 The U.S. Supreme Court building on March 28, 2018. Photograph by Margo Kirchner. By Margo Kirchner
In another tone-deaf year-end report, Chief Justice John Roberts ignores his own court’s present-day participation in undermining democracy. Last year, Roberts decried the erosion of adherence to court orders while ignoring how his own court’s poor ethical standards create a lack of public trust in the judiciary. This year, he says Americans can look to the Declaration of Independence and U.S. Constitution with continued confidence. Roberts writes: “As we approach the semiquincentennial of our Nation’s birth, it is worth recalling the words of President Calvin Coolidge spoken a century ago on the occasion of America’s sesquicentennial: ‘Amid all the clash of conflicting interests, amid all the welter of partisan politics, every American can turn for solace and consolation to the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States with the assurance and confidence that those two great charters of freedom and justice remain firm and unshaken.’” “True then; true now,” Roberts remarked immediately after the quotation. That the Supreme Court under his guidance recently held that Americans can be stopped for their brown skin (now referred to as “Kavanaugh stops”) and that the president of the United States has immunity from assassinating political rivals seems lost on Roberts, or intentionally forgotten. The same can be said for how his court has used its emergency docket to undermine lower judges’ authority and shift power to the executive branch, upsetting long-existing checks and balances on presidential power. In the annual report, dated Dec. 31, 2025, Roberts puts on his historian hat (his 50-year-old Harvard bachelor’s degree was in history) to discuss Thomas Paine’s Common Sense and to school readers on the Declaration of Independence. He is a professor rather than someone who takes to heart the power he and his fellow justices wield in protecting constitutional rights. Roberts notes the Declaration’s preamble statement of self-evident truths, including that "'all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.'” But he then focuses on how these are mere hopes: “The Declaration of Independence was then, and remains today, a statement of national aspirations, not a codification of enforceable legal obligations.” Roberts correctly discusses how the Constitution, not the Declaration, is the charter for the government, and that the 1787 Constitution “fell short of honoring the abstract principles set forth in the 1776 Declaration—most notably, in regard to the Declaration’s promise of liberty and equality.” He then discusses “national accomplishments” over the years—such as the Thirteenth through Fifteenth Amendments, the Nineteenth Amendment, the overruling of Plessy v. Fergusen in Brown v. Board of Education, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964—as part of an “ongoing project to make the ideals set out in the Declaration real for all Americans.” But his conclusion that the Declaration of Independence and Constitution today "'remain firm and unshaken'” is questionable. Using the first person, Roberts includes himself in saying that federal judges must continue to decide cases “according to our oath, doing equal right to the poor and to the rich, and performing all of our duties faithfully and impartially under the Constitution and laws of the United States,” as if it is a forgone conclusion that recent Supreme Court cases have been faithful to the Constitution and treated the rich and poor with equal rights. Two bright spots: First, Roberts tells readers about the 1805 impeachment trial and acquittal of Justice Samuel Chase, pointing out that disagreement with a judge’s decisions is not a valid basis for removal from office. Second, in the best part of Roberts’ message, he thanks all judges, court staff, and judicial branch personnel “for their commitment to public service and their dedication to upholding the rule of law.” Whether intentional or not, he left “justices” out of the sentiment. Lower court judges and staff, indeed, have been carrying the torch of upholding the rule of law. The appendix to the report contains a brief summary of federal court statistics. Supreme Court filings during the October 2024 through June 2025 term were down 9% from the prior term, while the number of cases with oral arguments and signed opinions remained about the same. For the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 2025, filings in the courts of appeals were up 5%; civil case filings in the district courts were up slightly, 4%, while the number of criminal defendants charged rose 13%; and bankruptcy court filings increased 11%. Of note, federal appeals by pro se litigants (those who represent themselves) made up half of all newly filed appeals; appeals by those in prison accounted for 20% of all newly filed appeals. In the district courts, civil rights filings increased by 15% and made up 15% of all cases filed, while petitions by those in prison accounted for 14% of new cases. Criminal filings for alleged immigration offenses increased 27% and constituted 41% of all criminal case filings (measured by number of defendants). Nonbusiness (mostly consumer) bankruptcy petitions accounted for 96% of the more than 550,000 new bankruptcy case filings nationwide.
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 Milwaukee's federal courthouse on July 18, 2024. Photograph by Margo Kirchner. By Alexandria Staubach
Milwaukee made national headlines when Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Hannah Dugan was convicted earlier this month for obstruction of a federal proceeding. Dugan was convicted in federal court of obstructing the administrative process of removal by the Department of Homeland Security by her actions at the Milwaukee County Courthouse on April 18, 2025. The jury found her not guilty of a misdemeanor charge of concealing an individual from arrest. Local media provided a play-by-play account of trial during the week of Dec. 15. The jury rendered its verdict on Dec. 18. Dugan’s attorneys have moved for additional time to argue that U.S. District Court Judge Lynn Adelman should set aside the jury’s guilty verdict—the first step in likely a lengthy post-verdict and appeal process. The case could land in front of the U.S. Supreme Court, especially regarding Dugan’s arguments of judicial immunity from prosecution. Adelman rejected those arguments in August 2025. If the defense’s motion for acquittal, which was filed at the close of the prosecution’s case, is any indication, Dugan is likely to mount a broad appeal, but jury instructions are an essential component of every case and, given jurors’ questions during deliberations, they could play a role in what arguments progress. Jury questions could indicate misunderstandings about the instructions. The split verdict—guilty on the felony but not guilty on the misdemeanor—and the questions the jury asked during deliberations beg the question: What happened? After evidence is presented at trial, the judge gives the jury a variety of instructions on how to proceed, including how to conduct deliberations, how to weigh the credibility of an expert, and, very importantly, the elements of the offenses that the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt for a guilty verdict. It is unusual for judges to issue written opinions about jury instructions, but in this case Adelman did, giving a small window into arguments that Dugan may make going forward. According to Adelman’s written opinion, the jury was largely given pattern instructions as “requested by the government and unopposed by the defense” regarding general matters. Pattern jury instructions are created by committees of judges and lawyers in each jurisdiction and are designed to standardize and simplify complex legal rules for jurors, but they do not exist for every crime in every case. Federal trial courts in Wisconsin are part of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals jurisdiction and usually start with the Seventh Circuit’s pattern rules. According to Adelman’s opinion, the Seventh Circuit pattern rules do not include standard instructions setting forth the elements of either of the charges against Dugan. Generally, when a pattern instruction does not exist, or a compelling reason exists to deviate from it, each side is permitted to propose an instruction. The judge then looks at the parties’ proposals, relevant law from cases that have dealt with the relevant statute, and pattern instructions in other circuits to craft an instruction. Parties can then suggest changes and object on the record if they disagree with what the judge reads to the jury. Adelman’s opinion indicates that the parties differed over the jury instructions regarding the elements of the two crimes charged in Dugan’s case. Adelman rejected some proffered instructions from each side. As to the misdemeanor charge of concealing an individual from arrest, Adelman instructed the jury that the government had to prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
Adelman wrote in his opinion that the lesser concealment charge for which Dugan was acquitted had no pattern instruction but “cases from other circuits adopt the foregoing elements.” Adelman wrote that the government argued against use of the word “actually” in the third element, arguing that “the word suggests the defendant must have actually succeeded in concealing the individual.” Adelman said he rejected that argument because the “cases include the word ‘actually’ not to require success but to make clear ‘that (the law) does not proscribe all forms of aid to a fugitive’ and that the ‘actual harboring or concealment element requires some affirmative, physical action by the defendant.’” The defense meanwhile sought an instruction requiring “materiality” for this charge. Materiality is a legal doctrine that distinguishes minor errors from substantial issues, preventing things that are trivial from triggering major legal consequences. Adelman wrote that materiality was not an element and that such an instruction was “unnecessary” because the third element included the word “actually” and “addressed the defense concern about mere trifles.” Adelman told the jury that a “federal warrant” includes federal administrative arrest warrants. He added statements in the instructions that “(t)he actual harboring or concealing element requires some affirmative, physical action by the defendant to hide, secrete, or keep out of sight” and that “(m)ere failure to disclose the location of a fugitive is not concealing.” The last statement was made over the government’s opposition, as Adelman found it to be “a correct statement of law.” Adelman declined to include the government’s proposed instruction that included language about conviction “regardless of whether the action was successful in actually delaying the individual’s observation, discovery or arrest.” Adelman wrote that “while the facts of the cases cited by the government may give that implication, they did not directly support an instruction using these terms.” Adelman excluded proposed defense instructions that “amounted to a rehash” of Dugan’s immunity arguments. As to the felony charge of obstructing federal proceedings, Adelman instructed the jury that the government had to prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
Adelman told the jury that DHS is a department of the United States and Immigration and Customs Enforcement is an agency within DHS. He told the jury that "'pending proceeding' simply means any process taking place in the manner and form prescribed for conducting business by or before a department or government agency, including all steps and stages in such an action from its inception to its conclusion.” Adelman included a definition of “endeavored” as meaning acting “purposefully, with knowledge that an action would have the natural and probable effect of wrongfully obstructing the proceeding. An ‘endeavor’ need not be successful.” He told the jury that “corruptly” meant “acting with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing another, including making a false or misleading statement.” According to proposed instructions filed in November, Dugan wanted the judge to tell the jury that “an effort to arrest a person, or to execute an arrest warrant of any kind, is not a proceeding within the meaning of the crime charged.” Adelman wrote in his opinion on the jury instructions that Dugan’s proposal “defined ‘proceeding’ too narrowly.” Adelman again rejected the defense proposal to add a materiality requirement on this count under Seventh Circuit law and because the definition of ”endeavored” that he gave “got at that same concept.” Other instructions proposed by the defense were not supported by case law or were “again a rehash of defendant’s immunity argument,” Adelman wrote. Dugan had proposed a jury instruction requiring the jury to unanimously agree on which, if any, of her actions established that she endeavored to influence, obstruct, or impede a pending proceeding. Adelman explained in his opinion that the jury did not need to unanimously agree on the acts committed to execute the endeavor. During their six hours of deliberations, the jury asked two key questions focused on the elements of the offenses. The jury first asked whether Dugan needed to know the specific identity of the person ICE agents were seeking (Eduardo Flores-Ruiz) to be convicted of the concealment charge. Adelman responded that, yes, Dugan did need to know the identity of the person being sought. The jury then similarly asked whether Dugan needed to know the specific identity of Flores-Ruiz to obstruct a federal proceeding. According to the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Adelman responded: "To know of a pending proceeding, the defendant needed to have sufficient knowledge about the nature of the proceeding." The jury then found Dugan guilty on that count. One juror told the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel that if Dugan had had to know the specifics of the proceeding at issue, the jury would have found her “not guilty” on the obstruction count. Dugan, who is not up for reelection until 2028, has been suspended with pay since April. Since her conviction, Republicans in the state Legislature have called for her resignation, threatening impeachment if she fails to resign. A judge has not been impeached in Wisconsin since 1853. Dugan has until Jan. 30, 2026, to file additional post-verdict motions and argument. By Margo Kirchner
The administrative warrant held by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers for the arrest of Eduardo Flores-Ruiz at the Milwaukee County Courthouse on April 18, 2025, was simply a form signed by an ICE agent. ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Supervisor Anthony Nimtz testified on Monday during the trial of Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Hannah Dugan that he signed the Flores-Ruiz administrative warrant, known as an I-200, on April 17. Dugan is charged with interfering with ICE agents’ arrest of Flores-Ruiz at the county courthouse on April 18. The type of warrant ICE officers held is an issue in the case. Nimtz acknowledged during his testimony that ICE officers did not have a type of warrant that allowed them to enter nonpublic areas but instead had the I-200 signed by Nimtz. He added that Milwaukee County officers are directed to not let ICE make arrests in nonpublic portions of the county courthouse. He said that arrests in a courthouse avoid safety risks for ICE officers, as subjects have been screened for weapons when entering the building. According to Nimtz and the copy of the Flores-Ruiz warrant shown in court, an I-200 warrant commands an ICE officer to take the individual into custody for removal proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Nimtz testified that Flores-Ruiz met two characteristics of ICE policy for arrest: public safety issues and having reentered the country illegally after removal. Noncitizen Flores-Ruiz had previously been ordered to leave the country on Jan. 15, 2013. Nimtz acknowledged that whether a prior order of removal like Flores-Ruiz’s 2013 order is to be reinstated is also up to ICE officers. They can issue warrants of removal—or orders of deportation—using a form known as an I-205. On cross-examination by Dugan's attorney, Nicole Masnica, Nimtz admitted that ICE arrests could use arrest warrants issued by federal judges or administrative law judges, but in Flores-Ruiz’s case the warrant was one signed by him as an ICE supervisor. A field operations worksheet (FOW) about Flores-Ruiz signed by Nimtz on April 17 and shown to the jury on Monday included Flores-Ruiz’s address. Nimtz agreed that the type of warrant he issued could not be used to go into someone’s home. Nimtz acknowledged an error in the FOW paperwork, which directs notice to the police department where an ICE arrest will take place. The FOW for Flores-Ruiz noted district 2, which is on the southside of Milwaukee, rather than district 1 where the county courthouse is located or even district 3 where Ruiz lived. Nimtz said he did not notice the error at the time. Nor did he make sure he had an accurate understanding of the charges in Flores-Ruiz's Milwaukee County court case when he signed the FOW and I-200. Nimtz said that at the time he signed the documents he thought Flores-Ruiz had pending charges for strangulation or suffocation. Nimtz found out only later that the actual charges against Flores-Ruiz were misdemeanor battery charges. He acknowledged on cross-examination that safety protections for ICE officers regarding courthouse arrests would still exist if ICE officers waited to arrest a subject when the subject is leaving the building.  WJI policy analyst Alexandria Staubach speaks at a rally outside the Historic Federal Courthouse in Milwaukee on Dec. 15, 2025. Photograph by Jessica Schmidt. Wisconsin Justice Initiative policy analyst Alexandria Staubach spoke about the importance of protecting court proceedings at a Monday rally addressing the multiple consequences of Immigration and Customs Enforcement presence in Wisconsin courthouses. “When a place that is designed to protect you, protect your right to a fair and impartial trial, your right to protection, your right to dignity and equal treatment before the law, becomes a trap to ensnare people seeking justice, we are all less safe,” Staubach said. She added that victims, witnesses, and the accused don’t disappear but “just stay home.” The rally took place just prior to opening statements in Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Hannah Dugan’s federal trial on charges of obstructing a federal agency and concealing an individual to prevent arrest. Dugan is accused of assisting an immigrant, Eduardo Flores-Ruiz, evade ICE arrest by providing him access to a restricted hallway and directing federal agents away from her courtroom. Dozens of organizers and community members gathered outside the federal courthouse in Milwaukee, braving low digit temperatures to register their discontent with Dugan’s prosecution. Staubach noted in her comments the power of federal prosecutors, including recently appointed Interim U.S. Attorney Brad Schimel. “We’re going to say the quiet part out loud for Brad Schimel,” said Staubach, a former assistant district attorney in Colorado. “Prosecutions are discretionary.” Maxwell Love, the state political and campaign director for the Working Families Party, told WJI the coalition holding the rally was built “so that we could bring the case into the ‘court of public opinion.’” The group seeks “to make sure that the Milwaukee community could engage in a conversation about our values of fairness, due process, and democracy since we couldn’t be present in the courtroom,” Love said. The group highlighted the detrimental impact ICE presence has in the courthouse and its chilling effect on access to justice. “If due process can be violated for one group, it can and will be violated for all,” Wisconsin Working Families Party director Corinne Rosen said. “Today we stand together in this freezing cold to reject fear.” Christine Neumann-Ortiz, executive director of Voces de la Frontera, discussed the human impact and feelings of insecurity and intimidation created in immigrant community when ICE stands between them and access to justice. Louis Davis, executive director of SEIU Wisconsin led the crowd in chanting, “Your struggle is my struggle.” Nick Ramos, executive director of the Wisconsin Democracy Campaign got the crowd going in yelling, “This is what democracy looks like.” The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reported that the chants and supportive honking could be heard inside the courthouse. Opening statements for Dugan’s trial began immediately after the rally. Prosecutors leaned heavily on the idea that courthouse arrests are “safe” and “routine,” and that Dugan’s “judicial robe didn’t put her above the law.” Dugan defense attorney Steven Biskupic said that conjecture about a chaotic morning was leading the federal prosecution and that Dugan did not obstruct law enforcement pursuit of Flores-Ruiz. Biskupic said Dugan directed federal law enforcement away from her courtroom in accord with a draft policy previously circulated by Chief Judge Carl Ashley to the Milwaukee County judges, telling them to direct federal agents to their supervisor. Biskupic said Dugan had not yet heard whether or for whom the federal agents had a warrant and so she did not intend to obstruct any action on their warrant. Biskupic also showed a screenshot of a group chat between federal agents, which suggested they had decided, on their own, not to arrest Flores-Ruiz in the courtroom hallway. A video shown during Biskupic’s opening remarks showed federal agents walking behind Flores-Ruiz at a leisurely pace as he exited the sixth floor of the courthouse where Dugan’s courtroom is located. The federal government plans to call up to 28 witnesses in the case and the trial is expected to last around five days.  WJI's Alexandria Staubach speaks at a rally outside the Historic Federal Courthouse in Milwaukee on Dec. 15, 2025. Photograph by Jessica Schmidt.  By Margo Kirchner
After Wisconsin Justice Initiative identified some improper charges for documents issued by judges in Wisconsin’s eastern district federal court, Chief Judge Pamela Pepper indicated that all judges in the district have been notified and they “will take (these issues) into consideration.” Federal district judges have broad discretion over whether the public is charged for obtaining copies of the orders and decisions they issue. Documents filed in federal district court cases are available to the public through the Public Access to Court Electronic Records, or “PACER,” system, though generally not for free. For most documents, the system charges 10 cents per page, with a cap at $3.00. Judicial opinions are an exception. Per the fee schedule for PACER, no fees are to be charged for access to “judicial opinions.” That term has been defined as “any document issued by a judge or judges of the court, sitting in that capacity, that sets forth a reasoned explanation for a court’s decision.” Responsibility for determining which documents meet this definition rests with the authoring judge and should be made at the time the document is filed. The judge or staff member when filing an order or decision in the court record indicates whether the document meets the definition. Over several years, WJI staff have incurred charges for certain documents that a reasonable person would think were judicial opinions. Most judicial opinions have been free, as expected, yet charges for judicial opinions occurred often enough to merit raising the issue with the court. WJI wrote to Pepper and the interim clerk of court in July 2025, stating that the categorization of a document as a written opinion “has a large effect on public access and affordability for those monitoring federal cases. Even though documents over 30 pages are capped at $3.00, . . . PACER charges quickly add up," especially for those monitoring cases with extensive dockets and lengthy briefs and opinions. “Improper categorization of judicial opinions may decrease the public’s confidence in the court’s fairness and transparency and cause needless frustration with the court,” WJI wrote. “The public should not be paying for documents that should be free. Such costs impact the openness of the courts and the ability of the public to monitor them.” In litigation brought by a PACER user several years ago challenging his payment for certain judicial opinions, a federal judge in Florida wrote that the authoring judge has the “absolute authority” to decide what court documents constitute judicial opinions. Thus, members of the public seem to have no recourse regarding a court’s failure to categorize a document as a free judicial opinion. WJI asked that the Eastern District’s judges and clerk of court be vigilant in making sure any order filed by a judge is assessed for being a “judicial opinion,” that the chief judge and clerk of court review procedures to ensure that judicial opinions are properly coded in the docketing system, and that court staff are adequately trained on how to docket judicial opinions to make them free to the public. WJI also queried whether the district has a procedure for the public to report improperly docketed judicial opinions in the PACER system and ask for them to be recategorized so they are free to the public. WJI indicated its preference for a default rule “that everything signed by a judge and entered into the case docket should be docketed as a judicial opinion. We argue that anything signed by a judge, plus all court minutes, qualify as judicial or written opinions and should be docketed as such.” Minutes in particular may escape the attention of staff as being judicial opinions. However, the minutes of some judges are quite detailed and contain “reasoned explanation” for the court’s decision, which WJI argues results in them meeting the definition of judicial decisions. “Plus, even for minutes that do not contain reasoned explanations, in light of open court and public access requirements and policies, all minutes should be free to the public.“ Pepper replied that she had shared WJI’s letter with all magistrate and district judges in the Eastern District and that, as noted above, the judges will take WJI’s concerns “into consideration.” WJI argues that a judge should always exercise his or her discretion to grant broader free PACER access, so if there is ever a question about the categorization of a signed document, it should be categorized as a judicial opinion. Have you been charged for a judicial opinion in PACER from the Eastern District or Western District of Wisconsin? If so, please let us know. Defendant wins a habeas hearing; Seventh Circuit blasts state courts, attorney general's office8/22/2021  y Gretchen Schuldt A federal appeals court hammered the Wisconsin court system last week in a ruling that may finally provide a hearing to a man who has waited in vain for more than four years to get his appeal considered by a state court. Marvin Carter, the federal court said, can pursue his habeas corpus petition in federal court. "Though we recognize that state court remedies exist in theory in Wisconsin and should be available, the last four years have demonstrated that those remedies are, at least for Carter, inaccessible," U.S. Circuit Judge Michael Y. Scudder Jr. wrote. Carter "has weathered a ten-month transcript delay, three different public defenders, and 14 extension requests by counsel and the trial court itself," Scudder wrote. "At no point during these four years has a single court in Wisconsin ruled on the merits of Carter’s colorable challenge to his sentence. None of this is Carter’s fault." "Carter contends that state court remedies in Wisconsin are ineffective to protect his rights. We agree, for the facts in this case afford no other reasonable conclusion....The length of the delay should have sounded an alarm bell within the Wisconsin courts, the public defender’s office, and even the Attorney General’s office," Scudder said. Carter's experience in the state court system has been "extreme and tragic," Scudder wrote for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel. Circuit Judge Michael B. Brennan joined the opinion and Circuit Judge Frank H. Easterbrook concurred, saying the decision did not go far enough in some areas of analysis. Carter's odyssey began in 2016, when he was charged in Milwaukee County Circuit Court with possessing heroin, cocaine, and other drugs with intent to deliver and with felon in possession of a firearm. He reached a plea agreement in the middle of trial, agreeing to plead guilty to the heroin and gun charges. The district attorney's office agreed to recommend a six-year sentence. When sentencing time rolled around, though, Assistant District Attorney Laura Crivello (now a Milwaukee County circuit judge) retreated from the deal. She told the court: “In hindsight, I so wish we would have allowed this to proceed through to the end of the trial and let the jury make their verdict because then I would have had four counts on the table today.” Circuit Judge Janet Protasiewicz, instead of honoring the plea agreement, sentenced Carter to nine years, three more than agreed upon. It was 2017 by then. Carter tried to appeal, arguing that Crivello breached the plea agreement and that Protasaiewicz sentenced him based on inaccurate information, both violations of his 14th Amendment due process rights. Things went wrong almost from the beginning. Carter filed a notice of his intent to seek postconviction relief with the trial court well within the 20-day time limit. The state public defender's office assigned him a lawyer. "But stagnation soon followed," Scudder said. "The clerk and court reporter took 10 months to locate and share the trial transcripts that Carter’s counsel requested – a step that should have been completed within 60 days." Carter's lawyer, on the day the postconviction motion was due, asked for more time. "He explained that his heavy caseload prevented him from meeting with Carter or reviewing the case materials," Scudder said. The lawyer, Leon Todd, also asked for a retroactive extension of time to request certain transcripts. The state Court of Appeals granted both. (Full disclosure: Todd is a WJI Board member.) "With the benefit of hindsight, we now know that the delay for Carter was just beginning. Carter’s counsel followed his first request to extend the deadline to file the postconviction motion with a second. And a third. And a fourth," Scudder wrote. "This pattern continued for months, with Carter’s counsel filing a new extension request on each day the prior request was due to expire. By late 2019 – more than two years after Carter’s July 2017 conviction and sentence – counsel had filed seven requests to extend the motion deadline. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals granted each motion in rote fashion." "Wisconsin’s courts need to fix the systemic deficiency that has resulted in how Carter’s case has been treated, and become more transparent about how discretion is exercised, for the benefit of the parties, their counsel, other courts, and the public," – Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Carter turned to federal court and filed a habeas corpus motion, a type of motion alleging that a person's incarceration violates the Constitution.
Another year passed before U.S. District Judge James D. Peterson issued a decision denying Carter's request. In it, Peterson recognized Carter's difficult position. "The delay in Carter’s postconviction or appellate process is inordinate. It has been more than three years after his judgment of conviction, and his case has gone nowhere," Peterson wrote. Peterson told Carter to give the state courts one more chance, questioning whether the courts knew Carter "disapproves" of Todd's repeated requests for more time. "By our tally, then," Scudder wrote, "Carter’s counsel filed twelve consecutive extension requests, collectively pushing the deadline to file the motion to Nov. 24, 2020. And, as best we can tell, not once has the Wisconsin Court of Appeals – or any other Wisconsin court for that matter—recognized that Carter’s case has been stalled for over four years."  Ludwig The U.S. Senate last month confirmed President Trump's nomination of Brett H. Ludwig as a judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, based in Milwaukee. The information below is taken from Ludwig's own submission to the Senate Judiciary Committee. This profile is similar to those WJI compiles for state judges in our "Evers' judges" and "Walkers' judges" series.
Name: Brett H. Ludgwig Appointed to: U.S. District Court Eastern District of Wisconsin Confirmation date: Sept. 9, 2020. (Lifetime appointment) Education: Law School – University of Minnesota Law School Undergraduate – University of Wisconsin – Stevens Point Recent legal employment: 2017-present – U.S. bankruptcy judge for the Eastern District of Wisconsin 1994; 1995-2017 – Associate and partner for Foley & Larner law firm, Milwaukee 2016-2017 – Adjunct professor, Marquette University Law School Bar and court admissions: Wisconsin State Bar, admitted 1994 Minnesota State Bar, 1998; gave up membership when he became a bankruptcy judge in 2017 United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 2014 United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 1995 United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, 1995 United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, 2012 Professional, business, fraternal, scholarly, civic charitable or other organizations belonged to since law school graduation: None Elsewhere Ludwig said he was on the board of the Mequon Thiensville Education Foundation from 2014-2017 and served as vice president in 2016-2017. He also served on the Board of the Fox Point Foundation from 2002-2006 and as Board president in 2006-2006. Military service: None Approximate number of cases provided over that have gone to verdict or judgment: As of February 1, 2020, I have presided over more than 11,900 bankruptcy cases and adversary proceedings. 10 most significant cases: In re Mendiola – This case involved a debtor who was a serial bankruptcy filer. He had filed five previous cases in the preceding five years, all of which were dismissed after he failed to comply with his obligations imposed by the Bankruptcy Code. In this latest case, the Chapter 13 Trustee and the debtor's mortgage creditor, U.S. Bank N.A., requested extraordinary relief to prevent further abuses of the bankruptcy system. The trustee asked the court to dismiss the case and bar the debtor from refiling for 180 days. The bank requested in rem relief from the automatic stay...to avoid having the automatic stay go into effect with respect to the mortgage property if the debtor filed yet another case. After an evidentiary hearing, I granted both motions. In re Poivey – This Chapter 7 case involved several disputes over the treatment in bankruptcy of a debtor-wife's inheritance of mineral rights under oil and gas leases in Texas. The case involved two evidentiary hearings concerning whether the inherited mineral rights were excluded from the debtor's bankruptcy estate...and whether royalty payments from those mineral rights could be exempted by the debtor-wife's husband. I resolved the first issue in favor of the trustee and the second in favor of the debtors. The case ended with a discharge. In re Bailey-Pfeiffer – This was a Chapter 13 case involving a recently divorced woman with several children and more than $870,000 in unsecured student loan debts, which she wanted to repay through a Chapter 13 repayment plan. Section 109(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that only an individual with noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less than $394,725 can be a debtor under Chapter 13. Based on the plain terms of the statute, I ordered that the debtor must either convert the case to a chapter for which she was eligible or the case would be dismissed. In re. Timothy Brennan – In this Chapter 11 case, a business owner sought bankruptcy protection to prevent the forced foreclosure sale of his former metal fabricating facility. After several contested hearings, I resolved a dispute over the valuation of the building and the debtor was able to confirm a Chapter 11 plan providing for the orderly sale of the real estate. The plan was ultimately confirmed, the real estate sold for $3.2 million, the secured creditor repaid, and the case closed. In re. Bagg – This was a Chapter 7 case in which a creditor, who had been a neighbor of the debtors, filed an adversary proceeding against them, seeking to have a debt arising from a state court tortious interference with contract judgment declared nondischargeable.... After a trial, I concluded that the creditor had not proved that the debt arose from a willful and malicious injury and thus ruled the debt was dischargeable. |
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