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By Alexandria Staubach
The year is just two weeks old, but two cases--one with significant implications for the criminal justice system--already have notable court activity. In the Wisconsin Court of Appeals District 3, a defendant in a criminal case filed his opening appellate brief seeking a declaration that a 468-day detention without appointment of counsel or a preliminary hearing violated his due process rights. James Grandberry sat for 14 months without even a copy of the complaint describing the allegations against him. He filed pro se motions to dismiss along the way. Grandberry’s case stems from the state’s first wiretap case aimed at disrupting the distribution of fentanyl. The case was filed under seal. Grandberry was arrested in summer 2024, but counsel was not appointed until September 2025, and his preliminary hearing was delayed until then. For individuals who remain in custody, preliminary hearings are supposed to take place within 10 days. But court commissioners in Brown County found exception to the rule at least seven times over 14 months. Granberry’s attorneys filed an interlocutory appeal—meaning an appeal before judgment in the trial court. The Court of Appeals, in its decision agreeing to hear the case, cited a 2022 Court of Appeals decision in State of Wisconsin v. Nhia Lee. In Lee, the appeals court ruled that a 113-day delay in appointment of counsel violated Lee’s rights, leading to dismissal without prejudice. A dismissal without prejudice allowed prosecutors to refile the charges. The Lee appeal was initially taken to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, but after oral arguments that court dismissed its review as “improvidently granted.” Justice Rebecca Dallet in Lee noted that the court was minimizing important questions “about the efficacy of Wisconsin's process for appointing counsel for indigent defendants, which protects one of a defendant's most important constitutional rights.” Grandberry’s appeal asks 1) whether “during his exceedingly long stay in jail,” the lower court appropriately considered all of the relevant factors in finding good cause to continue to extend the time to appoint counsel and hold the preliminary hearing, and 2) whether Grandberry’s due process rights were “denied by delay.” In the second case, the ACLU of Wisconsin, the national ACLU’s Voting Rights Project, and the Law Forward law firm join forces seeking to intervene in litigation brought by the federal administration against the Wisconsin Elections Commission for refusing to give the U.S. Department of Justice confidential information about Wisconsin’s registered voters. “It has been widely reported that the United States intends to use this data to build an unauthorized national voter database and to target voters for potential challenges and disenfranchisement, and the United States’ own representations to states tend to confirm those suspicions,” the coalition’s memorandum says. A press release from the ACLU of Wisconsin says Wisconsin is among 21 states, plus the District of Columbia, that the U.S. DOJ has sued to obtain sensitive voter data.
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By Alexandria Staubach The shuttering of WisconsinEye earlier this week has left a gaping hole in the public’s ability to watch what their officials are doing. For nearly 20 years, Wisconsin advocacy groups, community organizers, and independent journalists have relied on WisconsinEye, or “WisEye.” It provided comprehensive coverage of Capitol happenings and has been the state’s only gavel-to-gavel coverage of the Legislature, Supreme Court, Elections Commission, and more. WisconsinEye shut down on Dec. 15 due to a lack of funding and failure to meet minimum fundraising goals required to take advantage of a $10 million match offered by the Legislature earlier this year. It provided unedited, live coverage of full proceedings, as well as an important archive. WisconsinEye’s coverage allowed WJI staff and citizens across the state and nationwide to analyze arguments and identify the positions of Wisconsin’s legislators, justices, and executive branch officials without filter. Its closure highlights a dangerous trend: the decline of civic infrastructure. With the coverage and archive gone, tracking what happens at the Capitol becomes exponentially harder. Fish big and small—from formal media to nonprofits to active Wisconsinites of all parties and interests—will shoulder the weight of WisconsinEye’s demise. Wisconsin Justice Initiative's small staff is located in Milwaukee. WisconsinEye’s coverage of legislative hearings allowed staff to watch them without taking an entire day to travel to Madison. WJI has already missed a public hearing on proposed legislation to increase the maximum penalty for certain controlled substance offenses occurring near a homeless shelter. Kate Duffy, the woman behind Wisconsin’s @motherhoodforgood, spoke to WJI about the importance of WisconsinEye to what she does on that social media platform. Duffy's platform, with more than 100,000 followers, aims to make individual advocacy and civic engagement accessible to its followers. “As an independent content creator and civic educator, access to WisEye is essential to my work,” said Duffy. “More people are getting their news from social media, and many of us who aim to reach these audiences don’t have access to a traditional newsroom or the ability to be at the Capitol every day,” she said. Duffy said WisconsinEye allows her "to see for myself what’s actually happening in legislative hearings and floor sessions, without filters or spin.” “At a time when trust in information is fragile, WisEye remains one of the few truly objective, public-facing sources available,” she said. “Keeping it funded is critical to transparency and public understanding.” Amanda Merkwae, advocacy director at the ACLU of Wisconsin, confirmed that importance, telling WJI, “WisconsinEye plays a vital role in keeping the public informed and holding those in power accountable through transparency.” “Watching legislative floor sessions and committee hearings, Wisconsin Supreme Court oral arguments, and other programming on WIsconsinEye is part of my near-daily routine," she said. It’s unclear whether or how WisconsinEye could continue. Earlier this week a message replacing the decades-long archive of hearings and live coverage said in part: “Without consistent annual funding . . . citizens, legislators, legislative staff, the governor’s administration, agency leadership and staff, trade associations, attorneys and the courts, local government officials, journalists and all print, cable, television and radio news outlets, businesses, nonprofit organizations — all lose the only reliable and proven source of unfiltered State Capitol news and state government proceedings.” It attributed the shuttering to “extreme competition and a complete collapse in private funding.” That message has since been replaced by one highlighting the station’s award-winning coverage and years of service:  Legislation circulated for co-sponsorship by Sens. Mark Spreitzer, Kelda Roys, and Chris Larson and Rep. Brienne Brown earlier this week may provide an answer.
A new bill proposes the establishment of an Office of the Public Affairs Network to replace WisconsinEye. According a memo regarding co-sponsorship, the proposal “creates a permanent office to operate a public affairs network that will provide full coverage of state government proceedings in Wisconsin.” The memo says the Office of the Public Affairs Network would administer a network to:
The network would be governed by a board of seven, including the governor or their designee, two additional public appointees of the governor, and four legislators—one from the majority and one from the minority caucuses in both chambers. The Legislature would appropriate $2 million annually to support eight staff positions, which, according to the memo is equivalent to WisconsinEye’s “current coverage while supporting increased access.” The bill also directs the Department of Administration to “attempt” to obtain WisconsinEye’s digital archive to be incorporated into the new network’s archive. “While WisconsinEye's current contract requires them to hand over digital archives to the Wisconsin Historical Society for ongoing public access if WisconsinEye is ever dissolved or liquidated, WisconsinEye’s current funding issues have resulted in WisconsinEye taking the archives offline without a replacement becoming available,” wrote the senators. In the memo, the senators say the bill will transform “the recording, broadcasting, and archiving of Wisconsin’s state government proceedings from a failed private venture into a reliable, nonpartisan public service.” No matter the form, WisconsinEye’s coverage is critical to effective advocacy and public access to the actions of elected officials. “WisconsinEye’s live webcasts and recordings of state legislative proceedings in Wisconsin provide transparency and critical access to democracy for residents all over the state,” Merkwae told WJI. “We hope the Legislature can come to an agreement to continue this essential service, not only for individuals and organizations engaging in legislative advocacy, local government officials impacted profoundly by state government decisions, and journalists, but for everyday Wisconsinites who have a right to an accessible way to access what is happening in state government,” she said. By Margo Kirchner
The administrative warrant held by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers for the arrest of Eduardo Flores-Ruiz at the Milwaukee County Courthouse on April 18, 2025, was simply a form signed by an ICE agent. ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Supervisor Anthony Nimtz testified on Monday during the trial of Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Hannah Dugan that he signed the Flores-Ruiz administrative warrant, known as an I-200, on April 17. Dugan is charged with interfering with ICE agents’ arrest of Flores-Ruiz at the county courthouse on April 18. The type of warrant ICE officers held is an issue in the case. Nimtz acknowledged during his testimony that ICE officers did not have a type of warrant that allowed them to enter nonpublic areas but instead had the I-200 signed by Nimtz. He added that Milwaukee County officers are directed to not let ICE make arrests in nonpublic portions of the county courthouse. He said that arrests in a courthouse avoid safety risks for ICE officers, as subjects have been screened for weapons when entering the building. According to Nimtz and the copy of the Flores-Ruiz warrant shown in court, an I-200 warrant commands an ICE officer to take the individual into custody for removal proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Nimtz testified that Flores-Ruiz met two characteristics of ICE policy for arrest: public safety issues and having reentered the country illegally after removal. Noncitizen Flores-Ruiz had previously been ordered to leave the country on Jan. 15, 2013. Nimtz acknowledged that whether a prior order of removal like Flores-Ruiz’s 2013 order is to be reinstated is also up to ICE officers. They can issue warrants of removal—or orders of deportation—using a form known as an I-205. On cross-examination by Dugan's attorney, Nicole Masnica, Nimtz admitted that ICE arrests could use arrest warrants issued by federal judges or administrative law judges, but in Flores-Ruiz’s case the warrant was one signed by him as an ICE supervisor. A field operations worksheet (FOW) about Flores-Ruiz signed by Nimtz on April 17 and shown to the jury on Monday included Flores-Ruiz’s address. Nimtz agreed that the type of warrant he issued could not be used to go into someone’s home. Nimtz acknowledged an error in the FOW paperwork, which directs notice to the police department where an ICE arrest will take place. The FOW for Flores-Ruiz noted district 2, which is on the southside of Milwaukee, rather than district 1 where the county courthouse is located or even district 3 where Ruiz lived. Nimtz said he did not notice the error at the time. Nor did he make sure he had an accurate understanding of the charges in Flores-Ruiz's Milwaukee County court case when he signed the FOW and I-200. Nimtz said that at the time he signed the documents he thought Flores-Ruiz had pending charges for strangulation or suffocation. Nimtz found out only later that the actual charges against Flores-Ruiz were misdemeanor battery charges. He acknowledged on cross-examination that safety protections for ICE officers regarding courthouse arrests would still exist if ICE officers waited to arrest a subject when the subject is leaving the building.  WJI policy analyst Alexandria Staubach speaks at a rally outside the Historic Federal Courthouse in Milwaukee on Dec. 15, 2025. Photograph by Jessica Schmidt. Wisconsin Justice Initiative policy analyst Alexandria Staubach spoke about the importance of protecting court proceedings at a Monday rally addressing the multiple consequences of Immigration and Customs Enforcement presence in Wisconsin courthouses. “When a place that is designed to protect you, protect your right to a fair and impartial trial, your right to protection, your right to dignity and equal treatment before the law, becomes a trap to ensnare people seeking justice, we are all less safe,” Staubach said. She added that victims, witnesses, and the accused don’t disappear but “just stay home.” The rally took place just prior to opening statements in Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Hannah Dugan’s federal trial on charges of obstructing a federal agency and concealing an individual to prevent arrest. Dugan is accused of assisting an immigrant, Eduardo Flores-Ruiz, evade ICE arrest by providing him access to a restricted hallway and directing federal agents away from her courtroom. Dozens of organizers and community members gathered outside the federal courthouse in Milwaukee, braving low digit temperatures to register their discontent with Dugan’s prosecution. Staubach noted in her comments the power of federal prosecutors, including recently appointed Interim U.S. Attorney Brad Schimel. “We’re going to say the quiet part out loud for Brad Schimel,” said Staubach, a former assistant district attorney in Colorado. “Prosecutions are discretionary.” Maxwell Love, the state political and campaign director for the Working Families Party, told WJI the coalition holding the rally was built “so that we could bring the case into the ‘court of public opinion.’” The group seeks “to make sure that the Milwaukee community could engage in a conversation about our values of fairness, due process, and democracy since we couldn’t be present in the courtroom,” Love said. The group highlighted the detrimental impact ICE presence has in the courthouse and its chilling effect on access to justice. “If due process can be violated for one group, it can and will be violated for all,” Wisconsin Working Families Party director Corinne Rosen said. “Today we stand together in this freezing cold to reject fear.” Christine Neumann-Ortiz, executive director of Voces de la Frontera, discussed the human impact and feelings of insecurity and intimidation created in immigrant community when ICE stands between them and access to justice. Louis Davis, executive director of SEIU Wisconsin led the crowd in chanting, “Your struggle is my struggle.” Nick Ramos, executive director of the Wisconsin Democracy Campaign got the crowd going in yelling, “This is what democracy looks like.” The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reported that the chants and supportive honking could be heard inside the courthouse. Opening statements for Dugan’s trial began immediately after the rally. Prosecutors leaned heavily on the idea that courthouse arrests are “safe” and “routine,” and that Dugan’s “judicial robe didn’t put her above the law.” Dugan defense attorney Steven Biskupic said that conjecture about a chaotic morning was leading the federal prosecution and that Dugan did not obstruct law enforcement pursuit of Flores-Ruiz. Biskupic said Dugan directed federal law enforcement away from her courtroom in accord with a draft policy previously circulated by Chief Judge Carl Ashley to the Milwaukee County judges, telling them to direct federal agents to their supervisor. Biskupic said Dugan had not yet heard whether or for whom the federal agents had a warrant and so she did not intend to obstruct any action on their warrant. Biskupic also showed a screenshot of a group chat between federal agents, which suggested they had decided, on their own, not to arrest Flores-Ruiz in the courtroom hallway. A video shown during Biskupic’s opening remarks showed federal agents walking behind Flores-Ruiz at a leisurely pace as he exited the sixth floor of the courthouse where Dugan’s courtroom is located. The federal government plans to call up to 28 witnesses in the case and the trial is expected to last around five days.  WJI's Alexandria Staubach speaks at a rally outside the Historic Federal Courthouse in Milwaukee on Dec. 15, 2025. Photograph by Jessica Schmidt. By Alexandria Staubach The Wisconsin Court of Appeals last week invalidated part of a law that permitted individuals, institutionalized as "not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect” (NGI) and later released, to be sent back into state custody for mere rule violations.  Judge JoAnne F. Kloppenburg wrote for the three-judge panel in District IV, joined by Judges Brian W. Blanchard and Jennifer E. Nashold. The case centered on the institutionalization, release, and reinstitutionalization of Desmond J. Wilhite. Wilhite had been found NGI on a charge of threatening a law enforcement officer and committed to the care of the Wisconsin Department of Health Services. In November 2022, the state stipulated to Wilhite’s conditional release, stating that he “did not 'currently pose a significant risk of harm to self, others, property.'” As a result, the circuit court ordered Wilhite conditionally released in February 2023 to the same community residential facility where he previously resided. That release was later revoked by Dane County Circuit Court Judge Josann M. Reynolds. DHS had sought to have Wilhite’s conditional release revoked based on DHS rule violations, the nature of which were not specified in the appellate court’s opinion. The statute at issue allowed revocation and reinstitutionalization of NGI-committed individuals who had been released based on 1) violation of a release condition set by the court or DHS, or 2) the individual’s current dangerousness. Reynolds found that the state had met its burden of proof regarding rule violations by Wilhite and that it was "'not a situation where (she had) to find dangerousness.'" Wilhite argued on appeal that the law was unconstitutional on its face because it allowed a circuit court to revoke an NGI individual’s conditional release based solely on a violation of a court-ordered or DHS rule, absent proof of dangerousness. Wilhite relied on federal law to argue that it “always violates due process” to commit an individual to institutional care without proof of dangerousness, because due process requires release from commitment when the individual is no longer dangerous. The court of appeals agreed. Kloppenburg wrote that if an individual is conditionally released, the court must necessarily find that an individual no longer presents a danger to themselves or the community. “(I)f a court finds that an NGI acquittee is no longer dangerous, the court must release the acquittee because the constitution prohibits continued commitment.” After that, “the inference of dangerousness from an NGI verdict is no longer sufficient to justify commitment; rather, dangerousness must be established as a matter of fact,” she wrote. “It follows from this that, to avoid violating due process, a circuit court many not commit to institutional care a conditionally released NGI acquittee without making a new finding of dangerousness,” Kloppenburg wrote. “(I)n all such cases the court has previously determined that there was not clear and convincing evidence that the acquittee is dangerous.” Because state and federal law require a finding of dangerousness to justify the detention of an NGI individual, the portion of the statute allowing reinstitutionalization for rule violations alone is unconstitutional, the court held. The court left in place the remainder of the statute. Wilhite’s case was reversed and remanded to the circuit court with directions to vacate the order that revoked his conditional release and recommitted him to institutional care.  Former Chief Justice Ziegler is outraged by changes to Supreme Court's internal operating procedures9/9/2025 By Alexandria Staubach
Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler says the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has abandoned two-year-old internal operating procedures that took power from the chief justice and gave more decision-making authority to an administrative committee controlled by the court's majority. Ziegler discussed the recent procedural changes in her dissent to a July 2025 decision declining to establish a permanent specialty court for complex business litigation. “The public will not know what occurred behind closed doors for this about-face to take place,” said Ziegler about the changes in procedure, which occurred since Ziegler was replaced as chief justice. Wisconsin Watch in 2023 published the heated emails exchanged between justices when the majority formed by Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, Rebecca Dallet, Jill Karofsky, and Janet Protasiewicz changed internal operating procedures shortly after Protasiewicz took her seat on the court. The changes took power away from the chief justice—at that time Ziegler. Ziegler served two two-year terms as chief justice, from 2021-2025. This spring, the same majority that changed the rules in 2023 voted in two new chief justices, first Walsh Bradley, whose term on the court expired at the end of July, and now Karofsky. Ziegler was the only chief justice to deal with the more liberal majority’s internal operating procedures. Ziegler complained in her dissent that "these four justices embrace process when it is convenient and disregard process when it is not." Back in 2023, she said, "(t)he 'court of four,' unlike any majority in history, ensured that it would completely control what had always been understood as the constitutional authority of the chief justice." Ziegler wrote in her dissent that “almost immediately" after her ouster as chief, the court “reverted to the original practices and procedures that had been in place for over four decades.” The “nearly two-year-old changes to our administrative practices and procedures relating to the constitutional role of the chief justice were undone.” Ziegler called the about-face “the exercise of sheer will to undo the constitutional role of the chief justice, when convenient, and reinstate it, when opportune,” calling it a “power grab” and “complete disregard for process.” As for the matter of the business courts, Ziegler criticized the court’s decision to terminate the nearly decade-old pilot project for specialty business courts. She said the decision to end the business court project was a disservice to the memory and work of former Chief Justice Patience Roggensack, who led the court from 2015 to 2019. “The majority does this without any regard to the fact that former Chief Justice Roggensack viewed this initiative as of upmost importance.” Ziegler did not acknowledge in her opinion that conservatives also have a history of changing court procedure when it suits them. Ten years ago, Republicans used a constitutional amendment to replace the 126-year-old practice of the longest-serving justice serving as chief. At the time, Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson was the longest-serving chief justice in the state’s history, having taken the helm in 1996. Some felt then that conservatives were attacking the liberal Abrahamson. A campaign backed by $600,000 from the state’s largest business group resulted in passage by voters in April 2015 of a constitutional amendment allowing the justices to vote for chief justice. Abrahamson sued over the amendment but lost. Roggensack became chief on May 1, 2015, having been voted in shortly after the amendment passed. When the new majority of justices in August 2023 passed internal operating procedures to take away certain powers of the chief justice, Dallet said in a statement that they “were primarily made to ensure that any one person could not hold up the work of the entire court.” The statement came at the opening of the court’s 2023-2024 term, during which the court issued a record low of 14 opinions. The court’s productivity is up, with 23 cases decided in the 2024-2025 term. However, the numbers still lag behind the average of 50 decision cases in the previous decade, according to a report from University of Wisconsin’s State Democracy Research Initiative.  By Alexandria Staubach Milwaukee Municipal Court has been held in contempt for its failure to comply with an order directing it to record hearings. Milwaukee County Circuit Judge David L. Borowski on Monday found that Milwaukee Municipal Court (MMC) made “insufficient attempts” to comply with his December 2024 order instructing MMC to record certain proceedings as required by municipal court procedural law. Borowski admonished MMC for its failure to comply with his order, calling the violations “egregious,” especially given MMC’s special position as a court charged with enforcing law. He said the failure to comply was “exacerbated by the fact that the only burden imposed on MCC to record during a hearing, is for someone to simply press ‘record.’” Borowski said the facts demonstrated conduct that was “so consistently lacking and preposterous” that MMC’s failure to comply exceeds the intentionality standard for contempt and “might very well be a knowing—and intentional—disregard of this court’s orders.” Saying that MMC was "clearly only capable of following" the statute requiring recording of certain hearings by being forced to record everything, Borowski ordered MMC "to RECORD ALL COURT HEARINGS moving forward." (Caps in original.) Borowski sanctioned MMC with a fine of $1,000 per day if it fails to comply with the new order requiring recording of all hearings, but gave the court 14 days before fines would start. He also ordered MMC to pay all reasonable attorney’s fees of Legal Action of Wisconsin for counsel's efforts since December 2024 to force compliance. Since December, Borowski has rejected as insufficient two policies proffered by MMC. In April, Borowski set forth an exact list of hearings that MMC must record. At that time, Borowski told the municipal court to develop a new policy that “must explicitly require electronic recording of ALL of the following”:
In Monday’s order, Borowski laid out how despite MMC’s failed attempts to develop a policy, it has still been subject to his order to record the enumerated hearings. Nevertheless, MMC persists in failing to record them. Petitioner’s attorney Susan Lund sought proof of compliance after the December order. In the documents MMC provided to show its response, Lund found that between May 5 and May 19 MMC held 54 hearings where a defendant’s indigency was relevant and thus required recording. MMC recorded fewer than half of those hearings. MMC “has admitted they have the capacity to record EVERY hearing that they hold, with the only inconveniences involved in doing so being, charitably, hitting a ‘record’ button, and uncharitably, more easily being held accountable for the content of their hearings,” wrote Borowski. "Respondents, by their conduct following this court's December summary judgment order, have shown what is at least a complete inability to follow, if not a calculated disregard, for this court's orders," he wrote. Wisconsin law defines contempt of court as intentional disobedience, resistance or obstruction of the authority, process or order of a court. Because of judicial rotations, Judge Paul Van Grunsven will decide the exact amount of attorney's fees MMC will owe Legal Action of Wisconsin.  Inside the Milwaukee County Courthouse. Photograph by Gretchen Schuldt. By Heidi von Helms* and Margo Kirchner
Due to AmeriCorps funding cuts made by the Department of Government Efficiency, the Milwaukee County Courthouse navigator program is gone, and its absence is already affecting courthouse staff and visitors. A recent court victory by Wisconsin and other states challenging the cuts to AmeriCorps funding may not be enough to bring it back. For the past two years, courthouse navigators walked individuals to the department or courtroom they were looking for. The courthouse complex consists of three buildings, each with at least two entrances, and it is easy for members of the public to get lost and confused. With the navigators’ help, fewer people were wandering the halls and trying to figure out on their own what they needed to do and where to go, which made the lives of visitors and courthouse staff easier. When the program’s funding through AmeriCorps grants and volunteers terminated suddenly on April 25, the program was shut down. Now, the courthouse remains as convoluted as ever. A single staff member remains at the information desk on the ground floor, but that person cannot leave to escort people to offices or courtrooms and cannot guarantee that a visitor makes it to the right place. The AmeriCorps information desk and navigator program began in 2023 through the Milwaukee Justice Center (MJC) at the courthouse. MJC staff, who provide legal assistance at the courthouse, noticed they were answering many questions unrelated to the law or courtroom procedure—like where to find parking or which floor has the paternity testing center. MJC staff also found that after they helped people understand and complete legal forms, many of those helped never went through with filing the forms, possibly due to fatigue, confusion or frustration regarding different offices in the courthouse. Someone needed to answer the public’s questions, but the MJC’s desk was intended for legal help, so the MJC launched the navigator program with AmeriCorps grant funding and personnel. The program was a vital resource for the community. Mark Guzman, the former director of the AmeriCorps program at the courthouse, spoke with Wisconsin Justice Initiative before his position terminated at the end of May. He said his AmeriCorps staff members unexpectedly lost their jobs and volunteer stipends after the DOGE cuts. Many of the navigator program’s AmeriCorps volunteers were from out of state and had moved to Milwaukee to work at the courthouse. Wisconsin recently won a preliminary injunction in a multi-state case challenging the federal government’s AmeriCorps cuts. A federal judge on June 5 found that the government violated the Administrative Procedure Act by not providing notice and opportunity for comment before making the changes. The judge ordered the administration to immediately reinstate grant funding and AmeriCorps personnel, if they are able and willing to return. The injunction was "to restore the AmeriCorps-funded programs in the plaintiff states to the status quo before the grants were terminated and programs closed on April 25, 2025," she wrote. Federal government attorneys told the court in a June 10 status report that they had notified grant and project sponsors in the plaintiff states "to stop any closeout activities that may have been initiated (and) resume incurring costs on applicable grants." The injunction is a preliminary one; the case continues and an appeal may be filed. But even if the trial court's injunction stands and becomes permanent, lack of time and clarity on reversing course currently weigh against the navigator program’s reinstatement. Mary Ferwerda, chief deputy clerk for Milwaukee County Circuit Court, told WJI this week that “returning back to where we were is a practical issue with lots of questions, not the least of which is future funding and the risks inherent in moving forward without a legal process entirely complete.” Because AmeriCorps volunteers were “exited from service,” they may not be allowed to return to that same term of service, Ferwerda said. Right now it is unknown what the national AmeriCorps office may allow, she said. Further, the grant year was set to end Aug. 31, with the volunteers’ last day on Aug. 15. “This is not a lot of time for people to try to make up the currently seven weeks of hours they missed in order to qualify for their education award and does not consider the work required to bring back exited members, if allowed to do so.” Guzman’s layoff as of May 30 makes the prospect or reinstating the program even more difficult. Because the AmeriCorps participants were volunteers, not employees, former navigator staff members could not receive unemployment. AmeriCorps received $400 million of funding each year and had one of the best returns-on-investment for a government agency. It provided millions of Americans with disaster relief, economic opportunities, environmental services, and education. It helped hundreds of thousands of young people begin their careers in public service. Following the budget cuts, important programs all over the country were pared back or dissolved, including Milwaukee’s own courthouse navigators and help desk program. It is unclear whether the recent court win will bring them back to life. *Heidi von Helms in a summer intern at Wisconsin Justice Initiative. Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The rule for this is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision. The “upshot” and “background” sections do not count as part of the 10 paragraphs because of their summary and necessary nature. We’ve also removed citations from the opinion for ease of reading but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. Italics indicate WJI insertions except for case names, which are also italicized.  Karofsky The case: LeMieux v. Evers Majority: Justice Jill Karofsky (12 pages), joined by Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, Rebecca Dallet (except for five paragraphs), and Janet Protasiewicz Concurrence: Dallet (4 pages) Dissent: Justice Brian Hagedorn (20 pages), joined by Chief Justice Annete Ziegler and Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley Upshot We uphold the 2023 partial vetoes, and in doing so we are acutely aware that a 400-year modification is both significant and attention-grabbing. However, our constitution does not limit the governor's partial veto power based on how much or how little the partial vetoes change policy, even when that change is considerable. As our precedent recognizes, the governor's constitutionally-vested, quasi-legislative role defeats "any separation of powers-type argument thta the governor cannot affirmatively legislate by the use of the partial veto power." Indeed, the governor's reliance on his partial veto authority to potentially increase taxes without legislative approval is neither new nor unique in our partial veto jurisprudence. Background The Wisconsin Constitution provides that every two years the legislature is to pass a biennial budget. This budget establishes the level of revenue to be derived from taxes and other sources, as well as authorized expenditures. The process begins with the governor presenting the legislature with an executive budget bill. The executive budget bill then proceeds through the legislature’s multi-step review and report process involving the joint committee on finance and legislative fiscal bureau. The legislature then submits its bill to the governor. Before signing the bill into law, the governor may partially veto parts of the bill. Subsequently, the legislature may vote to override the governor’s partial vetoes by a supermajority. This process was followed for the 2023–25 biennial budget. First, the governor presented his 2023–25 executive biennial budget bill, which included three educational revenue limit increases . . . . Next the legislature reviewed the governor’s proposed budget bill and made modifications. Senate Bill 70 provided for a $325 per pupil revenue limit increase for both 2023–24 and 2024–25, without a subsequent inflationary index. Then the governor exercised his partial veto power, deleting portions of 2023 Senate Bill 70. As related to this matter, the governor deleted entire words and some numbers . . . The result . . . authorized a $325 per pupil revenue limit increase from 2023–2425, extending the provision by 400 additional years. . . . The senate subsequently voted to override the partial vetoes, but the assembly declined to vote on the override. Consequently, the effort to override the governor’s vetoes failed. The law went into effect and this original action followed. Per Hagedorn, the plaintiffs are two taxpayers. Guts In challenging the 2023 partial vetoes, petitioners do not ask us to overrule our precedent. Petitioners agree that the partial vetoes at issue satisfy the principles we have applied in our previous cases. Instead, petitioners bring two novel challenges. First, they contend that the 2023 partial vetoes violate the state constitution because the governor did not veto the bill “in part” when he extended a duration of time, as 402 years is not part of two years. Second, petitioners maintain that the 2023 partial vetoes violate the constitution because that provision prohibits the governor from striking digits to create new numbers. *** Over the past 90 years, our precedent has established four principles that we have applied to “deletion vetoes,” the traditional partial veto in which the governor strikes text: Deletion veto principles 1. The governor’s deletion vetoes are constitutional as long as the remaining text of the bill constitutes a “complete, entire, and workable law.” 2. The governor may exercise deletion vetoes only on parts of bills containing appropriations within their four corners. 3. The governor’s deletion vetoes may not result in a law that is “totally new, unrelated or non-germane” to the original bill. 4. The governor may strike “words, letters, or numbers.” But “the governor may not create a new word by rejecting individual letters in the words of the enrolled bill.” Nor may the governor “create a new sentence by combining parts of 2 or more sentences of the enrolled bill.” Separate from deletion vetoes, there is one scenario in which the governor may exercise “write-in” vetoes by striking certain text and then writing in different text: Write-in veto principle The governor may strike an appropriation amount and write in a smaller appropriation amount. *** Karofsky writes that Evers' partial veto at issue in this case complies with the four deletion veto principles. The following three paragraphs were not joined by Dallet. Having addressed all four deletion veto principles, we turn to petitioners' request to apply the . . . write-in veto principle here. Petitioners ask that we invalidate the 2023 partial vetoes because under a prior case, the 402-duration created by these partial vetoes is not "less than" and thus not "part" of the legislatively-approved two-year duration. Even though 402 years are clearly more than two, the prior case does not apply here. In a prior case we evaluated the unprecedented scenario in which the governor decreased an appropriation amount from $350,000 to $250,000 by deleting “350,000” and writing in “250,000.” We determined that this write-in partial veto was constitutional under the very narrow facts presented in that case. . . . We concluded that because the write-in veto was only to an appropriation amount, and $250,000 is less than $350,000, $250,000 was part of $350,000 for purposes of the constitution. *** Here, we are tasked with evaluating a change in years, not appropriation amounts, which plainly falls outside a prior case’s holding and analytical principles. Petitioners fail to reckon with that case’s explicit boundary and do not attempt to equate appropriations with durations. As significantly, petitioners do not ask that we overrule or revisit our precedent. Therefore, we do not extend the write-in veto principle to the 2023 partial vetoes. *** Joined again by Dallet. Turning to whether the governor impermissibly deleted digits, the plain meaning of “word” does not include numbers written out using digits, and the plain meaning of “letters” does not include digits. By way of example, all agree with petitioners that the number “ten” is a word written with letters. However, when we write the number “10” using digits, we have used no letters. Simply put, letters and digits are not interchangeable for purposes of the pertinent constitutional provision. This has not demonstrably changed since 1990 when this provision passed. *** The bottom line is that the partial vetoes were within the bounds of the constitution. But the legislature is not without recourse. It has multiple options at its disposal, including: Future budget bills: Unlike an appropriation amount typically spent during the biennium in which the funds were appropriated, the 2023 partial vetoes affect revenue limits 400 years into the future. Accordingly, the legislature may address those partial vetoes during the 2025–27 biennial budget process, or in a subsequent biennial budget. Constitutional amendment: The legislature has the power to introduce a constitutional amendment. In the past 35 years, the people of Wisconsin have twice amended the constitution to limit the governor’s partial veto power. . . . Legislative drafting: Legislators may draft bills separate from appropriation bills to avoid the governor’s partial veto. And, legislators may anticipate the governor’s use of her or his power when crafting appropriation bills.  Dallet Concurring I agree with the majority/lead opinion’s conclusion that the partial vetoes at issue in this case do not violate . . . the Wisconsin Constitution. I write separately, however, because I have a different understanding of Petitioners’ argument that those partial vetoes are unconstitutional . . . and why that argument should be rejected. Accordingly, I join all but five paragraphs of the majority opinion. The constitution authorizes the governor to approve appropriation bills “in whole or in part . . . .” Petitioners argue that the partial vetoes at issue here exceeded the governor’s authority . . . because he did not approve “part” of the original bill. They cite to two prior cases for the assertion that the ordinary meaning of “part,” at least when applied to numbers, is “something less than a whole.” They claim that applying that definition in this case requires us to determine whether, as a matter of “substance rather than form,” the governor’s partial vetoes approved “something less than [the] whole” of what the legislature passed. And because the substantive effect of those vetoes was to increase the two-year duration the legislature passed to a 402-year duration it never contemplated, the governor’s partial vetoes did not approve something less than the whole of what the legislature passed. Petitioners’ argument has some support in the reasoning of a prior case. Indeed, one reason we cited for upholding the veto at issue in that case—crossing out a $350,000 appropriation and writing in $250,000—was that the result of the veto was substantively “part” of what the legislature originally passed. As we said then, $250,000 is “part” of $350,000 because it is “something less than” $350,000. That case’s use of this reasoning, Petitioners contend, demonstrates that there is a threshold requirement, imposed on all partial vetoes by the constitution, that the result of the veto must be substantively “part” of the original bill. Petitioners’ substantive-part analysis should be rejected, however, because it cannot be squared with the rest of our cases interpreting the constitution, none of which Petitioners ask us to overturn. We have long held that the only test . . . for whether a veto approved “part” of a bill is simply whether the veto results in a complete and workable law. Thus while Petitioners argue that their substantive-part analysis is separate from, and in addition to, the “complete and workable law” requirement, our case law in fact holds that if the veto results in a “complete and workable law,” then the veto approved the original bill “in part.” But even more importantly, our cases have repeatedly emphasized that a partial veto may affirmatively change the policy of the original bill. As we said in a 1976 case, “the constitutional requisites . . . fully anticipate that the governor’s action may alter the policy as written in the bill sent to the governor by the legislature.” In other words, the governor may, through a partial veto, change the bill’s substance. To date, the only limitation we have placed on the governor’s ability change the substance of a bill via partial veto is that a partial veto may not “result in the creation of totally new, unrelated or non-germane provisions.” While this limitation does require the substance of the post-veto text to be related in some way to the substance of the pre- veto text, it does not require the post-veto substance to be “part” of the pre-veto substance. *** In sum, I reject Petitioners’ argument that the constitution requires the result of a partial veto to be substantively “part” of what the legislature originally passed because it is incompatible with our long- standing approach to the constitutionality of partial vetoes . . . . And perhaps for the same reasons, even the dissent does not adopt Petitioners’ position. Instead, the dissent argues that we should revisit all of our case law under these provisions of the constitution, at least since 1935. Although I am open to revisiting our . . . jurisprudence, this case is not a “clear opportunity” to do so. Petitioners do not ask us to overturn any of our prior decisions, let alone reimagine completely our approach . . . . Accordingly, because upholding the partial vetoes in this case is consistent with our precedent, I respectfully concur.  Hagedorn Dissent
How does a bill become a law? According to the majority, one option looks like this: The legislature passes a bill in both houses and sends it to the governor. The governor then takes the collection of letters, numbers, and punctuation marks he receives from the legislature, crosses out whatever he pleases, and—presto!—out comes a new law never considered or passed by the legislature at all. And there you have it—a governor who can propose and enact law all on his own. This fantastical state of affairs did not appear all at once. The people of Wisconsin gave the governor the power to partially veto appropriation bills 95 years ago. But as governors pushed the boundaries over the last half-century, this court largely responded by throwing up its hands. And now, what the constitution calls the power to “approve[] in whole or in part” has transformed into the monarchical authority of one person to create brand new laws from scratch. Instead of reading what the bills actually say, and construing the partial veto power accordingly, this court treats bills presented to the governor as simply a set of alphanumeric ingredients from which the governor can cook up whatever he pleases. One might scoff at the silliness of it all, but this is no laughing matter. The decision today cannot be justified under any reasonable reading of the Wisconsin Constitution; the majority does not suggest otherwise. Yet when presented with a clear opportunity in this case to reboot our mangled jurisprudence, the majority responds by blessing this constitutional monstrosity, all the while pretending its hands are tied. The cases the majority relies on make a mockery of our constitutional order. This is a mess of this court’s making, and it is long past time for us to fix it. *** Our founders were intentional about placing the legislative power in the hands of the legislature. They designed the Wisconsin legislature to be the institution most animated by, representative of, and responsive to the people. This representative design was meant to “unit[e] a disparate group of people into one society” by providing a collective “mechanism for bringing together, negotiating, and resolving the different interests.” Following the pattern of the federal constitution, the Wisconsin legislature is the institution “by which the body of the people can act; the only way in which their opinions can be known and collected; the only means by which their wills can be united, and their strength exerted.” In other words, by vesting the power to legislate in the legislature, the Wisconsin Constitution situates the power to make laws in “the collective wisdom of the people and their representatives.” *** The veto power is an aberration from and exception to the default constitutional structure. A veto gives the governor a powerful voice in whether a legislative proposal becomes law. This function is not naturally within the power to execute the law. Rather, it serves as a limit on the legislature’s vested power to make law. Alexander Hamilton similarly described the president’s veto in Federalist No. 73 as a “qualified negative” meant to check legislative power. The delegates to the Wisconsin Constitutional Convention of 1846 were clear that “the governor’s powers should be limited and the primary lawmaking power should reside with the legislature,” while acknowledging a narrow exception for the gubernatorial veto. In that way, the “veto is simply one of the instances in which our framers broke off a small piece of power that naturally belongs in one branch and put it in another.” But this quasi-legislative power to veto is still at root the power to influence legislation by subtraction, not addition. All laws—policy proposals that have been formed into legal commands and instructions in a bill—must come from the legislature. And while the governor may reject bills presented to him, he may not affirmatively design them on his own. This is Wisconsin’s constitutional design. *** Hagedorn then discusses how the supreme court strayed in prior caselaw. So how should the court handle the 402-year “veto”? By doing what the majority suggests, but never does: “’focus on the constitutional text, reading it reasonably, in context, and with a view of the provision’s place within the constitutional structure.’” Once we do so, it is clear that the Governor’s “veto” in this case is not a veto at all, but merely gubernatorial lawmaking that is repugnant to our constitutional structure. As we have explained, a “veto” is a power of negation. It allows the governor to do nothing more than to reject laws that the legislature has proposed. The fundamental nature of a veto does not change just because the governor can veto “part” rather than all of an appropriation bill. The partial veto simply means that the governor can now reject policy proposals contained within an appropriation bill instead of being forced to reject it in its entirety. As a power to “reject,” it may assuredly change aspects of the legislature’s collection of policy prescriptions; the legislature may get most of its proposals, but not all of them, enacted into law. But what the partial veto clause does not do is establish a second lawmaking branch of government. The governor has no constitutional power to create new proposals that did not originate with the legislature or go through the constitution’s lawmaking process. An appropriations bill is not merely “a potpourri of individual letters, an alphabet soup if you will,” as the majority assumes. It contains draft statutes reflecting specific policies that have been considered and voted on by the legislature. This is what the constitution commands with all laws. So when the governor rejects part of an appropriations bill, the policy proposals that remain after the governor exercises his partial veto must still have been created and approved by the legislature in the first instance. Once again, we cannot lose sight of the constitution’s structure. The legislative power is vested in the legislature. And the constitutional amendment giving the governor power to partially veto appropriation bills did not change this. Here, when the bill left the legislature’s hands, it permitted school districts to exceed their base tax revenue for two years, the 2023–24 and 2024–25 school years. By striking out numbers, words, commas, and some hyphens, the governor rewrote the bill to say that districts could increase their revenue by those amounts from 2023 through 2425. The legislature never proposed extending the increase through 2425. This simply was not a policy proposal considered and voted on by both houses of the legislature. This is not a policy that was presented to the governor for approval. And contra the majority, we are permitted to read the words in the bill and make sense of them, not just consider the bill an alphabet soup of options. Thus, after the governor exercised his “veto,” there was something in the bill that did not originate from the legislature, was never subject to lawmaking procedures, and was not presented to the governor. This is plainly unconstitutional. It is true that the petitioners here do not explicitly ask us to . . . formally roll back the missteps of our prior cases. But where the governor’s actions are so out of step with the constitutional order, and where we are asked to apply the constitution, “the principle of stare decisis should yield to a result consistent with the plain meaning of the words within the amendment.” Instead of treating the fractured legal framework with another quick fix of judicial epoxy, it is time to raze it to the ground. By Alexandria Staubach
Milwaukee Municipal Court continues to dodge its obligation to record hearings by proposing an insufficient new policy in response to a court order. Milwaukee County Circuit Judge David Borowski rejected the municipal court’s proffered new policy but clarified some of the municipal court’s responsibilities. Borowski held in December 2024 that the municipal court and its judges had consistently failed to comply with statutorily imposed recording requirements for hearings on motions to reopen as well as hearings addressing a defendant’s ability to pay. Such hearings must be recorded so an appellate court can review them. Borowski placed the municipal court under his supervision and ordered the municipal court to comply within 90 days. He reserved the right to hold hearings every three to six months to monitor compliance. Over the years, Milwaukee Municipal Court developed several different categories of hearings and limited recordings to only what it called “indigency hearings,” even though judges regularly took up a defendant’s ability to pay in other hearings as well. Borowski found in December that names of court proceedings are an invention of Milwaukee Municipal Court and the court could not avoid recording requirements through its naming system. He ordered the municipal court to “fully implement” policies and procedures to electronically record every hearing in which “(1) a decision is made as to a motion to reopen a case (regardless of whether said motion is made orally or in writing, regardless of the label or category assigned to said hearing, and regardless of the ultimate result of the hearing) and (2) a determination is made as to the defendant’s ability to pay a judgment due to poverty (regardless of the ultimate result of the hearing).” In March 2025, Milwaukee Municipal Court submitted to Borowski a plan that purported to bring it into compliance but failed to address key components of his December order. The policy Milwaukee Municipal Court submitted again only applied to “indigency hearings.” Further, it shifted the burden of recording from the municipal court to the court’s bailiffs and said the municipal court would no longer grant “motions to reopen based on pleadings alone but rather schedule a hearing,” as a result of Borowski’s decision. Milwaukee Municipal Court sought clarification from Borowski because it thought his December decision was “reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation,” asking Borowski to point out the “specific circumstances requiring a hearing in open court” that would trigger the recording requirement. Last week, Borowski found that the proposed policy Milwaukee Municipal Court presented “lacks sufficient clarity to ensure compliance with the Court’s Decision and Order.” He directed the municipal court to develop a new policy that “must explicitly require electronic recording of ALL of the following”:
The new order forbids the municipal court from placing the obligation of recording on bailiffs. “Court staff may be responsible for turning on the recorder, but the policy and procedure must clarify that any recording must be made at the direction of the judge,” Borowski wrote. Milwaukee Municipal Court has 14 days to develop a new policy, Borowski said. Borowski noted that nothing in his December order requires Milwaukee Municipal Court to hold a hearing on a written motion or when a judge would otherwise dispose of a matter by written order. “Judge Borowski’s April 21, 2025 order is very clear guidance to any municipal court that is still unsure which hearings must be electronically recorded,” said Susan Lund, attorney for the plaintiff who brought the case challenging Milwaukee Municipal Court’s recording procedures. |
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