By Gretchen Schuldt
​
​An unwritten agreement made by a district attorney to forego criminal charges in a child abuse case in exchange for a couple's agreement to terminate parental rights is enforceable, the state Court of Appeals ruled Thursday.

The ruling by the three-judge District IV appellate panel affirms a decision by Juneau County Circuit Judge Stacy A. Smith dismissing with prejudice criminal charges brought against the couple after the district attorney's office changed hands.

The appellate panel, however, dodged the question of whether Smith correctly decided the case based on prosecutorial misconduct by former controversial Juneau County District Attorney Michael Solovey. Instead the panel, in a decision written by Appellate Judge Rachel Graham, held that the state, among other things, did not meet its burden to show the agreement was against public policy.

Graham was joined in her decision by Appellate Judges Brian W. Blanchard and Jennifer E. Nashold.

The couple, Debra and Steven Rippentrop, were each charged with multiple felonies related to child abuse they allegedly committed against their son around 2014 and 2015.

Law enforcement first got wind of potential abuse in January 2015, when the son, then 14, told law enforcement that he ran away because the Rippentrops were restraining him "24 hours a day seven days a week," Graham wrote. 

The adult Rippentrops admitted it, but said they did so "as a desperate measure to prevent him from harming himself or others due to violent and destructive behavior," Graham said. 

The issue was referred to Solovey for review, and the county began a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS) case. Solovey expressed some concern about A.B.'s credibility and whether a jury would believe his testimony.

The son, identified in the decision as "A.B.," ran away again later that year. He again reported abuse, and the county human services department placed him with other relatives, who eventually adopted him. 

Solovey, who was aware of the CHIPS case, got together with Debra and Steven Rippentrop and their lawyer, Kerry Sullivan-Flock, and made an offer. Solovey would forego issuing criminal charges if the Rippentrops gave up parental rights and ended all contact with A.B., Graham said. The couple accepted.

Solovey said he was concerned that the CHIPS case could result in A.B. going back to their home, which Solovey believed was not in A.B.'s best interest.

Solovey notified law enforcement and attorneys in the corporation counsel's office of the agreement and later told the guardian ad litem representing A.B.'s interests.

He testified later that his decision was “ '[not] received well,' and that the office of corporation counsel was not happy about his decision to not charge the Rippentrops with criminal offenses," Graham wrote. 

The Rippentrops began meeting their obligations under the agreement. They stopped contesting allegations in the CHIPS case and began pursuing voluntary termination of their parental rights.

Unhappy officials in the corporation counsel's office began a John Doe proceeding in early 2016 that the Rippentrops did not learn about for about three years. Solovey attended, but was not allowed to cross-examine witnesses or to testify.

By Gretchen Schuldt

​Convicted fifth- or sixth-offense drunk drivers must serve at least a year behind bars and cannot be placed on probation, the state Court of Appeals ruled Wednesday.

“The law does not authorize the circuit court to impose but stay the sentence and instead place the defendant on probation,” Appellate Judge Shelley A. Grogan wrote for the District II panel. The decision reversed a ruling by Waukesha County Circuit Judge and Supreme Court candidate Jennifer Dorow. 

Grogan has endorsed Dorow’s opponent in the race, Daniel Kelly, and has been publicly critical of Dorow.

In the OWI case, Grogan was joined in her opinion by Appellate Judges Lisa S. Neubauer and Maria S. Lazar.

The court returned the case to circuit court so Lynne M. Shirikian can be given more incarceration time.

Shirikian was arrested for fifth-offense drunk driving, a felony, in May 2020. A blood test showed a blood alcohol level of .299, well above legal limits, Grogan wrote.

She was released on bail with a condition of absolute sobriety, which she violated. The state charged her with felony bail jumping in a separate case.

Shirikian eventually pleaded guilty to the OWI fifth and to refusal to consent to a blood test. 

At sentencing, the prosecutor, Mary Caitlin Brejcha, argued the felony bail jumping made for a more serious case. 

“It pointed out that while out on bail on the initial charge, Shirikian was caught at a store again trying to conceal alcohol … and she had also been drinking, as evidenced by the .096 preliminary breath test performed at that time,” Grogan wrote. 

Shirikian, in response, said that she is an alcoholic who relapsed because of COVID-19.  

Defense counsel, Donna Jean Kuchler, also told the circuit court that since the bail-jumping charge, Shirikian had received treatment and had been sober for seven months,” Grogan wrote. Although refusal to take a blood test “is normally an aggravating factor,” the defense contended, “here, she was so drunk that ‘[s]he didn’t know what was going on.’ ”

Dorow, in her sentencing remarks, said the state law mandated a minimum of 18 months in prison unless she could find that a lesser sentence is in the best interest of the community and the public would not be harmed. She also was required to make a record of those findings.

“That’s a tough one for me,” Dorow said during the sentencing hearing. “How do I make a finding that confinement of less than one year and six months is in the best interest of the community, and will not harm [the] public, when you’ve had four priors? When you’ve been given the opportunity for probation in the past? Can I do that under the circumstances of this case?”

Eventually, though, she did. Dorow sentenced Shirikian to three years in prison followed by two years of extended supervision, but stayed the sentence and put Shirikian on probation for three years with nine months incarceration with work-release privileges.

Afterward, the prosecutor, relying on an analysis from the state Department of Justice, told Dorow the drunk driving law relied on another statute that required Shirikian to serve at least a year of incarceration, even with the exception to the 18-month presumptive minimum. 

The state filed a motion for resentencing, which Dorow denied, saying that resentencing would violate her double jeopardy protections. The state appealed.

The state’s reading of the OWI law is correct, Grogan wrote for the panel. The language of the statute is unambiguous, and the state’s progressively harsh OWI penalties shows that Dorow’s interpretation is unreasonable.

“It would likewise be unreasonable to interpret this statute, as the circuit court suggested, to mean that a court could sentence a fifth- or sixth-OWI defendant to as little as one day in jail, which is less than the required sentence for a second OWI offense,” Grogan wrote.

The panel ordered resentencing for Shjirikian, rejecting Dorow’s double jeopardy contention.

“Because Shirikian’s sentence was not lawful, she has no legitimate expectation of finality in it, and resentencing her does not violate double jeopardy,” Grogan said.

By Gretchen Schuldt

​The Wisconsin Institute for Law and Liberty is appealing a circuit court decision preserving a scholarship program designed to increase student diversity in colleges.

WILL argues that Jefferson County Circuit Judge William F. Hue got it wrong when he said the Minority Undergraduate Retention Program, operated by the state’s Higher Education Aids Board, survived “strict scrutiny,” the most-stringent level of judicial review. The program provides grants of $250 to $2,500 per year to students who are Black, American Indian, or Hispanic, or who are former citizens of Laos, Vietnam, or Cambodia. Eligible students also must attend private, nonprofit colleges or technical colleges. 

Hue found the state had compelling interests in post-enrollment racial diversity and providing financial aid to students who might not otherwise have access to it. Those interests, WILL said in a brief filed Tuesday, were “not previously recognized by other courts.”

Hue also found that no race-neutral alternative would serve the state’s interests and that the program was sufficiently temporary and was narrowly tailored because it did not take money from other aid programs, WILL said. 

The state has not yet filed a reply brief.

WILL, representing five plaintiffs opposed to the program, contended in its District II Court of Appeals brief that Hue did not properly apply strict scrutiny standards. Instead, he relied on a U.S. Supreme Court case, Grutter v. Bollinger, “with a starkly different policy and some law review articles rather than the entire body of admissions case law,” WILL argued. 

In Bollinger, the Supreme Court ruled that the Equal Protection Clause did not prevent the University of Michigan Law School from considering race in admissions decisions to obtain the benefits that come from a diverse student body. The court found that the school’s individualized review of student applications meant that acceptance or rejection would not be automatically based on race.  

It is undisputed, WILL said in its brief, “that the Grant program excludes large swaths of students from consideration solely based on their race. The barred groups include not only Caucasian students, but students from India, China, Afghanistan, and the Middle East. A student who is not a member of one of the preferred racial groups selected by the Legislature in the 1980s is ineligible, full stop, no matter the extent of the student’s need."

WILL wrote that “In fact, appellants have located no policy in higher education or otherwise that provides a complete racial bar and still survives strict scrutiny."

By Gretchen Schuldt

The state Supreme Court will hear arguments Tuesday in a case that could have a profound impact on how hospitals and doctors treat patients and the degree of control patients have over their medical care.

At issue is whether patients or their representatives can demand treatment that their caregivers believe is below an adequate standard of care.

The Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, ruled in May that Aurora Health Care did not have to administer ivermectin to John Zingsheim, a COVID-19 patient. Ivermectin, promoted by some as a COVID treatment, is primarily used as an anti-parasitic in farm animals and is given to humans to treat some parasites and scabies. It has not been approved by the FDA for COVID-19 treatment. 

Aurora declined to administer the drug, requested by Zingsheim’s representative, Allen Gahl, who is the plaintiff in the appeal. Waukesha County Circuit Judge Lloyd Carter first ordered Aurora to administer ivermectin, then said Gahl should find a physician willing to administer the drug and to whom Aurora could grant credentials to practice in its hospital. Once credentialed, that doctor would have permission to go to the hospital and administer the ivermectin to Zingsheim.

Aurora appealed and won. Then-Appellate Judge Lori Kornblum wrote that Gahl “failed to identify any law, claim, or recognized cause of action under Wisconsin law by which a patient may compel a health care professional to administer a course of treatment contrary to that medical professional’s judgment,” so the lower court “erroneously exercised its discretion in granting Gahl injunctive relief.”

Appellate Judge Shelley A. Grogan, in dissent, said Carter ruled reasonably when he issued the injunction directing Aurora to credential a doctor willing to give the treatment to Zingsheim.

Zingsheim recovered.

Aurora, in its brief to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, agreed that Gahl failed to meet legal standards to be granted the relief he sought. In addition, it argued, “There is no authority that would give hospital patients a legal right to demand a specific treatment against the medical judgment of their providers.”

Aurora is represented by attorneysJason J. Franckowiak, Michael L. Johnson, and Randall R. Guse.

Karen Mueller, the lawyer representing Gahl, said in her appeal brief that “It has been established in the record that the hospital relies heavily on the CDC and the FDA for directions on what drugs to give and what drugs to withhold from their patients.” 

Mueller accused Aurora of “strict and blind adherence to unconstitutional edicts, guidelines and administrative rules of federal agencies who had loftier goals than keeping John Zingsheim and many other Wisconsin citizens alive.” 

Both parties have allies in the case. The Wisconsin Medical Society and the American Medical Association filed a joint amicus brief supporting Aurora. Two groups, the Front Line COVID-19 Critical Care Alliance and the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, are weighing in on behalf of Gahl.

The AMA and Medical Society said reversing the appellate decision would mean that doctors will be forced “to choose between the law and their ethical duties, potentially exposing patients to harm and physicians to liability.” 

Ivermectin is not-an FDA-approved COVID treatment, attorneys Patricia Epstein Putney and Melita M. Mullen wrote.

“To the contrary, the FDA cautions that taking ivermectin – even in amounts approved for human consumption – can interfere with other medications” and cause a variety of reactions ranging from nausea to “seizures, coma, and even death,” they wrote.

Doctors can administer off-label prescriptions if they minimize risk, the treatment is backed by evidence and clinical experience, and the treatment is shown to improve patient outcomes, they said. 

“Novel treatments do not become part of the standard of care simply because they are ethically attempted, however,” they said. “And physicians do not breach ethical or legal duties by declining to administer them. Consequently, even if a physician could ethically treat COVID-19 with ivermectin, patients have no legal or ethical entitlement to that care.”

The Physicians and Surgeons group, in supporting Gahl, said Grogan’s dissent was right and that Wisconsin law “does fully recognize the right of a patient ‘to request and receive medically viable alternative treatments.’ That right would be meaningless if a powerful, revenue-maximizing business such as Aurora could interfere with access to treatment without judicial review, as the panel majority decision mistakenly establishes.”

The FDA found “decades ago” that ivermectin is safe, attorneys Rory E. O’Sullivan and Andrew L. Schlafly wrote in the brief. Many physicians have prescribed it for countless COVID-19 patients, they said.

“Yet Aurora blocked access to that physician-prescribed medication by patients trapped in its hospital,” they said. “Aurora never disclosed to the public that patients who admit themselves to that hospital will be automatically denied this medical care that is widely available outside of its hospital. As Aurora benefits enormously from its nonprofit tax status in purportedly serving the public, it can hardly hide behind its private status now to evade judicial review for how it senselessly blocked access to medication by all the patients hospitalized there for COVID-19.”

Attorney Joseph W. Voiland, writing for the Critical Care Alliance, said overturning the Court of Appeals decision would “preserve the equitable and statutory authority…of trial judges to grant temporary injunctive relief, particularly in matters where a patient is on their deathbed without many, if any, other option.” 

Mueller, Schlafly, and Voiland have represented and advocated for conservative causes in the past, such as arguing that the 2020 presidential election was “stolen” (Mueller), filing suit to challenge the Affordable Care Act (Schlafly), or submitting an amicus brief for Sen. Ron Johnson in Wisconsin’s ballot-box case (Voiland).

I wish I didn’t have to pick up the proverbial pen and write this as I am forced to revisit prior tragedies and traumas of our society. However, for context and clarity of current events it is necessary. It starts with a headline: “10-year-old Wisconsin boy charged as an adult in fatal shooting of mother over Amazon order of VR headset.” Yes, a tragedy of immense pain for a family, a community, a nation. There’s hurt, pain, anger, frustration, confusion, questions, and emotional fatigue as the community and the courts react and respond to the reality that in Wisconsin a 10-year-old is under the original jurisdiction of the adult criminal court if charged with a homicide offense. See Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1)(am).
 
I am sorry if this starts off and comes off as an emotional appeal, but 10 years old is 10 years old! Our great and progressive State of Wisconsin should not be charging 10-year-olds in adult criminal courts, subjecting them to the state’s harshest penalties. A 10-year-old facing up to 60? In our state? The community was shocked at a 10-year-old being charged as an adult — but not the courts. In fact, our lawmakers in their wisdom thought this to be a good idea when they codified this sentiment in 1995. See 1995 Wisconsin Act 77. This has been the law in Wisconsin for more than 26 years. It is time for us to revisit and rethink this immediately!
 
But how did we get to where we are today, where we are charging 10-year-olds as adults? We have to revisit another tragic event. In 1991, an 11-year-old Racine boy stood on the roof of a community center and shot a man dead as he left the building. The boy had been put up to this by some older teens. However, under the then-existing law, the 11-year-old could not be charged as an adult and was sent to a treatment center. At that time, Racine County Circuit Court Judge Dennis Barry (now deceased) was outraged that the 11-year-old could not be charged as an adult. So he vowed to revise the juvenile justice code to make this a new reality, partnering with Bonnie Ladwig, a Republican representative (also now deceased) who served on a committee tasked to revise the code.
 
The reason this law needs to be revisited is that it was born out of frustration and reaction to a tragic event that provided no simple solutions. What do you do with an 11-year-old who was used by two teen gang members to commit an egregious act? Our lawmakers were under the spell of the now-debunked popular myth of the '90s about the rise of “juvenile super predators.” In addition, the lawmakers did not have at their disposal the solid research we have from the neuroscience community concerning adolescent brain development. In simple terms, the research empirically demonstrates that children are different than adults and should be treated differently than adults because of the “diminished culpability” of the juvenile.
 
In the last decade, the United States Supreme Court has relied on and accepted the research as the basis of numerous policy-changing decisions. The courts have established that children are categorically less deserving of the harshest forms of punishment. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). In Miller, the court reiterated that children are fundamentally different from adults and the sentencer must take into accounts a juvenile’s “lessened culpability” and “greater capacity to change.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 465. The changes that made it possible to charge 10-year-olds as adults in Wisconsin are a product of good intentions fueled by bad science, bad policy, and the politics of race.
 
Believe it or not, there was a time when the “children’s court” did not exist. Children and adults accused of crime were lumped together in their treatment. This began to change in 1899 in Illinois with the establishment of the first juvenile court. Wisconsin followed suit with its juvenile court in 1901. Recognizing the need for two systems in the 1900s, we have somehow lost our way and gone backwards in the 21st century, as our laws deem it appropriate to treat 10-year-olds with adult charges and adult sanctions. With what we know now in law, public policy, and science, how can we be all right with a 10-year-old treated as an adult to punish him, when it is quite obvious he has serious emotional and behavioral issues that need to be treated — not in a punitive environment but in a patient and parental setting. This 10-year-old may have some messed up things going on, but he is not a monster. He needs help on so many levels, as he will eventually deal with the grief of not having a mom.
 
If this child is kept in the adult court, he will be exposed to an extreme sentence for his age and will not receive the treatment needed. This child will potentially go untreated until he can he learn how to read and write properly and get his GED, which are prerequisites before any treatment in the adult system. In the meantime, how do we cancel out puberty for this child in an adult setting? And let us not be ignorant of the fact that hundreds of 14- to 16-year-olds have lived in maximum security prisons in Wisconsin for decades. With his charges, the reality of this child staying in a juvenile home until he is 17 or 18 is not realistic. To keep him in the adult system is cruel and unusual and is the equivalent of executing a child, creating a pseudo adult — because there is no such thing as a 10-year-old adult.
 
Let me wrap this up with a story — a true and tragic story. In 1858 in Mobile, Alabama, an enslaved 10-year-old black boy named Godfrey was accused of murdering another child. Godfrey was charged, tried, found guilty, and, after his judgment was upheld, subjected to the harshest penalty of the day. Godfrey was hanged at the age of 10. I have to believe that we are a better society than the pre-Civil War 1858 slave society that felt it was okay to hang a 10-year-old as if he was deserving of the state’s worst form of punishment. Godfrey v. State, 31 Ala. 323 (1858).
 
I have to believe we are better. In the name of Godfrey, we have to be better.

Chief Judge Mary Triggiano reported that Milwaukee County Circuit Court is emerging from the pandemic, and the public and justice system participants can look forward to the future with optimism.

The misdemeanor court backlog is gone, and 475 jury trials have taken place since July 2020. Although “it was no cake walk,” the court’s commitment to public health and safety allowed the court to reopen more quickly than other courts around the state, she said.

Triggiano gave a state-of-the-court address at the Milwaukee Bar Association’s luncheon meeting on Wednesday, October 12.

“Sometimes things worked out” but other times the court “had to go back to the drawing board,” she said.

She called the pilot misdemeanor night court run by Judge Christopher Dee a success and noted the addition of multiple felony courts to address the felony court backlog, with reserve judges and court reporters hired using extra funding. Milwaukee County’s felony backlog still makes up about 12% of the backlog statewide, she said.

She thanked Deputy Chief Judges Judge William Pocan and Carl Ashley for their assistance in guiding the court through the pandemic while managing their own caseloads. She also thanked Wisconsin Court of Appeals Judge Maxine Aldridge White “for always taking [her] phone calls” and providing advice.

Triggiano indicated that despite the court’s best efforts, the public health crisis took a toll on court staff, causing a wave of resignations and retirements. In addition, the court is impacted by the shortage of defense attorneys available for appointment by the State Public Defender.

However, recent funding has allowed for the hiring of eight law clerks for the civil division. The court has received a grant for an eviction diversion coordinator. And Triggiano and Clerk of Court George Christenson worked on a budget that increases staff pay to attract and keep high-quality employees.

The court also plans to expand its mental health court, she said.

Following Trigginao’s talk a panel of three judges answered questions about the court’s adoption of videoconferencing for court proceedings.

Judge Jane Carroll indicated that videoconferencing “is here to stay” and was one good thing that came out of the pandemic. The court now needs to figure out how to best incorporate it going forward, she said.

Judge David Feiss remarked that virtual proceedings have made the court rethink its operations. For instance, criminal court had often held “cattle calls” with many cases given the same time for appearance and a full courtroom waiting for cases to be called, he said. Virtual proceedings caused a shift to staggered schedules, which “has improved the quality of the services we provide,” he said.

Judge Kevin Martens noted that virtual proceedings may have increased access for some self-represented parties who previously faced challenges in getting to the courthouse.

Martens was chief of the civil division during the pandemic and estimated that the length of time civil cases took to resolve probably doubled during the pandemic. However, even though resources may have been taken from the civil division to help the criminal division tackle the backlog there, the pandemic impacted the civil division less than the criminal division because many civil hearings could easily move to a virtual format.

Carroll echoed that comment. Because the family division does not hold jury trials and rarely involves someone in custody, that court was able to move very quickly to virtual proceedings, she said.

Martens indicated that when jury trials returned to the courthouse the entire civil division was allowed only one civil trial per week. That number is now up to four trials per week, he said.