Wisconsin Court of Appeals OKs resurrection of dismissed conviction in impaired-driving case6/26/2024 By Alexandria Staubach The Wisconsin Court of Appeals recently allowed the Rock County Circuit Court to resurrect a conviction previously dismissed under the “single-conviction provision” in Wisconsin law. The single-conviction provision permits prosecutors to pursue multiple counts that arise out of a single incident and fall into the three categories prohibiting operating a motor vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant or other drug. Under the provision, if a defendant is convicted of multiple impaired-driving offenses for the same incident, all but one is dismissed so a single conviction remains for purposes of sentencing and counting convictions. District IV of the Court of Appeals held that dismissal of a parallel count can be reversed if the offense chosen for the sentence is later thrown out on appeal. The dismissed count can be revived and then provide the basis for a new sentence. ![]() Judge Brian Blanchard wrote for the court, joined by Judges Rachel Graham and Jennifer Nashold. A Rock County jury found Carl Lee McAdory guilty of two eighth-offense driving-while-intoxicated charges arising out of the same incident: (1) operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of one or more controlled substances (“OWI”), and (2) operating a motor vehicle with a restricted controlled substance (“RSC”). The OWI offense required the state to prove that McAdory’s driving was actually impaired by drugs or alcohol, while the RSC charge was a strict liability offense, meaning the state merely had to prove McAdory had consumed drugs and was operating a motor vehicle, regardless of whether the drugs affected his driving. Though found guilty on both counts, under the single-conviction provision McAdory could be sentenced on only one. At sentencing, the state asked the court to dismiss the RSC charge and sentence McAdory on the OWI charge. Judge Karl Hanson did so. McAdory appealed his OWI conviction to District IV of the Court of Appeals and won. The appeals court reversed the OWI conviction for violation of McAdory’s right to due process. Hanson had permitted a modified jury instruction as to the OWI offense, which, coupled with arguments raised in opening and closing arguments by the prosecution, resulted in a “reasonable likelihood that the State was effectively relieved of its burden to prove that McAdory was ‘under the influence’ of cocaine and marijuana while driving,” wrote the court. The appeals court sent the case back to circuit court “for a new trial on the [OWI] offense.” The appeals court was not asked to and did not address the merits of the dismissed RSC charge. McAdory did not get a new trial on remand, however. Instead, the prosecutor asked Hanson to reopen the judgment, dismiss the OWI conviction, reinstate the RCS conviction, and sentence McAdory on the RSC charge. McAdory argued that the court lacked the authority to reinstate the dismissed count and that reconviction would violate protections against double jeopardy (the legal theory prohibiting multiple prosecutions for the same incident). Hanson agreed with the prosecutor, entering a new sentence and judgment on the RSC charge. McAdory again appealed. He argued that Hanson exceeded his authority when he ignored the appellate court’s order for a new trial, nothing in state law authorized reinstatement of the RCS charge, and the second RCS conviction (following dismissal of the first) violated double-jeopardy protections. (WJI wrote about McAdory’s appeal here shortly after it was filed.) The appeals court found that nothing in Wisconsin law prohibited reinstatement of the RSC count. Although the single-conviction provision does not explicitly address the procedures to be used to accomplish the result of a single conviction, a prior Court of Appeals opinion “interpreted the single-conviction provision to mean that ‘the defendant is to be sentenced on one of the charges, and the other charge is to be dismissed,’” Blanchard wrote. In McAdory’s case that was what the prosecutor requested at the first sentencing hearing and what the prosecutor requested on remand—sentencing on one count and dismissal of the other, Blanchard said. “(T)he only reasonable interpretation is that the single-conviction provision implicitly authorizes circuit courts, in the procedural posture here, to accomplish the intended goal of a single conviction in this way,” Blanchard wrote. “(I)t would be unreasonable to interpret the single-conviction provision to mean, as McAdory contends, that the court’s post-trial dismissal of the guilty verdict on the RCS count in order to satisfy the provision was necessarily permanent, regardless of subsequent events in the case.” Further, “in enacting the single-conviction provision the legislature is presumed to have been aware of the postconviction and appellate relief potentially available to defendants in criminal cases, specifically in the form of potential reversal of individual counts of conviction,” Blanchard wrote. Blanchard said the court’s decision comported with language from the Wisconsin Supreme Court that impaired-driving convictions “terminate with one conviction for all purposes,” because even through the second appeal McAdory’s case had not yet terminated. The court found no double jeopardy problem. Read the full opinion here.
0 Comments
By Alexandria Staubach
Earlier this month the Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld the Wisconsin Department of Justice’s denial of Scot Van Oudenhoven’s handgun purchase application based on an previous misdemeanor domestic violence conviction that had been expunged under Wisconsin law. The decision reinforces the narrow effect of expungement on criminal convictions in Wisconsin, where they are difficult to obtain and of limited effect. Expungement seals a criminal court file but has no impact on the conviction itself. Judge Gregory B Gill Jr. wrote for District III appeals court. He was joined in the opinion by Judges Lisa K. Stark and Judge Thomas M. Hruz. Van Oudenhoven was convicted of battery as an act of domestic violence in a 1994 Calumet County case. In 2019, a Calumet County Circuit Court judge granted Van Oudenhoven’s petition for expungement. In 2022, Van Oudenhoven attempted to purchase a handgun in Wisconsin. The Wisconsin Department of Justice (DOJ) denied the purchase based on his misdemeanor battery conviction. After Van Oudenhoven exhausted administrative remedies with the DOJ, he sought judicial review in Winnebago County Circuit Court. Judge Teresa S. Basiliere affirmed the DOJ denial. Federal law prohibits the sale of firearms to individuals who have been convicted of offenses related to domestic violence, but among the exceptions are misdemeanor cases. Possession is permitted where the misdemeanor conviction has been “expunged or set aside.” On appeal, Van Oudenhoven argued that expungement under Wisconsin law has the same force and effect as “expunged or set aside,” which phrase is not explicitly defined under federal law. Van Oudenhoven argued that the U.S. Supreme Court provided a common understanding of the phrase when it said in Logan v. United States that “expungement,” “set-aside,” “pardoned,” and “civil rights restored,” “describe[] a measure by which the government relieves an offender of some or all of the consequences of his [or her] conviction.” Because Van Oudenhoven’s expungement removed “some” consequences of his conviction, the Calumet County court “expunged or set aside” his conviction, he argued. The Court of Appeals rejected Van Oudenhoven’s argument that his conviction had been “expunged or set aside.” “The terms expunged, set aside, pardoned, and restoration of civil rights all, by definition, require state action that removes the prohibition on an individual from possessing or receiving a firearm under federal law,” wrote Gill. “The state procedure in question must completely remove all effects of the conviction at issue,” he said. Wisconsin’s expungement law does not remove the effects of conviction; “the statue merely removes evidence of the conviction from court files,” said Gill. Current state law permits expungement for an offense with a penalty of six years or less, as long as the offense was not a violent felony, the person was under 25 years old and had no prior felony record, and the person requested expungement at the time of sentencing. If all conditions are met, a subsequent court may grant a request for expungement after the person has successfully completed their sentence. During the last decade, several bills have been introduced to reform Wisconsin’s expungement and pardon laws. Last session, one bill seemed poised for success. Senate Bill 38/Assembly Bill 37 received broad support, with organizations on both sides of the aisle registering in favor, from the conservative group Americans for Prosperity to the ACLU. The bill also had a bipartisan group of 63 co-sponsors. Although the bill successfully made its way through the Assembly, it ultimately failed to get a vote from the Senate. “Expungement is an issue that has been before the Legislature and the Supreme Court for several years, yet, despite extensive study and discussion, there have been few changes made,” wrote the State Bar of Wisconsin in support of the bill. “Without expungement, every sentence is a life sentence,” it said. Some legislators remain undeterred. Rep. Tip McGuire (D-Kenosha) told WJI “It has unfortunately been a long, difficult road for the expungement reform bill. However, every session brings in new legislators and a fresh chance for us to get on the same page and recognize the importance of getting this done.” “Too many people in our state have trouble finding work or housing because of low-level crimes they committed many, many years ago when they were quite young. I’m hopeful we can properly strike a balance between public safety and rightfully giving people a second chance to build a life and a career for themselves,” McGuire told WJI. According to a 2018 Wisconsin Policy Forum report, an estimated 1.4 million individuals in Wisconsin have criminal records that may hinder their ability to find employment. In Milwaukee County, 30,638 cases closed between 2006 and 2017 technically meet the current restrictive eligibility criteria but have not been expunged, said the report. In 2020, the Court of Appeals held that even minor, technical violations of community supervision rules will bar expungement. By Alexandria Staubach Time-sensitive functions of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court are moving to children’s court in the Vel R. Phillips Juvenile Justice Center during the Republican National Convention (RNC). “The courthouse is already difficult to get to” said Chief Judge Carl Ashley in an interview with WJI. He anticipates that security checkpoints, crowds, and the unavailability of parking will dramatically intensify with the 50,000 people expected to participate in RNC activities. WJI talked with Ashley and Chief Court Administrator Stephanie Garbo about the court’s plans during the convention, which runs July 15 through July 18 in downtown Milwaukee. Garbo is helping to orchestrate the move to children’s court, which is located west of I-41 at 10201 W. Watertown Plank Rd. Garbo, like other Milwaukee-area officials, is organizing essential functions in and around the security footprint of the RNC without a complete picture of the U.S. Secret Service’s plans for the area. Garbo said a full outline of anticipated changes to court operations is yet to be announced but is expected in the coming weeks. Some of the changes Garbo anticipates include:
The Milwaukee County Jail will remain accessible to visitors and attorneys, but visitors will likely have to pass through intensified security to get to the building. As court plans remain in flux, Garbo encouraged anyone with court business the week of the convention to monitor Milwaukee County’s convention website, which will contain the most up-to-date information as the convention approaches. At a press conference in February, Mayor Cavalier Johnson also announced a city convention website, but as of today, both websites largely contain placeholders for plans that are still being developed and encourage the public to check back soon. The courts are not the only county functions likely to experience reorganization during the RNC. The county anticipates changes to several bus routes that ordinarily penetrate the RNC’s security zone. Currently, the county website for the RNC informs riders that “the security plan for the 2024 RNC is still in development – as soon as its finalized, riders will be alerted to impacts on bus routes” and “changes to the RNC’s security perimeter may happen on short notice.” Milwaukee County Courthouse. Photographs by Alexandria Staubach.
By Alexandria Staubach The Wisconsin Court of Appeals recently rejected a new Fourth Amendment warrant exception for canine searches, but different facts could lead to a different result in the future. The state argued in the case that an “instinct exception” permits canine searches that naturally extend into a vehicle during a traffic stop if the canine conducts the search “instinctively,” meaning without an officer’s direction, assistance, or encouragement. The appeals court concluded that regardless of whether an instinct exception to the warrant requirement exists in Wisconsin, the state failed to establish a necessary element of any such exception—that the canine act unprompted. The appeals court remanded the case to Sawyer County Circuit Court with an order to grant Ashley Campbell’s motion to suppress. ![]() District III Judge Gregory B. Gill wrote for the court, joined by Judges Lisa K. Stark and Thomas M. Hruz. Campbell pleaded no contest to possession of marijuana after Judge John M. Yackel denied her motion to suppress the marijuana found during a warrantless search of her vehicle. Yackel accepted the state’s argument for the instinct exception, which had not otherwise been adopted in the state of Wisconsin. Trooper Mitchell Kraetke initiated a traffic stop of Campbell’s vehicle after noticing that the vehicle did not have a front license plate and the passenger was not wearing a seat belt. As Kraetke stopped the vehicle, he called for Sergeant Al-Moghrabi to arrive with his canine to assist. After initially talking with Campbell and her passenger, Kraetke conducted a record check and discovered that Campbell’s license was suspended for failure to pay a forfeiture. Her passenger’s license was revoked due to a prior conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Al-Moghrabi arrived, talked briefly with Kraetke and then approached Campbell’s vehicle. He asked Campbell and her passenger if there was any illegal contraband in the vehicle, and both responded there was not. Al-Moghrabi then ordered both individuals out of the vehicle. Campbell did not close her driver’s side door when she exited, and it remained open. Kraetke then met with Campbell and her passenger behind the vehicle to discuss the traffic infractions. Meanwhile, Al-Moghrabi retrieved his canine from his squad car and walked the dog to the hood of Campbell’s vehicle, allowing the dog to “scan” it. “Scanning,” meant that al-Moghrabi allowed the canine to sniff independently instead of identifying certain areas of the vehicle for the dog to check. The canine’s leash had slack. Dashboard camera video from the trial court showed that Al-Moghrabi walked from the hood of Campbell’s vehicle, around the open driver’s side door, and up to the door’s entrance. Al-Moghrabi then stopped and allowed the canine to enter the vehicle. Al-Moghrabi was not pulling the leash or attempting to get the canine to exit the vehicle at any point. Al-Moghrabi testified that the dog began “sniffing intently at” a purse on the floor of the vehicle. According to Al-Moghrabi intent sniffing indicates an alert. The dog exited the vehicle and Al-Moghrabi repeated the steps. He walked the canine up to the door’s opening, stopped, and allowed the canine to enter the vehicle. Al-Moghrabi testified that on the canine’s second entry, it again began “sniffing intently” at the purse. Al-Moghrabi returned the dog to his squad car then searched the purse, finding marijuana inside. “(R)egardless of whether an ‘instinct exception’ to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement exists when a canine ‘searches’ a vehicle, the exception does not apply under the facts in this case to excuse the State’s obligation to obtain a warrant prior to searching Campbell’s vehicle,” wrote Gill. “Here, the canine did not instinctively enter Campbell’s vehicle because the officer had full control of the canine and implicitly encouraged it to enter through the driver’s side door. We therefore conclude that even if the instinct exception were to be recognized in Wisconsin, the exception would not apply to the canine’s searches in this case,” Gill wrote. Jurisdictions recognizing the instinct exception have split on whether reasonable suspicion that narcotics be present is required prior to the dog’s unprompted alert. The state argued in Campbell’s case that no independent basis for reasonable suspicion that narcotics are present is required. By Alexandria Staubach
On Wednesday, a Dane County Circuit Court judge heard oral arguments on whether she should dismiss a case challenging two cash-bail constitutional amendments passed by voters in April 2023. The lawsuit asks the court to toss the results of the election on procedural grounds. The plaintiffs allege that the Legislature and Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) failed to timely file the Republican-backed resolutions calling for the voter referendums, so the questions should not have appeared on the ballot. One amendment expanded the situations in which cash bail could be imposed, while the other expanded conditions for release on cash bail. Notably, in the same year that Wisconsin voters expanded cash bail, Illinois became the first state to abolish it. The plaintiffs are WISDOM—a statewide network of mainly faith-based organizations—and EXPO Wisconsin. Both groups work to end mass incarceration. They “advocated strenuously” against the amendments, according to court filings. WISDOM and EXPO allege they were deprived of opportunities to organize against the resolutions. State law requires the Legislature to file ballot questions “with the official or agency at least 70 days before the election,” making the deadline for the Apr. 4, 2023 election Jan. 25, 2023. The lawsuit involves questions about who the appropriate “official or agency” is and the stricture of the 70-day rule and whether substantial compliance is enough. WISDOM and EXPO allege the law required the Legislature and WEC to submit ballot questions to county clerks and the Milwaukee County Board of Election Commissioners (MCBEC), as the entities who prepare ballots, on or before the deadline. The ballot questions were not received by county clerks and MCBEC until Jan. 26, 2023. Oral arguments occurred before Judge Rhonda L. Lanford at the summary judgment stage of litigation. Plaintiffs maintain that procedural impropriety motivates the suit. “Those who run our elections have to follow the law,” said Jeff Mandell of the LawForward law firm, which represents EXPO and WISDOM. WEC’s attorney, Charlotte Gibson, argued that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring the lawsuit and that the Legislature substantially complied with the requirements for filing. The 70-day deadline is “not mandatory,” she said. “The gerrymandered Wisconsin Legislature must respect the proper procedures for amending the state constitution,” and “attempts to push through constitutional amendments without the established legislative process are yet another example of legislative overreach,” said Mandell after oral arguments. Many working to end mass incarceration remain strongly opposed to the amendments. "The problem with the recent constitutional and statutory changes on bail is they move us away from an evidence-based system and more toward a system in which the charged offense drives the bail decision,” said criminal defense attorney Craig Johnson (who also is WJI’s board president). “Even a person accused of a serious offense maintains a presumption of innocence. If the evidence shows they carry a low risk of re-offending or missing court, they should be entitled to release. We always have to keep in mind that holding people on cash bail unnecessarily can cost them their jobs, their housing and their families. The cash bail system also unfairly impacts indigent and low-income defendants," Johnson told WJI. The nonprofit LawForward began in 2020 “with a mission of protecting democracy,” according to the firm’s website. Since then it has been involved in litigation regarding voting rights and ballot access, redistricting, and election administration, among other issues. By Alexandria Staubach
Last week, conversations about elections loomed large at the Capitol in Madison, involving all three branches of government. Judicial branch On May 13, the Wisconsin Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Priorities, USA v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, a case that could restore the use of drop boxes in Wisconsin after they were banned by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 2022. Oral arguments hinged on the question of whether state law makers and the law itself effectively banned the use of drop boxes by omitting them from a set of mandatory requirements applicable to absentee ballots. Chicago attorney Misha Tseytlin represented the Wisconsin Legislature as he has in numerous other high stakes cases, including Wisconsin’s most recent redistricting case. Tseytlin argued that “two years ago the Court made this decision,” so the court should be precluded from making any determination in the new case. Justice Janet Protasiewicz highlighted that the Legislature was not part of the case decided two years ago and at the time took a position “assuring federal and state courts that drop boxes were permitted” and “safe and secure.” Plaintiffs Priorities USA and Wisconsin Alliance for Retired Americans argued that the court’s prior interpretation of the law places an unnecessary restriction on casting absentee ballots and in practice is “unworkable.” They argued that under the court’s prior decision municipal clerks and voters are unable to decipher what they can and cannot do. According to the plaintiffs, the law only mandates specific minimum requirements and does not state every possible option for the return of ballots to clerks, leaving such decisions to the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) historically. Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley asked several times how clerks should be limited in their discretion and what prevented them from administering elections in “whatever way they choose.” WEC’s attorney, Faye Hipsman, responded that regardless of the use of drop boxes, clerks remain bound by all other election statutes, including statutes that require them to “conduct elections that are proper and secure.” Advocates for drop boxes held rallies around the state on the day of the oral arguments. At a rally in Milwaukee, ACLU-Wisconsin Deputy Advocacy Director James Stein said that “Drop boxes make it easy for folks to drop off their ballots hassle-free." He said that “for rural voters who have to drive far and wide to vote on election day, voters in large cities who have limited ballot return options, voters with disabilities, and voters who work long hours or have caregiving responsibilities that make it difficult to return a ballot to a single clerk’s office during shortened hours in the middle of the work day, drop boxes are essential. For voters who receive their absentee ballots late, drop boxes are critical for making sure their ballot can get returned in time to be counted." Stein noted how widespread drop box access was associated with extraordinary voter participation in 2020 and that in the 2022 general election over 760,000 Wisconsinites (almost 30% of voters in that election) cast their ballots absentee. “By fighting for ballot drop boxes, we're fighting for the very soul of our democracy," he said. At a rally in Madison, ACLU-Wisconsin Campaign & Political Manager Conor Miller said, “Over the past decade, we have witnessed several attacks on the fundamental right to vote. . . . “Enough is enough.” Executive branch On May 14, Gov. Tony Evers signed an executive order calling for a special election in the 4th Senate District to fill the seat of Sen. Lena Taylor. Taylor resigned as state senator following her appointment to Milwaukee County Circuit Court in January. The special election will take place on July 30. A primary will occur on July 2 if necessary. Legislative branch On May 16, the Assembly Committee on Campaigns and Elections and the Senate Committee on Shared Revenue, Elections, and Consumer Protection held a joint informational hearing about measures currently in place and investigations that may occur in the future to ensure election integrity. The committees' purpose was to “remove any conjecture that may be out there about what is occurring with elections,” said Rep. Scott Krug (R-Nekoosa). He added that the committee would continue to hold public hearings throughout the summer despite inconvenience to its members, to avoid “another 2020.” The committees heard testimony from the Department of Transportation regarding voter identification cards issued under current law. Ashley Reichert and Lida Tollefson, county clerks in Washington County and Rock County, respectively, discussed systems implemented in their jurisdictions to ensure election integrity. Fond du Lac District Attorney Eric Toney advised the committees that he was unaware of any significant voter fraud. Toney said his office has prosecuted only three voter fraud cases since 2020 and indicated that, at times, voter fraud is a crime that people do not necessarily know they are committing. For instance, persons under felony supervision may vote believing their rights have been restored. Testimony centered around three issues central to the committees: (1) non-citizen voting (2) voting by persons ineligible due to felony convictions, and (3) voting by persons who have been deemed incompetent to exercise the right to vote. Rep. Donna Rozar (R- Marshfield) inquired about the possibility of a shared database of incompetent voters. Tollefson and Reichert indicated that such information is provided by the WEC only to municipalities where incompetent individuals reside. They acknowledged the hypothetical possibility that a person who has been deemed incompetent could move to another municipality and be permitted to vote absent a readily available statewide list. Although not discussed at the hearing, the scenario raised by Rozar is the subject of a lawsuit making its way through the courts, Wisconsin Voter Alliance v. Kristina Secord. Wisconsin Voter Alliance (WVA) brought two failed lawsuits seeking to overturn the results of 2020 presidential election. The Walworth County registrar denied WVA’s open records request for notices sent to election officials (as required by current election law) when a court determines a person is incompetent. Walworth County believes the notices are not subject to disclosure under public records law. WVA argues that the public has an interest in the information, as shown by alleged discrepancies between notices issued to the WEC and the volume of notices published on WEC’s website. A Walworth County Circuit Court judge dismissed the case. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, ordering the records released, though with birthdates and case numbers redacted. In March, the Supreme Court agreed to review that ruling. This afternoon WJI petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court to require trained interpreters in municipal court proceedings involving low-English-proficiency (LEP) individuals.
WJI’s proposed new rule of procedure would bring municipal courts more in line with circuit courts, which are required to use “qualified” interpreters in proceedings involving LEP individuals. Qualified interpreters must meet certain requirements regarding their capabilities and accuracy. The current rule requires qualified interpreters in municipal courts only in matters involving juveniles. Otherwise, municipal judges are allowed to ask a party to bring a friend or family member—sometimes even a minor child—to court to interpret legal proceedings. “I’ve even seen a judge ask the gallery—the defendants awaiting their own cases to be called—if anyone spoke Spanish and could interpret proceedings when a woman did not bring someone with her to court,” said WJI Executive Director Margo Kirchner. The proposed new rule for municipal courts tracks the circuit court rule, with a major difference. The proposed rule divides proceedings into 1) evidentiary hearings that involve testimony and 2) other proceedings. Qualified interpreters would be required for all evidentiary hearings, including trials. In other proceedings, such as initial appearances or status conferences, the municipal court could use a telephonic, video, or computerized service approved by the director of state courts. Interpretation of legal proceedings by untrained friends, family members, or strangers would no longer be permitted. WJI wrote in its brief supporting the petition that “LEP individuals in Wisconsin today are not receiving proper access to qualified interpreters in municipal court proceedings.” Family members and friends acting as interpreters may not be proficient in the languages being used and may have conflicts of interest. “Even assuming they are proficient, these individuals almost certainly lack professional training as interpreters, let alone the specialized legal training necessary for properly interpreting court proceedings,” WJI wrote. “The ability to understand the words of the judge and the opposing party during a legal proceeding is a crucial element of due process. Without the help of a qualified interpreter, LEP individuals cannot meaningfully participate in their own legal proceedings This deprivation of due process rights has serious legal and practical consequences,” WJI wrote. WJI added that holding proceedings without providing qualified interpreters may also amount to national origin discrimination. “Very few defendants in Wisconsin's municipal courts have attorneys. This problem is compounded for those who do not understand the language being spoken in the courtroom,” said WJI board member and former Milwaukee Municipal Judge Jim Gramling about the need for the petition. “Municipal courts handle drunk driving cases, building and health code violations, charges of disorderly conduct, vandalism, marijuana possession, assault and battery. Forfeitures can reach into the thousands of dollars. Defendants in these cases deserve full interpreter services,” Gramling said. “Every court in Wisconsin, by law, must provide full interpreter services for defendants with one exception—the 230 municipal courts which handle over 400,000 cases every year,” Gramling said. “Municipal courts fly under the radar for the public and media, but that is where many people interact with the court system. As we say in our brief, municipal court cases involve real charges and real consequences," Kirchner said. “Those charged with offenses in municipal court, just as in circuit court, should be able to understand what is said and argue their case to the judge with accurate interpretation.” The petition is part of WJI’s broader effort to improve municipal court outcomes for defendants, especially low-income and minority individuals. “Since 2016, WJI has educated the public about municipal courts, monitored municipal court proceedings, and advocated for an end to jail and driver’s license suspension in response to unpaid municipal court forfeitures,” said Kirchner. “While monitoring municipal courts, we saw the frequent use of friends and family members when interpreters were needed,” said Kirchner. WJI has published public education information to help defendants understand municipal court proceedings. The materials include a Spanish-language video and pocket guide. Under the proposed rule, interpreters would be provided at municipal expense. WJI argues that the cost is reasonable and necessary in light of the important interests at stake. WJI awaits review of the petition by the Supreme Court. Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The rule for this is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision. The “upshot” and “background” sections do not count as part of the 10 paragraphs because of their summary and necessary nature. We've deleted footnotes and headings. We’ve also removed citations from the opinion for ease of reading but have linked to important cases cited or information about them if helpful. Italics indicate WJI insertions except for case names, which are also italicized. The case: A.M.B. v. Circuit Court for Ashland County Majority: Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley (23 pages), for a unanimous court Concurring: Grassl Bradley (12 pages), joined by Chief Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler and Justice Brian Hagedorn Concurring: Justice Rebecca Frank Dallet (7 pages), joined by Justices Ann Walsh Bradley and Janet Protasiewicz Concurring: Justice Jill J. Karofsky (7 pages) ![]() The upshot A creature of statute, adoption confers legal rights and duties on adopted children and their adoptive parents. The legislature has made policy choices regarding the circumstances under which children may be adopted and by whom. A.M.B. is the biological mother of M.M.C. and wishes to have her nonmarital partner, T.G., adopt M.M.C. Under the adoption statutes, T.G. is not eligible to adopt M.M.C. because T.G. is not A.M.B.'s spouse. A.M.B. and T.G. allege the legislatively drawn classifications violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in denying T.G. the right to adopt M.M.C. and in denying M.M.C. the right to be adopted by T.G. Because the adoption statutes do not restrict a fundamental right or regulate a protected class, we consider whether any rational basis exists for the legislative limits on eligibility to adopt a child. Among other legitimate state interests, promoting stability for adoptive children through marital families suffices for the statutes to survive this equal protection challenge; therefore, we affirm the circuit court. Background A.M.B. is the biological mother of M.M.C. and maintains a cohabitating, nonmarital relationship with her male partner, T.G. After more than a decade in a relationship with A.M.B., T.G. has become a father figure for M.M.C. and has assumed a variety of parental duties for her. The parental rights of M.M.C.'s biological father have been terminated. Based on T.G.'s fatherly bond and relationship with M.M.C., T.G. filed a joint petition with A.M.B. to adopt M.M.C. Prior to the adoption hearing, the county department of human services generated a "Home Study Report," which included a background check of T.G., a review of T.G.'s relationship with M.M.C., and an interview with M.M.C. The interview with M.M.C. revealed she did not have a meaningful relationship with her biological father and views T.G. as her father. The report concluded with a recommendation to grant the adoption. On June 20, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing on the adoption petition. At the outset, the court raised concerns over its authority to grant the petition given the criteria for adoption under applicable statutes, despite having determined the adoption would be in the best interests of the child, M.M.C. The circuit court cited this court's decision in Georgina G. v. Terry M., which the circuit court summarized as precluding "an adoption to a third party who is not the spouse of the parent." Because T.G. was not married to A.M.B., the circuit court determined T.G. was not statutorily eligible to adopt M.M.C. and denied the adoption petition. A.M.B. and T.G. appealed. The case bypassed the court of appeals on its way to the Supreme Court. The guts Chapter 48 of Wisconsin Statutes establishes legal adoption and specifies the circumstances under which a child may be adopted as well as who is eligible to adopt. Under the statutes, a child who is present in the State of Wisconsin when the adoption petition is filed may be adopted under any of the following four scenarios: (1) the parental rights of both parents have been legally terminated; (2) both parents are deceased; (3) the parental rights of one parent have been terminated and the other parent is deceased; or (4) "[t]he person filing the petition for adoption is the spouse of the child's parent with whom the child and the child's parent reside." Subsection (4) applies only if the child's other parent is deceased or his parental rights have been terminated. Colloquially called the "stepparent" exception, this provision permits a stepparent to adopt his spouse's child while the spouse's parental rights remain intact. The adoption statutes additionally identify three classifications of individuals who may adopt an eligible child: "A husband and wife jointly," "either the husband or wife if the other spouse is a parent of the minor," or "an unmarried adult." The statutes do not allow two unmarried adults to jointly adopt a minor. Nor do the statutes permit a nonmarital partner to adopt his partner's child. Omitting those categories of unmarried individuals from the list of eligible persons who may adopt means the law does not qualify them as adoptive parents." . . . *** The court discussed why the adoption statutes do not implicate a fundamental right under federal or state constitutions and do not affect a protected class of individuals. If a fundamental constitutional right is not at stake and a protected class is not disadvantaged by the statute, the court applies rational basis review. A "relatively relaxed standard," rational basis review reflects the court's respect for the separation of powers and recognizes "the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one." In applying rational basis review, the court will uphold the statute provided the classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest. *** The state has a legitimate interest in ensuring children are adopted into "safe and stable families." The state may achieve this goal by encouraging married couples to adopt children and the legislature recognized the essential link between marriage and the welfare of children in "The Family Code." Marriage in the State of Wisconsin creates a legal bond between two persons who "owe to each other mutual responsibility and support." This legal bond creates a series of rights and obligations between the two individuals, dissolvable only by death or divorce. Wisconsin law imposes on each spouse "an equal obligation" in accordance with financial ability "to contribute money or services or both which are necessary for the adequate support and maintenance of" the couple's "minor children and of the other spouse." The state deems "[t]he consequences of the marriage contract" to be "more significant to society than those of other contracts." Unlike a nonmarital relationship, the legal union between two individuals through marriage cannot be terminated impulsively or spontaneously; the law requires a court proceeding to terminate the contractual relationship. If a child already has a legal parent, the state reasonably concludes it would be more beneficial for that child to be adopted into a marital family, rather than by an unmarried partner of the child's legal parent. As the state argued in its brief, the fact that marriage requires legal proceedings to terminate provides "some level of assurance" the adoptive stepparent "will remain committed to the family unit and the child’s upbringing." A child joining a family with married parents enjoys a greater likelihood of a financially stable upbringing compared to a household with two unmarried parents. In the event of a divorce, Wisconsin statutes create a presumption guaranteeing both marital partners leave the relationship on financially equivalent footing. This presumption "effectuates the policy that each spouse makes a valuable contribution to the marriage and that each spouse should be compensated for his or her respective contributions." Nothing comparable exists for unmarried couples. If an unmarried partner decides to sever the relationship, he may freely leave without an equal division of financial assets, to the financial detriment of the remaining parent and the adoptive child. Rational basis review is a "low bar" for the government to clear in an equal protection challenge. In this case, the state has met this burden because it is reasonable for the legislature to have concluded that a married couple would provide a more secure and financially stable home environment for adoptive children than an unmarried couple. While A.M.B. and T.G. may provide a safe, stable, healthy, and loving home for M.M.C., the judiciary is powerless to craft an exception to the adoption law on a case-by-case basis. "A legislative classification satisfies rational basis review if any conceivable state of facts could provide a rational basis for the classification." Petitioners cannot overcome the rational basis for the classifications established in the adoption statutes. Wisconsin has a legitimate interest in preferring the stability and security of a marital household for the upbringing of adopted children. The statute's classifications for whom may adopt a child reflects the state's interest in preferring stable and financially secure households for adoptive children. Petitioners argue the state draws an arbitrary and irrational distinction by permitting a single, unmarried adult to adopt a child but not a cohabitating, unmarried partner. We disagree. The legislative classifications bear a rational basis because the state may reasonably prefer a child to be adopted by a single, unmarried adult rather than be placed in foster care or another impermanent living arrangement. Because a child with one parent has permanency, the state has a legitimate interest in restricting adoption to the child's stepparent, who is more likely to provide a stable family and better outcomes for the child. Allowing married couples to adopt but not unmarried couples is consistent with the "public policy" of the state "to promote the stability of marriage and family." By allowing married couples to adopt but not unmarried couples, the state provides a benefit to married couples not afforded to unmarried couples. States "have throughout our history made marriage the basis for an expanding list of governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities." Precluding an individual from adopting his nonmarital partner's child merely makes marriage a basis for the adoption right, a classification rooted in our nation's history. Limiting adoption to married couples and single adults is neither irrational nor arbitrary because the state has legitimate reasons for the legislative classifications established . . . . Under rational basis review, the court does not judge the wisdom of the legislative classifications. Instead, we must uphold the statute's classification if there exists some rationale to justify it. In establishing eligibility to adopt or to be adopted, the legislature chose to prioritize the stability of marriage for adopted children with one parent, while preferring an unmarried adoptive parent to impermanency for a child with no parents. A rational basis exists for these legislative policy choices. We hold that the statutes do not violate the Equal Protection Clause because they serve the legitimate state interest in promoting the adoption of children into stable, marital families. Grassl Bradley concurrence For most of the history of the United States, constitutional-rights litigation occurred predominantly in state courts and centered on state constitutional rights. It's no wonder why. The individual rights protected by the United States Constitution did not originally apply to the states. Regardless, all individual rights protected under the Constitution originated from the guarantees of liberty embodied in state constitutional provisions. Even the practice of judicial review—the main vehicle by which citizens vindicate their liberties—originated in state courts. Invoking state constitutional rights, however, has been out of vogue for some time. Such claims have sometimes been relegated to "second-tier status," and an afterthought in legal briefs. Many commentators have noted the decline in the centrality of state constitutional claims as the United States Supreme Court federalized constitutional rights during the Warren Court era. Over the course of the twentieth century, and especially in the 1960s, the Court incorporated most federal constitutional rights against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. As incorporation occurred, the Court also developed expansive—and novel—interpretations of the Constitution. As Justice William Brennan put it, the Court "fundamentally reshaped the law of this land" by "nationaliz[ing] civil rights." As a result, the relevance of state constitutions appeared to fade. Litigants stopped arguing their cases under state constitutions. Some state courts interpreted their state constitutions in lockstep with the federal courts' interpretation of the Federal Constitution. In recent years, a newfound interest in asserting state constitutional rights has emerged, which, in theory, should benefit individual liberty. State constitutional rights are just as important and worthy of protection as federal constitutional rights. And this court has a duty to enforce the rights protected under the Wisconsin Constitution. Not all arguments for enforcing state constitutional rights are rooted in text, history, and tradition; some stem from disappointment with the outcomes in certain United States Supreme Court decisions. Negative reaction to the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts' reluctance to "innovate" new federal constitutional rights, triggered a resurgence of interest by litigants and legal commentators in asking state courts to fill the gap. For example, in two famous law review articles, Justice William Brennan urged state courts to "step into the breach" created by the Court, and argued that "activist intervention[s]" into democratic governance are less problematic when done by state courts. The pressure on state courts to intrude on the democratic process has intensified with the Court's landmark decisions in Rucho (gerrymandering) and Dobbs (abortion). Channeling the spirit of Justice William Brennan, Justice Rebecca Dallet argues this court should abandon its past practice of construing Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution to provide substantially identical protections as the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, she invites litigants to ask this court to invent constitutional rights: "[T]he lack of settled case law [discussing Article I, Section 1] should be encouraging to litigants. It is up to us—judges, lawyers, and citizens—to give effect to the fundamental guarantees of Article I, Section 1." As a pivotal part of her call for activism, Justice Dallet claims this court has embraced a "pluralistic approach" to constitutional interpretation in which this court "balance[s] the majority's values against the values that should be protected from society's majorities." Nothing could be further from the truth or more corrosive to our democratic form of government. It is not for judges to superimpose their values on the constitution. The Wisconsin Constitution's text "is the very product of an interest balancing by the people," which judges cannot "conduct for them anew" in each case. The balance struck by the people of Wisconsin, as embodied in the constitution, "demands our unqualified deference." What the constitution does not say is as important as what it says. If the constitution itself does not bar majorities from passing certain laws, there is no lawful basis for judges to say otherwise. Nothing in the constitution authorizes judges to void laws that violate some judges' sense of what ought to be. There is a good reason jurists "seldom endorse[]" the views espoused by Justice Dallet openly: They contradict "the basic democratic theory of our government." Justice Dallet attempts to conceal her call for an antidemocratic power grab with the illusion of inclusive language. She intimates that future generations must each decide for themselves what the constitution means in their time: "It is up to us—judges, lawyers, and citizens—to give effect to" the constitution's words today. When the president of Wisconsin's 1848 convention said "the pages of our constitution . . . abound[] in the declaration of those great principles which characterize the age in which we live," he did not mean to characterize the constitution as an empty vessel into which each generation may pour its prejudices and aspirations. He meant exactly what he said. The new constitution embodied the values and principles of that time, and those principles were to remain fixed and endure throughout the ages: "[The Wisconsin Constitution] abounds in the declaration of those great principles which characterize the age in which we live, and which, under the protection of Heaven, will—nay, must—guard the honor, promote the prosperity, and secure the permanent welfare of our beloved country." Justice Dallet ultimately advocates for the discredited "practice of constitutional revision" by a committee of four lawyers who happen to form a majority on the court. Should a majority of this court—four lawyers—decide to imbue the constitution with modern meanings divorced from the constitutional text and the history and traditions of this state, they will rob the people of Wisconsin of their most important liberty: "the freedom to govern themselves." Although living constitutionalism is often couched in the rhetoric of flexibility and a purported need to adjust for a changing society, in practice it presents a grave threat to democracy by thwarting the people from passing legislation to accommodate changing views. Living constitutionalism invites lawyers donning robes to decide all the important issues of the day, removing their resolution from the political process altogether and depriving the people of any say in such matters. "In practice, the Living Constitution would better be called the Dead Democracy." Justice Dallet's invitation to reimagine the constitution's text with a so-called "pluralistic approach" flies in the face of this court's established method of constitutional interpretation and should be rejected. As with statutory interpretation, the goal of constitutional interpretation is to ascertain the meaning of the constitutional text as it would have been understood by those who adopted it. Judges lack any authority to "rewrite the Constitution to reflect the[ir] views and values." As stated by Justice Cassoday in 1890: "It is no part of the duty of this court to make or unmake, but simply to construe this provision of the constitution. All questions of political and governmental ethics, all questions of policy, must be regarded as having been fully considered by the convention which framed, and conclusively determined by the people who adopted, the constitution, more than 40 years ago. The oath of every official in the state is to support that constitution as it is, and not as it might have been." *** Any argument construing Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution to protect an asserted right must be grounded in the constitution's actual text and history. "Certainly, states have the power to afford greater protection to citizens under their constitutions than the federal constitution does." But it cannot simply be assumed that the Wisconsin Constitution provides more protection for an asserted right than the Federal Constitution: "[T]he question for a state court is whether its state constitution actually affords greater protection. A state court does not have the power to write into its state constitution additional protection that is not supported by its text or historical meaning." This court has stated many times that "[i]n interpreting a constitutional provision, the court turns to three sources in determining the provision's meaning: the plain meaning of the words in the context used; the constitutional debates and the practices in existence at the time of the writing of the constitution; and the earliest interpretation of the provision by the legislature as manifested in the first law passed following adoption." Litigants asserting a right under Article I, Section 1 must ground their arguments in those considerations—not policy or subjective moral judgments. Our constitution and our commitment to a democratic form of government demand nothing less. ![]() Dallet concurrence I agree with the majority's conclusion that the adoption statutes are rationally related to a legitimate state interest, and therefore do not violate M.M.C.'s or T.G.'s rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For that reason, I join the majority opinion. I write separately to address petitioners' alternative equal protection challenge under Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution. Our constitution was written independently of the United States Constitution and we must interpret it as such, based on its own language and our state's unique identity. When we do so, there are several compelling reasons why we should read Article I, Section 1 as providing broader protections for individual liberties than the Fourteenth Amendment. We cannot simply assume—as petitioners seemingly did in this case—that these different constitutional provisions mean the same thing. *** (W)e have a long history of interpreting our constitution to provide greater protections for the individual liberties of Wisconsinites than those mandated by the federal Constitution. For example, we concluded that the Wisconsin Constitution guarantees the right to counsel at the state's expense in criminal cases more than 100 years before the United States Supreme Court recognized the same right in Gideon v. Wainwright. More than 40 years before Mapp v. Ohio, we held that suppression was the appropriate remedy for unlawful searches and seizures under our constitution. And we have also said that when police deliberately violate a criminal defendant's Miranda rights, our constitution requires that the evidence be suppressed, even if the Fourth Amendment doesn't require the same. More recently, we have endorsed the view that "[t]he Wisconsin Constitution, with its specific and expansive language, provides much broader protections for religious liberty than the First Amendment." *** Even a cursory review of Article I, Section 1 of our constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment indicates that the clauses have different meanings. Article I, Section 1 states, in its entirety: "All people are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights: among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." Compare this with the Fourteenth Amendment which provides in pertinent part that "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Aside from two shared words—"life" and "liberty"—Article I, Section 1 and the Fourteenth Amendment are worded in dramatically different ways. Article I, Section 1 protects more than the enumerated rights of "life, liberty, or property." It declares unequivocally that all Wisconsinites have "inherent rights," a phrase that was written "to be broad enough to cover every principle of natural right, of abstract justice." Whereas the Fourteenth Amendment's protections extend only to those rights "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," the inherent rights contemplated by Article I, Section 1 are not so limited. Moreover, Article I, Section 1 begins with the clear and expansive declaration that all people are "born equally free and independent." As we said over a century ago, "[t]oo much dignity cannot well be given to that declaration." By contrast, the Fourteenth Amendment contains a narrower guarantee of "equal protection of the laws." *** Notwithstanding the many reasons to interpret our state constitution differently than the federal Constitution, litigants often overlook state constitutional claims, or fail to develop them fully. This case is a perfect example. Although petitioners argued that the adoption statutes at issue violate Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, they offered little more than a citation to that section as support. Otherwise, the parties' briefs focused solely on the Fourteenth Amendment and federal precedent, and ignored the Wisconsin Constitution entirely. That omission is somewhat understandable. Lawyers are surely more familiar with the extensive case law interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment. By comparison, our case law regarding Article I, Section 1 is sparse. But we must break this self- perpetuating cycle whereby lawyers fail to develop state constitutional arguments because they lack clear legal standards, which further prevents courts from developing clear legal standards. In a way, the lack of settled case law should be encouraging to litigants. It is up to us—judges, lawyers, and citizens—to give effect to the fundamental guarantees of Article I, Section 1. And in doing so, I agree with what Justice Dodge wrote more than 100 years ago, when he said that Article I, Section 1, should "not receive an unduly limited construction." ![]() Karofsky concurrence I agree with the majority that A.M.B.'s constitutional challenge merits rational basis review and that the challenged adoption statutes have a rational basis under the law. Rational basis review presents a low bar for the state to clear. We need only to conceive of a single rational connection between the statutes and a legitimate state interest in order for us to uphold the statutes' constitutionality. Here it is rational for the legislature to connect marriage to relationship longevity, then relationship longevity to household stability, and finally household stability to the child's best interest. Because there is a conceivable logic behind those connections, the statutes have a rational basis. But in this case, the logical threads begin to shred under the weight of any sincere scrutiny. Here, we are left with the inescapable fact that the legally rational statutes prevented an adoption that all agree would have been in A.M.B.'s best interest. This incongruent outcome exemplifies the specious connection between the statutes and their stated goal of promoting a child's best interest. At first glance the connection may seem neatly knitted together; however, closer inspection reveals nothing more than a fraying tangle of dubious assumptions, circular reasoning, and outdated values that fail to reflect the practical realities of modern family life. I write separately to call out these three fraying threads that form an ever weakening connection between our adoption statutes and the goal of a child's best interest. I urge the legislature to reform the adoption restrictions so that they truly support the best interest of every child. The first fraying thread connecting the adoption statutes to the best interest of a child is a set of dubious assumptions regarding the stability of marital families compared to non-marital families. To be clear, the state has a legitimate interest in making sure that legal decisions involving a child are made based on the best interest of that child. And there is no doubt that it is in a child's best interest to grow up in a safe and stable household. However, conditioning adoption on the marital status of the child's parent and prospective adoptive parent reflects questionable assumptions about which types of households are stable, and which are unstable. There are many different family structures that create stability for children, and the statute's one-size-fits-all approach can actively work against the benefit of a child, as it did in this case. Children can and do thrive in families with single, unmarried, or married parents. This case is an excellent example of the second category. T.G. has, by all accounts, demonstrated dedication and commitment to A.M.B. over the past decade, and for her part A.M.B. reports that she views T.G. as a father figure. There is no dispute that adoption would be in A.M.B.'s best interest. Moreover, children can and do struggle in households with married parents. Married couples may, on average, stay together in the same household longer than unmarried parents, and that may look like stability from a thousand-foot-view. But inside the home, the legal pressure for a married couple to stay together, the very thing that makes the household appear stable in a superficial sense, may sometimes lead to worse outcomes for children. More than 20% of children have witnessed domestic violence within their lifetime, often resulting in long term harm to their development. Even short of domestic violence, legally "stable" marriages may be rife with stressors for the children in those homes. Even ignoring the challenges that may arise when a married couple remains together, marriage is hardly a guarantee of relationship stability given that divorce rates have continued to rise in the United States since the Civil War. In short, using marriage as a litmus test for household stability reflects suspect assumptions about which family structures create stability, and what it means for a household to be stable in the first place. Marriage is treated as binary, where married parents check the stability box, unmarried parents do not, and all nuance is disregarded as insignificant. In cases such as this where unmarried parents provide stability, there is no tolerance for any exception. And, as a result, children suffer. The second frayed thread linking the adoption statutes to the best interest of the child goal is little more than tail-wagging-the-dog circular reasoning. It goes like this: The state grants a "constellation of benefits" to married couples related to "taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate succession; spousal privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access; medical decision making authority," and more. The state then uses those benefits as justification to grant yet another benefit to married couples—here, adoption rights—reasoning that because married couples are already well-supported by the state, they are in a better position to receive the new benefit. The connection between the granting of the benefit and the state's goals is thus substantially manufactured by the state, resulting in a spiral of ever-expanding benefits to married couples, leaving alternative family structures further and further behind. Perhaps the answer then is not to limit adoption benefits to married couples on the basis that the other benefits they receive make them "safe and stable," but for the legislature to expand support for alternative family structures, making them even more "safe and stable," and (from the state's point of view) suitable for adopting children. The third unraveling thread is an outdated set of values positioning marriage as the moral center of family and society. These values sometimes lurk beneath other seemingly neutral rationales for marital benefits (such as ensuring household stability), only surfacing occasionally as a reminder to us that they are still there. Sometimes these values are front and center, serving as the main justification for a marriage-based distinction under the law. To explain what is fundamentally wrong with using this set of values to justify marriage-based laws, I turn to an 1888 U.S. Supreme Court case . . . that expounded on marriage as "the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization or progress." At the time those words were written, the following was true about the institution of marriage. Coverture laws subordinated married women to their husbands' legal control, eliminating their legal and economic identities. As a result, a married woman's property, earnings, and labor automatically belonged to her husband. In addition, there was no legal recourse for a married woman whose husband had sexually assaulted her, which would be true well into the 1970s in many states. And neither married women nor unmarried women had the right to vote, to exercise civic influence in order to right these wrongs. Furthermore, marriage was limited exclusively to heterosexual relationships. And, marriages between people of differing races and ethnicities were widely banned. In short, if marriage was the foundation of the family and of society in 1888, there was something rotten at the core of that foundation. Times have changed, of course, but the justification that marriage is the moral core of society and the family is as weak as it ever was. With only about half of U.S. adults in a marriage, first marriages beginning later in life, and increasing divorce rates over time, Americans are spending more and more of their adult lives unmarried. Unsurprisingly then, nearly one third of children live in a single-parent home. Yet many Americans still desire to create families. Functional, stable families continue to form as alternative family structures proliferate and garner greater societal acceptance. The notion that marriage serves as the foundation of society is at best outdated, and at worst misogynistic. It provides scant justification for laws that distinguish based on marital status. By Margo Kirchner
When John Remington takes his seat this month as Milwaukee County Circuit Court judge, he will be the eighth new judge joining the court during the past 12 months. And once newly elected Marisabel Cabrera takes her seat, about one-fifth of the judges on the court will have been appointed since June 2023. Cabrera’s term starts Aug. 1. For comparison, just one judge started on the court in all of 2022 and two in 2021. “Is it unusual to have this many (new judges)? Yes, no question,” said Milwaukee County Circuit Court Chief Judge Carl Ashley in an interview with WJI. Cabrera and Judge Ana Berrios-Schroeder were elected. The other seven new judges were appointed by Gov. Tony Evers to fill vacancies. (Several of the appointees then won election in April to serve new terms beginning Aug. 1.) A chart below shows the new judges and their start dates based on information provided by Ashley. Milwaukee County Circuit Court has 47 judicial seats (called branches). In lesser-populated counties, some with just one judicial seat, the judges hear all varieties of cases. But in Milwaukee County, judges are assigned to specific divisions such as felony, misdemeanor, civil, probate, children’s, or small claims court. Ashley said that historically most new judges have started in children’s or misdemeanor court. However, when a judge had prior experience in a particular area of the law, a start in another division has occurred. Becoming a judge is a transition, he said, and “We want to be supportive of the judge” during that transition. Veteran judges are always helpful for the new judges, he said. In Milwaukee County, judges generally rotate after four years maximum in a particular division. For rotations, the chief judge takes into account where the judges want to be assigned, their seniority, and other factors. Ashley said we wants to have the best judges where they are needed. “Does (the number of new judges) impact the ability to assign judges? Yes,” he said, adding that it's all part of balancing and “just something we have to adjust for.” “As one would expect, there’s a bit of a learning curve that every judge experiences as they acclimate themselves to being a judge. As chief judge that impacts how judge assignments are made, but that is the nature of the process,” Ashley told WJI. The number of new judges is not the only change that today impacts initial judge assignments to children’s court, Ashley said. Children’s court has changed as well, with nearly 10 homicide cases in children’s court in the past year, compared with perhaps one per year before then, he said. “Things have changed on both ends." Ashley noted his respect for the judges who have retired recently. “I certainly want to acknowledge our veteran judges who have served our community for decades with great skill and commitment. The legacy of their mentorship has been and will be invaluable to our newer judges,” he said. Currently, a committee led by Deputy Chief William Pocan and District 1 (Milwaukee County) Court Administrator Stephanie Garbo is studying rotation procedures for Milwaukee County Circuit Court. Ashley said the process for rotations was last assessed about 15 years ago. The committee gathered survey data and other input from attorneys, current and retired judges, and the public. The committee will soon present Ashley with recommendations for any changes to the processes and policies governing rotations. Wisconsin Supreme Court declines request to determine maps for recall and special elections4/3/2024 The Wisconsin Supreme this morning denied a motion by the Wisconsin Elections Commission seeking clarification on what maps apply to recall and special elections.
The court issued the order in the Clarke redistricting case. The court stated in the order that “(o)n December 22, 2023, we enjoined the ‘Elections Commission from using [the prior] legislative maps in all future elections’ because the maps violated the Wisconsin Constitution.” The Legislature then passed redistricting maps proposed by Gov. Tony Evers. On Feb. 19, 2024, Evers signed them into law as 2023 Wisconsin Act 94. Act 94 states that the new maps go into effect for seats up in the 2024 fall general election, leaving a question about what maps apply between now and then for special and recall elections. The old maps are unconstitutional, but do the new maps apply yet? The Legislature has ended its session so a legislative clarification looks unlikely. The general election is on Nov. 5, 2024, with a primary on Aug. 13, 2024. A special election is due for Senate District 4. The seat is vacant after Sen. Lena Taylor resigned her seat to become a Milwaukee County Circuit Court judge. Meanwhile, a second effort to recall Rep. Robin Vos (R-Rochester) is underway. The court said that weighing in on what maps apply to special and recall elections would be an impermissible advisory opinion. “Act 94 is not before us in the Clarke case and any examination of these maps departs from the relief requested in Clarke v. WEC,” the court wrote. The court said it would not "make a pronouncement based on hypothetical facts," adding that the Wisconsin Elections Commission bears statutory responsibility for administering elections. |
Donate
Help WJI advocate for justice in Wisconsin
|