her best interest, but focused solely on a technicality that would have no effect on M.M.C.’s day-to-day life," they said. McKnight "determined that the best interest of the child was wholly irrelevant in determining whether to approve an adoption," they said. The law specifically allows "an unmarried person" to adopt, they said. "If the legislature were seeking to 'promote marriage, stability for children and families…[and] protect the traditional unitary family,' it does not make sense the legislature would explicitly permit unmarried individuals to adopt under Wisconsin law," they wrote. Oral arguments in the case are scheduled for 9:45 a.m. Sept. 11. By Gretchen Schuldt
Supreme Court rules don't support Chief Justice Annette K. Ziegler's complaint that the new liberal court majority ignored them when it dismissed at-will employee Randy Koschnick as director of state courts and changed the way the court runs. The Koschnick decision, Ziegler said, "was made without regard for the Constitution, case law, or Supreme Court rules." But here's what the court's own operating procedures (emphasis added) actually say: The court continually reviews its procedures to improve the efficient processing of its caseload and the effective discharge of its administrative responsibilities. Accordingly, these procedures may be changed without notice as circumstances require. It should be reemphasized that these are not rules. They do not purport to limit or describe in binding fashion the powers or duties of any Supreme Court personnel. These internal operating procedures are merely descriptive of how the court currently functions. Any internal operating procedure may be suspended or modified by majority vote of a quorum of the court. The rules say the courts director "is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of" the Supreme Court. Ziegler also said the majority's decision to set up a new committee with new administrative powers and to increase court transparency was made in an "illegitimate closed meeting." It was the then-conservative majority who in 2012 voted, 4-3, to close many Supreme Court administrative meetings. Ziegler voted in favor of secrecy. The new majority voted this week to open those meetings again. And did the majority "gut" Ziegler's constitutional authority as administrator of the court, which she alleged in a statement? In a word, no. Here's what the constitution says: "The chief justice of the supreme court shall be the administrative head of the judicial system and shall exercise this administrative authority pursuant to procedures adopted by the supreme court." (Emphasis added.) Finally, Ziegler said changes like those the court majority has announced are made "when seven members of the court convene with an agenda prepared by the Chief Justice and at a time set by the Chief Justice during the court’s business year, which is September-June." Ziegler, in other words, believes the court should consider only the rules that Ziegler likes at a time that Ziegler likes. But now the court's new four-member majority constitutes a quorum of the court and will actually have a say in how things run. The court's own procedures and the state constitution make that clear. Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The rule for this is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision. The “upshot” and “background” sections do not count as part of the 10 paragraphs because of their summary and necessary nature. We’ve also removed citations from the opinion for ease of reading but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. Italics indicate WJI insertions except for case names, which are also italicized. The case: State of Wisconsin vs. Quaheem O. Moore Majority: Justice Brian K. Hagedorn (12 pages), joined by Chief Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler and Justices Patience Drake Roggensack and Rebecca Grassl Bradley Dissent: Justice Rebecca Frank Dallet (11 pages), joined by Justices Ann Walsh Bradley and Jill J. Karofsky ![]() The upshot After he was pulled over for speeding, officers searched Quaheem Moore based primarily on the smell of marijuana emanating from his vehicle. The circuit court suppressed the results of that search, and the court of appeals affirmed. The State contends this was error. It argues the officers had probable cause to arrest Moore, and thus, this was a lawful search incident to arrest. We agree and reverse. Background On November 17, 2019, City of Marshfield Police Officer Libby Abel executed a traffic stop for speeding. While attempting to make the stop, Officer Abel "observed some sort of liquid fly out of the driver's window" and noticed the vehicle hit a curb while turning onto a side street. Officer Abel approached the vehicle, identified the driver and sole occupant as Quaheem Moore, and questioned him about the speeding and the liquid. During this initial contact, Officer Abel "detected an odor of raw marijuana." She called for back-up, and Officer Mack Scheppler arrived on the scene. Both officers escorted Moore out the vehicle, in between his vehicle and Officer Abel's squad car. Officer Abel performed an initial safety pat-down for weapons. She did not find any, but she did discover a vaping device. She asked Moore if it was a THC (tetrahydrocannabinols) vape, and he responded that it was a CBD (cannabidiol) vape pen. Officer Abel proceeded to question Moore. She first asked about the liquid, which she said she could still see on the side of the car and inside the window; but Moore denied throwing anything out of the window. He explained that the vehicle was his brother's rental, and that he had taken it to the car wash earlier in the day. Officer Abel next asked Moore if he had been drinking, which he also denied. Then, Officer Abel told Moore that she smelled marijuana coming from the vehicle, but he immediately expressed disbelief. Officer Scheppler confirmed that he too smelled marijuana, and later described the odor as overwhelming. Moore continued to express his disbelief and insisted that the officers could not smell marijuana on him. Officers Abel and Scheppler agreed, indicating the smell was coming from the vehicle, not from Moore. Eventually, the officers told Moore that they were going to search him based on the odor of marijuana. Officer Scheppler found only cash at first. Officer Abel then stepped away to search Moore's vehicle while Officer Scheppler and Moore chatted. Several minutes later, Officer Scheppler noticed Moore's "belt buckle was sitting a little higher on his pants" and decided to examine the zipper area. . . . Officer Scheppler ultimately found two plastic baggies containing cocaine and fentanyl in a false-pocket behind Moore's zipper. The State charged Moore with two crimes: possession with intent to deliver narcotics and possession with intent to deliver more than one but less than five grams of cocaine——both as second and subsequent offenses and as a repeater. Moore moved to suppress evidence of the cocaine and fentanyl found by Officer Scheppler, arguing the State lacked probable cause to arrest and therefore to search him. The circuit court agreed and granted the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, and we granted the State's petition for review. The guts The United States Constitution provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ....” "Warrantless searches are presumed to be unconstitutional." But there are exceptions, and the State bears the burden to prove an exception applies. One exception is a search incident to an arrest. When conducting a search incident to arrest, the officer is not required to formally arrest before the search. The "search may be incident to a subsequent arrest if the officers have probable cause to arrest before the search." "Probable cause to arrest is the quantum of evidence within the arresting officer's knowledge at the time of the arrest which would lead a reasonable police officer to believe that the defendant probably committed or was committing a crime." This requires more than a mere hunch or reasonable suspicion, but "does not require proof 'beyond a reasonable doubt or even that guilt is more likely than not.'" Probable cause is an objective test that "requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances."... *** (T)he issue presented here is, examining the totality of the circumstances, whether a reasonable law enforcement officer would believe Moore probably committed or was committing a crime. The answer is yes. When Officer Abel pulled Moore over, she watched his vehicle hit the curb and observed a "liquid fly out the driver's window"; she later saw the liquid on the side of the car as well. And when she first approached the vehicle, she smelled raw marijuana. Officer Scheppler smelled it too, and even called it overwhelming. The circuit court found both officers' testimony regarding the smell credible, stating multiple times in its decision that the officers smelled a "strong" odor of marijuana. Moore does not challenge this factual finding. Critically, Moore was the sole occupant of the vehicle. And he was in possession of a vape pen. Taken together, a reasonable officer would believe it was Moore that was responsible for the overwhelming odor of a prohibited substance emanating from a vehicle with no other passengers. The officers need not know with certainty that Moore was committing or had committed illegal activity, but they had more than enough to meet the modest bar that it was probably true. Therefore, the officers had probable cause to believe a crime was or had been committed — at the very least, possession of THC. Moore provides several counterarguments, none of which are persuasive. First, he contends that the odor of marijuana was not sufficiently linked to him because the officers did not smell it on him, only in his vehicle.... (However), “(t)he strong order of marijuana in an automobile will normally provide probable cause to believe that the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle is linked to the drug.” That leads to Moore's second counterpoint: the vehicle was not his, but his brother's rental. While this could constitute an innocent explanation — albeit, a strained one — Moore misses the legal standard. Who owned the title or signed the rental lease does not change the analysis. A reasonable law enforcement officer would still likely conclude, absent other facts not in the record, that the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle was probably connected to the illegal substance whose odor the officer clearly detected in the vehicle. Third, Moore contends that the odor of marijuana cannot be unmistakable when there are innocent explanations for it — such as the odor of CBD, a legal substance that Moore stated his vape pen was used for. The circuit court referenced this as well: "The State notes that CBD and marijuana are indistinguishable in their odor.”... While the officers might have reasonably inferred that the smell from the vehicle was CBD, that was not the only inference they could draw — they also could infer (and they did) that the smell was THC. It is black letter law that "an officer is not required to draw a reasonable inference that favors innocence when there also is a reasonable inference that favors probable cause." Therefore, while an innocent explanation may exist, we still conclude under the facts of this case, a reasonable law enforcement officer would infer that Moore had probably committed or was committing a crime. Finally, Moore notes that neither Officer Abel nor Officer Scheppler testified with respect to their training and experience to detect the smell of marijuana. He asserts that without this testimony, the State failed to establish the odor was unmistakable.... The circuit court acting as fact-finder here found the officers' testimony credible and stated repeatedly that the officers noted the "strong smell" and "strong odor" of marijuana coming from the vehicle. It made this factual finding absent specific testimony regarding the officers' training and experience. Moore does not challenge this factual finding; nor do we conclude this finding is clearly erroneous. Furthermore, the fact that the officers testified to smelling marijuana suggests they know what marijuana smells like. It could be that a fact-finder will not believe an officer's identification of marijuana absent an on-the-record statement of training and experience. The changing legal status and ubiquity of marijuana could make the lack of such evidence vulnerable to attack. But again, we do not see why such testimony would be required… There was enough here without testimony regarding the officers' training and expertise to support a finding that they smelled illegal raw marijuana. ![]() The dissent After pulling Moore over for speeding, police officers removed him from his car to conduct a pat-down search. They found no evidence that a crime had been committed, so Moore should have been free to go, perhaps with a speeding ticket. Instead, the officers conducted a second, more thorough search of Moore and found baggies containing cocaine and fentanyl concealed in his pants. The majority concludes that this second search was permissible because the officers had probable cause to arrest Moore on the basis that the car he was driving smelled like marijuana. I disagree; because the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Moore, the evidence they found should be suppressed. *** The majority concludes that under the totality of the circumstances, "the officers had probable cause to believe a crime was or had been committed — at the very least, possession of THC." The circumstances the majority cites for this conclusion are the following:
Almost none of these circumstances "would lead a reasonable police officer to believe" that Moore possessed THC. Hitting the curb while pulling over might be evidence the driver was impaired, but Moore was not arrested for operating while intoxicated and there is no evidence of impairment from the bodycam footage or the officers' reports. Officer Abel's testimony about a liquid spraying out of the driver's side window is immaterial as well. There is nothing in the record about what the liquid was or linking it in any way to THC. Likewise there is nothing in the record that suggests Moore's vape pen was used for anything other than CBD — a legal substance. That leaves only the smell of marijuana coming from the car Moore was driving — a fact the majority all but admits is the only support for probable cause to arrest Moore. In concluding that the smell of marijuana alone gave the officers probable cause to arrest Moore, the majority relies primarily on one 24-year old case decided when the use or possession of any amount of cannabis was illegal nationwide. *** For starters, even if the officers smelled the "unmistakeable" odor of marijuana coming from the car Moore was driving, the linkage between that smell and Moore was not particularly strong.... (T)he likelihood that an occupant is linked to the smell of marijuana in a vehicle "diminishes if the odor is not strong or recent, if the source of the odor is not near th eperson, if there are several people in the vehicle, or if a person offers a reasonable explanation for the odor." Here, it is true that Moore was the sole occupant of the car, thus increasing the probability that he was linked to the smell. But that linkage is weaker than it initially appears, since neither officer smelled marijuana on Moore once he was out of the car and because Moore explained that he was driving a vehicle his brother had rented — a fact the officers subsequently verified. More fundamentally, however, legal developments in the last 24 years may call into question (whether) marijuana is "unmistakabl[y the] odor of a controlled substance." Thirty-eight states have legalized medical marijuana and twenty-three of those have also legalized recreational marijuana. Additionally, Congress modified the Controlled Substances Act in 2018 to remove hemp and hemp-derived products from the definition of marijuana, which legalized certain hemp products nationwide. This means that virtually all adults can legally purchase hemp-derived products from local CBD stores. Hemp-derived products come in a variety of processed forms like gummies, oils, and creams, as well as in their unprocessed state as hemp flowers. And just like marijuana, hemp flowers can be smoked, vaped, or eaten. Unlike marijuana, however, hemp contains only trace amounts of the psychoactive compound THC — the main psychoactive ingredient in marijuana. Experts indicate that hemp flowers and marijuana are so similar in appearance and smell that even drug detection dogs can't tell the difference. If true, this means that when a police officer smells what they believe to be the distinctive odor of either raw or burnt marijuana, they could just as easily be smelling raw or burnt hemp. In light of the nationwide legalization of hemp, this raises the question: Should the smell of marijuana alone still justify a warrantless arrest? Courts in jurisdictions that have legalized marijuana for medical or recreational purposes have answered "no" .... Dallet then discusses cases from Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Minnesota. Although Wisconsin has not yet legalized medical or recreational marijuana, or decriminalized possession or consumption of marijuana, the reasoning in these cases demonstrates that marijuana's once-unique odor may no longer serve as the beacon of criminal activity it did a quarter-century ago. ... Wisconsinites can legally purchase, transport, and smoke or vape hemp products that experts indicate are identical to marijuana in look and smell. As such, officers who believe they smell marijuana coming from a vehicle may just as likely be smelling raw or smoked hemp, which is not criminal activity. Moreover, in virtually all of Wisconsin's neighboring states — Illinois, Michigan, and Minnesota — recreational marijuana is now legal. With that, Wisconsinites may travel to neighboring states and consume marijuana without violating any state laws. And experience teaches us that smells linger in cars, sometimes long after the item responsible for the smell is gone. In sum, ... reliance on the smell of marijuana as an unmistakable indication of illegal activity sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest may no longer ring true. All things considered, the totality of the relevant circumstances here do not add up to probable cause to arrest and thus any evidence found during the search should be suppressed. Other than the officers' testimony that they smelled raw marijuana coming from the car Moore was driving, there was no reason to believe that Moore possessed THC. The smell the officers identified was not sufficiently linked to Moore under the circumstances of this case…. For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent. The state Supreme Court ruled Tuesday, 4-3, that police can base a search primarily on the smell of marijuana, even though the legalization of CBD and hemp means the smell could be from a perfectly legitimate source.
Justice Brian Hagedorn wrote the opinion, joined by Chief Justice Annette K. Ziegler and Justices Rebecca Grassl Bradley and Patience D. Roggensack. Justice Rebecca F. Dallet dissented, joined by Justices Ann Walsh Bradley and Jill J. Karofsky. Quaheem Moore was pulled over for speeding. Police searched him based largely on the smell of marijuana coming from the car he was driving, which he borrowed from his brother. "The circuit court suppressed the results of that search, and the court of appeals affirmed," Hagedorn wrote. "The state contends this was error. It argues the officers had probable cause to arrest Moore, and thus, this was a lawful search incident to arrest. We agree and reverse." "While an innocent explanation (for the smell) may exist, we still conclude under the facts of this case, a reasonable law enforcement officer would infer that Moore had probably committed or was committing a crime," he wrote. "All things considered, the totality of the relevant circumstances here do not add up to probable cause to arrest and thus any evidence found during the search should be suppressed," Dallet wrote in her dissent. "Other than the officers' testimony that they smelled raw marijuana coming from the car Moore was driving, there was no reason to believe that Moore possessed THC. The smell the officers identified was not sufficiently linked to Moore under the circumstances of this case. " Look for more on the case in an upcoming "SCOW docket," where we cut Supreme Court decisions down to size and hit the highlights. The Wisconsin Supreme Court today upheld the 2020 victims’ rights constitutional amendment. In doing so, the court tossed out a standard for assessing constitutional questions in place since 1925 and created a new standard never argued by the parties.
The majority decision and two concurrences used more ink on debates about how to interpret the constitution and the place of originalism—a theory of constitutional interpretation aimed at discerning the intent of a provision at the time it was adopted—than on the arguments raised by the parties in the case before it. Justice Brian Hagedorn wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Annette Ziegler, Justice Patience Roggensack, and Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley. Hagedorn also wrote a concurrence to his own majority opinion. Grassl Bradley wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Ziegler and Roggensack. Justice Rebecca Dallet wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Jill Karofsky. Justice Ann Walsh Bradley dissented. No justice denied that the victims' rights amendment diminished the rights of an accused under the state constitution. In her dissent, Walsh Bradley expressly noted that it did. The state defendants, who filed the appeal, never raised any question about the applicable legal standard in their briefs or at oral argument. As noted by Walsh Bradley in her concurrence, they confirmed at oral argument that they were not asking the court to overturn any prior decision. The precedent at issue was the Supreme Court's 1925 decision in State ex rel. Ekern v. Zimmerman. The parties argued their case in the trial court and appellate briefs under the language of Ekern and another case from 1953. The Supreme Court never asked the parties to re-brief the appeal to address whether the standard in Ekern should be rejected, what a new test might be, and how the 2020 ballot question fared against the new standard. Nevertheless, the majority threw out the Ekern test as unsupported by the text of the constitution and its original meaning. The constitution requires only that an amendment be “submitted” to the people without “any explicit obligations regarding form or substance,” Hagedorn wrote. “The text simply requires that the people must have the opportunity to ratify or reject a proposed amendment.” He pointed to early ballot questions from 1850s and 1860s that asked voters merely whether they were voting for or against amending the constitution, without any indication of the amendment’s contents at all. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Ekern had stated that a constitutional amendment question presented to voters “must reasonably, intelligently, and fairly comprise or have reference to every essential of the amendment” and that the “essential criterion” is “an intelligent and comprehensive submission to the people, so that the latter may be fully informed on the subject upon which they are required to exercise a franchise.” After tossing any standard from Ekern, the court adopted its new standard: a ballot question is invalid “only in the rare circumstance that the question is fundamentally counterfactual such that voters were not asked to approve the actual amendment.” Telling voters in the question that crime victims and those accused of crime would have rights protected “with equal force,” while the amendment actually provides that crime victims’ rights are protected “no less vigorous(ly)” than an accused’s was not “fundamentally counterfactual,” said the court. WJI had argued that “equal to” and “equal or greater than” were not equivalent. Failing to tell voters that the amendment deleted a sentence of the constitution ensuring that victims’ rights provisions in the constitution or state statutes would not limit any right of an accused, while diverting voters with a phrase indicating that federal constitutional rights were not impacted by the amendment, did not rise to the level of a fundamentally counterfactual question, said the court. “(T)he issue is not whether the amendment was explained, but whether it was ‘submitted’ to the people. Nothing in the constitution requires that all components be presented in the ballot question. The constitution leaves the level of detail required to the Legislature, which may impose more or less requirements on itself,” Hagedorn wrote. The ballot question need not under the constitution present any kind of description of the amendment’s substance to voters at all, he wrote. Grassl Bradley in her concurrence included significant disagreement with Dallet over constitutional interpretation. She also opined that voters are expected to review in advance and educate themselves about proposed constitutional amendments. “By analogy, a ballot for President of the United States does not describe the candidates or their platforms. Voters are trusted to inform themselves,” she wrote. Dallet and Karofsky would have retained the Ekern test, but found that the ballot question satisfied it. Walsh Bradley would have retained the Ekern test, and she agreed with WJI and the four individual plaintiffs that under Ekern the 2020 ballot question was invalid. She agreed that the provisions of the vicitms’ rights amendment “do, in fact, decrease the rights afforded to criminal defendants,” and remarked on the majority’s failure to recognize it. “From the ballot question only, voters would have no idea that the proposed amendment diminishes the rights of criminal defendants in addition to bolstering the rights of crime victims. In my view, the diminution of a defendant’s rights previously protected by law, constitutes an ‘essential’ element of the amendment,” she wrote. Walsh Bradley noted that the Ekern test furthered the aims of democracy: “Making sure that a ballot question includes ‘every essential’ of an amendment ensures that the public is informed and can ‘vote intelligently.’ This is critical to maintaining a democracy.” The majority’s test “risks giving the Legislature carte blanche in crafting ballot questions,” while Ekern provided a safeguard for the public against being misled, she wrote. “(R)ather than respecting the precedent of a nearly century-old unanimous opinion, the majority charts a new course not requested by either party. Instead of applying the test established in Ekern, the majority conjures its own test, never before stated, much less applied,” she wrote. “In addition to being created by the majority from whole cloth, this new test is unnecessary for the simple reason that we already have a test from Ekern.” Walsh Bradley recognized that the new test would be “news to the parties here, who both argued their positions in terms of the ‘every essential’ framework Ekern sets forth.” Updated
The 2020 crime victims’ amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution stands. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has rejected Wisconsin Justice Initiative’s challenge to the amendment. WJI challenged the amendment, known as "Marsy's Law," on the grounds that the question put to voters for approval on the April 2020 ballot failed to properly inform them of the amendment’s contents and, in fact, misled them about the elimination of state-law rights of those accused of crimes. In addition, WJI argued, more than one ballot question was needed because the amendment had multiple parts, WJI argued. The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed, through a majority decision and multiple concurrences. Justice Brian Hagedorn wrote on behalf of the court. Justice Ann Walsh Bradley dissented. (Details on the decision to follow in a separate blog post.) Attorney Dennis Grzezinski, representing the plaintiffs, responded to the decision. “The trial court, in a careful and well-reasoned decision, had found the ballot question to be inadequate to inform Wisconsin voters of the contents of the amendment, and we were hopeful that that decision would be affirmed by the Supreme Court,” he said. “WJI and the individual plaintiffs are disappointed by the Supreme Court’s decision.” WJI and four individual plaintiffs brought the case in December 2019 and won at the trial-court level. In November 2020, Dane County Circuit Court Judge Frank D. Remington declared that the April 2020 ballot question used to pass what is known as “Marsy’s Law” failed to fully and fairly inform the public of the essential components of the amendment, misstated the contents and impact of the amendment, and improperly encompassed more than one subject, in violation of constitutional requirements. Remington stayed his decision pending appeal, so the changes went into effect. Attorney General Josh Kaul appealed Remington’s decision to District III of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, located in Wausau. Kaul appealed on behalf of himself, the Wisconsin Elections Commission, its chair, and then-Secretary of State Douglas LaFollette. The case skipped from the Court of Appeals to the Wisconsin Supreme Court on certification by the District III panel of judges. In certifying the appeal, the court of appeals remarked that the case involved “significant questions of state constitutional law, the resolution of which will have a sweeping effect on our criminal justice institutions and those operating within them, including victims, defendants, prosecutors, defense attorneys, law enforcement officials, and our courts.” The Supreme Court heard oral argument on September 6, 2022, and issued its decision on May 16, 2023. “WJI agrees with Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's dissent,” said WJI executive director Margo Kirchner. “The Supreme Court has given the Legislature permission to frame and word referendum questions that leave out important information for voters and even mislead them. The Wisconsin Constitution is the foundation of our state’s laws; changes to it should not occur on the basis of insufficient and misleading ballot questions.” WJI is disappointed with the outcome, but also with how the majority reached it, said Kirchner. The court decided an issue that the parties never argued in the trial court or on appeal. The court threw out the legal standard from a century-old case, which the state defendants did not challenge, and created a new standard. The parties were not asked to re-brief the case under the new standard. During the three years the victims' rights amendment has been in effect, it has created significant challenges for criminal courts and their participants, said WJI president Craig Johnson, a criminal defense attorney and another plaintiff in the case. "Unfortunately, the Court's decision does not fully recognize the chaos and confusion that this amendment has ushered into the day-to-day workings of our criminal courts,” said Johnson. “The amendment is a story of arguably good intentions that produced confusing and unanticipated results.” “Further appeals can be expected, as various aspects of Marsy's Law are challenged in trial courts,” said Johnson. “I don't think we've heard the final verdict on Marsy's Law." In addition to WJI and Johnson, plaintiffs in the case included criminal defense attorney Jerome Buting, attorney Jacqueline Boynton, and former Wisconsin Sen. Fred Risser. ![]() Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The rule for this is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision. The "upshot" and "background" sections do not count as part of the 10 paragraphs because of their summary and very necessary nature. We've also removed citations from the opinion for ease of reading, but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. Italics indicate WJI insertions except for case names, which also are italicized. The case: Allen Gahl v. Aurora Health Care Inc. Majority: Justice Ann Walsh Bradley (13 pages), joined by Justices Rebecca F. Dallet, Brian Hagedorn, Jill J. Karofsky, Patience D. Roggensack, and Annette K. Ziegler Dissent: Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley (41 pages, plus a 25-page appendix) The upshot The petitioner, Allen Gahl, who holds power of attorney for his uncle, John Zingsheim, seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's issuance of an injunction. That injunction compelled Aurora Health Care, Inc., to administer a certain medical treatment to Zingsheim. The court of appeals determined that Gahl's claim must fail because he did not identify a source of law that (1) would give a patient or a patient's agent the right to force a health care provider to administer a treatment the health care provider concludes is below the standard of care, or (2) could compel Aurora to put an outside provider that would provide such care through its credentialing process. *** We conclude that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by issuing an injunction without referencing any basis demonstrating that Gahl had a reasonable probability of success on the merits of some type of legal claim. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. Background WJI has covered this topic before. First, when the Court of Appeals decision came down, and again in advance of the SCOW arguments. Gahl holds health care power of attorney for his uncle, Zingsheim. At the time this case was filed, on October 7, 2021, Zingsheim was a patient in Aurora's care after testing positive for COVID-19. Zingsheim eventually recovered and was released. Through personal research, Gahl became aware of a drug called ivermectin, which had been used as a purported treatment for COVID-19. He received a prescription for ivermectin from Dr. Edward Hagen, a retired OB/GYN, who asserted that he "wrote the prescription based on a detailed discussion of Mr. Zingsheim's condition with Mr. Gahl," but never met with Zingsheim. Aurora declined to effectuate Dr. Hagen's prescription for several reasons. According to Aurora's Chief Medical Officer, ivermectin is "primarily used as an anti-parasitic in farm animals or administered to humans for treatment of certain parasites and scabies" and is not approved by the Food and Drug Administration as a treatment for COVID-19. The Chief Medical Officer further averred that a high dose of ivermectin, such as that prescribed by Dr. Hagen, "can be dangerous to humans and cause hypotension, ataxia, seizures, coma, and even death," and that accordingly "the use of ivermectin in the treatment of John Zingsheim's COVID-19 symptoms does not meet the standard of care for treatment." Gahl subsequently filed a complaint in the circuit court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, he sought an order requiring Aurora to administer ivermectin to Zingsheim as prescribed by Dr. Hagen. Aurora opposed the requested relief. *** Based on the supplemental information submitted, the circuit court (Waukesha County Circuit Judge Lloyd Carter) acted quickly, and later in the day on October 12, signed an order to show cause Gahl had drafted and submitted. The order compelled Aurora to "immediately enforce Dr. Hagen's order and prescription to administer ivermectin to their mutual patient, Mr. Zingsheim, and thereafter as further ordered by Mr. Gahl." There was no statutory basis or other legal foundation for the order set forth in its text. Almost immediately after the order issued, Aurora objected. Aurora referred to the circuit court's order as "extremely problematic." Specifically, it observed the following alleged shortcomings: I am not aware of any orders written by Dr. Hagen, but am aware of a prescription written by Dr. Hagen for ivermectin 66mg to be taken once daily. The prescription does not indicate from where the ivermectin is to be obtained or how the tablets are to be administered to a patient who is intubated and sedated. Finally, the Order provides that Aurora is to administer ivermectin "as further ordered by Mr. Gahl." Mr. Gahl is not a healthcare provider. ... The next day, on October 13, 2021, Aurora filed a petition for leave to appeal a nonfinal order with the court of appeals. Additionally on that date, the circuit court held another hearing. At this hearing, the discussion revolved largely around Zingsheim's medical condition and the advantages and disadvantages of ivermectin. After hearing from both sides, the circuit court maintained, but modified its previous order of the day before such that rather than ordering Aurora to administer the treatment, Gahl could identify a physician who could then be credentialed by Aurora. ... Accordingly, the circuit court indicated its intent to clarify its previous order, agreeing that Gahl "is to supply or identify a physician that Aurora can then review and pass through its credentialing process. And once credentialed, that physician . . . will have permission to enter upon the premises and administer the ivermection as ordered by Dr. Hagen[.]" *** In a published opinion, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court's order. It determined that "[Gahl] has failed to identify any source of Wisconsin law that gives a patient or a patient's agent the right to force a private health care provider to administer a particular treatment that the health care provider concludes is below the standard of care." ... The court of appeals further concluded that the circuit court "had no legal authority to compel Aurora to credential an outside provider to provide care that is below the standard of care." Gahl petitioned for this court's review. The guts A circuit court may issue a temporary injunction if four criteria are fulfilled: (1) the movant is likely to suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is not issued, (2) the movant has no other adequate remedy at law, (3) an injunction is necessary to preserve the status quo, and (4) the movant has a reasonable probability of success on the merits. ... We begin by observing the limited nature of our review and emphasize that this case is not about the efficacy of ivermectin as a treatment for COVID-19. Rather, it is about whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by issuing the subject temporary injunction. Gahl raises three arguments in this court in an attempt to demonstrate that the court of appeals erred and that in fact the circuit court had the authority to issue a temporary injunction. First, he contends that the power of attorney statute, Wis. Stat. § 155.30(1), provides authority to issue the subject injunction. Second, Gahl asserts that the circuit court has inherent authority to issue such an injunction. Finally, he advances that the circuit court may issue the injunction in question under a theory of implied contract between Zingsheim and Aurora. Aurora disputes each of these bases. We need not address in depth any of Gahl's arguments because we do not know on what basis the circuit court issued the injunction. The circuit court cited no law in either its written order or its oral ruling, as Gahl conceded at oral argument before this court. This in itself constitutes an erroneous exercise of discretion. *** A circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion in the context of a temporary injunction when it "fails to consider and make a record of the factors relevant to its determination." Further, whether the party seeking an injunction has a reasonable probability of success on the merits in part turns on whether the moving party has stated a claim entitling it to relief. Although the circuit court acknowledged the four factors that must be fulfilled in order for a temporary injunction to be granted, it did not engage in any analysis of those factors. We base our determination here on its lack of analysis of Gahl's reasonable probability of success on the merits. Indeed, from a review of the circuit court's order, we do not know upon what legal basis it premised its authority to issue the injunction in the first instance. In other words, we do not know what viable legal claim the circuit court thought Gahl had presented. Without identifying the legal basis it accepted, the circuit court cannot support the conclusion that Gahl has demonstrated a reasonable probability of success on the merits. ... In exercising its discretion, there are no "magic words" the circuit court must utter or any precise level of specificity that is required. But the record must make clear that the circuit court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach. The circuit court heard legal argument and at one point stated that is (sic) "has a significant respect for an individual's right to choose their treatment." However, such a stray reference does not equate to a legal analysis of the probability of success on the merits of Gahl's legal claim. The circuit court did not tie such "respect" to any legal analysis or indicate how it could serve as a basis for the declaratory and injunctive relief Gahl sought. We therefore conclude that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by issuing an injunction without referencing any basis demonstrating that Gahl had a reasonable probability of success on the merits of some type of legal claim. ![]() Dissent In this case, the circuit court used its equitable power to craft a narrow remedy, ensuring a non-state actor could not override the decision-making autonomy of a Wisconsin citizen to whom the non-state actor owed a duty of care. *** The circuit court properly exercised its discretion by considering the relevant facts and applying the correct legal standard, ultimately reaching a reasonable conclusion. ... Although the court's analysis could have been more meticulous, this court has never required the detailed explanation the majority now demands. *** If the majority applied the correct standard of review, it would be forced to uphold the circuit court's decision. As Judge Shelley A. Grogan, who was on the panel at the court of appeals, wrote in dissent, "it is clear the . . . decision was reasoned and based on the record and applicable law." *** In this case, the circuit court properly exercised its discretion. The majority seems to take issue with the circuit court's analysis regarding only one of the four prerequisites for injunctive relief: the reasonable probability of success. The majority, however, also states, "[the circuit court] did not engage in any analysis" of any requirement. Similarly, the court of appeals majority opinion, which the majority of this court affirms, seriously misunderstood the elements. A majority of this court leaves these errors uncorrected, and therefore they are likely to feature in future cases. Although the majority seems to affirm the decision on a narrow basis, it does not expressly – or even impliedly – signal the opinion below loses its precedential value. Consequently, the court of appeals will understand itself to be bound by that opinion. *** Contradicting its rejection of a magic words standard, the majority repeatedly faults the circuit court for not citing a specific source of law. ... Ironically, the majority does not cite any authority obligating the circuit court to provide a specific citation, wading into "the native land of the hypocrite." *** Although the circuit court did not recite case precedent or statutory law, it explicitly espoused a "significant respect for an individual's right to choose and choose their treatment" clearly grounded in both. In light of the petition for relief and the record as a whole, this statement should be sufficient. After all, magic words are not required. The majority nevertheless claims "such a stray reference" is insufficient. It cites nothing to support this conclusion. ... The majority errs in treating this politically controversial case differently than other cases involving similar decisions. ... Arguably, the majority must search the record for reasons to support the circuit court's decision. Altogether absent from the majority opinion is any attempt to read the record in a light favorable to the circuit court's discretionary decision. Alternatively, the majority could remand the case to the circuit court to better explain its decision. Outright reversal is a drastic remedy, not normally imposed unless the record is totally devoid of evidence supporting the circuit court's decision. On a final note, the majority fails to appreciate the circumstances the circuit court faced when it made its decision. Zingsheim had COVID-19, and Aurora placed Zingsheim on a ventilator. Death was a realistic possibility. Time was of the essence. As the circuit court recognized, the situation was "dire." The circuit court, which was not a medical professional, was presented with "polar opposite" information as to whether ivermectin was likely to improve Zingsheim's condition. Under such fast-paced, high-stakes circumstances, the majority commits an especially egregious error by demanding a "polished transcript" from the circuit court. The circuit court considered the relevant facts and applied the correct legal standard to reach a reasonable decision in light of the life-or-death circumstances presented. Like the majority of the court of appeals, a majority of this court fails to look for reasons to sustain the circuit court's discretionary decision as the law requires. Under our highly deferential standard of review, the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in entering an order granting temporary injunctive relief to a man near death. Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The rule for this is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision. The "upshot" and "background" sections do not count as part of the 10 paragraphs because of their summary and very necessary nature. We've also removed citations from the opinion for ease of reading, but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. Italics indicate WJI insertions except for case names, which also are italicized. The case: Citation Partners LLC v Wisconsin Department of Revenue Majority: Justice Rebecca F. Dallet (12 pages), joined by Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, Brian Hagedorn, and Jill J. Karofsky. Dissent: Justice Patience D. Roggensack (13 pages), joined by Chief Justice Annette K. Ziegler and Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley. ![]() The upshot Citation Partners, LLC owns an aircraft which it leases to third parties, the Lessees. As part of the total amount the Lessees pay to lease the aircraft, Citation Partners charges per-flight-hour rates for aircraft repairs and engine maintenance. Those rates correspond to the amount Citation Partners spends on aircraft repairs and engine maintenance. Citation Partners argues that this portion of the lease payment is tax exempt because it is a sale of aircraft parts or maintenance. We disagree. The per-flight-hour charges for aircraft repairs and engine maintenance are taxable because they are part of the total amount of consideration the Lessees pay to lease Citation Partners' aircraft. We therefore affirm the court of appeals' decision. Background Citation Partners owns an aircraft that it leases to the Lessees. The Lessees signed a contract called the Aircraft Dry Lease, defining the responsibilities they and Citation Partners have with regard to the lease of the aircraft. The Dry Lease requires the Lessees to notify Citation Partners if the aircraft needs repairs or maintenance. If so, Citation Partners is responsible for scheduling and paying for all repairs or maintenance. It does not perform any of the repairs or maintenance itself. In addition to the Dry Lease, the Lessees entered into a Side Agreement with Citation Partners that sets forth the financial terms for the lease of the aircraft. The Side Agreement includes costs-per-flight-hour that Citation Partners charges the Lessees for aircraft repairs and engine maintenance. Those charges are substantially similar to the amount Citation Partners spends when it purchases aircraft repairs and engine maintenance directly from vendors. In 2013, the Legislature passed Wisconsin Act 185, which expanded an existing sales tax exemption to include the sale of aircraft parts or maintenance. After the Act took effect, Citation Partners stopped collecting sales tax on the amounts it charged Lessees for aircraft repairs and engine maintenance. In 2017, the Wisconsin Department of Revenue notified Citation Partners that unpaid sales taxes were due on those amounts. Citation Partners appealed and won in Dodge County Circuit Court before Circuit Judge Martin J. De Vries, but the Court of Appeals reversed that decision, meaning Citation Partners was on the hook for the taxes again. The guts State statutes together state that the total amount of consideration paid for a lease – the "sales price" – is taxable, with no deduction for the lessor's costs. *** The sum of those (per-hour flight) costs – including for aircraft repair and engine maintenance – is thus "the total amount of consideration . . . for which [the aircraft is] . . . leased" and is therefore taxable. If there were any doubt remaining as to whether Citation Partners' costs for aircraft repairs and engine maintenance can be deducted from the sales price, § 77.51(15b)(a) confirms that the "total amount of consideration" must be calculated "without any deduction" for Citation Partners' costs. Citation Partners argues that the payments are not taxable because they are not consideration at all. That is because, in its view, Citation Partners simply hands the money the Lessees pay for repairs and maintenance over to the vendors that provide those services. But consideration is "any act of the plaintiff from which the defendant . . . derives a benefit or advantage." And Citation Partners clearly benefits from these payments by passing along to its Lessees the costs of maintaining its aircraft. For that reason, these payments are – by definition – consideration. Additionally, accepting Citation Partners' argument that it receives no consideration from the Lessees' payments for aircraft repairs and engine maintenance simply because that payment corresponds to anticipated repair costs would render part of (the statute) meaningless. After all, if Citation Partners is right, it is not clear what (the law) means when it says that the "sales price" – the "total amount of consideration" – is calculated "without any deduction" for Citation Partners' costs. Citation Partners claims that the costs-per-flight-hour that it receives for aircraft parts and engine maintenance are nevertheless tax exempt. It points to two statutory exemptions related to aircraft: Wis. Stat. § 77.54(5)(a)3., which exempts the sale of "parts used to modify or repair aircraft," and Wis. Stat. § 77.52(2)(a)10., which exempts the sale of "repair, service, . . . and maintenance of any aircraft or aircraft parts." Citation Partners argues that since the plain language of both exemptions covers the costs of aircraft repairs and engine maintenance, then "the reimbursement payments that Citation Partners receives from the Lessees are exempt from sales tax." We disagree because neither of these statutory exemptions applies to the payments Citation Partners receives from the Lessees. Simply put, Citation Partners does not sell its Lessees "parts used to modify or repair aircraft," or "repair, service, . . . and maintenance of any aircraft." It leases its aircraft to the Lessees. And as explained previously, the statutes already make clear that the total amount of consideration paid on an aircraft lease is taxable without any deduction for the Lessor's costs. When Citation Partners (or the Lessees for that matter) buy aircraft repairs or engine maintenance directly, those transactions are tax-exempt. But when Citation Partners passes those costs along to its customers as part of the total amount of consideration in a lease, that transaction is taxable. *** Citation Partners tries to circumvent the plain language of the statutes by arguing that it is the Lessees' agent when it purchases aircraft repairs and engine maintenance. And for that reason, the per-flight-hour reimbursements for aircraft repairs and engine maintenance are akin to the Lessees purchasing those repairs and maintenance directly. An agency relationship is a "fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control." ... Citation Partners relies on the lease documents as "provid[ing] the framework for the agency relationship." It points out that the Dry Lease makes the Lessees responsible for "inspect[ing] the Aircraft" and notifying Citation Partners if "any repair or maintenance should be completed." Additionally, the Dry Lease contains an indemnification provision under which the Lessees are "ultimately responsible for all obligations, expenses and disbursements asserted against Citation Partners arising out of the operation of the Aircraft." Rather than prove an agency relationship exists, the lease documents reveal the opposite. The Dry Lease states that Citation Partners – not the Lessees – "shall schedule and pay for all repairs and maintenance." And that decision is not "directed" by the Lessees just because they must notify Citation Partners of necessary maintenance upon inspection of the aircraft. Rather, the Lessees' inspection obligation is limited to confirming that the aircraft is flightworthy before using it. Likewise, under the Dry Lease, the Lessees have only limited authority to purchase repairs and maintenance up to $5,000, and are reimbursed by Citation Partners if they do so. Additionally, although the parties entered into a new Side Agreement in 2015 which states that the Lessees are "responsible for fixed and indirect operating expenses and charges attributable to the operation and maintenance of the Aircraft," including "[s]cheduled and unscheduled maintenance," nothing in that Agreement or the Dry Lease suggests that the Lessees control Citation Partners' aircraft-maintenance activities. *** Wisconsin imposes a five percent sales tax on the sale or lease of tangible personal property like Citation Partners' aircraft. The tax applies to the total "sales price" of the lease unless there is an applicable exemption. Two such exemptions exist for the sale of aircraft parts and maintenance, but neither apply to the Lessees' payments to Citation Partners for aircraft repairs and engine maintenance. Accordingly, we hold that the total amount of consideration the Lessees pay to lease Citation Partners' aircraft is taxable, and affirm the court of appeals' decision. ![]() Dissent The majority opinion never interprets §§ 77.52(2)(a)10. or 77.54(5)(a)3, (see Dallet's opinion above for her reasoning rejecting the application of these exemptions) which address aircraft repairs and aircraft parts. It skips over the plain meaning of those two statutes, and instead, it interprets Wis. Stat. §§ 77.51(15b)(a) and 77.52(1)(a), neither of which contains the word, "aircraft," nor does either statute mention aircraft parts or aircraft maintenance. ... The plain meaning of those statutes grants Citation Partners the sales tax exemption it seeks. Because the majority opinion chooses to follow the error-strewn path of the Tax Appeals Commission (TAC), which contravenes the clear statutory direction to exempt the sales price of aircraft parts and aircraft maintenance from state sales taxes, I respectfully dissent. *** Section 77.52(2)(a)10. is broadly stated. The statute applies to "any aircraft or aircraft parts." (Emphasis added.) There is no statutory limitation on the statute's use that refers to whether the "selling, licensing, performing or furnishing" of aircraft parts or services are set out in a written agreement or performed without a written agreement. There is no limitation on whether the person responsible for that financial obligation pays the vendor directly or pays another who has paid the vendor on that person's behalf. *** In this matter, we are concerned about how TAC's factual findings affected its decision not to apply Wis. Stat. §§ 77.52(2)(a)10. and 77.54(5)(a)3. to the transaction under review here. As explained below, I conclude that the TAC's material factual findings that underlie its legal conclusion are not supported by substantial evidence, and therefore, TAC's decision must be set aside. *** (U)nder the Side Agreement, the lessees are obligated to pay for repairs and maintenance of the aircraft. Therefore, Citation Partners is being reimbursed under the Side Agreement for obligations of the lessees that it paid on their behalves. In addition to its misreading of record exhibits, the TAC ignores the Stipulation of Facts that the parties jointly submitted. That stipulation in paragraph 3 states, "the Side Agreements and invoices to lessees expressly provided for dollar for dollar reimbursement by each of the lessees of the Aircraft of both engine maintenance cost and Aircraft maintenance cost." Notwithstanding that factual stipulation the TAC says, "That starting point, reimbursement, presupposes that each Lessee was obligated to pay for repair and maintenance such that the Lessor, in effect, paid the expenses on behalf of the Lessees. That is not what happens under these Agreements." However, reimbursement from the lessees for expenses that Citation Partners paid for the lessees is exactly what the parties represented in the Factual Stipulation that they provided to TAC, as well as under other record exhibits. Accordingly, TAC's material factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence, and they must be set aside based on documents in the record and the Stipulation of Facts that the parties provided to the TAC. TAC's legal conclusions are grounded in its erroneous factual findings. As with the majority opinion, the TAC does not interpret the statutes that are at issue here. Instead, it interprets Wis. Stat. § 77.51(15b)(a), which does not mention aircraft maintenance, aircraft parts or aircraft in any regard. Nevertheless, TAC concludes that "expenditures for those repairs and maintenance parts and services are not separately exempt when incorporated into the lease payments of a subsequent lease of the entire Aircraft." Rather, it is Wis. Stat. § 77.54(5)(a)3. that creates an "exemption" for the "sales price" of "[p]arts used to modify or repair aircraft," and Wis. Stat. § 77.52(2)(a)10. that sets sales of "repair, service, alteration, fitting, cleaning, painting, coating, towing, inspection and maintenance of any aircraft or aircraft parts" outside the scope of state sales taxes. Nothing in either statute changes those exemptions when an aircraft is leased. Stated otherwise, there is nothing in either statute that limits its use when obligations to pay for aircraft maintenance and parts are incurred pursuant to written documents rather than directly to the vendors. *** Rather, it is Wis. Stat. § 77.54(5)(a)3. that creates an "exemption" for the "sales price" of "[p]arts used to modify or repair aircraft," and Wis. Stat. § 77.52(2)(a)10. that sets sales of "repair, service, alteration, fitting, cleaning, painting, coating, towing, inspection and maintenance of any aircraft or aircraft parts" outside the scope of state sales taxes. Nothing in either statute changes those exemptions when an aircraft is leased. Stated otherwise, there is nothing in either statute that limits its use when obligations to pay for aircraft maintenance and parts are incurred pursuant to written documents rather than directly to the vendors. ![]() By Gretchen Schuldt A case involving the odor of marijuana that could have a significant impact on when police can search people and their vehicles will be heard this month by the state Supreme Court. At issue is whether the smell alone is a legitimate basis for a police search when the smells of illegal cannabis and legal CBD are indistinguishable. Such odor-based searches are fine as long as the smell can be linked to a person, the state argued in its brief seeking to overturn a Court of Appeals decision that found otherwise. Besides, "unmistakable" does not necessarily mean "can't be mistaken," the state said. But lawyers for Quaheem O. Moore contend that those smell-based searches are not fine. "A well-established probable cause standard, even as it relates to the odor of THC, should not be lowered," they wrote in a brief. Moore is represented by Joshua Hargrove, Tracey A. Wood, and Teuta Jenozi. The case is scheduled for argument April 19. Moore's trip to the Supreme Court started with a traffic stop. Moore was driving a rented car he borrowed from his brother. The officers said they could smell raw marijuana emanating from the car, but acknowledged after Moore got out of the car that they could not smell it on him personally. The officers also said they had seen Moore throw a liquid from the car while he was driving, which he denied. The liquid later was determined not to be alcohol and neither Moore nor the car smelled of booze. Moore told officers that a vape pipe he was carrying, discovered during a pat-down for weapons, was for CBD, which is legal in Wisconsin. The officers told him they were going to search him more thoroughly based on the raw marijuana smell. They found cocaine and fentanyl in two baggies in a hidden pocket behind the zipper of Moore's pants. He was charged with intent to deliver drugs and possession with intent to deliver cocaine, both as a repeater. His lawyer successfully sought to suppress the evidence in circuit court and the Court of Appeals upheld that decision. The officers did not, given the totality of the circumstances, including the odor, have probable cause to search Moore, the court said. A 1999 SCOW ruling in State v. Secrist is key to Moore's case. The court, in upholding a search, said that "the odor of a controlled substance provides probable cause to arrest when the odor is unmistakable and may be linked to a specific person or persons because of the circumstances in which the odor is discovered or because other evidence links the odor to the person or persons." At the time, all cannabis products were illegal. Some are legal now, however. In the Moore case, Assistant Attorney General Jacob J. Wittwer argued in a brief, the appeals court's interpretation of Secrist is unreasonable because it "establishes a heightened standard of proof for search and arrest based on the odor of marijuana that is significantly more demanding than probable cause." In addition, he said, "the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the word 'unmistakable' is inconsistent with a commonly-accepted meaning of the term that is in full agreement with the Secrist decision." While some dictionaries define "unmistakable" as meaning something that cannot be mistaken for something else, others are not so restrictive, Wittwer wrote. Other dictionaries define it as "very distinctive," "very easy to recognize," and "not likely to be confused with something else." The Supreme Court should "reaffirm its holding in Secrist that the odor of marijuana may provide probable cause to arrest if it is unmistakable — that is, if it has marijuana’s very distinctive and recognizable smell such that it is unlikely to be something else — and is linked to the person or persons." The smell also was linked to Moore because he was driving the car and was its only occupant, Wittwer said. In contrast, Moore's attorneys argued that "By its definition, an unmistakable odor may not be mistaken for that of any other substance. ... The state cites to no authority for the assertion that the Court should use or has ever used a word while intending to give force to a tertiary or less common understanding of the word used." The record is "devoid" of evidence linking Moore to the smell, they wrote. The officers could not smell cannabis on Moore, and it wasn't his car. |
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