 Grassl Bradley By Gretchen Schuldt
Even the most inconsequential violation of a condition of community supervision makes a person ineligible for expungement of the crime from their record, the State Supreme Court decided. "Once an individual completes his term of probation, if it is undisputed that the individual violated at least one of his conditions of probation – as in this very case – circuit courts must deny expungement," Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley wrote for the five-member majority. She was joined by Justices Annette K. Ziegler, Patience D. Roggensack, Brian Hagedorn, and Jill J. Karofsky. The requirement for strict adherence applies both to conditions set by the court and those set by the Department of Corrections, Grassl Bradley said. Any violation makes a person ineligible for expungement. Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, joined by Justice Rebecca F. Dallet, dissented. "The majority opinion places expungement further out of reach of those defendants who would benefit most," Walsh Bradley wrote. "Although I agree with the majority that expungement requires satisfaction of conditions imposed by both the sentencing court and DOC, I part ways with the majority when it determines that the circuit court has no discretion to order expungement in the face of any rule violation, no matter how small." The court's decision stemmed from a case involving Jordan A. Lickes' request to expunge three of four convictions related to a sexual encounter he had with a 16-year-old girl in 2012, when he was 19. Lickes was charged with fourth-degree sexual assault, sexual intercourse with a child age 16 or older, disorderly conduct, and exposing his genitals or pubic area. The first three charges were misdemeanors; the fourth was a felony. He pleaded guilty to the sex with a child charge and no contest to the others and was sentenced to 90 days in jail with work-release privileges. He was also placed on probation, but violated some of the rules and was sanctioned. DOC, however, did not seek to revoke his supervision. His probation ended in 2016 and Lickes applied for expungement. His probation agent eventually certified that Lickes had successfully completed his supervision. The Supreme Court, agreeing with the state Department of Justice and Attorney General Josh Kaul, said he did not. Walsh Bradley, in her dissent, noted that DOC's standard rules of supervision require "that a person meet regularly with the probation agent and obtain approval from the agent prior to moving; changing employment; leaving the state of Wisconsin; purchasing, trading, selling, or operating a motor vehicle; borrowing money; or buying anything on credit." The rules also require those on supervision to adhere to conditions set by the court or their supervision agent, and that those conditions can change at any time. "Does the majority's determination mean that if, without agent approval, probationers from the border community of Marinette, Wisconsin cross to Menominee, Michigan to do grocery shopping, that they must be denied expungement? The majority apparently responds, 'Yes. Under the standard rules of probation, it is a violation.' " "How about the standard rule of buying nothing on credit?" Walsh Bradley said. "What happens if the probationer, without agent approval, pays for gas with a credit card? 'It's out of our hands,' responds the majority. The same apparently holds true if the probationer misses a single meeting with the probation agent." The statutory requirement that expungement candidates "satisfy" the conditions of their supervision leaves room for discretion by the judge and DOC, Walsh Bradley said. Yet "the majority proceeds to rigidly interpret 'satisfaction' in an all-or-nothing fashion," she wrote. "In the majority's view the circuit court has no discretion at all in deciding whether to grant or deny expungement. "One would expect a determination of such reach to be supported with more than the majority's cursory analysis," which was three paragraphs long, she said. "And it is an analysis that runs counter to the statutory language, has no basis in the case law the majority cites, and thwarts the purpose of the expungement statute."
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Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The rule for this is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision. The "upshot" and "background" sections do not count as part of the 10 paragraphs because of their summary and very necessary nature. We've also removed citations from the opinion for ease of reading, but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. Italics indicate WJI insertions.  Karofsky The case: Christus Lutheran Church of Appleton v. Wisconsin Department of Transportation Majority: Justice Jill J. Karofsky (24 pages), joined by Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, Brian Hagedorn, and Rebecca F. Dallet. Dissent: Justice Patience D. Roggensack (18 pages), joined by Justices Rebecca Grassl Bradley and Annette K. Ziegler. The upshot In this case, the Wisconsin Department of Transportation ("DOT") acquired a portion of land owned by Christus Lutheran Church of Appleton ("Christus") through eminent domain. As part of that process, DOT issued a jurisdictional offer to purchase. We are tasked with determining the validity of that offer. We uphold the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to DOT and conclude that the jurisdictional offer was valid. Background Christus is a nonprofit entity that owns and operates a church in Greenville that abuts State Trunk Highway 15. As part of a major project to improve and reconstruct a portion of the highway, DOT sought to acquire 5.87 acres of Christus' property and obtain a temporary limited easement of 0.198 acres. DOT stated that the estimated fair market value of the property to be acquired was $133,400, based on a third-party appraisal by Single Source, Inc. DOT provided Christus with an offer in that amount. DOT's letter also included an itemized table that listed the allocations contained in the appraisal. The letter further informed Christus that if it was not satisfied with the appraisal's valuation of the property to be condemned, Christus was "eligible to obtain an additional appraisal from a qualified appraiser of [its] choice" at DOT's expense within 60 days, by December 5, 2016. DOT called Christus' representative to encourage the church to obtain a second appraisal, explaining that "this was a complex acquisition and even if the two appraisals were close in value, it would give [Christus] assurance that nothing had been missed." By the time of the second-appraisal deadline, Christus had not engaged in negotiations, accepted DOT's initial offer, or obtained a second appraisal at DOT's expense....Christus' attorney informed DOT that the church council would not agree to a voluntary sale. (WisDOT conducted an internal review of the appraisal). DOT focused on three areas that the initial appraiser considered, but ultimately did not compensate, and "items the original appraisal did not fully address," including: (1) severance damages related to the building's increased proximity to the right of way; (2) the cost to increase the parking lot to replace the loss of 26 parking spaces; and (3) the cost of "moving the retention pond." By letter dated March 24, 2017, DOT rescinded its initial offer and provided a "final offer" in the amount of $403,200. Christus commenced an action alleging that DOT violated the statutory requirement that a jurisdictional offer be "based" "upon" the appraisal of the property...The circuit court granted summary judgment to DOT....The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, reasoning that "the jurisdictional offer in this case was not sufficiently based on the appraisal" as required by (state law) because it included a new line item for severance damages, which the initial appraisal did not contain. The guts A right-to-take action, which Christus filed, is used "to contest the right of the condemnor to condemn the property described in the jurisdictional offer, for any reason other than that the amount of compensation offered is inadequate." Christus first asserts that DOT's jurisdictional offer was not "based" "upon" an appraisal, as required by (statute) because the jurisdictional offer contained several new line items, including severance damages, not found in the appraisal. Further, Christus claims that the appraisal failed to satisfy (state law's) "all property" requirement. Christus' arguments fail. To summarize, just because there is a monetary difference between the initial appraisal and the jurisdictional offer does not mean the jurisdictional offer is not "based" "upon" the appraisal under (state law). The initial appraisal discussed and considered severance damages, the loss of 26 parking spaces, and the loss of the current pond on the property, despite not allocating compensation for these items. A side-by-side comparison shows that no allocation decreased between the initial appraisal and jurisdictional offer. As the circuit court properly noted, most of the allocations "are relatively close in value," if not "actually identical in both offers." The significant changes between the initial appraisal and the jurisdictional offer, as a result of DOT's internal administrative revision process, included increased allocations for: (1) severance damages because of the proximity of the new right of way; (2) compensation for the cost to replace the 26 lost parking spaces; and (3) compensation to add a retention pond. Adding these new amounts to the initial appraisal valuation does not make the initial appraisal something other than a foundation for the jurisdictional offer. To the contrary, the fact that most of the allocations remained unchanged from the beginning to the end of the process demonstrates that the appraisal served as the foundation for the offer.... According to the court of appeals, because the jurisdictional offer included compensation for severance damages not found in the initial appraisal, the appraisal failed to satisfy (state law). (The statute) defines "property" as "includ[ing] estates in lands, fixtures and personal property directly connected with lands." Damages are not included in (the) definition of "property" and we do not "read into the statute words the legislature did not see fit to write." Ultimately Christus failed to identify any portion of its property, as defined in chapter 32 (of the statutes), that the initial appraisal excluded, and therefore the offer satisfies (legal requirements). Finally, we must explicitly reject the new requirement that the court of appeals enunciated in its opinion: "if the DOT, based solely upon its independent review of an appraisal, believes additional statutory items of just compensation warrant inclusion in the jurisdictional offer, it must obtain a new appraisal that substantiates that belief and provides an opinion as to the value of those interests." Not only does this requirement find no support in the statutory text, it also raises a multitude of ethical concerns. The only way for condemnors like DOT to "obtain a new appraisal that substantiates [a particular] belief" would be for DOT either to improperly direct or to coerce its in-house appraisers or third-party appraisers into acting in accordance with DOT's instructions rather than making independent assessments. Yet, Wisconsin appraisers must comply with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice ("USPAP").... USPAP ethics rules outline an appraiser's ethical obligation to be independent, impartial, and objective and forbids appraisers from "agree[ing] to perform an assignment that includes the reporting of predetermined opinions and conclusions."...Therefore, any appraiser who provides an estimate or opinion based on DOT's directive would be in violation of her ethical code. We uphold the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to DOT and conclude that the jurisdictional offer was valid because it was "based" "upon" an initial appraisal of "all property proposed to be acquired."  Roggensack The dissent
Christus Lutheran contends that DOT did not make a jurisdictional offer sufficient to satisfy necessary statutory requirements and therefore, it lacks the right to condemn its property. I agree, for a number of reasons. First, DOT did not provide Christus Lutheran with an appraisal sufficient to comply with the directive of (state law). (Second,) Because a jurisdictional offer is required to include severance damages which occurred here and because the jurisdictional offer must be based on a full narrative appraisal, severance damages must be a component of that full narrative appraisal. The majority opinion concludes that totally missing severance damages is no problem because DOT is required to pay just compensation for "property," which is different from "damages." The majority opinion asserts that the court of appeals conflated 'property' and 'damages.'" It then relates that the definition of "property" found in (statutes) does not include the word, "damages." Before condemnation, Christus Lutheran's church building had a 147.7 foot side yard buffer from the Highway 15 right-of-way. After condemnation, the church building would be only 9 feet from Highway 15's right-of-way. Certainly, having trucks rumble-by only 9 feet from where church services are being conducted removed a significant sound buffer and safety barrier that the land DOT is taking had provided to religious service participants. The majority opinion also creates facts to excuse the Single Source appraisal's failure to include any value for severance damages, parking replacement or a retention pond and its gross undervaluation for landscaping and acreage taken. It does so in part by repeatedly misstating facts. For example, the majority opinion says: "Most of the allocations in the final offer were either identical or close to the initial appraisal valuation." "[T]he fact that most of the allocations remained unchanged from the beginning to the end of the process demonstrates that the appraisal served as the foundation for the offer." The record shows that all totaled, Single Source valued the property taken at $269,800 less than DOT's jurisdictional offer. I agree with the court of appeals that the jurisdictional offer was not based upon the appraisal that DOT provided. The jurisdictional offer was based upon DOT's own internal review. The majority opinion also repeats and repeats that Christus Lutheran was told it had the right to get its own appraisal for which DOT would pay. However, that Christus Lutheran did not obtain an appraisal has nothing to do with whether DOT complied with its statutory obligations. (DOT) ignored fundamental statutory obligations necessary to its jurisdiction to condemn Christus Lutheran's property and, therefore, DOT lacks jurisdiction. Jurisdictional errors cannot be overlooked.  Dallet Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The rule for this is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision. The "upshot" and "background" sections do not count as part of the 10 paragraphs because of their summary and very necessary nature. We've also removed citations from the opinion for ease of reading, but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. Italics indicate a WJI insertion.
The case: State v. Tavodess Matthews Majority: Justice Rebecca Dallet (16 pages) for a unanimous court. The Upshot Section 801.58(1) entitles a party in a civil case to substitute the assigned circuit court judge if, among other things, that party files a written substitution request before "the hearing of any preliminary contested matters." Matthews filed his substitution request after the circuit court granted his motion to adjourn a scheduled probable cause hearing under Wis. Stat. ch. 980. We hold that Matthews' substitution request was timely because his motion to adjourn is not a "preliminary contested matter" per that phrase's accepted legal meaning and the circuit court heard no other such matter before Matthews filed his request. Background This case arises from the early stages of proceedings to commit Matthews as a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. ch. 980....the circuit court must "hold a hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the person named in the petition is a sexually violent person...." Matthews' attorneys met with him for the first time on the morning of the probable cause hearing. That same morning, Matthews' attorneys told the State they intended to ask the circuit court to adjourn the hearing because they needed more time to prepare. As a result, the State told its sole witness not to appear. At the outset of the probable cause hearing, the circuit court acknowledged that the parties were "not going forward with the hearing." Matthews' counsel requested additional time to prepare, noting that Matthews had no objection to rescheduling the hearing outside of the 10-day window required under (state law). The State objected to the adjournment "for the record," but admitted that it was "in a somewhat difficult position" as it had let go of its witness for the day. Despite its "disappointment," the circuit court agreed to reschedule the hearing so long as Matthews waived his statutory right to a probable cause determination within 10 days of his scheduled release. Matthews did so, and the circuit court rescheduled the hearing... ¶The morning of the rescheduled hearing, Matthews' counsel filed a written request...to substitute the circuit court judge. (The law) provides that a party in a civil action, such as a ch. 980 commitment proceeding, may request to substitute the circuit court judge before "the hearing of any preliminary contested matters" but "not later than 60 days after the summons and complaint are filed." \ Matthews argued that his motion was timely because he filed it only 33 days after the State filed its ch. 980 petition and, since the circuit court had not actually commenced the probable cause hearing, it had not yet heard a "contested matter." The circuit court disagreed, finding Matthews' request untimely because the State's objection to Matthews' motion to adjourn rendered the matter "contested." The circuit court also noted that it had made the "substantive decision" to accept Matthews' time-limit waiver, so it was too late for Matthews to request a substitution. Upon review, Chief Judge Maxine A. White of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court agreed with the circuit court's determination, explaining that Matthews' time waiver constituted a preliminary contested matter. The court of appeals accepted Matthews' interlocutory appeal and affirmed the circuit court's ruling.... The guts Our focus here is specifically on the phrase "the hearing of any preliminary contested matters," which both parties recognize as the crux of the case.... First, that "preliminary contested matters" has a specific legal meaning, which the legislature explicitly adopted....And second, that there is no "hearing of" a preliminary contested matter until a court actually hears such a matter.... The phrase "preliminary contested matters" has a specific legal meaning referring to pretrial issues that go to the ultimate merits of the case. The roots of this meaning can be traced to the court's interpretation of a mid-nineteenth century change-of-venue statute. That statute provided that when a party requested a change of venue because of the presiding judge's "prejudice," the judge had no discretion to deny the request. Our survey of the case law revealed that, in the judicial substitution context, a preliminary contested matter is more than just a preliminary issue over which the parties disagree (or, literally, "contest"). Rather, the phrase carries a particular common law meaning referring to a substantive pretrial matter that relates to the "ultimate issues" of the case.... Wisconsin courts have interpreted "preliminary contested matters" consistent with its accepted legal meaning. Pretrial motions that directly implicate the merits of a case, such as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and a motion to compel discovery, are preliminary contested matters.... Conversely, this court, as well as the court of appeals, has held that procedural issues that have no direct effect on the merits of a case are not preliminary contested matters.... The bottom line is that whether a party has timely filed its judicial substitution request turns on what issues a circuit court has already heard. It is irrelevant whether a judge schedules to hear a preliminary contested matter or whether a party actually contests a preliminary issue. Accordingly, we hold that a party's substitution request is timely if it is made before a judge in fact hears a substantive issue that goes to the ultimate merits of the case. Turning to the facts in this case, we conclude that the circuit court heard no preliminary contested matter prior to Matthews' filing his judicial substitution request. By the time Matthews filed his request on August 29, the circuit court had addressed only his motion to adjourn the August 15 hearing....The circuit court's decision to grant the motion had no effect on the ultimate merits of whether Matthews is a subject for commitment.... We therefore reverse the court of appeals and remand the cause for further proceedings. Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The rule for this is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision. The "upshot" and "background" sections do not count as part of the 10 paragraphs because of their summary and very necessary nature. We've also removed citations from the opinion for ease of reading, but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. Italics indicate a WJI insertion. The case: Village of Slinger v. Polk Properties Majority: Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley (22 pages), joined by Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, Rebecca Dallet, Jill Karofsky, and Patience Roggensack Concurrence: Justice Annette Ziegler (10 pages) Justice Brian Hagedorn did not participate  Grassl Bradley The upshot Polk Properties, LLC and its sole member, Donald J. Thoma (collectively, "Polk"), seek review of the court of appeals decision, which affirmed the circuit court's order requiring Polk to pay forfeitures for zoning violations, damages for the Village of Slinger's lost property tax revenue, and attorney's fees. Whether these forfeitures, damages, and fees can be sustained depends upon whether Polk abandoned the legal nonconforming use of the property after its zoning classification was changed from agricultural to residential.... It is undisputed that the farmer who farmed the land before Polk acquired it continued to cut and remove vegetation on the property after Polk purchased it and after the rezoning. Because the agricultural use continued without cessation, Polk remained in compliance with the applicable zoning code provisions and Polk's use of the property constituted a lawful nonconforming use for which it cannot be penalized. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and vacate the circuit court's order imposing forfeitures, its monetary judgment for real estate taxes, its order authorizing special assessments, special charges, and fees to be levied against Polk, and its order enjoining Polk from using the property for agricultural purposes. We remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this decision. Background Polk's property comprises 82 acres of rural land located in the Village of Slinger, which the Melius family operated as a farm before Polk purchased the parcel in 2004. Polk worked with the Village of Slinger on his proposed plan to convert the farmland to a residential subdivision known as Pleasant Farm Estates, which would consist of three phases of development over the course of several years. In February 2007, the Village of Slinger approved Polk's planned residential subdivision development. Installation of the infrastructure for the development began in June 2007 and was completed in August 2008. Two of the lots in phase one of the project were sold and residential homes were constructed on those lots. Sales of additional lots stalled, however, due to the 2008 economic recession and the collapse of the real estate market. Throughout the entire development project, Ronald Melius continued to farm the property by cutting and removing vegetation from the land. This continuous farming formed the basis for the Village of Slinger's lawsuit against Polk, in which the Village of Slinger sought an injunction from the circuit court ordering Polk to stop the agricultural use of the property. Melius' continued farming of the property is the particular conduct that led the circuit court to conclude Polk violated the residential zoning ordinance as well as the circuit court's order, for which that court found Polk in contempt....Ultimately, the circuit court ordered Polk Properties, LLC to pay to the Village of Slinger $28,760, representing daily zoning violation forfeitures, as well as $48,953.26 in additional real estate taxes covering tax years 2009 to 2013. The circuit court additionally ordered Thoma to pay to the Village of Slinger $28,760, representing daily zoning violation forfeitures as well as $12,017 for additional real estate taxes covering tax years 2009 to 2013. Polk appealed the circuit court's orders and the court of appeals affirmed. Relying on an opinion from the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the court of appeals decided that Polk had abandoned its legal nonconforming use.... The guts Polk maintains that the cutting and removing of the vegetation on the property was not abandoned after purchase, but in fact occurred continuously as part of the maintenance of the property. The Village of Slinger agrees that the farming occurred continuously, but argues that specific actions Polk took to convert the property into a residential subdivision constituted abandonment. Specifically, the Village of Slinger pinpoints Polk's request for the zoning change, the Subdivision Development Agreement for Pleasant Farm Estates ("the Development Agreement"), which limited the property to residential use, and the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of Pleasant Farm Estates ("the Declaration") with residential restrictions executed and recorded by Polk. The court of appeals agreed that these specific acts by Polk constituted legal abandonment regardless of any farming still taking place on the property. Rather than relying on Wisconsin law, however, the court of appeals rested its determination on a single foreign case at odds with our own jurisprudence. Wisconsin law requires two elements for abandonment of a legal nonconforming use: (1) actual cessation of the nonconforming use and (2) an intent to abandon the nonconforming use. Although Polk's specific acts may signify an intent to abandon the nonconforming use, the undisputed fact that Polk continued farming on the property confirms there was no actual cessation of the nonconforming use.... For nearly a century, Wisconsin has required actual cessation of a legal nonconforming use together with an intent to stop it as prerequisites to abandonment. We have even rejected a "mere suspension" of the nonconforming use in considering whether the actual cessation element had been met. The law requires actual cessation in order to conclude that a property owner has abandoned the legal nonconforming use. The record in this case overwhelmingly demonstrates that Polk did not actually stop farming this property, despite the Village of Slinger's repeated and persistent attempts to end this use.... The Village of Slinger has not presented nor have we located any case suggesting that merely reducing the nonconforming use constitutes actual cessation.... We conclude that Polk did not abandon the lawful nonconforming use of the property because farming occurred continuously on the property before, during, and after the rezoning. Polk never ceased cutting and removing vegetation on the property. Because this nonconforming use continued without cessation, Polk's use of the property constituted a lawful nonconforming use for which it cannot be penalized. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and vacate the circuit court's order imposing forfeitures, its monetary judgment for real estate taxes, its order authorizing special assessments, special charges, and fees to be levied against Polk, and its order enjoining Polk from using the property for agricultural purposes. We remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.  Ziegler Concurrence
While I agree with the majority's conclusion that Polk did not abandon its nonconforming use of the property, I write separately because the majority could be read to be unnecessarily breathing life back into a doctrine that the legislature abrogated over 80 years ago. In 1931, we originally adopted the two-part test for abandonment, which required intent to abandon and actual cessation of use.... However, the legislature later abandoned this approach....the legislature changed the statutory language regarding discontinuance to its current form: "[i]f such nonconforming use is discontinued for a period of 12 months, any future use of the building and premises shall conform to the ordinance...." (T)he doctrine of voluntary abandonment is inapplicable to cases where either the statute or municipal ordinance contains a definite time limit. In the case at bar, both the statute and municipal ordinance contain the language "discontinued for a period of 12 months...." Applying the proper test here, it is clear that Polk never ceased agricultural use of the property for a 12-month period. As I described above, both the statute and the ordinance have a 12-month definite time period. Accordingly, to have lost the right to use the property for agricultural purposes, Polk must have ceased using the property for agricultural purposes for a period of 12 months. Polk never ceased its agricultural use for a period of 12 months. Indeed, Polk never ceased its agricultural use for a single day.... While I agree with the majority that Polk did not abandon its nonconforming use, I would make clear that the voluntary abandonment doctrine is inapplicable here. I would rely on the objective test that the legislature set forth in the statute – whether the property owner actually ceased use for the legislatively definite time limit. Because Polk never ceased its agricultural use of the property for even a day, let alone the 12-month time limit, I conclude that Polk did not abandon its nonconforming, agricultural use. As a result, I do not join the majority opinion and instead respectfully concur.... Roggensack Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The rule for this is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision. The "upshot" and "background" sections do not count as part of the 10 paragraphs because of their summary and very necessary nature. We've also removed citations from the opinion for ease of reading, but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. Italics indicate a WJI insertion. The case: Tavern League of Wisconsin v. Andrea Palm Majority: Justice Patience Roggensack (18 pages), joined by Justices Rebecca Grassl Bradley and Annette Ziegler Concurrence: Justice Brian Hagedorn (2 pages) Dissent: Justice Ann Walsh Bradley (15 pages), joined by Justices Rebecca Dallet and Jill Karofsky The upshot The Department of Health Services (DHS) Secretary-designee, Andrea Palm, issued Emergency Order 3 on October 6, 2020, as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Emergency Order 3 limited the size of indoor public gatherings either to 25 percent of a facility's permitted capacity or, if no general capacity limit was prescribed, to 10 people. We conclude that Emergency Order 3 meets the definition of a rule, as we recently explained in Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm. Therefore, Emergency Order 3 should have been promulgated according to rulemaking procedures. Because it was not, Emergency Order 3 was not validly enacted and was unenforceable. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. Background On October 6, 2020, as her second response to COVID-19 cases in Wisconsin, Palm issued Emergency Order 3. Emergency Order 3 limited the number of people who could be present at indoor, public gatherings.... Emergency Order 3 stated in part: 2. Public gatherings limited. a. Public gatherings are limited to no more than 25% of the total occupancy limits for the room or building, as established by the local municipality. b. For indoor spaces without an occupancy limit for the room or building that is established by the local municipality, such as a private residence, public gatherings are limited to no more than 10 people. The order listed entities who were exempt from its public gathering limits: childcare settings, schools and universities, health care and human services operations, Tribal nations, governmental and public infrastructure operations (including food distributors), places of religious worship, political rallies, and other gatherings protected by the First Amendment. Emergency Order 3 was enforceable by civil forfeiture, and it was to be effective until November 6, 2020. One week after DHS issued Emergency Order 3, the Tavern League of Wisconsin, Inc., the Sawyer County Tavern League, Inc., and the Flambeau Forest Inn, LLC (collectively the "Tavern League plaintiffs") initiated this lawsuit in Sawyer County circuit court. The Tavern League plaintiffs alleged that Emergency Order 3 was "a general order of general application . . . in other words, it is a rule." The Tavern League plaintiffs further alleged that DHS did not undertake proper rulemaking procedures under ch. 227 and as required by our decision in Palm.... The circuit court, the Honorable John M. Yackel originally presiding, granted the Tavern League plaintiffs' motion for an ex parte temporary injunction. Judge Yackel did not provide reasoning for his decision.... (Later) the circuit court, the Honorable James C. Babler now presiding, granted The Mix Up's motion to intervene but vacated Judge Yackel's ex parte order and denied The Mix Up's motion for temporary injunctive relief.... The court of appeals summarily reversed the circuit court.... The guts The Mix Up urges us to dismiss the review that we granted to DHS because the issues are now moot. The Mix Up argues that, because Emergency Order 3 expired on November 6, 2020, there is not a live controversy.... The Mix Up is correct that the issue in this case is moot; Emergency Order 3 expired on November 6, 2020. However, we conclude that this case satisfies several of our mootness exceptions set forth above, one of which we address below.... Emergency Order 3 impacts every person in Wisconsin, in one way or another, and it is open to all who come into Wisconsin during its operation. It charts a course that the Secretary-designee will repeat with future orders. Accordingly, it is important to confirm, once again, that Emergency Order 3 is beyond the power that the legislature delegated to the Secretary-designee. This satisfies the great public importance mootness exception. Accordingly, we decline to dismiss our review; instead, we turn to the merits.... (In Palm) We...explained that agency action that exhibits all of the following criteria meets the definition of a rule: "'(1) a regulation, standard, statement of policy or general order; (2) of general application; (3) having the effect of law; (4) issued by an agency; (5) to implement, interpret or make specific legislation enforced or administered by such agency.'" The court of appeals concluded that Emergency Order 3 was a rule because it was issued by DHS purportedly pursuant to its authority under Wis. Stat. § 252.02(3), it imposed statewide restrictions on public gatherings and it made subjective policy decisions regarding which entities were subject to its mandate and which entities were exempt. Because Emergency Order 3 was not promulgated as a rule the court of appeals concluded that it was invalid and unenforceable. We agree. On its face, Emergency Order 3 meets the definition of a rule and DHS was required to comply with rulemaking procedures in ch. 227. DHS contends that Emergency Order 3 was not a rule because it issued Emergency Order 3 under Wis. Stat. § 252.02(3)6 rather than the more general statutory subsections discussed at length in Palm, namely §§ 252.02(4) and (6)....Additionally, DHS argues that § 252.02(3) "confer[s] well-delineated statutory power" and therefore does not require rulemaking to enforce. This argument reads Palm too narrowly and misses Palm's overarching holding....(W)hether DHS issued Emergency Order 3 under a different statutory subsection than those Palm focused on is of no import if DHS's action meets the definition of a rule.... Emergency Order 3 is a general order generally applied, and therefore, it meets the facial definition of a rule...explained further in Palm.... Emergency Order 3 satisfied all five criteria that define a rule and, because it was not promulgated through rulemaking procedures, it was not valid or enforceable.  Hagedorn Concurrence
Some details have changed, but this case arises because Palm issued another order doing exactly what this court said she may not do: limit public gatherings by statewide order without promulgating a rule. Palm hopes to achieve a different outcome this time by seizing on some of the vulnerabilities in last term's decision. To be sure, the court's rationale in Palm was, in some respects, incomplete. My objections to the court's legal analysis were no secret. But creative efforts to engineer a different result from an indistinguishable set of facts would, in my view, be a departure from basic principles of judicial decision-making. The reach and nature of stare decisis——a Latin phrase that means "to stand by things decided"——is the subject of much debate.1 But if stare decisis is to have any import at all in our legal system, it surely must apply when a court has told a specific party that certain conduct is unlawful, and that party does the very same thing again under the same circumstances. That is what we have here. No further clarification of our opinion in Palm is needed; its application is plain. We held that Palm's statewide order limiting public gatherings (along with a number of other restrictions) meets the statutory definition of a rule, and must be promulgated as a rule to have legal effect. Respect for this court and its authority compels me to stand by that decision today. Dallet By Gretchen Schuldt
The Department of Corrections must turn over a database containing information about sex offenders that a defense lawyer contends could show the state has been overstating how likely sex offenders are to commit future sexual violence, the State Supreme Court ruled, 4-3, this week. Justice Rebecca Dallet's opinion for the majority recounts how far DOC officials went to block lawyers for Anthony Jendusa from getting the information. Among other things, the Department of Corrections' legal counsel twice advised its staff not to turn over a database containing information about state sex offenders, despite a subpoena and then a court order requiring the agency to do so, Dallet wrote. A DOC psychologist testified he failed for more than a year to open an email that could potentially undercut his evaluation methods. And a DOC research committee said Jendusa could have the information, but then never provided it. Dallet was joined in her opinion by Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, Brian Hagedorn, and Jill Karofsky. Justice Annette Ziegler dissented, joined by Justices Rebecca Grassl Bradley and Patience Rogensack. Ziegler said state statute prohibited Jendusa from having access to the database because "neither the State nor Jendusa claimed they would introduce the raw data at trial." Jendusa contends the database of Wisconsin offenders is key to demonstrating that Christopher Tyre, a DOC psychologist, used the wrong base from which to calculate the chances of repeated sexual violence. The lawyers contend that using a base of Wisconsin offenders, rather than Canadian and Danish offenders, in a risk assessment tool used by the state, could significantly reduce the reoffense likelihood scored by his client, Anthony James Jendusa. In fact, when Tyre finally gave a summary of the data in the email, the "preliminary (Wisconsin) base rate was roughly one-third of the base rate he relied on to predict Jendusa's recidivism risk," Dallet wrote. (Tyre testified in November 2018 that in addition to his regular DOC job, he had made about $120,000 from the state performing private evaluations for the state in other sex offender commitment cases, Jendusa's appellate lawyer, Assistant State Public Defender Dustin C. Haskell, said in a brief.) The risk assessments are critical in determining whether sex offenders should remain incarcerated under civil commitments after their prison terms end. A finding that the state has overstated the likelihood of reoffending could have a major impact on civil commitment proceedings for other sex offenders. Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The rule for this is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision. The "upshot" and "background" sections do not count as part of the 10 paragraphs because of their summary and very necessary nature. We've also removed citations from the opinion for ease of reading, but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. Majority: Justice Brian Hagedorn (19 pp.) Concurrence: Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley (10 pp.), joined by Justice Annette Ziegler Concurrence: Justice Rebecca Dallet (7 pp.), joined by Justices Ann Walsh Bradley and Jill Karofsky. The full opinion is here. Hagedorn The upshot While this court need not always follow federal constitutional interpretation in lockstep, we conclude that neither the Wisconsin Constitution nor the purposes underlying the Miranda warnings support a judicially-created rule treating all incarcerated individuals as "in custody." In the alternative, (Brian L) Halverson contends that his incriminating statements should be suppressed because he was "in custody" under the traditional Miranda custody test. We disagree and conclude that Halverson was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. Background The question in this case concerns the scope of "custody" for purposes of Miranda. The defendant, Brian L. Halverson, was an inmate in jail when he returned a call from an officer regarding an incident at Halverson's prior correctional institution. During the short call, the officer asked Halverson about an inmate's missing property, and Halverson admitted that he took and destroyed the property. No Miranda warnings were given. Halverson argues that his statements must be suppressed because he was in custody as an inmate in jail, and therefore he also was most assuredly "in custody" for purposes of Miranda. In a 1999 case, this court agreed. Relying on United States Supreme Court precedent, we held "that a person who is incarcerated is per se in custody for purposes of Miranda." In 2012, however, the United States Supreme Court clarified this is not what federal law requires. In Howes v. Fields, the Court concluded that the Constitution contains no such per se rule. The Court emphasized that "custody" for purposes of Miranda is a term of art; it is not consonant with the inability to leave or with incarceration generally. Whether a suspect was "in custody" depends on an inquiry of the totality of the circumstances, looking to the degree of restraint and coercive nature of the interrogation.... The circuit court relied on (an officer's) uncontested testimony as factual background, but it granted Halverson's motion to suppress. The circuit court concluded it was bound to apply Armstrong's per se rule that incarcerated individuals are in custody for Miranda purposes.... The State appealed and the court of appeals reversed. The court of appeals held that the per se rule adopted by this court in Armstrong was effectively overruled by the United States Supreme Court in Howes, and it declined to readopt the per se rule under the Wisconsin Constitution. It further concluded that Halverson was not in custody for purposes of Miranda under the totality of the circumstances. We granted Halverson's petition for review and agree with the court of appeals. The guts The issues in this case center on the nature of "custody" for purposes of determining whether Miranda warnings must be administered. Halverson contends he was in custody for two independent reasons. First, Halverson argues all incarcerated individuals should be deemed "in custody" for purposes of Miranda solely due to their incarceration. Although the United States Supreme Court rejected a per se rule to this effect, he asks us to adopt this approach under the Wisconsin Constitution. Second, if we decline that request (as we do), Halverson asserts the totality of the circumstances nonetheless demonstrates he was in custody for purposes of Miranda.... Miranda is a judicially instituted effort to protect against self-incrimination by creating an unrebuttable legal presumption of coercion whenever the warnings are not administered.... The Miranda custody analysis proceeds in two steps. First, courts "ascertain whether, in light of 'the objective circumstances of the interrogation,' a 'reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.'" This requires examining the totality of the circumstances, including relevant factors such as "the location of the questioning, its duration, statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning." The inability to leave and terminate the conversation, however, is not enough on its own to trigger the need for Miranda warnings....Instead, courts proceed to the second step in the custody analysis where they ask "whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda." (In Howe) the (U.S. Supreme) Court expressly rejected a categorical rule that questioning an inmate is custodial. Instead it reviewed and re-emphasized the two-step, totality-of-the-circumstances custody inquiry established in prior cases. Using that analysis, it reasoned that incarcerated individuals are not automatically in custody for purposes of Miranda. The Court offered three reasons to support its conclusion – all centering on whether the environment necessarily contains the same coercive pressures that animated the Court's holding in Miranda. First, questioning an incarcerated person does not involve the same kind of shock accompanying someone arrested in the first instance, and therefore the coercive pressures are substantially diminished. Second, incarcerated individuals have far less pressure to speak with the hope of securing release. They know that when the questioning is finished, they will remain incarcerated. Finally, incarcerated individuals know that their questioners "probably lack authority to affect the duration of [their] sentence." Therefore, the Court held that incarceration alone does not necessarily implicate the same anti-coercion interests that motivated the Court's prophylactic efforts in Miranda. In this case, the court of appeals correctly deduced that it was bound to follow the United States Supreme Court's decision in Howes rather than our earlier decision in Armstrong.... *** Halverson recognizes that Miranda warnings are a prophylactic tool fashioned to protect the privilege against self-incrimination, a right independently protected in both constitutions. Halverson therefore asks this court to create an expanded prophylactic to protect a person's rights under the Wisconsin Constitution.... We have generally interpreted Article I, Section 8 (of the Wisconsin Constitution) consistent with the protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment. Halverson provides no textual or historical basis to suggest any meaningful difference between the two provisions meriting an expanded judicially-created prophylactic rule. Nor do we see any basis in the Wisconsin Constitution for Halverson's request. Instead, Halverson focuses chiefly on the argument that incarceration inherently creates the kind of custodial circumstances meriting Miranda warnings. We agree, however, with the Supreme Court's determination in Howes that a per se rule does not serve the anti-coercion purposes of Miranda....Halverson's circumstances do not even satisfy the standard requirements for custody under Miranda's framework. Further, no facts in Halverson's case indicate coercion or anything close to it. And that is the whole point of requiring Miranda warnings in the first place.... This was why the United States Supreme Court rejected the per se rule in Howes, and Halverson offers no strong reasons to diverge from this rationale. Halverson has an alternative argument——namely, that he was "in custody" for purposes of Miranda under the prevailing two-step inquiry examining the totality of the circumstances.... For many of the same reasons, proceeding to the second step of the custody analysis, we conclude Halverson's environment did not "present[] the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda." He spoke to Officer (Matthew) Danielson over the phone in the jail's community room where he was alone, without physical restraints, and could sit or stand at will. The interview lasted less than five minutes, and during that time Officer Danielson kept his tone calm. These circumstances are nowhere close to the kind of coercive pressures of station-house questioning that sparked the Supreme Court's holding in Miranda. Grassl Bradley Concurrence I join the majority opinion in full. I write separately to address the petitioner's reliance on State v. Knapp. Because the Knapp court's interpretation of Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution lacks any mooring in text or history, this court should restore the original meaning of this constitutional provision.... The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the Wisconsin Constitution's analog to the Fifth Amendment – Article I, Section 8 – affords greater protections than the United States Constitution. In particular...(the) second Knapp court held that, "[w]here physical evidence is obtained as the direct result of an intentional Miranda violation, . . . [Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution] requires that the evidence must be suppressed...." The Knapp II court invented the sanction of suppressing evidence because the officer's "conduct at issue was particularly repugnant and require[d] deterrence." The Knapp II court also invoked the "preservation of judicial integrity" as a basis for contriving a different meaning for Article I, Section 8 than the United States Supreme Court gives the nearly identical Fifth Amendment.... Halverson's reliance on that case to request an expanded prophylactic to protect the privilege against self-incrimination indicates it is time for this court to revisit Knapp's holding....Restoring the proper method of interpreting Article I, Section 8 is imperative if this court takes seriously its oath to uphold the Wisconsin Constitution. The question for this court is not whether the Wisconsin Constitution should afford greater protections, but whether it "actually affords greater protection[s]...." "Because Article I, Section 8 does not require suppression of evidence obtained as the result of voluntary statements made by a criminal suspect from whom the reading of Miranda rights was withheld, only a constitutional amendment could create this remedy. The court in Knapp II acted beyond its authority in devising it. Its holding should be overturned. " – Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley Hagedorn By Gretchen Schuldt Did the state misrepresent data it used to argue that convicted felons should never be allowed to own guns? State Supreme Court Justice Brian Hagedorn said yes, and a WJI analysis suggests the state's presentation was misleading, at best. It is unclear, though, that having more accurate data would have changed the court's ruling in State v. Roundtree upholding the gun possession ban law that courts had also previously upheld. Assistant State Attorney General Sarah Burgundy and Attorney General Josh Kaul contended in a brief that a Department of Corrections study showed that "Public-order offenders had a significant rate of recidivating with violent crimes. For example, based on data from prisoners released in 2011 for public order offenses, 21.4% recidivated with a violent offense..." WJI, based on the data contained in the report, determined that 6% of public-order offenders recidivated with violent crimes. Reached by email for comment, Burgundy simply referred WJI to the DOC study. Public-order offenses, the study said, included non-property, non-violent crimes such as fifth- or sixth-offense drunk driving, felony failure to pay child support, possession of a firearm by a felon, and felony bail jumping. The appellant in the gun case, Leevan Roundtree, was convicted in 2003 of felony failure to pay child support and was placed on probation, which he completed; in 2015, police found a gun under his mattress, and he was convicted of felon in possession of a gun and sentenced to 18 months in prison and 18 months of extended supervision. Roundtree argued unsuccessfully that the gun ban was unconstitutional when applied to non-violent offenders like him. DOC defined recidivism in its report as "Following an episode of incarceration with the Wisconsin DOC, to commit a criminal offense that results in a new conviction and sentence to Wisconsin DOC custody or supervision." Burgundy and Kaul, in their brief, also said the study's data showed that "the 21.4% of public-order offenders recidivating with a violent crime was higher than that of property offenders (16%) and drug offenders (17.9%)," they wrote. "And it was just seven percentage points lower than the rate of violent offenders (28.3%). WJI determined that 6.6% of property offenders, 5.5% of drug offenders, and 7.7% of violent offenders recidivated with violent crimes. The DOC study did not measure the released offenders who recidivated with violent crimes, as the brief suggested. It measured instead the share of recidivists who committed such crimes, as Hagedorn said in his dissent. The state's brief did not make clear that the percentages it cited so prominently represented a percentages of percentages.  Justice Ann Walsh Bradley cited the state's figures in the majority opinion upholding the gun possession ban.
"This data is surely sufficient to support a substantial relation between keeping firearms out of the hands of those convicted of nonviolent felonies and the public safety objective of preventing gun violence," Walsh Bradley wrote. Hagedorn, in dissent, disagreed. "That's simply not what the study says, and it is an egregious error in light of its almost singular prominence in the State's effort to prove the requisite connection," Hagedorn wrote in a dissent "It should be obvious, then, that this (21.4%) statistic offers no assistance in establishing the relationship between past crime and a person's risk to commit gun-related violent crime in the future, which is the core inquiry of the intermediate scrutiny analysis," he said.  Walsh Bradley Note: We are trying something new here, crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. (Left to themselves, some of our justices do go on so.) The rule for this is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision. The "upshot" and "background" sections do not count as part of the 10 paragraphs because of their summary and very necessary nature. We've also removed citations from the opinion for ease of reading, but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. In this case, we've omitted a concurrence by Justice Rebecca Dallet, joined by Justices Ann Walsh Bradley and Jill Karofsky, because it addresses a secondary issue. Majority: Ann Walsh Bradley, joined by Patience Roggensack, Annette Ziegler, Rebecca Dallet, and Jill Karofsky. (20 pages) The upshot The petitioner, Leevan Roundtree, seeks review of an unpublished per curiam decision of the court of appeals affirming his judgment of conviction and the denial of his motion for postconviction relief. He asserts that the felon-in-possession statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutional as applied to him. Specifically, Roundtree contends that Wisconsin's lifetime firearm ban for all felons is unconstitutional as applied to him because his conviction over ten years ago for failure to pay child support does not justify such a ban. He maintains that the conviction was for a nonviolent felony and that no public safety objective is served by preventing him from owning a firearm.... We determine that Roundtree's challenge to the felon-in-possession statute requires the application of an intermediate level of scrutiny. Under such an intermediate scrutiny analysis, we conclude that his challenge fails. The statute is constitutional as applied to Roundtree because it is substantially related to important governmental objectives, namely public safety and the prevention of gun violence..... The Background In 2003, Roundtree was convicted of multiple felony counts of failure to support a child for more than 120 days. As a consequence of these felony convictions, Roundtree was, and continues to be, permanently prohibited from possessing a firearm. Milwaukee police executed a search warrant at Roundtree's home on October 30, 2015. Under his mattress, officers located a revolver and ammunition. A record check of the recovered gun revealed that it had been stolen in Texas. Roundtree claimed that "he purchased the firearm from a kid on the street about a year ago, but that he did not know it was stolen." The State charged Roundtree with a single count of possession of a firearm by a felon contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2). He pleaded guilty and was subsequently sentenced to 18 months of initial confinement and 18 months of extended supervision. The guts
Roundtree's as-applied challenge is based on the contention that his conviction for failure to pay child support is a nonviolent felony and thus is insufficient to curtail his constitutional right to bear arms. He argues that "[d]isarming [him] does not in any way advance public safety, but deprives him of his right to keep and bear arms for self-defense." As this is an as-applied challenge, he must demonstrate that his constitutional rights specifically were violated, not that the statute is unconstitutional in all applications.... The United States Supreme Court has made clear that "[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited." The same is true of the right provided by our State Constitution. Indeed, the Second Amendment secures "the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home." In Heller, the Court struck down a regulation barring residential handgun possession as contrary to the Second Amendment. Id. In doing so, the Court observed "that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms." It was careful, however, to delineate the reach of its analysis: [N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. Roundtree was convicted of failure to support a child for over 120 days. In his view, this is different in kind from the crime at issue in Pocian, where the defendant was convicted of uttering a forgery as the underlying felony. Put frankly, he suggests that failing to pay child support is not as bad as "physically taking a victim's property." But failure to pay child support is every bit as serious as uttering a forgery if not more so. Those who fail to make support payments deprive the very people they should be protecting most, their own children, from receiving basic necessities. Roundtree chose to keep money for himself that rightly belonged to his children. And, to further add to the egregiousness of his offense, he committed this crime repeatedly by failing to support for at least 120 days. By all accounts this is a serious offense. Simply because his crime was not physically violent in nature, it does not follow that the felon-in-possession statute cannot be constitutionally applied to Roundtree. The Seventh Circuit determined as much in Kanter when it concluded that "the government has shown that prohibiting even nonviolent felons like Kanter from possessing firearms is substantially related to its interest in preventing gun violence." The legislature did not... create a hierarchy of felonies, and neither will this court. Even in the case of those convicted of nonviolent felonies, "someone with a felony conviction on his record is more likely than a non-felon to engage in illegal and violent gun use." Thus, even if a felon has not exhibited signs of physical violence, it is reasonable for the State to want to keep firearms out of the hands of those who have shown a willingness to not only break the law, but to commit a crime serious enough that the legislature has denominated it a felony, as Roundtree has here. Such assertions are echoed by data from the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC). For example, DOC data indicate that among recidivists who committed public order offenses, such as failure to pay child support, and were released from prison in 2011, 21.4 percent recidivated with a violent offense. As the State strikingly observes in its brief, "the 21.4 percent rate of public order offenders recidivating with a violent crime was higher than that of property offenders (16 percent) and drug offenders (17.9 percent). And it was just seven percentage points lower than the rate of violent offenders (28.3 percent)." This data is surely sufficient to support a substantial relation between keeping firearms out of the hands of those convicted of nonviolent felonies and the public safety objective of preventing gun violence." Further, the fact that Roundtree's conviction occurred over ten years ago does not affect the result. Roundtree asserts that he poses no danger to public safety and should be able to possess a firearm as a result. However, the record indicates that the gun Roundtree possessed was stolen and purchased off the street. Supporting street level gun commerce is hardly the benign action Roundtree would have us believe it is. The State Supreme Court will hold a public hearing at 9:30 a.m. Jan. 14 to hear comments about a rule proposed by the Wisconsin Institute for Law and Liberty that would allow the court to slam the door on public participation in the redistricting process. As many as 2,000 or more comments opposing the measure were submitted to the court. A summary of the proposal is here:  |
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The Wisconsin Justice Initiative Inc. does not endorse candidates for political office. The Wisconsin Justice Initiative Inc. is a 501(c)3 organization.
The Wisconsin Justice Initiative Inc. does not endorse candidates for political office. The Wisconsin Justice Initiative Inc. is a 501(c)3 organization.