1998-2018 Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek S.C./Husch Blackwell, LLP 
 
As an associate and then shareholder/partner at Whyte Hirschboeck and Husch Blackwell (following the merger of the two firms in 2016), I advised companies, governmental entities, and individuals in a broad range of constitutional, compliance, employment, land use, and commercial litigation matters, including class action proceedings. I represented clients in jury and bench trials and on appeal at all levels of the state and federal court systems, including the Wisconsin Court of Appeals and Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and the United States Supreme Court. I also represented employers in administrative hearings before the Wisconsin Equal Rights Division and in private labor arbitrations.   
 
I was an elected member of the board of directors of Whyte Hirschboeck from July 2012 until August 2016 and of Husch Blackwell between August 2016 and when I resigned from the firm to take my seat on the bench in September 2018.  In addition, I served in numerous other leadership positions during my time at the firms, including as a member of the executive recruiting committee for the Wisconsin offices of Husch Blackwell, as the shareholder director of the Whyte Hirschboeck associate development program (WHD University), as a shareholder director of the Whyte Hirschboeck associate mentor program, as a member of Whyte Hirschboeck’s diversity and inclusion committee.

1994-1998 Office of the Corporation Counsel, New York City Law Department 
 
As an Assistant Corporation Counsel, I represented New York City and its employees in a wide range of constitutional, employment, and civil service litigation before the federal and state courts in New York. 

1991-1994 University of Wisconsin Law School 
 
Summer Clerk, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund
Intern, Office of the Public Intervenor, Wisconsin Department of Justice
Intern, Justice Shirley Abrahamson, Wisconsin Supreme Court 

Jones' resume is here. Personal information, such as telephone numbers, personal email addresses, and the names of people not directly involved in the campaign have been redacted.

https://www.judgeandrewjones.com/  

​I am currently an Assistant State Public Defender. During my time as an Assistant Public Defender I have become a well-known and respected litigator. I have conducted scores of motion and evidentiary hearings, successfully litigated complex legal issues, and first-chaired dozens of jury trials. Previously, I was a staff attorney for Legal Action of Wisconsin as their Senior Law attorney.  As a Senior Law attorney I helped seniors in various capacities such as consumer fraud, nursing home abuse, Medicaid or tax issues.

Shelton's resume is here. Personal information, such as telephone numbers, personal email addresses, and the names of people not directly involved in the campaign have been redacted.​

https://www.sheltonforjudge.com/​​​

I have worked as a civil litigator as well as a criminal defense attorney.  As a civil litigator, working at Legal Action of Wisconsin, I had a case regarding the interplay of a Power of Attorney and a Joint Account holder. My client was an elderly woman that had her money and property stolen by her power of attorney. I had the privilege of litigating this case at the trial and appellate level. The appellate court sent it to the Wisconsin Supreme Court and that Court ruled that when an agent acting under a power of attorney transfers funds deposited by the principal from a joint account for the agent's own use, a presumption of fraud is created. When these two conflicting and inconsistent presumptions coexist, the circuit court is free to make a determination based upon the facts and the credibility of the witnesses.
 
As a defense attorney, I had a case where my client stabbed the mother of his child 17 times, in public. Thankfully, the woman lived because two men heard her screams and saved her life.  I took the opportunity to get to know my client to find out how he got to a point where he could commit such a crime. I worked with social workers and psychologists to develop an understanding of the young man, to help me negotiate with the prosecutor and prepare a sentence recommendation for the Court.  This was a difficult case because I learned about so much pain that had been visited on my client from a young age, and how when it seemed he was going to be a leader in our community and make something of himself, all the pain and rage from a childhood spent going from multiple foster homes, surfaced uncontrollably. Although, this was a horrific crime and the victim will have scars that will never heal, my job was to help the court understand the mitigating factors in the final determination of the case. 

Shelton's resume is here. Personal information, such as telephone numbers, personal email addresses, and the names of people not directly involved in the campaign have been redacted.​

https://www.sheltonforjudge.com/​​

Kingsley v. Hendrickson

Michael Kingsley was incarcerated in the Monroe County jail when officers used force against him for resisting a cell transfer. He sued the officers…asserting that they violated the Fourteenth Amendment by using excessive force. I represented the defendant officers. 
 
A jury returned a verdict in favor of the officers and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted Kingsley’s petition for review. The issue was what constitutional standard governs excessive force claims brought by pre-trial detainees. This was a question that previously had not been addressed by the Court. 
 
We associated with Supreme Court counsel, but I continued to be involved in all aspects of the case, including meeting with representatives of the Solicitor General’s Office, recruiting and meeting with amici curiae, drafting the opposition brief, and preparing for oral argument. 
 
Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of Kingsley, holding that the objective reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment governs excessive force claims of pre-trial detainees brought under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
On remand, the case was again tried to a jury, this time under the new standard established by the Court. The jury again returned a verdict in favor of the officers. 
 
Christiansen v. Sullivan
 
Christensen v. Sullivan was a class action filed against Milwaukee County in 1996 regarding overcrowding in the county jail. Milwaukee County and the plaintiff class settled the case in 2001, and the court entered a consent decree. 
 
The consent decree, among other things, required the county to ensure that inmates being booked into the jail did not remain in the jail’s booking room in excess of 30 hours before they were assigned to housing. In 2004, it was discovered that thousands of inmates had been held in the booking room in excess of 30 hours. 
 
In 2005, the plaintiff class sought to have the court hold the county in civil contempt and impose monetary damages as a remedial sanction. My firm was hired to defend the contempt proceeding on behalf of the county. 
 
The circuit court held the county in contempt, but declined to impose monetary damages, concluding that the Wisconsin contempt statute only permits monetary damages as a remedial sanction to terminate a continuing civil contempt of court. Because the county was no longer holding inmates in the booking room in excess of 30 hours, the court reasoned, no basis existed for the imposition of a remedial sanction. 
 
The Court of Appeals overturned the circuit court’s decision. We successfully petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court to accept the case for review, and, on review, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals on a 4-3 vote. The Court accepted our arguments in substantial part, holding that the contempt statute does not permit monetary damages except when they are imposed to terminate an ongoing civil contempt of court. 
 
I was the principal author of the briefs before the circuit court, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, and I argued the case to the Supreme Court.

(This piece was edited slightly for length.)

Jones' resume is here. Personal information, such as telephone numbers, personal email addresses, and the names of people not directly involved in the campaign have been redacted.

https://www.judgeandrewjones.com/  

Having practiced law for more than twenty-four years, in both the federal and state courts, and at trial and on appeal, I am far more experienced in the day-to-day aspects of litigation than I am with the ideals of any particular judicial philosophy. However, in two plus decades of litigating cases in New York and Wisconsin, I appeared in front of dozens and dozens of judges. I was in a position to observe how they handle all aspects of civil litigation, from pre-trial matters to discovery disputes, motion hearings, trials, and appellate proceedings. As a result, I was also able to observe what makes a judge a good judge, one litigants and their counsel respect and welcome the opportunity to appear before, regardless of the nature of their case.  

Good judges are always prepared, having taken the time to carefully review the parties’ submissions and to familiarize themselves with the issues presented. Good judges are open minded and ready to listen, but also in control of their courtroom, fair but firm with counsel, and decisive. Good judges absolutely do not make the proceedings in their courtroom about either themselves or the lawyers who appear in front of them. Good judges are respectful of the lawyers and parties who appear before them, recognizing how important every dispute at hand is to the litigants. Good judges are also equally respectful of the citizens who serve on juries in their courtrooms, valuing their time and the sacrifices they are making to fulfil (sic) their civic responsibilities.  

Litigants need to be able to rely on the fact that when they come before a judge – at any level of the federal or state judicial system – the law will be enforced and applied as the constitution, applicable legislation, or precedent dictates. This provides certainty and reliability to litigants, both of which are crucial to the role of the judiciary in our system of government. Good judges, regardless of their personal politics, see no dispute and no party who comes before them in political terms. Good judges are not result-oriented and instead handle each case based solely on the facts presented and the controlling law, be it constitutional, statutory, regulatory, or the common law, even if it leads to a result that they may find personally unsatisfactory.  
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I am 100% committed to focusing on these qualities and ideals as a sitting judge.  In doing so, I believe I am able to ensure that the law is applied fairly, impartially, and equally to everyone in my courtroom, without exception. 

​​Jones' resume is here. Personal information, such as telephone numbers, personal email addresses, and the names of people not directly involved in the campaign have been redacted.

https://www.judgeandrewjones.com/

My upbringing, life experiences and professional life have shaped my legal philosophy simply as to always do what is right. I see the U.S. Constitution as a living document, including the Bill of Rights and the other amendments protecting individual freedoms and human rights.

Shelton's resume is here. Personal information, such as telephone numbers, personal email addresses, and the names of people not directly involved in the campaign have been redacted.​

https://www.sheltonforjudge.com/​

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), held that limits on corporate and union political expenditures during election cycles violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Corporations and labor unions can spend unlimited sums in support of or in opposition to candidates as long as the spending is independent of the candidates.
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The contradiction is that the Supreme Court required electoral districts to be drawn with roughly equal populations because the Constitution “demands” that each citizen have “an equally effective voice.” Hence, “one person, one vote.” Yet, when corporations, or other big money spenders, are able to flood the airwaves with their messages, they can effectively drown out the voices of other citizens, whose democratic right to political speech deserves no less protection than those with financial resources. This undermines the political equality that gives our government legitimacy. 

​Shelton's resume is here. Personal information, such as telephone numbers, personal email addresses, and the names of people not directly involved in the campaign have been redacted.​

https://www.sheltonforjudge.com/

In Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the City of New London, Connecticut’s use of the power of eminent domain to acquire private property to be used for development by other private parties as part of a large-scale redevelopment plan approved by the City violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  Specifically, the Court addressed the question of whether the use of eminent domain for such a purpose qualified as a “public use,” as would be necessary for it to satisfy the Takings Clause.

 Acknowledging that the City’s use of eminent domain to take private property for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular private party would not constitute such a “public use” and would be an unconstitutional taking, the Court nonetheless ruled in Kelo that the use of eminent domain to take the property in question was constitutional because the underlying redevelopment plan of the City served a “public interest.”  In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that prior precedent defines what serves the “public interest” broadly and requires significant deference by the courts to legislative decisions about what does and does not serve the public interest.
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I believe the majority’s holding in Kelo is flawed in that it too broadly defines what may constitute a “public use” for purposes of the Takings Clause and is too deferential to legislative determinations about whether or not a particular taking of private property serves the public interest.  As Justice O’Connor reasoned in her dissenting opinion, the majority’s holding opens the door to all private property being taken by a local government and transferred to another private property owner as long as the local legislative body deems the use proposed by the new owner to be more advantageous to the public.  Further, as Justice O’Connor’s dissent further reasoned, “an external, judicial check” on the use of eminent domain under such circumstances is necessary if the Takings Clause is to have any meaning.  Otherwise, as the dissent pointedly noted, “[n]othing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.”

​Jones' resume is here. Personal information, such as telephone numbers, personal email addresses, and the names of people not directly involved in the campaign have been redacted.

https://www.judgeandrewjones.com/

In Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a decision by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals overturning the petitioner’s criminal conviction under a Texas statute prohibiting the desecration of the American flag. According to the Court, the petitioner’s conviction violated the First Amendment and thus was unconstitutional.

The petitioner (Johnson) burned a flag at the conclusion of a political march and demonstration through the streets of Dallas protesting the policies of the Reagan administration. According to the Court, given the overtly intentional political message of the flag burning, the nature of which would have been overwhelmingly apparent to any observer, the conduct was “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication” to constitute expressive conduct (speech) protected by the First Amendment. (Indeed, Texas conceded as much at oral argument.)

As such, the Court addressed the interests asserted by Texas to assess whether the law’s restriction on the petitioner’s expressive conduct was justified. The Court found that one purported interest – preventing breaches of the peace – was not implicated by the underlying facts, as no such breach had actually occurred, and the fact that some observers took offense at the conduct was insufficient to constitute such a breach. With respect to the second interest advanced by Texas – preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity – the Court concluded that the purpose was related to the expression inherent in the petitioner’s conduct. As a result, the restriction on the petitioner’s expressive conduct was content based and subject to exacting scrutiny. Reviewing prior precedent in which it had held that punishment for using words critical of the flag is prohibited and that the government may not compel conduct that reflects respect for the flag, the Court held that the fact that the government cannot prohibit expression it disagrees with is not dependent on the mode of expression. According to the Court, to uphold the petitioner’s conviction would be to enter “territory with no discernable or defensible boundaries” by permitting a designated symbol such as the flag to be used to convey one (positive) set of messages but not another (negative).

In my view, the Johnson decision represents an instance where the Court ruled in a manner compelled by the First Amendment notwithstanding the fact that the speech in question was and is abhorrent to many. The decision reflects both a core value of this nation and our American society – freedom of thought, speech, and expression from government intrusion – and the critical role the courts (from the Supreme Court down to state and federal trial courts) play in our system of government – the faithful application of the law consistent with the Constitution, whether or not it is popular or even true to a particular judge’s personal beliefs.

Jones' resume is here. Personal information, such as telephone numbers, personal email addresses, and the names of people not directly involved in the campaign have been redacted.

https://www.judgeandrewjones.com/

​Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), held that the police cannot conduct a warrantless search in a home where one occupant consents and the other objects. Justice David Souter, in the majority opinion, compared the reasonableness of such a search to a more casual interaction. Souter wrote, "it is fair to say that a caller standing at the door of shared premises would have no confidence that one occupant's invitation was a sufficiently good reason to enter when a fellow tenant stood there saying, 'stay out.' Without some very good reason, no sensible person would go inside under those conditions." A police search in such circumstances, Souter wrote, would therefore not meet the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

I am critical of any erosion of the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.  A great deal of my career has been spent protecting people against government intrusions, so I appreciate the U.S. Supreme Court protecting our rights.

​Shelton's resume is here. Personal information, such as telephone numbers, personal email addresses, and the names of people not directly involved in the campaign have been redacted.​

https://www.sheltonforjudge.com/