​Attorney General Josh Kaul appealed the judgment on behalf of himself, the Wisconsin Elections Commission and its chair, and Secretary of State Douglas LaFollette. The appeal will be heard by the District III appeals court. The state is allowed to choose the appeals court district as long as it is not the district that includes the court that issued the original decision.
District III is located in Wausau and consists of judges Lisa K. Stark , Thomas M. Hruz, and Mark A. Seidl.

In the trial court, WJI and the individual plaintiffs argued that the ballot question failed to warn voters that they were striking the state constitution’s only reference to a defendant’s fair trial, eliminating a defendant’s right to exclude an alleged victim from the courtroom if necessary for a fair trial, and altering defendants’ rights set forth in other sections of the Wisconsin Constitution and state statutes.

Remington agreed, writing that the question at hand was “about the integrity of the process of amending the State Constitution by ballot. Voters deserve to know what they are voting on.” 
Plaintiffs also argued that the ballot question directly misled voters, telling them that the amendment would protect a victim’s and an accused’s rights “with equal force,” while the amendment’s text actually permitted a victim to receive greater protections “no less vigorous” than the accused receives. Again, Remington agreed.

Finally, plaintiffs argued that the amendment contained more than one subject, requiring multiple ballot questions. Remington agreed again, holding that under the Wisconsin Constitution two questions were required: one for expanding victims’ rights and one for narrowing rights of the accused.

Remington did not comment on the public policy of Marsy’s Law. Instead, he focused on process, stating that “Wisconsin voters deserve no less than to be asked the right question(s). Wisconsin voters cannot and should not be misled or deceived if the outcome of the ballot question is to have full force and effect of law.”

Marsy’s Law is the personal cause of billionaire and now convicted drug felon Henry Nicholas III. He and his organizations have advocated for passage of substantially similar amendments in at least 20 states. The national Marsy’s Law for All website states that after achieving successful constitutional amendments at the state level the organization aims to be “ultimately successful at the national level” as well.
​
Marsy’s Law for Wisconsin, LLC spent over $1.5 million from January 2017 through June 2019 lobbying the Legislature to approve the amendment and ballot question so the matter could be sent to voters.

By Margo Kirchner

In a decision with statewide impact, Dane County Circuit Judge Frank D. Remington on Tuesday struck down the “Marsy’s Law” constitutional amendment adopted by voters in April. 

Remington permanently enjoined the amendment, but ordered that it stay in effect pending appeal. His decision is here.

WJI, three individual voters, and Sen. Fred Risser brought the case, arguing that the April 2020 ballot question failed to fully and fairly inform the public of the essential components of the alleged victim’s rights amendment, misstated the contents and impact of the amendment, and improperly encompassed more than one subject.

“Plaintiffs are pleased by the court's decision,” said their attorney, Dennis Grzezinski.  “It protects Wisconsin voters' important right not to be misled by a ballot question when they vote on proposed amendments to the state constitution.”

The suit named as defendants the Wisconsin Elections Commission and its chair, Dean Knudson; Secretary of State Douglas LaFollette; and Attorney General Josh Kaul. Kaul’s office represent the defendants.

The plaintiffs argued that although Wisconsin Supreme Court case law gives the Legislature discretion in formulating a ballot question, that discretion is not limitless.

The Supreme Court has said that a constitutional ballot question must “reasonably, intelligently, and fairly comprise or have reference to every essential of the amendment” so the public “may be fully informed on the subject” on which it is voting. 

The plaintiffs argued that the April 2020 ballot question failed this test. They contended that the question failed to warn voters that the amendment struck the state constitution’s only reference to a “fair trial for the defendant,” eliminated a defendant’s right to exclude an alleged victim from the courtroom if necessary for a fair trial, and altered defendants’ rights set forth in other sections of the Wisconsin Constitution or state statutes. 

Remington agreed, finding that the “question presented to the voters was insufficient because it did not reference the effect on the existing constitutional rights of the accused.”

Remington stated: “If the amendments to Wisconsin’s Constitution had just given crime victims meaningful and enforceable constitutional rights equal to the rights of the accused, (as suggested in the ballot question), this case would easily have been resolved. But, in this court’s opinion, the amendments went further and reduced and in some ways eliminated existing State Constitutional rights. From a constitutional perspective, this is a problem. Reducing or eliminating existing constitutional rights required the informed approval and ratification by Wisconsin voters.”

Remington found that the ballot question failed to communicate to voters that the amendments would eliminate the rights of those accused of a crime of their right to a fair trial and affect other existing rights in the Wisconsin Constitution. “The question today is about the integrity of the process of amending the State Constitution by ballot. Voters deserve to know what they are voting on,” he wrote.

Plaintiffs also argued that the ballot question directly misled voters, telling them that the amendment would protect a victim’s and an accused’s rights “with equal force,” while the amendment’s text actually permitted a victim to receive greater protections “no less vigorous” than the accused receives.

Again, Remington agreed, stating that the question presented “did not accurately correspond to the language in the proposed amendments regarding the standard ‘no less vigorous.’”

“Clearly, if something is to be done no less vigorous it can be greater to that which is equal,” he said.

Finally, plaintiffs argued that the amendment contained more than one subject, requiring separate ballot questions. The Wisconsin Constitution mandates that “if more than one amendment be submitted, they shall be submitted in such manner that the people may vote for or against such amendments separately.”

Remington agreed again: “These amendments, taken as a whole, required two questions because the portion of the amendments that affected the rights of the accused did not sufficiently relate to the principal purpose behind the changes being driven by Marsy’s Law to create rights for crime victims.”

"This is a great victory for the citizens of Wisconsin and our criminal justice system,” said Craig Johnson, WJI president and an individual plaintiff in the case. “Since this referendum passed in April, confusion has reigned in the courts as prosecutors, judges and attorneys for the accused have tried to decipher the meaning of undefined terms and confusing procedural requirements. It has undermined protections for the accused and has not improved justice for victims.”

“Prior to this amendment's passage, we had a system that worked and provided meaningful protections for victims in this state. We don't need a 'one-size fits all' solution to a problem that doesn't exist imposed on us by a billionaire from out of state," Johnson added.

Remington made clear his decision was not about the merits of the victim's rights or defendant's rights as affected by the amendment. Instead, he focused on process, stating that “Wisconsin voters deserve no less than to be asked the right question(s). Wisconsin voters cannot and should not be misled or deceived if the outcome of the ballot question is to have full force and effect of law.”

"Nothing in this opinion should suggest that the provisions relating to the rights of the accused should or should not be deleted," he wrote. "Nothing in this opinion should suggest that the provisions relating to victims and victim rights should or should not be made part of the State Constitution. The sole purpose of this opinion is to hold that if the provisions relating to the rights of the accused are to be repealed from the existing State Constitution it was constitutionally required that the voters be asked that question directly.

"In the end, it is ultimately up to the voters to determine what changes are to be made to the State Constitution."

Marsy’s Law is the personal cause of billionaire and now convicted drug felon Henry Nicholas III. He and his organizations have advocated for passage of substantially similar amendments in at least 20 states. The national Marsy’s Law for All website states that after achieving successful constitutional amendments at the state level the organization aims to be “ultimately successful at the national level” as well.

Remington’s decision means that Marsy’s Law amendments have been invalidated in three states.  The supreme courts of Kentucky and Montana struck Marsy’s Law due to violations of rules for constitutional amendments, but Kentucky adopted the measure again Tuesday. A court in Pennsylvania held that the ballot question for voters there did not adequately set forth contents of the amendment and contained too many matters for one question. An en banc Pennsylvania appellate court heard arguments on the case on June 10.

Marsy’s Law for Wisconsin, LLC spent over $1.5 million from January 2017 through June 2019 lobbying the Legislature to approve the amendment and ballot question so the matter could be sent to voters. ​

By Margo Kirchner

A person’s Fourth Amendment rights are not completely extinguished upon conviction of a crime, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held recently in overruling two prior cases that suggested otherwise.

In particular, the court concluded that the Fourth Amendment protects a convicted person’s right to bodily privacy, though the right is significantly limited.

The case stems from a prison training exercise in which women were forced, among other things, to undergo strip searches and stand for several hours without water or bathroom breaks as part of a training session for prison guards.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

Circuit Judge Amy J. St. Eve wrote for the en banc (full) court in Henry v. Hulett. The decision reversed a lower district court’s dismissal of a class-action suit alleging Fourth Amendment violations and remanded the case for further proceedings. The lower court found that the women had no right to privacy after conviction.

In the lawsuit, Delores Henry and three other female plaintiffs alleged that strip searches conducted as cadet training violated their Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights. The women filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of more than 200 former and current female inmates at the medium-security Lincoln Correctional Center in Illinois. Wisconsin also is in the Seventh Circuit, so the appeals court’s ruling applies here as well as in Illinois.

The training exercise in 2011 simulated a “mass shakedown,” in which guards search prisoners’ living areas and perform strip searches to find contraband.

No emergency or safety concerns existed on the day the training took place, and the two prison housing units searched were randomly chosen.

A tactical team called “Orange Crush,” Lincoln correctional officers, and cadets from the Illinois Department of Corrections training academy conducted the mass shakedown. Orange Crush members were outfitted with full riot gear, including helmets, armored vests, military boots, shields, batons, and pepper spray.

In the early morning, Orange Crush members banged batons on walls and doors of prison cells, and correctional officers and cadets yelled at inmates to wake up and get in line. Officers and cadets lined up 200 women facing the wall, and cadets handcuffed them as practice. Some elderly women cried in pain after standing handcuffed for a long time.

Officers ordered the women to the prison gym while screaming obscenities at them and calling them sexually derogatory names. In the gym, correctional officers forced the women to stand facing the wall, shoulder to shoulder. Orange Crush members and correctional officers ordered cadets to perform strip searches on groups of four to 10 women at a time. The women in the gym remained standing, with no water or restroom breaks. Some stood for seven hours.

Although female cadets performed the strip searches in a bathroom and beauty shop adjacent to the gym, those spaces were open and visible, allowing male correctional officers and cadets to view the searches taking place.

During the searches, the incarcerated women were ordered to remove all clothing; lift their breasts and hair; turn around, bend over, and spread their buttocks and vaginas; and cough several times. Women stood naked for as long as 15 minutes.

By Margo Kirchner

​Oral argument on WJI’s challenge to the victims’ rights constitutional amendment known commonly as “Marsy’s Law” is set for 9 a.m. Thursday.

The hearing will be conducted virtually, and the public may watch on YouTube using this link: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC5SDXzrIBTLO0a0I8iz2P9w. 

Dane County Circuit Judge Frank D. Remington presides over the case. WJI and four individuals allege that the April 2020 ballot question asking voters to approve the amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution was invalid.

Attorney Dennis Grzezinski will represent WJI and the other plaintiffs at the hearing.

As reported previously, the plaintiffs contend that the ballot question failed to fully and fairly inform the public of the essential components of the amendment, misstated the contents and impact of the proposed amendment, and improperly encompassed more than one subject.

Although under Wisconsin Supreme Court cases the Legislature has discretion in formulating a ballot question, the question must nevertheless “reasonably, intelligently, and fairly comprise or have reference to every essential of the amendment” so the public “may be fully informed on the subject” on which they are voting.

The plaintiffs contend that, among other things, the amendment struck the state constitution’s only reference to a “fair trial for the defendant,” eliminated a defendant’s right to exclude an alleged victim from the courtroom if necessary for a fair trial, and altered defendants’ rights set forth in other sections of the Wisconsin Constitution or state statutes. Yet the ballot question failed to tell voters of such changes.

The plaintiffs argue that the ballot question told voters the amendment would protect a victim’s and an accused’s rights “with equal force,” but the amendment’s actual text permits giving a victim greater protection of rights than an accused receives.

Also, the plaintiffs say, the amendment contains more than one subject, requiring separate ballot questions. The Wisconsin Constitution mandates that “if more than one amendment be submitted, they shall be submitted in such manner that the people may vote for or against such amendments separately.” The plaintiffs charge that the amendment created a new category of victims, including roommates or live-in caregivers of deceased individuals, but the ballot question failed to reference that change.

The plaintiffs' brief in support of striking th eamendments is here; the state's brief in opposition is here; and the plaintiffs' reply is here. 

By Margo Kirchner

​Criminal law rarely provides justice in cases of police brutality and violence because convictions are so difficult to obtain even with video evidence, according to a Villanova University law school associate dean.

 “It’s hard to win cases against police officers, and because plaintiffs usually lose, police are not deterred from their bad behavior,” said Teressa Ravenell, who also is a professor at Villanova’s Charles Widger School of Law.

Ravenell made her comments during the American Constitution Society’s recent briefing call on police violence and systematic racism in the U.S. legal system. ACS held the call in response to the killing of George Floyd and waves of protest across the country.

Ravenell said that federal law allows individuals to sue when their civil rights are violated by government actors, but that law has not prevented police violence either.

The law, Section 1983, has become “another example of systematic failure,” she remarked. The statute is “not inherently flawed,” but the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute has caused it to fail, she said. Problematic interpretation of Section 1983 includes the judge-made doctrine of qualified immunity, Ravenell said.

The qualified immunity doctrine protects public officials from civil liability unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right about which a reasonable person would have known. The Supreme Court has written that the doctrine protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” and balances the need to hold public officials accountable when they act irresponsibly with the need to shield them from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably. 

In a 2018 dissent, however, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that the doctrine “tells officers that they can shoot first and think later, and it tells the public that palpably unreasonable conduct will go unpunished.”

The doctrine has recently shielded officers from liability for stealing $225,000 while executing a search warrant, shooting a 10-year-old boy in his backyard while pursuing a suspect, and slamming to the ground a woman who turned to walk away from an officer toward her daughter, rendering the woman unconscious.

Ravenell set forth five large hurdles plaintiffs face under current law, which in her view result in continued racist law enforcement.

First, the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment cases give police officers too much power to stop, investigate, and arrest Black people. Police may legally stop someone if an officer has reasonable suspicion to think that criminal activity is afoot, and that standard can be met when a person acts evasively in a high-crime area. Ravenell called “high-crime area” a “fancy way” of saying poor, Black neighborhoods. As a result, Blacks are more likely to be stopped by police. Further,  Blacks are pulled over for traffic violations more than any other group, she said.

Second, the Court’s Fourth Amendment cases give police officers too much license to use force. The court has allowed officers to use deadly force when they reasonably believe a person poses an immediate threat of harm to the officer or others, and too often officers view unarmed Black men as threats, Ravenell said. Ravenell proposed that the qualified immunity standard should at the least be transformed from considering what a reasonable or average officer would do to what a well-trained officer would do in the situation.

Third, Ravenell said, under current law plaintiffs face too many causation problems because they must establish which specific officers harmed them. For instance, a protester shot by a rubber bullet must show which officer fired the shot. But that is impossible if officers will not testify against each other, she remarked.

Fourth, the qualified immunity defense protects officers in too many situations when the law was not clearly established at the time the officers acted. “Many people are writing about this right now,” she said, adding that “we need to eliminate the qualified immunity defense.”

Fifth, even when plaintiffs succeed, verdicts against officers fail to alter conduct because officers do not pay the verdicts against them; taxpayers do.

Ravenell closed by noting that the failure to fire violent officers also played a role in creating the current crisis. The officer who killed George Floyd had 18 prior complaints against him, she noted. Ravenell compared the vastly greater money spent on monitoring parolees with that spent on monitoring police.

“We need to ensure that police departments have the incentive and the means to terminate the recidivist officers,” plus a database to track them so they are not hired by other communities, she said.

Another call participant, Taja-Nia Henderson, a professor at Rutgers Law School and dean of the Rutgers Graduate School, discussed the historical predicates for police abuses today.

Henderson described how policing in the United States has always been linked to property interests and the control of black and brown bodies.

By Margo Kirchner

​Trial courts must issue specific factual findings on why a person is a danger to self or others before extending an involuntary commitment, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently held.

Moreover, said the court, general concerns regarding a person’s mental state, inability to maintain employment, and inability to care for oneself are not sufficient for a finding of dangerousness. Justice Ann Walsh Bradley authored the court’s opinion in Langlade County v. D.J.W.

Chief Justice Patience Drake Roggensack dissented, saying she would have recommitted D.J.W. on grounds that Langlade County never even raised in Circuit Court or on appeal. Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley also dissented, on different grounds.

In January 2017, a circuit court in Langlade County found D.J.W. mentally ill, dangerous, and in need of treatment. The court committed D.J.W. to custody for six months and ordered involuntary treatment and medication. In June 2017, Langlade County petitioned to recommit D.J.W. for a year.

The Circuit Court appointed Dr. John Coates to examine D.J.W. in connection with possible recommitment. Though Coates wrote a report following the examination, at the July 2017 recommitment hearing the County presented only Coates’ oral testimony. The report was not admitted as evidence.

Coates testified at the hearing that D.J.W. had schizophrenia, a history of hallucinations over three years, and an illogical thought process with “grandiose illusions.” Coates said D.J.W. reported seeing the devil and hearing voices in the months prior to the hearing and that D.J.W.’s illness was treatable with psychotropic medication.

When asked whether D.J.W. was a danger to himself or others, Coates opined that if D.J.W. were to end treatment he would likely exacerbate his illness and experience hallucinations. But, said Coates, “the greater risk is just his inability to properly care for himself and to properly socialize if he goes untreated.”

Coates noted that D.J.W. had been living with his parents, quit his job because he thought he was the Messiah, and obtained disability benefits. To the doctor, these facts suggested that D.J.W. could not independently care for himself and would be homeless if his parents did not provide shelter. Coates thought D.J.W.’s judgment was still impaired.

Coates testified that he did not know if D.J.W. was suicidal or homicidal. But, he said, acutely psychotic individuals’ actions are unpredictable and for D.J.W. suicidal and homicidal ideations were possible.

Coates reiterated that the “major danger” to D.J.W. was that if he stopped medications he would be delusional and hallucinating and unable to interact appropriately with others. Coates continued: “So the major danger is to himself. I don’t think he’s necessarily a violent man that’s going to go out and harm others.”
​
On cross-examination, when pressed about how D.J.W. quitting his job showed dangerousness, Coates responded that D.J.W. lost his employment and could not provide for his basic needs, had been found disabled, and would be homeless without his parents’ help.

By Margo Kirchner

​Incarcerated people cannot be forcibly medicated unless they are a danger to themselves or others – just being too incompetent to refuse the medication is not enough to justify its administration, says the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

The court recently held that a statute permitting administration of medication upon a finding of mere incompetence to refuse was unconstitutional.

Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler wrote for the court, joined by Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, Daniel Kelly, and Rebecca Dallet.

In 2005, C.S. was convicted of mayhem and sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment plus extended supervision. C.S. suffers from schizophrenia, and during his incarceration in 2012 Winnebago County petitioned to involuntarily commit and medicate him.

Involuntary commitment is a separate matter from involuntary medication. Those who are involuntarily committed, whether in prison or not, have a general right to refuse unwanted medication and treatment.

The Winnebago County Circuit Court committed C.S. and ordered involuntary medication after finding that C.S. was incompetent to refuse it himself.

In prior litigation C.S. unsuccessfully challenged his involuntary commitment. The recent case instead challenged the involuntary medication orders.

Those orders were based on findings that C.S. was incapable of understanding his condition and could not make an informed choice about medication. At no point in the proceedings did the court determine that C.S. was dangerous.

C.S. argued that the statute allowing medication of an incarcerated person was unconstitutional because, unlike the law governing those not in prison, it did not require the judge to find that the person is a danger to himself or others.

Winnebago County argued in response that it had an interest in the care of mentally ill and incompetent inmates, which justified the statute.

By Margo Kirchner
​
With courthouse closures and postponements of jury trials and other proceedings for weeks and months, at what point does justice delayed become justice denied?

Legal experts brought together telephonically by the American Constitution Society recently discussed the issue in a briefing titled “Pandemic at the Courthouse.”

The experts described effects of coronavirus social-distancing measures on the justice system to date, warned of dangers to constitutional rights, and noted a few bright spots that may lead to system improvement.

The experts’ comments follow court orders around the country bumping jury trials for weeks or months; the U.S. Supreme Court’s postponement of April and May oral arguments; and the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision to suspend federal Speedy Trial Act requirements until April 2021.

Elaine Poon, managing attorney of the Legal Aid Justice Center in Charlottesville, Virginia, noted that on the civil side, courts continue to work on several types of cases, especially cases brought by victims of domestic abuse.
​
Nevertheless, Poon worries that with court slowdowns comes a decrease in protection of educational requirements for children with disabilities, fewer reviews of the status of children in foster care and conditions in immigration detention centers, and lack of attorney access to detainees. She is seeing juveniles in detention held in cells for too many hours each day due to social-distancing policies. And she worries about hearings being moved online when not everyone owns computers or phones.