By Gretchen Schuldt

​A man who did not have a chance to cross examine the officer who issued him a citation or to present evidence on a new charge determined by a judge is entitled to a new trial, a state appeals court ruled Tuesday.

District 1 Court of Appeals Judge Timothy G. Dugan did not even decide the case on the issue raised by defendant Roosevelt Cooper, Jr. – that he was denied discovery – but instead relied on Milwaukee County's recognition of errors in Cooper's trial.

"As the County acknowledged in its supplemental brief, '[a]t no point throughout the trial was Cooper afforded the opportunity to question or cross-examine' the officer and 'Cooper was denied his right to trial,' ” Dugan wrote. "A review of the record confirms the County’s characterization of the proceedings."

Cooper was cited in December 2020 for reckless driving / endangering safety. The officer who issued the citation testified at trial before Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Jonathan Richards that the officer observed Cooper speeding and making multiple lane changes while close to other vehicles. The officer said Cooper was driving about 80 mph in a 55-mph zone.

The officer's dash cam video showed that Cooper drove on a non-traffic area of the roadway, changed lanes without signaling, and drove faster than the cars around his, Dugan wrote. Cooper said he swerved into the non-traffic area to avoid an accident with a car in front of him when its driver slammed on the brakes.

The video, however, was never moved into evidence and Dugan said in a footnote that Cooper was not under oath when he began explaining his actions. "It was not until the county started questioning Cooper following Cooper's explanation of the video that Cooper was put under oath," he wrote.

At the end of the bench trial, Richards said he could not see where Cooper endangered safety, but that Cooper was speeding, passed six cars, and drove in the non-traffic area, Dugan wrote. The judge found Cooper guilty of unreasonable and impudent speed. 

"The county expressed confusion over the finding, and the clerk interrupted saying that Cooper was not charged with speeding," Dugan wrote. The county said it could amend the charge to unreasonable and imprudent speed "and over Cooper’s objection, the trial court accepted the amended charge and found Cooper guilty" of the charge.

Richards ordered Cooper to pay a $100 forfeiture, according to online court records.

The county, in its appeals briefing, said a judge has the power to amend a charge to conform to the evidence, but that the court also must find that the parties consent to the change, Dugan wrote. That is also state Supreme Court precedent, Dugan said.

"The county...concedes that the trial court failed to make any finding that Cooper consented to the amended charge, and in fact, the county maintains that Cooper was clear that he did not consent to the amended charge," Dugan said. "The county also concedes that the trial court failed to give the parties an opportunity to present additional evidence to support the amended charge." 

In addition, "Despite receiving an assurance that he would have an opportunity to question the officer, Cooper received no such opportunity," Dugan wrote.

While he is not required to accept the county's concessions, it is appropriate in this case, Dugan said.

"As a result, this court concludes that Cooper is entitled to a new trial on the amended charge of unreasonable and imprudent speed," he said.

By Gretchen Schuldt

​A Meijer Store employee's use of derogatory, homophobic terms when talking about a co-worker disqualified her from unemployment after she got fired for the comments, a divided state Court of Appeals panel ruled recently.

Susan A. Wozniak's comments constituted harassment, Appellate Judge M. Joseph Donald wrote in the 2-1 decision for the District I Court of Appeals panel. He was joined by Appellate Judge Maxine A. White. Appellate Judge Timothy G. Dugan dissented.

The decision affirms Milwaukee County Circuit Judge William S. Pocan, who ruled in favor of the Department of Workforce Development in its action against the state Labor and Industry Review Commission.

LIRC had contended that Wozniak was entitled to unemployment benefits; DWD disagreed.

The case began when Wozniak, frustrated that a fellow greeter was not doing his job, complained to co-workers. One of them reported the conversation to management, saying that Wozniak said the co-worker was a “pretty boy,” “fairy,” and “fruit loop.” Wozniak also said that he was gay, and that “the way he skipped around the store made her sick,” according to the appeals court decision.

Wozniak, interviewed by management, admitted calling the co-worker a "pretty boy," denied calling him a "fairy," and said if she had used the other terms she should not have done so. Wozniak was suspended and eventually fired.

Meijer, in its dismissal, cited Wozniak's “discriminatory remarks towards a team member."

Wozniak filed for unemployment, and DWD found that the firing was not for "misconduct or substantial fault connected with her employment." Wozniak was entitled to benefits, the agency said.

Meijer appealed. The administrative law judge reversed DWD and ruled that Wozniak was fired for misconduct and not entitled to benefits.

Wozniak appealed again, this time to the LIRC. The administrative law judge was overturned and Wozniak was back to being eligible for unemployment compensation. The LIRC vote was 2-1.

DWD asked a circuit court to consider the matter, and Pocan eventually ruled that LIRC had erred in finding that Wozniak’s comments did not constitute misconduct or substantial fault.  

LIRC appealed.

Wisconsin law, Donald wrote, defines misconduct as one or more "threats or acts of harassment, assault, or other physical violence instigated by an employee at the workplace of his or her employer.” 

While the law does not define harassment, DWD and LIRC agreed on a definition as "words, gestures, and actions which tend to annoy, alarm, and abuse (verbally) another person. ... [h]arassment may include verbal abuse, epithets, and vulgar or derogatory language, display of offensive cartoons or materials, mimicry, lewd or offensive gestures, and telling of jokes offensive to protected class members.” 

Wozniak’s comments were derogatory and aimed at the co-worker's sexual orientation, Donald wrote.

"Whether the comments were made directly to the co-worker is of no consequence" under the statute, he said. 

LIRC contended that Meijer did not provide a definition or examples of harassment in its work rules, Donald wrote, but the law does not require that the company have an anti-harassment policy or rule. There also is no requirement that a person "knowingly" engage in harassment, he said.

"We will not read additional language into a statute," he said.

​Dugan, in his dissent, said that Meijer had not met its burden in showing that Wozniak was fired for misconduct or substantial fault.

Harassment that fits the definition of "misconduct" must include an element of intent, which Wozniak's statements did not, Dugan said.

"Her comments were not loud enough for anyone to hear," he wrote. "She did not make her comments to customers, and she did not make her comments directly to the co-worker about whom she was complaining. The record is also devoid of evidence that either of these co-workers were offended or unable to continue with their work responsibilities as a result of the conversation. Thus, Wozniak’s comments were part of an isolated incident during a brief, private, casual conversation that does not rise to the level of misconduct and that demonstrates no intent to harass her co-worker within the meaning of" the law.

While the majority did not address the substantial fault issue because it already found Wozniak committed misconduct, Dugan did. 

"As has been repeatedly stated, there is no dispute that Meijer’s workplace rules prohibited harassment but also provided no definition of what was considered harassment under the rule. ...Wozniak would have had no reason to believe that her brief, private conversation with two co-workers would qualify as harassment," he wrote. 

​To study bail jumping in Wisconsin, WJI and the Mastantuono Coffee & Thomas law firm are looking county by county at 2021 bail-jumping charges. Which counties are charging bail jumping the most? Who are some of the defendants? What happens to those cases? We'll report the statistics from individual counties and tell you the stories from randomly chosen cases.

Case file

Ashley last year racked up 14 counts of felony bail jumping, exposing her to a potential 84 years in prison on those charges alone.

Add in four counts of misdemeanor bail jumping, and she was looking at a possible 87 years – a life sentence for the 35-year-old woman – on bail-jumping charges alone.

​Then there were the other felony and misdemeanor charges she faced: 20 all together, ranging from disorderly conduct to battery to a law enforcement officer.

In each of her cases, she posted bond.

In the end, she pleaded to a variety of charges, including bail jumping. Most charges were dismissed in plea bargaining, however, and her penalty was far, far below the maximum she originally faced. 

As in many bail-jumping cases, alcohol and drug abuse played a big part in Ashley's legal problems. And in her case, so did her obsession with a man, whom she simply would not leave alone, according to criminal complaints. She broke into his home and harassed him with hundreds of unwanted texts. She was arrested several times on charges related to her obsession.

Her 2021 bail-jumping history actually began in 2019, when she was arrested in Bayfield County for drunk driving. She pleaded guilty to first-offense OWI with a child in her car and was sentenced in January, 2020, to 30 days in jail. Her license was revoked for 14 months, and Ashley was ordered to install an ignition interlock device on her car.

In February, 2020, Ashley was arrested again and charged with second-offense drunk driving, with second-offense operating with a prohibited blood-alcohol content, failure to install the ignition interlock device required after her first OWI case, and driving while her license was revoked. Her blood alcohol content was .136, according to the criminal complaint, well above the legal limit of .02 that applied to her because of the interlock requirement. 

In March, 2020, Ashley was busted for taking her car to the Bayfield County Courthouse at about 8:30 a.m. and to the Sheriff's Department at 12:15 p.m., according to the criminal complaint. Her occupational license, a result of her first drunk-driving case, allowed her to drive from 4:45 a.m. to 8 a.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. Her trips to the courthouse and Sheriff's Department occurred outside those hours. She was charged in May with two counts of driving on a revoked license, a misdemeanor. 

Circuit Judge John P. Anderson set a $500 signature bond to cover both 2020 cases.

Ashley faced her first three bail-jumping charges in July, 2021, when she was allegedly dumping clothes and other personal items belonging to her boyfriend's roommate in a burn pit and a water-filled hot tub. 

"Victim said that items were ruined including her leather boots ($400), leather jacket ($200), Samsung Galaxy S7 phone ($700) and other personal belongings," the complaint said.

A witness told police that Ashley called him the night of the incident. Ashley told him that "she found out her boyfriend was cheating on her with his ex-girlfriend/roommate so she through (sic) some of her belongings into the hot tub and took some others," the complaint said. 

Ashley was charged with criminal damage to property and entry to a locked room. Because she was still on bond for the 2020 cases, she also was charged with two counts of misdemeanor bail jumping. It's unclear from online court records whether Anderson required a bond from Ashley.

Things spun downward for Ashley. She was charged in August, 2021, with 15 new criminal counts. They included her first felonies and her first two felony bail-jumping charges. 

Police got a call on Aug. 1 from a man – apparently the same man – who was staying at his father's house. Ashley, he said, broke into his dad's and would not leave. 

She finally left in a car shortly before a deputy arrived.

"Victim reported (Ashley) was texting him nonstop obscenities and very long messages," the criminal complaint said.

Earlier that very day, shortly before 4 a.m., Ashely texted "I swear to God, if you cheated and I find out – I will cover your cock in lye" and "If you fucking cheated on me, you don't tell me the truth, and I have an STD or find out you cheated it will be very unfavorable for you and your whore."

The man told a deputy that Ashley would not stop texting him despite his requests. The deputy took pictures of Ashley's texts – more than 300 in all, according to the complaint. The man told the deputy that he was worried about what Ashley might do.

The case: Billie Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Commission

Concurrence: Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley (49 pages), joined by Justices Patience D. Roggensack and Annette K. Ziegler

Concurrence: Justice Brian Hagedorn (4 pages)

Dissent: Justice Jill J. Karofsky (39 pages), joined by Justices Ann Walsh Bradley and Rebecca F. Dallet (See part 2)

​Majority opinion: Ziegler (50 pages), joined by Grassl Bradley, Hagedorn, and Roggensack (See part 1)

Grassl Bradley's concurrence

This redistricting cycle proceeded in a manner heavily focused on color, supposedly for remedial purposes, but accomplishing nothing but racial animosity as showcased by the dissent's race-baiting rhetoric and condescension toward people of color. 

The United States Supreme Court rejected Homer Plessy's argument that racial segregation violates the Fourteenth Amendment, to its everlasting shame. Plessy exists in our nation's history as a stain, dishonoring America's quest for equality under the law for all, which began with the founding. At times, the United States has strayed from this sacred principle, often on the basis of sham social science of the day promoting the repugnant notion that people of different races would be better off if the law distinguished between them. Allowing social science to infect constitutional analysis inevitably "result[s] in grave abuses of individual rights and liberty." 
 
                                                                                  ***

Judges can certainly consider whether a particular government action has had a disparate impact on minorities – our color-blind Constitution does not countenance ignoring incidents of discrimination. Under a color-blind approach, however, this court may not order a remedy that purports to address racial discrimination by discriminating on the basis of race. The Constitution prohibits this court from sorting people on the basis of their race.

                                                                                  ***

Imposing a race-based redistricting plan, without strong evidence of necessity, endorses the stereotype that people of the same race must think alike and must think differently than people of other races. Governor Evers' plan, adopted by this court on March 3, imposed "distinctions . . . based upon race and color alone," which is "the epitome of that arbitrariness and capriciousness constitutionally impermissive under our system of government."

                                                                                  ***

The inconclusive pseudo-science presented to this court fell far short of justifying race-based redistricting, as the majority opinion thoroughly explains. It amounted to little more than selectively-cited election data, which appears to have been researched only after-the-fact. That is to say, mapmakers seem to have used racial stereotypes, not legitimate social science, to heuristically draw maps that segregated people based on race. No such "shortcuts" are allowed for proponents of race-based redistricting as a remedy for past discrimination. 

The dissent's ambitious attempt to paint Milwaukee County as the Jim Crow-era South reflects "an effort to cast out Satan by Beelzebub." The dissent would remedy what it perceives as racial disparities by literally "draw[ing] lines between the white and the black" with no apparent recognition that doing so replaces one devil with another. 

                                                                                  ***

The people have a "right to know" what happened this redistricting cycle. Unfortunately, media coverage on this case, like on so many others, has been skewed by partisan pundits disappointed in the "results." 

One media outlet went so far as to run a subheadline attacking the motives of the nation's highest court: "The justices [of the United States Supreme Court] are concerned that Wisconsin's legislative maps may give too much political power to Black people." Ian Millhiser, Black Voters Suffer Another
Significant Loss in the Supreme Court, Vox (Mar. 23, 2022)  https://www.vox.com/2022/3/23/22993107/supreme-court-wisconsinrace-gerrymander-voting-rights-act-legislature-electionscommission. Worse still, while accusing the justices of indulging an "inflammatory assumption," specifically, "[t]hat legislative maps with fewer Black-majority districts are often preferred to those that give more power to Black voters," the author made an inflammatory assumption of his own, seemingly designed to foster racial tension. See id.; see also Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court's Astonishing, Inexplicable Blow to the Voting Rights Act in Wisconsin, Slate (Mar. 23, 2022), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2022/03/supreme-court-voting-rights-shredder-wisconsin.html.

Governor Evers' oddly shaped districts are numerous — and many of the odd shapes in his plan are analogous to the PMC's (People's Maps Commission). For example, Governor Evers redrew Senate District 4, currently represented by Sen. Taylor, to extend into Waukesha and Ozaukee Counties. The result was a substantial decrease in BVAP (Black voting-age population). Under his plan, Assembly District 11 would extend to Mequon. In critiquing a similar feature of the PMC's map, Rep. LaKeshia Myers rhetorically asked, "[w]hy? That's going to cross the county line. Doesn't make sense. Doesn't make sense at all. . . . That's not going to stick when it comes to people's interest. That's not going to stick when it comes to thinking you're going to elect people that look like me."  Without any VRA (Voting Rights Act)-grounded justification, Governor Evers violated Article IV, Section 4 the Wisconsin Construction, which requires assembly districts "to be bounded by county, . . . town, or ward lines[.]" ​

Governor Evers' plan also would have harmed the Black community by forcing it to bear the brunt of disruption stemming from redistricting. While demonstrating high overall core retention, Governor Evers concentrated major changes in Milwaukee County, proposing what the Legislature fairly labelled a "most-change Milwaukee" map. According to the Legislature, Governor Evers' plan would have retained merely 72.6% of Milwaukee-area voters in their current district. In accordance with the principles expounded in our November 30 opinion, this court rightly rejects a "most-change Milwaukee," as the Legislature did with a bipartisan vote months ago. "State authorities" should not "localize the burdens of race reassignment" on a particular community. It leaves "the impression of unfairness" when a discrete and insular minority "disproportionately bears the adverse consequences of a race-assignment policy."

 Note: Hey, this one is a little different! WJI's "SCOW docket" pieces generally include decisions, dissents and concurrences all in one post. This time, with this case, we are doing it in three: First we shortcutted the decision, then the dissent, and next the concurrences. Why? Because this package of writings, and the strange U.S. Supreme Court decision that led to it, are extremely important to the state and country. Besides that, the SCOW decisions are unusually long – 142 pages, all in, not counting the cover sheets.

And instead of allowing each writing justice 10 paragraphs, we are giving each 15. Other than that, the rules remain the same. We've removed citations from the opinion for ease of reading, but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. ​Italics indicate WJI insertions except for case names, which also are italicized.

The case: Billie Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Commission

Dissent: Justice Jill J. Karofsky (39 pages),  joined by Justices Ann Walsh Bradley and Rebecca F. Dallet

Concurrence: Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley (49 pages), joined by Justice Patience D. Roggensack and Chief Justice Annette K. Ziegler

Concurrence: Justice Brian Hagedorn (4 pages)

​Majority opinion: Ziegler (50 pages), joined by Grassl Bradley, Hagedorn, and Roggensack (See part 1)

Karofsky begins her dissent with a bit of background on the "odyssey" that led to SCOW's original decision to select redistricting maps submitted by Gov. Tony Evers. That decision was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which overturned it and sent it back to SCOW, which then selected maps submitted by the Legislature.

We are careening over the waterfall because the Legislature's maps fare no better than the Governor's under the U.S. Supreme Court's rationale. If, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Governor's addition of a Milwaukee-area majority-minority district evinces a disqualifying consideration of race, then the Legislature's removal of a Milwaukee-area majority-minority district reveals an equally suspect, if not more egregious, sign of race-based line drawing. In addition, if a further-developed record is required to definitively determine whether the Governor's seventh majority Black district is required then a further-developed record is also required to definitively determine that the Legislature's removal of a majority-minority district does not violate federal law. The Court indicated that in a case like this where the court sits as the map-drawer in the first instance, the court, rather than the parties, are responsible for showing that the number of majority-minority districts required by the VRA (Voting Rights Act) constitutes the narrowly tailored remedy allowed under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. In choosing the Legislature's maps the majority repeats this court's reversible mistake by again failing to implement fact-finding procedures conducive to addressing the relevant issues under both the VRA and the Equal Protection Clause.
                                                                            ***
Karofsky briefly traces Milwaukee's history of segregation and discrimination.

The VRA's application in redistricting is designed to remedy precisely these kinds of historical wrongs – those that create current barriers to democratic participation. Instead of allowing the past unconstitutional practices of redlining and racially restrictive covenanting to continue limiting Black people's opportunity to participate in our democracy, the VRA establishes that it is a sufficiently compelling government interest to draw districts that counteract the historical racial ​gerrymander.

We must, of course, also consider the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. And in doing so, it is impossible to ignore the 180-degree turn from that clause's purpose to how it has been wielded in this case. Ratified in 1868 after the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment demands that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Since Brown v. Board of Education, the Equal Protection Clause has been invoked to desegregate this country, protect the voting rights of its citizens, and fight discrimination in its many forms.

More recently, the Equal Protection Clause has been turned on its head and used, not to fight against the constant pull of our collective historical failing toward the promise of a better future, but to bar our government's ability to remedy past mistakes. The majority opinion perfectly captures this reversal by relying on cases pontificating that "[r]acial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions," and that "[r]ace-based assignments . . . embody stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their race[.]"  This argument is nothing short of gaslighting, seemingly denying Milwaukee's history of purposeful racial segregation. It was unrelenting overt racial discrimination that balkanized Milwaukee into "competing racial factions" and reduced Black individuals to a "product of their race." The fault and responsibility to remedy this systemic segregation lies not with Milwaukee's residents but instead with the government and the society that perpetuated racial redlining and restrictive covenants. Those practices shaped Milwaukee and that history of discrimination cannot be undone by force of will alone. 

The Milwaukee area perfectly demonstrates why the VRA's race-conscious remedy is often needed. Segregation of minority communities does not happen accidentally. If this country were anywhere close to living up to the "goal of a political system in which race no longer matters," then maybe we could apply the promise of Equal Protection in a race-blind manner. But the overwhelming evidence shows that we have not lived up to that goal. As such, a race-blind and effects-blind application of the Equal Protection Clause has become a sword against progress wielded by majority groups who fear giving away too much of their accumulated power. I fervently hope it will regain its place as a shield against harmful discriminatory action.

                                                                            ***

Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, an Equal Protection analysis began with whether "race was the predominant factor motivating the [map-drawer]'s decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district. That entails demonstrating that the [map-drawer] 'subordinated' other factors –compactness, respect for political subdivisions, partisan advantage, what have you – to 'racial considerations.'" Yet, the Court's opinion did not first analyze whether race was the "predominant factor" motivating this court's districting decisions. Instead, it appeared that the Court took this court's limited analysis regarding the VRA, meant only to ensure the least-change map did not violate that law, as evidence that race – not least change – predominated our choice of maps. Our March 3 opinion never professed as much. 

While the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion said it was unclear whether this court viewed itself or the Governor as the map-drawer, we plainly stated that the court itself was the map-drawer. ("As a map-drawer, we understand our duty is to determine whether there are 'good reasons' to believe the VRA requires a seven-district configuration.")

                                                                            ***​

Despite our clear declaration that "least change" predominated our choice of maps, and despite the purported purpose of "least change" as a neutral criterion to shed ourselves of the political baggage that would be inherent in party-drawn maps, the Court nonetheless transposed the Governor's motivations onto this court. We are left to conclude that the motivations of the party submitting the map are the relevant motivations we must analyze going forward. This court can no longer hide behind a "least change" gloss to ignore a party's ulterior motives. 

The U.S. Supreme Court left us with other unanswered questions:

• Is the court required to fully address a VRA challenge when selecting a purportedly race-neutral map or have we been given carte blanche to ignore federal law?
• Which race-neutral configuration was the court to use when analyzing the Governor’s maps given the myriad potential "race-neutral" district configurations in Milwaukee?
• How do we proceed if the process we adopted prevented the parties from sufficiently testing the evidence necessary for a VRA determination?
• Could this court simply explain ourselves further to satisfy the Court's newly voiced standard?

The majority opinion attempts to shift the blame by noting that the parties stipulated through their joint discovery plan that they did not anticipate discovery "beyond the exchange of maps, expert disclosures, and any documents or data that a party intends to rely upon or an expert has relied upon." But we had the authority, indeed the responsibility, to direct further discovery or examination of expert witnesses. This court's initial reliance on the joint discovery plan was guided by the court's "least change" directive, which failed to account for the full and definitive Equal Protection or VRA inquiry the U.S. Supreme Court now demands. This persistent imprudence in developing a record has now led us to a legally untenable outcome at odds with the Court's directive. The Equal Protection and VRA claims usually litigated after the implementation of a remedial map must now be fully adjudicated as part of this decision – an impossible task on this record.

                                                                            ***
The Legislature's maps fail for two reasons: first, we are not to act as a gubernatorial veto override body; and second, the Legislature's maps show evidence of racially motivated packing and cracking that could violate both the Equal Protection Clause and the VRA. ​​

The Legislature's maps derive from a failed political process. In Wisconsin, the redistricting process follows the same process as the enactment of any law. Both houses of the legislature must pass a bill containing new maps, which is then presented to the governor who may approve or veto the bill, the latter of which the legislature may override with a supermajority vote. Here, the Legislature, having failed to override the gubernatorial veto, submitted the very same proposal to us. By now implementing that failed bill, this court judicially overrides the Governor's veto, thus nullifying the will of the Wisconsin voters who elected that governor into office. But our constitution provides only one avenue to override such a veto; no judicial override textually exists. Nor, historically, has this court ever exercised such a supreme power. By judicially enacting the very bill that failed the political process, a bare majority of this court, rather than a supermajority of the legislature, has taken the unprecedented step of removing the process of lawmaking from its constitutional confines and overriding a governor's veto ourselves. ​

In addition to being derived from a failed political process, the Legislature's maps show signs of violating the Equal Protection Clause. If, as the U.S. Supreme Court explained, the Governor's addition of a majority-minority district sufficed to show that race predominated its proposal, then equally, if not more, suspect is the Legislature's removal of a majority-minority district. Despite the majority opinion's assertions, the Legislature's maps do not appear to be race-neutral and calling the claim "indisputable" does not make it so. The Legislature's claim that it drew its maps without considering race, quite frankly, flies in the face of its transfiguration of Milwaukee's six current districts with a Black voting age population (BVAP) majority. In Milwaukee, the BVAP increased 5.5 percent while the White voting age population decreased 9.5 percent over the last decade. Those demographic changes make the Legislature's draw down of BVAP percentage in five out of six VRA districts – one by over 12 percent – with the remaining VRA district packed at 73.3 percent BVAP highly suspicious.

                                                                            ***

Self-serving professions of race-neutrality should also be ignored because the Legislature offered no alternative reasons for making decisions regarding Milwaukee's districts. The Legislature's "least change" pretext fails when it openly admits its Milwaukee-area changes substantially differed from its treatment of the rest of the state. Nor can the Legislature justify its unique redrawing of Milwaukee districts on a desire to keep municipalities whole; it split at least one relevant village, Brown Deer, by dividing its Black population between two districts. Respecting "communities of interest" also fails to justify the Legislature's actions because no party submitted evidence establishing such communities. That leaves the more nefarious partisan advantage reasoning – a reliable pretext for racial motivations. But a neutral judicial body cannot adopt a map on such a justification, especially now that the party's motives are imputed onto the court. The Legislature also has not, and could not, claim such a justification as this court barred consideration of partisanship in our redistricting process. As such, no judicially acceptable justification for the Legislature's Milwaukee-area redistricting decisions exists.

                                                                            ***

This has been a profoundly disheartening odyssey. The unavoidable political nature of remedial redistricting plagued us every step of the way. Too rarely did this process present true questions of law – this court's only area of expertise. At every change in the tide, this court seemed to choose what it hoped to be a short-cut to streamline our voyage, only to find ourselves lost and unable to do our work as a non-partisan court of law. But the redistricting process is likely to stalemate and come before this court again in the future. And when it does, I hope that we have learned our lesson. I hope that we will permit a politically insulated federal court to manage the task. Federal courts are better able to conduct extensive factfinding through trial-style litigation, a task for which we proved ill equipped. ​

The upshot

Upon review of the record, we conclude that insufficient evidence is presented to justify drawing state legislative districts on the basis of race. The maps proposed by the Governor, Senator Janet Bewley, Black Leaders Organizing for Communities ("BLOC"), and Citizen Mathematicians and Scientists ("CMS") are racially motivated and, under the Equal Protection Clause, they fail strict scrutiny.

By contrast, the maps proposed by the Wisconsin Legislature are race neutral. The Legislature's maps comply with the Equal Protection Clause, along with all other applicable federal and state legal requirements. Further, the Legislature's maps exhibit minimal changes to the existing maps, in accordance with the least change approach we adopted in Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n. Therefore, we adopt the state senate and assembly maps proposed by the Legislature for the State of Wisconsin. ​

Background

In 2011, the Wisconsin Legislature passed and the Governor signed state legislative and congressional maps after the 2010 census. Over the subsequent ten years, the population of Wisconsin changed; people moved away from some areas and people moved into others. These changes were recognized in the 2020 census, which identified a population increase in the state from 5,686,986 to 5,893,718. 

The Petitioners filed this original action in August 2021 to remedy alleged malapportionment in Wisconsin's state legislative and congressional maps. In September 2021, this court accepted the case, and in October 2021, the court directed the parties to file briefs addressing what factors the court should consider when selecting new maps. ...

On November 30, 2021, the court issued a decision explaining the framework by which the court would select maps. The court identified that under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, "a State [must] make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as practicable...."  

The court explained that, in addition to satisfying all Equal Protection Clause requirements, the court must consider compliance with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA"). ...

In its November 30 decision, the court adopted the "least change approach," whereby the court would select maps that "comport with relevant legal requirements" while "reflect[ing] the least change necessary." The court rejected the suggestion that the court consider partisan fairness and proportional representation of political parties when selecting maps.

                                                                                       *** 

On March 3, 2022, the court issued a decision adopting the Governor's state legislative and congressional maps. The court reasoned that the Governor's maps included the least alterations to preexisting maps. In addition, the court said that the Governor's maps complied with the Equal Protection Clause, the VRA, and the Wisconsin Constitution. 

After the court issued its March 3 decision, the Petitioners and the Legislature sought certiorari review by the United States Supreme Court, asserting that the court's adoption of the Governor's state legislative maps constituted a racial gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. ...

On March 23, 2022, the United States Supreme Court reversed the court's decision to select the Governor's state legislative maps. The Supreme Court confirmed that, under the Equal Protection Clause, a state government cannot draw district maps on the basis of race unless the state satisfies strict scrutiny. However, the state must possess this evidence before it creates maps based on racial classifications. 

In the case before this court, the Supreme Court reasoned that, based on the filings and presentations made by the Governor, the Governor had failed to present a strong evidentiary basis for believing the VRA mandated the district lines he drew. Specifically, the Supreme Court identified that the Governor's primary explanation for his racially drawn maps was the fact that it was cartographically possible to draw them.  According to the Supreme Court, "[s]trict scrutiny requires much more." Based on the record, the Governor's maps failed to satisfy this legal standard. ...

The Supreme Court remanded the case to us for further proceedings. The Court explained that we could "choose from among...other submissions." Alternatively, the court could "take additional evidence if [we] prefer[ed] to reconsider the Governor's maps." It instructed, however, that "[a]ny new analysis...must comply with our equal protection jurisprudence."

                                                                                       *** 
​
The Supreme Court has demanded that three specific preconditions be met before it can conclude that the creation of additional majority-minority districts may be necessary: "(1) the racial group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district; (2) the racial group is politically cohesive; and (3) the majority vote[s] sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." These three requirements are called the "Gingles preconditions." ...

The VRA requires an "intensely local appraisal" which "pars[es] . . . data at the district level" and evidences a lack of minority electoral opportunity, such that a race-based remedy is needed. ...The inquiry is emphatically not to create "the maximum number of majority-minority districts," regardless of the on-the-ground characteristics of the minority communities under consideration. ...

The guts

​Here, examining the available record, we conclude that there is not a "strong basis in evidence" that the VRA requires the use of race to draw majority-black legislative districts. Specifically, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that here, black voters have their choice of candidate blocked by a cohesive and oppositional voting bloc. 

The Governor failed to present evidence that a race-based remedy was necessary under the VRA, but nonetheless drew districts on the basis of race to create seven majority-black districts. The Supreme Court recognized that the Governor "provided almost no other evidence or analysis supporting his claim that the VRA required the seven majority-black districts that he drew."  The Supreme Court further noted that the Governor's "main explanation for drawing the seventh majority-black district was that there is now a sufficiently large and compact population of black residents to fill it apparently embracing just the sort of uncritical majority-minority district maximization that we have expressly rejected."  This is clearly in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, as a race-based remedy cannot precede proof of a VRA violation. ...

The Governor's maps were racially motivated and are thus subject to strict scrutiny. ...

He produced no evidence of electoral history and no district-specific evidence demonstrating that the black communities he moved among districts would be denied the opportunity to effectively participate in democracy absent his proposed district lines. ...

(Ziegler outlined reasons for rejecting maps submitted by Bewley, BLOC, and CMS. All, she said, failed to meet VRA requirements.)

In contrast to the maps proposed by the Governor, Senator Bewley, BLOC, and CMS, the Legislature's proposed maps are indisputably race neutral. No party argued and no evidence was provided demonstrating that the Legislature's maps were, in fact, not race neutral. The Legislature affirmed multiple times that the maps proposed by the Governor and BLOC to create exactly 51% BVAP (Black voting-age population) districts were a "racial gerrymander," and by contrast, the Legislature utilized "race-neutral criteria" to draw districts in the Milwaukee area, as it did for all other citizens regardless of race in the remainder of the state. Unlike the other parties, the Legislature never asserted that the Gingles preconditions required the drawing of majority-black districts. To the contrary, the Legislature's expert stated correctly that "the electoral patterns detailed by [BLOC] raise serious doubts about whether the Gingles threshold standard is currently met." 

                                                                                       *** ​

Only those maps that purposefully discriminate between individuals are subject to strict scrutiny. Maps come under strict scrutiny "not just when they contain express racial classifications, but also when, though race neutral on their face, they are motivated by a racial purpose or object." The standard to demonstrate racial motivations through circumstantial evidence alone is high and rarely met. The map must be "so highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate[e] ... voters on the basis of race."

                                                                                       *** 

No such evidence of discriminatory intent has been provided, and, with the presumption of good faith in mind, we cannot conclude that the Legislature's maps are so highly irregular that they are "unexplainable on grounds other than race." Unlike the Governor and BLOC, who carefully calibrated BVAP in their districts, the BVAP in the Legislature's districts varies depending on the unique geography and community characteristics of those districts. BVAP in the Legislature's districts varies from 45.8% to 71.5%. In so doing, the Legislature's maps perform very well in race-neutral criteria. Out of the plans proposed, the Legislature's maps have low population deviation and have a low number of local government splits, including in the Milwaukee-area districts. In addition, the Legislature's maps include few incumbency pairings, and they move few voters into new senate districts with different election cycles. Those characteristics are seen in the Milwaukee-area districts, as they are throughout the state. Further, the districts with high BVAP are compact and do not have "highly irregular" features common to racial gerrymanders. ... When drawing districts, race-neutral considerations drove the Legislature's decisions; racial targets did not. ...

No party challenged or presented evidence which would support a claim that any of the districts in the Legislature's maps were racially motivated. In addition, no evidence was presented in the record that could overcome the presumption of good faith or show that any district lines in the Legislature's maps, including those districts with high BVAP, were "unexplainable on grounds other than race."

The Governor and BLOC argue that the Legislature's maps violate the VRA by having one assembly district at 45.8% BVAP and another at 71.5% BVAP. However, neither the Governor nor BLOC cite authority standing for the position that, using race-neutral redistricting criteria, having low or high percentages of black voters in a given district on its own violates the VRA. ...

The Governor and BLOC also argue that the Legislature's 10th assembly district, which has 45.8% BVAP, does not provide effective democratic opportunity for black voters. Thus, the Governor and BLOC aver that the Legislature's maps include only five effective black assembly districts. However, assembly district 10 does not create a VRA violation because the Gingles preconditions are not satisfied – namely, the record does not demonstrate that black voters are usually denied their preferred candidate. In fact, the evidence demonstrates otherwise. ...

The Governor and BLOC point to BLOC's analysis on a single election result, the 2018 Democratic Gubernatorial Primary, to demonstrate that the 10th assembly district violates the VRA. We are unaware of a single case that has found the existence of a strong evidentiary record, applied the VRA, and satisfied strict scrutiny through consideration of a single result from an exogenous election in a party primary. ...

Even so, under BLOC's own statistics, the black preferred candidate won in the Legislature's 10th assembly district by a comfortable margin. According to BLOC, the black preferred candidate, Mahlon Mitchell, won a plurality of the vote and beat the next strongest candidate, the Governor, 39% to 29%. This indicates that the Legislature's 10th assembly district supports black preferred candidates, not that white coalitions stymie black electoral opportunity in violation of the VRA. ...

[T]he Legislature provides its own analysis on the 10th assembly district that contradicts BLOC's conclusions. The Legislature did not rely on one election, but instead considered the 2018 Democratic Lieutenant Gubernatorial Primary in addition to the 2018 Democratic Gubernatorial Primary. Not only did the Legislature find that the 10th assembly district selected the black-preferred candidate in the gubernatorial primary (as did BLOC), the Legislature also found that the 10th assembly district supported the black-preferred candidate in the lieutenant gubernatorial primary by a wide margin. Given this evidence, the Legislature concluded that this district would not usually exhibit white coalition voting blocking black-preferred candidates. In addition, CMS analyzed the Legislature's 10th assembly district by considering whether "the outcome in most general elections favors the Black candidate of choice" and whether "Mandela Barnes and Mahlon Mitchell [the black candidates of choice in the 2018 Democratic lieutenant gubernatorial and gubernatorial races] perform strongly in their respective 2018 Democratic primary elections." CMS concluded that the Legislature's 10th assembly district was "perfectly effective" for black voters. On this record, we cannot agree with the Governor and BLOC that the Legislature's race-neutral proposal would violate the VRA. ...

                                                                                       *** 

​Because the maps submitted by the Governor, Senator Bewley, BLOC, and CMS are eliminated for being racially motivated, we concentrate our review on the Legislature's maps. In maximum population deviation, the Legislature's maps perform exceptionally well. The Legislature's maps recognize the sizable population shifts, keep Wisconsin citizens in their existing districts and also achieve population equality across districts. The Legislature's maximum population deviation is .57% for the Senate and .76% for the Assembly. This is in line with deviations accepted by federal courts. 

                                                                                       *** 

The Legislature's maps comply with the Equal Protection Clause, along with all other applicable federal and state legal requirements. Further, the Legislature's maps exhibit minimal changes to the existing maps. Therefore, we adopt the state senate and assembly maps of the Legislature for the State of Wisconsin. 

Next: The dissent. Karofsky takes on the SCOW majority and the U.S. Supreme Court.

On April 13, 2022, Dane County Circuit Judge Everett Mitchell discussed the pipeline from child welfare to adult prison and his efforts to turn that pipeline off, how to address trauma among the youth he sees in juvenile court, shortcomings in the justice system when it comes to dealing with kids, and the role of a judge.

Ashland County

Total number of cases with bail-jumping charges: 148
Total number of misdemeanor and felony cases: 439
Percent of misdemeanor and felony cases that include bail-jumping charges: 34%

Total number of felony cases with bail-jumping charges: 110*
Total number of all felony cases: 262
Percent of felony cases that include bail-jumping charges: 42%

Total number of misdemeanor cases with bail-jumping charges: 38
Total number of all misdemeanor cases: 177
Percent of misdemeanor cases that include bail-jumping charges: 21%

Largest number of bail-jumping charges issued in a single case: 10
Number of felony bail-jumping charges issued: 198
Number of misdemeanor bail-jumping charges issued: 149

*Felony cases can include felony or misdemeanor bail-jumping charges or both; misdemeanor cases can include only misdemeanor bail-jumping charges.

Case file

Joe's legal troubles began in November 2020, when he allegedly kicked and dented his girlfriend's car, then went to their apartment where he broke a door and damaged a shower and kitchen wall, according to a criminal complaint.

Joe was charged with misdemeanor disorderly conduct/domestic abuse and misdemeanor criminal damage to property. 

Circuit Judge Kelly J. McKnight set a $2,000 signature bond and $200 cash bond. He also ordered Joe to have no contact with his girlfriend, BJ, and to stay away from the apartment where they both had been living. McKnight later, with BJ's consent, limited the no-contact order to a no-abusive-contact order.

In February 2021, Joe pleaded no contest to both counts and entered a deferred prosecution agreement, according to online court records. He also agreed to pay $3,100 in restitution. He was represented by the State Public Defender's Office in his cases, indicating poverty.

In August, Joe faced new domestic-abuse related charges. He was hit on Aug. 12 with four counts related to a May 15 incident involving BJ. He also was charged the same day with three domestic abuse counts for an Aug. 5 incident, again involving BJ.

In the May case, which BJ told police about on the day it happened, Joe allegedly smashed her phone, pulled her hair, and head-butted her, according to the complaint. He also called her derogatory names and said she was "fat" and "psychotic," BJ told police.

BJ told officers that Joe "was a meth user and he had not used for a couple of days."

He got upset, she said, when she tossed him her phone and it went over his shoulder. 

Joe was charged with misdemeanor battery/domestic abuse, disorderly conduct/domestic abuse, criminal damage to property, and bail jumping.

Regarding the August instance, according to the complaint, BJ told police she went out with her girlfriends the night before, leaving her children in Joe's care. When she returned, Joe was upset, grabbed her hair, and punched her twice. She left with the children and learned later in the day that Joe had skipped work and was still at the residence. BJ said Joe also had pulled her hair shortly before police arrived and that he had damaged the bathroom door.

BJ "stated that she believed (Joe) may seriously injure or kill her," the complaint said. She also said that Joe "consumed meth a day ago, and that he usually gets crabby if he does not have it for a day." 

Joe was charged with more misdemeanors – battery/domestic abuse, disorderly conduct/domestic abuse, criminal damage to property, and misdemeanor bail jumping.

​This time, McKnight set a $750 cash bond and a $2,000 signature bond to cover both cases. McKnight ordered Joe to stay away from the woman and the apartment, and he extended Joe's deferred prosecution agreement, according to online records.

Joe posted bond and was released but was back in court in October, this time facing a felony charge – at least at first.

Police responded Oct. 3 to a man with a gun at BJ's residence, according to the criminal complaint. When police arrived, Joe ran out the back door right at them. He complied with orders to get on the ground.

He told police that he had stopped by to give BJ some cash and see his daughter "but when he got there he found that his daughter was not there. (Joe) stated that he (then) grabbed a gun in the apartment."

BJ said she thought Joe might have wanted to kill her, but Joe said "he wasn't hurting anyone but was thinking about killing himself," according to the complaint.

BJ "yelled at (Joe), asking him if he was going to kill himself with an eight-year-old there," the complaint said.

Police saw that one of the locks on a case where BJ kept guns had been opened. 

Joe was charged with felony burglary while armed with a dangerous weapon, misdemeanor criminal trespass, and misdemeanor bail jumping.

McKnight ordered a $750 cash bond and a $2,000 signature bond, according to court records. He again ordered Joe not to have contact with BJ and to stay away from her residence, though that again was modified later to a no-abusive-contact order. The judge also ordered Joe to maintain absolute sobriety and prohibited him from possessing weapons, according to court records.

At the preliminary hearing, McKnight found that there was not enough probable cause to merit the felony charge and it was amended to misdemeanor disorderly conduct.

In November, McKnight issued a bench warrant for Joe and ordered his bail amounts forfeited, but he vacated the order after Joe was charged in two new domestic violence and bail-jumping cases in January 2022.

McKnight has vacated the deferred prosecution agreement in the 2020 case and sentencing is set for June 7.

Our methodology: WJI and Mastantuono Coffee & Thomas determined the number of felony and misdemeanor bail-jumping cases and charges in each county through court data. The total number of felony and misdemeanor cases filed in a county was obtained through the state's online court system. Cases selected for the "case file" section are chosen randomly through a random number-generator web site. The intent of the project is to show a variety of bail-jumping cases.

Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The rule for this is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision. The "upshot" and "background" sections do not count as part of the 10 paragraphs because of their summary and very necessary nature. We've also removed citations from the opinion for ease of reading, but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. ​Italics indicate WJI insertions except for case names, which also are italicized.

The case: State of Wisconsin v. Daniel J. Van Linn

​Majority opinion: Justice Rebecca F. Dallet (14 pages), joined by Chief Justice Annette K. Ziegler and Justices Patience Roggensack, Rebecca Grassl Bradley, Brian Hagedorn, and Jill J. Karofsky

Dissent: Justice Ann Walsh Bradley (11 pages)

The upshot

After crashing his car, Daniel Van Linn was taken to the hospital, where two blood tests were performed: the first one by the hospital for diagnostic and treatment purposes; a later one at the direction of a sheriff's deputy for investigative purposes. Both blood tests revealed that Van Linn's blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) was over the legal limit. The circuit court suppressed the results of the deputy's blood test, concluding that the deputy's blood draw violated the Fourth Amendment because the deputy did not have a warrant. The State then subpoenaed the hospital for Van Linn's medical records, which included the hospital's diagnostic blood-test results. Van Linn argues that those results should be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule because the State subpoenaed the hospital only after it learned from the deputy's unlawful blood draw that Van Linn's BAC was over the legal limit. The issue is whether hospital's blood-test results are nevertheless admissible under the independent-source doctrine, an exception to the exclusionary rule. We hold that they are, and therefore affirm the court of appeals.

Background

Around 2:00 a.m. one Sunday morning, the Oconto County Sheriff's Office responded to a call about a car accident on a rural road in the Town of Mountain. When a deputy arrived, he found Van Linn's car crashed into the back of a cabin. The subsequent investigation revealed that Van Linn was driving to his cabin when he thought he saw an oncoming car in his lane and swerved to avoid it. He veered off the road and into a ditch, where he hit a tree. He then drove back onto the road, crossing both lanes of traffic before continuing into a ditch on the other side of the road, over a hill, and through a field, eventually crashing into the back of someone's cabin.

Ambulance personnel found Van Linn lying on the ground across the street. He had a bump and some blood on his forehead and his hands were bleeding. Van Linn claimed to know nothing about the accident and denied that he was driving. The deputy noted a "moderate odor of alcohol" coming from Van Linn, and Van Linn told the deputy that he had drank "two beers" earlier that evening. The deputy learned that because Van Linn had four prior OWI (operating while intoxicated) convictions, he was subject to a BAC limit of 0.02 and his driving privileges were revoked.

Van Linn was taken to the hospital. At 3:55 a.m., hospital personnel performed a "diagnostic workup," which included drawing Van Linn's blood. The results of that blood test revealed that Van Linn's BAC was 0.226. Not long after, the deputy arrived at the hospital and, based on his investigation at the accident scene, arrested Van Linn for his fifth OWI. At the time of Van Linn's arrest, the deputy was unaware of the hospital's blood draw and its results.

Following his arrest, Van Linn admitted that he had in fact been driving and that he was the one who called the police to report the crash. The deputy asked Van Linn to consent to a blood draw, which Van Linn refused. Nevertheless, at his lieutenant's direction and without a warrant, the deputy had Van Linn's blood drawn at approximately 4:15 a.m., about twenty minutes after the hospital had taken Van Linn's blood. A test of this second sample showed that Van Linn's BAC was 0.205.

In the circuit court, Van Linn moved to suppress the results of the deputy's blood draw because the deputy did not have a warrant and no exceptions to the warrant requirement applied. The State argued that the deputy did not need a warrant because the natural dissipation of alcohol in Van Linn's bloodstream was an exigent circumstance. The circuit court granted Van Linn's motion, suppressing the results of the deputy's warrantless blood draw on the grounds that no exigent circumstances justified the deputy's failure to get a warrant.

Three months later, the State asked the circuit court to issue a subpoena to the hospital for Van Linn's medical records, which included the results of the hospital's diagnostic blood test. The State submitted an accompanying affidavit asserting there was probable cause for the subpoena because the deputy smelled alcohol on Van Linn at the scene, Van Linn had a reduced BAC restriction, and Van Linn admitted he had been drinking before the accident. The affidavit referenced the deputy's blood draw and noted that testing of the sample showed that Van Linn's BAC was over the legal limit.

The subpoena issued notwithstanding Van Linn’s objection, and the hospital produced its records from testing Van Linn's blood. Van Linn moved to suppress the hospital's blood-test results, but the circuit court denied the motion. Van Linn then appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that the hospital's blood test was an independent source of evidence of Van Linn's BAC.

The guts

The Fourth Amendment protects against "unreasonable searches and seizures." When the State obtains evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment, that evidence typically must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule can apply to both evidence discovered during an unlawful search or seizure and evidence discovered only because of what the police learned from the unlawful activity, also referred to as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Not all Fourth Amendment violations, however, justify applying the exclusionary rule. Rather, the rule applies when excluding the unlawfully obtained evidence will "meaningfully deter" police misconduct such that interfering with the criminal justice system's truth-seeking objective is justified. Whenever the exclusionary rule applies, the scope of the remedy is limited to preventing the State from "profit[ing] from its illegal activity" without placing the State "in a worse position than it would otherwise have occupied" absent its illegal conduct. It follows that excluding illegally obtained evidence "does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible," provided the State's knowledge of them is gained from a source unrelated to the State's illegal conduct.

That idea is the foundation of the independent-source doctrine. The doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule in that it allows for the admissibility of evidence or information tainted by an illegal evidence-gathering activity when the State otherwise acquires the same information—or "rediscover[s]" it—by lawful means "in a fashion untainted" by that illegal activity. Subsequent lawful means, such as a subpoena, are "untainted" when the State can show that the illegal conduct neither "affected" the circuit court's decision to approve its subpoena request nor "prompted" the State's decision to seek a subpoena in the first place. The former question turns on "whether the [subpoena's supporting affidavit] contain[s] sufficient evidence of probable cause without the references to the tainted evidence." Van Linn concedes that although the supporting affidavit referenced his BAC as discovered by the deputy's unlawful blood draw, the affidavit establishes probable cause for the subpoena without that reference. Our analysis therefore focuses on the latter question of whether the State's decision to seek the subpoena was prompted by what it learned from the deputy's unlawful blood draw.

Van Linn argues that the State's decision to subpoena his medical records was "motivated specifically" by the knowledge it gained from the deputy's unlawful blood draw—that his BAC was over the legal limit. According to Van Linn, if the deputy had not unlawfully drawn Van Linn's blood, the State would not have known that the hospital's blood test would show he had a prohibited BAC and, therefore, "would have had no reason to seek a subpoena" for his medical records.

Murray (v. United States), however, demonstrates that the independent- source doctrine can apply even though the State knew the hospital's blood test would show an unlawful BAC. . . . Murray teaches that the independent-source doctrine applies when the State has a separate reason to seek the challenged evidence apart from the knowledge it gains from an unlawful search.

Here, the State had ample reasons to subpoena Van Linn's medical records for evidence of OWI, apart from what it learned from the deputy's unlawful blood draw. At the accident scene, the deputy found Van Linn's car crashed into the back of a cabin. His investigation revealed that Van Linn had veered off the road and into a ditch, where he hit a tree. The deputy smelled an "intoxicant" on Van Linn, and Van Linn admitted to having had "a couple of beers." While Van Linn was en route to the hospital, the deputy also learned that Van Linn had a reduced BAC restriction of 0.02. Moreover, the deputy arrested Van Linn for OWI prior to conducting the unlawful blood draw. . . . (T)he testing results of the deputy's unlawful blood draw "only served to confirm [the State's] prior suspicions": that Van Linn's BAC was over the legal limit. Stated differently, the State's decision to subpoena Van Linn's medical records was not prompted by what it learned from the deputy's unlawful blood draw.

Granted, the State did not subpoena Van Linn's medical records until after the circuit court suppressed the deputy's unlawful blood draw. Van Linn argues that the State's subpoena is therefore the "direct result" of the deputy's unlawful conduct because, but for that conduct, there would have been nothing for the circuit court to suppress. And but for the circuit court's suppression decision, the State would not have subpoenaed the hospital. We hold that, despite the timing of the State's subpoena request, suppression is not justified for two reasons.

First, in the exclusionary-rule context, the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the strict but-for causality Van Linn presses here. The "more apt question" for whether the exclusionary rule applies is: did the State "exploit[]" the deputy's unlawful conduct? In this case, the State did not exploit the deputy's illegal conduct because, as explained above, the State had reasonable grounds to suspect Van Linn of OWI prior to anyone drawing his blood. Additionally, the blood-test evidence contained in Van Linn's medical records is "untainted" by the deputy's unlawful conduct because the hospital drew Van Linn's blood for its own diagnostic and treatment purposes, not at the direction of law enforcement.

Second, suppressing the hospital's blood-test results would not further the purpose of the exclusionary rule, which is to deter police misconduct. The circuit court's suppression of the deputy's warrantless blood draw remedied the police misconduct in this case. Suppressing the hospital's diagnostic blood test, however, would have no further deterrent effect because it involved no police conduct at all, let alone misconduct. Moreover, suppressing the hospital's blood test runs counter to the exclusionary rule because it would put the State in a worse position than it occupied absent the deputy's unlawful conduct.

​***

To study bail jumping in Wisconsin, WJI and the Mastantuono Coffee & Thomas law firm will look county by county at 2021 bail-jumping charges. Which counties are charging bail jumping the most? Who are some of the defendants? What happens to those cases? We'll report the statistics from individual counties and tell you the stories from randomly chosen cases.

Adams County

Total number of cases with bail-jumping charges: 103
Total number of misdemeanor and felony cases: 390
Percent of misdemeanor and felony cases that include bail-jumping charges: 26%

Total number of felony cases with bail-jumping charges: 65*
Total number of all felony cases: 179
Percent of felony cases that include bail-jumping charges: 36

Total number of misdemeanor cases with bail-jumping charges: 38
Total number of all misdemeanor cases: 211
Percent of misdemeanor cases that include bail-jumping charges: 18

Largest number of bail-jumping charges issued in a single case: 12
Number of felony bail-jumping charges issued: 119
Number of misdemeanor bail-jumping charges issued: 118

*Felony cases can include felony or misdemeanor bail-jumping charges or both; misdemeanor cases can include only misdemeanor bail-jumping charges.

Case file

The 30-year-old Wisconsin Dells woman was out on bond for a Sauk County hit and run. She allegedly ran a red light and crashed into a Honda Civic, leaving a man shaken and slightly injured. He was bleeding from the mouth and his back was sore, according to the criminal complaint. A trip to the emergency room showed that he was bruised, but nothing was broken and he did not need stitches.

After the accident, the woman allegedly left her car and ran away on foot. When police got there, the abandoned car smelled like booze and there was an open can of Budweiser, about a third full, on the front passenger floor. There also were two other unopened containers of alcohol – a 16-ounce can of Steel Reserve and a one-shot bottle of Smirnoff vodka. There was a debit card with the woman's name on it. 

The woman eventually was arrested. She was charged with felony hit and run and was released in May 2001 on a $1,000 signature bond.
​
In August, while that charge was pending, she got in trouble again, this time in Adams County. First she argued with her boyfriend, then later with her mother at her mother's house.

She was intoxicated and angry that her mother would not let her leave, drunk, with her children. At some point, the woman punched her hand through a screen door.

Deputies from the Adams County Sheriff's Department arrived.

The woman told a sergeant that "she just wanted to go home and became increasingly argumentative with deputies....She made comments that she wanted deputies to shoot her and she would rather die in front of her child...." the complaint said. 

When deputies tried to handcuff her, she tried to pull her arm away and refused to cooperate. They took her to the ground and cuffed her. 

She later resisted getting into a squad, kicked at the door and slammed her head into the side of the car. A deputy eventually was able to calm her down and get her to cooperate.

She was charged with felony bail jumping, misdemeanor criminal damage to property with a domestic abuse assessment, misdemeanor resisting an officer, and misdemeanor disorderly conduct with a domestic abuse assessment.

The misdemeanors each carried maximums of 9 months or less in jail. The bail-jumping charge carried a maximum term of six years in prison.

She was booked and released on signature bond.

The woman pleaded no contest in Sauk County Circuit Court to misdemeanor hit and run. She was sentenced to one year's probation and ordered to serve 30 days in jail with work-release privileges. Circuit Judge Patricia A. Barrett also ordered her to participate in alcohol and other drug abuse treatment and to participate in any ordered follow-up counseling/treatment. Barrett also ordered her to pay $27,552 in restitution. 

The Adams County felony bail-jumping charge was dropped as part of a plea agreement, as was the misdemeanor criminal damage to property charge. The woman pleaded guilty to the resisting and disorderly conduct charges and was sentenced to a year of probation. Circuit Judge Daniel Wood, like his Sauk County counterpart, ordered her to participate in AODA treatment and follow-up.

Our methodology: WJI and Mastantuano Coffee & Thomas determined the number of felony and misdemeanor bail-jumping cases and charges in each county through court data. The total number of felony and misdemeanor cases filed in a county was obtained through the state's online court system. Cases selected for the "case file" section are chosen randomly through a random number-generator web site. The intent of the project is to show a variety of bail-jumping cases.