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By Alexandria Staubach There’s some consensus among lawyers that ethics rules already cover the responsible use of generative artificial intelligence in court submissions, but a recent petition to the Wisconsin Supreme Court is asking for more. The rule change petition seeks to mandate explicit disclosure to the court and disclosure by the court when generative AI is used in the preparation of everything from court filings to opinions. The petition was filed by frequent pro se (self-represented) litigant Jay Stone. Stone’s petition “has a lot of the hallmarks of a ChatGPT document itself,” attorney Stacie Rosenzweig recently remarked to Wisconsin Justice Initiative. Rosenzweig, a partner at the law firm Halling & Cayo, specializes in legal ethics and professional responsibility. She said by email that that while it would be unusual for Stone’s petition to be adopted by the Supreme Court as is, the petition “could spur some further discussion or an invitation from the Court for comments.” Rosenzweig discussed “a bit of debate” in ethics circles about the necessity of additional guidance. According to personal injury attorney Ann Jacobs, Wisconsin’s code of legal ethics should be sufficient to cover the landscape regarding AI use. Jacobs recently gave a continuing legal education presentation on the topic. She told WJI that rules regarding confidentiality, candor, and competence are sufficient to protect against the dangers of generative AI. The trouble, though, she said, is that those rules are not always followed. For example, earlier this year Kenosha County District Attorney Xavier Solis found himself in hot water after failing to disclose the use of AI in a brief he submitted to a court. The brief included hallucinated (made-up or fake) citations and ultimately resulted in sanctions. In late 2025, a misattributed citation by Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Annette K. Zeigler in a dissent regarding congressional redistricting had some speculating about the use of AI. “It looks and quacks like an AI generated error,” said Jacobs. And there are now a handful of databases tracking legal decisions in which generative AI produced hallucinated content. One demonstrates that internationally, United States judges and arbitrators are by far the most frequent offenders in this area, with 871 offenses. Canada (139 offenses) and Australia (73 offenses) are next in line. The most prolific of the watchdog projects is run by Damian Charlotin, a senior research fellow at HEC Paris, a top ranking European business school. Another newer and less robust Charlotin data base tracks legal cases in which generative AI was used as evidence to argue or prove a point. But the use of AI itself isn’t the issue. Instead, the problem is the technology’s propensity for inaccuracy. Courts across the United States have sanctioned, fined, and otherwise provided extreme consequences for attorney misuse of generative AI, primarily viewing them as ethics violations. In Wisconsin, Supreme Court Rule 20:1.1 governs attorney competence about technology: “(A) lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology,” the rule says. Other rules regarding client confidentiality and candor to the court supplement that rule. For example, using AI may involve an attorney providing sensitive client information to an unsecure system. That implicates a client’s confidentiality and triggers a lawyer’s obligation to communicate with the client, Jacobs said. Rule 20:3.3 requires candor to the tribunal. “You cannot have read a fake case, which means your work has not been thorough,” said Jacobs. In July 2024, the American Bar Association issued a formal opinion on attorney use of generative AI. It cited existing ethical obligations “such as those relating to confidentiality, communication with a client, meritorious claims and contentions, candor toward the tribunal, supervisory responsibilities regarding others in the law office using the technology and those outside the law office providing (generative AI) services and charging reasonable fees.” But what’s happening in practice is nevertheless evolving, shaped by local rules and sanctions when things go awry. Currently, Kenosha County (where petitioner Stone lives) and Waukesha County are the only jurisdictions in the state with local rules requiring disclosure to the court regarding AI use. Complicating the issue is little specific instruction for litigants who represent themselves—which generative AI may encourage more people to do. Some, like Stone, believe that upfront disclosure of generative AI use should be a requirement moving forward. No stranger to litigation, Stone has a handful of what he calls “election integrity” cases pending in the Court of Appeals and lower courts. He used AI in many of them. “It’s a tremendous tool,” Stone said on a call with WJI. “But it can be very harmful.” Throughout his litigation, Stone observed there was no AI disclosure requirement for pro se litigants. Holding pro se litigants to the same standards and expectations of attorneys is based on caselaw. He feels disclosure is the right way to go. “I believe in full transparency,” he said. The current rule change petition would require a self-represented litigant who uses a generative AI tool in preparing any filing or other written work product submitted to a state tribunal to independently review and verify the accuracy of all statements of fact and law and the authenticity of all citations before filing. The pro se litigant would have to disclose such use in the same manner as an attorney. The proposed rule emphasizes that existing ethical duties of competence, confidentiality, candor, and supervisory responsibility apply fully to the use of AI tools, Stone wrote in the petition. For Rosenzweig, a rule applicable to pro se litigants makes more sense as a rule of civil procedure. “Perhaps disclosure rules, more generally, and applied across the board, are a good stopgap,” Rosenzweig said. “(T)hey’ll remind people (lay and lawyer) of their obligations.” But we may have already entered a world where most people use AI without even knowing it. “I think eventually we won’t need disclosure,” said Rosenzweig. “Either AI will fizzle as a fad, or will be integrated into so much that affirmative disclosures would be as useless as disclosing whether you used Google or a cloud server.” The Supreme Court has not yet taken any action on Stone's petition, known as petition 26-02.  Suggested disclosure from Stone's rule change petition.
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"Evers' judges" is our effort to present information about Gov. Tony Evers' appointees to the bench. The information is taken from the appointees' own judgeship applications. Italics indicate direct quotes from the application. Typos, including punctuation errors, come from the original application even though we have not inserted “(sic)” after each one. WJI has left them as is.  Name: Owen Piotrowski
Appointed to: Milwaukee County Circuit Court Appointment date: Jan. 7, 2026, (effective Feb. 1, 2026) to term ending July 31, 2027. (Piotrowski was earlier appointed to a planned retirement vacancy in Branch 38 and then named to Branch 31 to fill the immediate vacancy created by resignation of Judge Hannah Dugan.) Education: Law School – University of Wisconsin-Madison Undergraduate – University of Wisconsin-Eau Clarie High School – Pacelli High, Stevens Point, Wisconsin Recent legal employment: September 2014-present – Assistant district attorney, Milwaukee County District Attorney’s Office Bar and administrative memberships: State Bar of Wisconsin General character of practice: I am an Assistant District Attorney in Milwaukee County. My practice is exclusively in the area of criminal prosecution. For the past several years, I have supervised a team of four Assistant District Attorneys and two Assistant Attorney Generals who are responsible for the prosecution of non-fatal shooting in Milwaukee County. Describe typical clients: I serve the people of Milwaukee County. Given the size of the Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office, I have served in a number of units prosecuting specific kinds of offenses: the domestic violence unit, the sensitive crimes unit, and the violent crimes unit. Number of cases tried to verdict: 63 List up to three significant trials, appeals, or other legal matters in which you participated as a judge or lawyer in the past seven years: State v. Xavier Sevilla, Milwaukee County case 22CF2693 This was a serious case that received significant media attention. As a 15 year old, Mr. Sevilla fired a gun during an ongoing dispute with another group of young people inside Mayfair Mall. Ultimately he shot 8 people inside the mall, four of whom had nothing to do with the ongoing dispute. The case began as a juvenile case and was waived into adult court only after the juvenile proceeding was appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. I inherited this case shortly before the sentencing hearing when the prior ADA left my office for different employment. I had one week to familiarize myself with the case, communicate with victims, and make an appropriate sentencing argument. I succeeded in making an persuasive sentencing argument for an appropriate sentence without demonizing a defendant who was only 15 at the time he committed a mass shooting. State v. Kendall Love (22CF1689 and 22CF2000) and State v. Marvin Johnson (22CF1690 and 22CF1999) These cases involved two individuals who, acting together, shot two people around three hours apart in Milwaukee. In a nutshell, each defendant found a person they had a previous dispute with, hunted them down, ran up behind them, and repeatedly shot at their intended target. I charged the case, litigated the pretrial issues, and tried each defendant separately. Both defendants were convicted of a number of charges, including Attempted First Degree Intentional Homicide. Both defendants had significant criminal records. In each case the Judge followed my recommendation for an appropriately significant sentence of 40 years of initial confinement. State v. Sanchez Wilson, Milwaukee County case 19CF1411 This was a horrific case in which Mr. Wilson sexually assaulted a young girl in the morning and then, during a shootout with her uncle later that day, shot the same girl he had assaulted. This was my case from the beginning: I met with the family at charging, handled the pretrial litigation, tried the case (securing convictions on all counts), handled the sentencing, and consulted with the Wisconsin DOJ on the appeal. This case sticks out to me as significant because of the severity and variety of the crimes committed. It involved a wide variety of evidence: forensic interviews of children, DNA evidence, ballistic evidence, and many others. Ultimately during cross examination the defendant admitted to shooting the young victim. Experience in adversary proceedings before administrative bodies: My career has been spent prosecuting cases in Circuit Court, so I have never practiced before an administrative agency or commission. Describe your non-litigation experience (e.g., arbitration, mediation). My career has been spent litigating criminal cases, so I do not have significant experience with arbitration or mediation. Position or involvement in judicial, non-partisan, or partisan political campaign, committee, or organization: I have never held an official position in a political campaign, partisan or otherwise. I was publicly involved in and did some campaign work on a State Senate campaign in 2020. My father ran as the Democratic candidate for the 24th Senate District. I made some public appearances as part of the campaign and engaged in some fundraising. Previous runs for public office: N/A All judicial or non-partisan candidates endorsed in the last ten years: N/A Professional or civic and charitable organizations: Historic Brewers Hill Association, April 2025-present Public office to which you were appointed or elected: Kenosha Housing Authority, appointed, July 2019-present Significant pro bono legal work or volunteer service: As an attorney for the State of Wisconsin I cannot provide pro bono legal services. A few years ago I joined the Milwaukee Curling Club. The MCC is run mostly by club members volunteering their time, and I regularly volunteer at these events. My wife and I co-chaired/ chaired the MCC's end of year event for club members in the Spring of 2024 and 2025. I have also volunteered at Polish Fest for the last couple of years. Quotes: Why I want to be a judge: I have served the people of Milwaukee County as a prosecutor for over eleven years, and I believe that I can best continue to positively impact my community as a Circuit Court Judge. I have the courtroom experience, professional judgment, and empathy necessary to be a judge in a trial court. Circuit Court Judges are uniquely situated to positively affect their community. The Court system, whether in the criminal or civil context, is where we as a people resolve our disputes. Both parties advocate their positions, but ultimately the Judge makes the tough decisions. I have spent my time in the Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office seeing how judges make those tough decisions every day. I have the courtroom experience to make the appropriate calls regarding evidence and the willingness to listen to the parties and make the right decision for the community. As a prosecutor I have served not only as a zealous advocate, but more importantly as a minister of justice. Acting in that role in Milwaukee County criminal courts presents unique challenges because of the volume of cases and the amount of information that needs to be processed. Throughout my career I have developed the ability to handle that volume without losing sight of the most important question in every case: is what I am doing the best thing for the community in this situation? Simply put, I love Milwaukee County. I am a lifelong Wisconsin resident who grew up in Stevens Point, then went to college in Eau Claire, and law school in Madison. But Milwaukee is where I have made my home. There's no place else I would rather be. and there is no better way I can serve my community than as a Circuit Court Judge. Describe which case in the past 25 years by the Wisconsin Supreme Court or U.S. Supreme Court you believe had a significant positive or negative impact on the people of Wisconsin. I believe that the U.S. Supreme Court decision that had the biggest negative impact on the people of Wisconsin, and people across the United States, in my lifetime is Citizens United v. F.E.C., 558 U.S. 310 (2010). For more than 100 years before that case was decided, there were some limits on independent expenditures by people and corporations. The U.S. Supreme Court obliterated those long held limits in Citizens United. The only potential beneficiaries of that decision are large corporations and extremely wealthy individuals. Every Wisconsin resident has experienced firsthand the consequences of that decision. As a traditional political battleground State, Wisconsin residents are subjected, election after election, to ads run by Political Action Committees. These ads, as long as they aren't formally coordinated with a candidate, are entirely legal after Citizens United. This has changed the entire tenor of political discourse for the worse. As a Political Science student at the University of Wisconsin - Eau Claire between 2007 and 2011, I remember many debates about the effectiveness and appropriateness of attack ads in political campaigns. Those debates feel like ancient history. Citizens United has turned political campaigns into a series of increasingly dishonest and vitriolic attacks on candidates, which has shunted actual political discussion to the side. Possibly worse, because PACs are allowed to run these ads technically "independently" of candidates and campaigns, it's unclear to people watching just who is responsible for spewing the lies and hatred common in ads these days. Virtually everyone in Wisconsin seems to agree that political discourse has degraded over the past ten years or so. Every dinner table at every family gathering across the State seems to include a lament about the way politics used to be. Citizens United is directly responsible for that degradation by allowing PACs to spend virtually unlimited amounts on blatantly dishonest and hateful advertising. Two or three judges whom I admire and why: I have been fortunate throughout my career to practice in front of many excellent Circuit Court Judges, two of whom have now been elected to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Justice Rebecca Dallet is the current Judge or Justice who I admire most. Early in my career, while she was the Judge in Br. 40 of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, I was primarily assigned to her courtroom. At the time, she was assigned to a calendar of domestic violence cases. I was able to see firsthand how Justice Dallet conducted her courtroom. I was consistently struck by her ability to maintain firm control over her courtroom (and as anyone who has practiced in Milwaukee County in the domestic violence courts can attest, maintaining control over those chaotic calendars is one of the most difficult tasks a judge can face) while treating everyone with respect and dignity. I remember trying one particularly difficult case in Justice Dallet's court with a particularly difficult pro se defendant. She demonstrated tremendous patience with the defendant while holding me to a high standard. I have been impressed with Justice Dallet's work on the Supreme Court. She always held me to a high standard as a young lawyer, and she continued the hold prosecutors statewide to that same high standard in State v. Wayerski, 385 Wis. 2d 344 (2011). That case, arguably, expanded a prosecutor's obligation to uncover and disclose exculpatory information to the defense. I believe that prosecutors should be held to the highest standards, and I admire Justice Dallet's willingness to enforce that standard. As a historical figure, I have always admired former Chief Justice Earl Warren. I don't think that the impact of the decisions made by the Supreme Court can be overstated. The landmark Brown v. Board of Education Decision that abolished segregation in public schools may be the most significant civil rights decision in the history of the United States. It is also indicative of two things this I admire about Justice Warren. First, this was the controversial topic of the day, and Justice Warren managed to author a unanimous opinion on the topic. Obtaining that unanimity, rather than showing the public a divided judiciary, I believe contributes to the lasting impact of that decision. Second, Justice Warren considered social science research about the effects of segregation in reaching this decision. I believe that the most important quality that a Judge or Justice can display is a willingness to listen. Justice Warren, by engaging with and considering social science, opened the door for courts to consider a wider variety of information and reach better decisions. The proper role of a judge: I believe that a good judge serves three main functions. First, a good judge listens to the parties. Second, a good judge properly administers the rules of procedure. Third, a good judge makes substantive decisions on a case with the good of the community in mind. A judge needs to really listen to and engage with the parties in a case. When a party states their positions, I believe that a good judge considers it, and asks follow-up questions as needed. Listening is not a passive activity. This also means carefully considering the written submissions of the parties. This active listening is one of the things that I believe separates a lawyer's functions from a judge's function. A lawyer will zealously advocate for their positions. The judge must listen to the positions of both parties, sifts through the self-serving statements by both parties, and reach the appropriate legal decision. Second, a judge must accurately administer the rules of procedure. We have a justice system that runs on an adversarial model. The rules of evidence, rules of civil procedure, and rules of criminal procedure set the expectations of the parties. A judge must have a mastery of those rules so that the parties have a basis from which to litigate a case. I firmly believe that this does not involve splitting the proverbial baby; if a call on an evidentiary or procedural issue is close, a good judge considers all of the available information and makes a tough decision. Ultimately the system falls apart and becomes unpredictable if procedural rules are not applied accurately and consistently.  By Margo Kirchner
Just seven judicial races across Wisconsin were contested in yesterday's elections. You’ve likely already heard about Judge Chris Taylor winning the open Supreme Court seat over Judge Maria Lazar. No Wisconsin Court of Appeals races were contested, so Judges Joe Donald and Rachel Graham were reelected to Districts 1 and 4 respectively, and newcomer Anthony LoCoco will join the appeals court in District 2. What happened in the six contested circuit court races? Here are results from the unofficial reports posted online by the respective counties. Dane County Branch 1: Recently appointed incumbent Ben Jones held off challenger Huma Ahsan, 55.7% to 43.9%. Florence and Forest Counties: Robert A. Kennedy Jr., with 2,182 votes, defeated Alex Seifert, with 1,644 votes. Kennedy will succeed retiring Judge Leon Stenz. Marathon County Branch 3: Michael D. Hughes defeated Douglas Bauman, 64.6% to 35.2%. Hughes will succeed retiring Judge LaMont Jacobson. Washburn County: Incumbent Angeline Winton-Roe beat challenger Aaron Marcoux by 819 votes, 2,792 to 1,973. Washington County Branch 2: Challenger Grant Scaife won against the incumbent, recently appointed Gordon Leech, 60.5% to 39.1%. Wood County Branch 3: Recently appointed incumbent Emily Nolan-Plutchak held off challenger Elizabeth Gebert, winning by 659 votes, 9,588 to 8,929. The election winners will start their new terms on Aug. 1, 2026. By Margo Kirchner In last week’s Wisconsin Supreme Court candidate debate, Wisconsin Justice Initiative’s legal challenge to the spring 2020 ballot question was the foundation for one of the final questions. WISN 12 in Milwaukee held and broadcast the debate between Wisconsin Court of Appeals Judges Chris Taylor and Maria Lazar on April 2. About 10 minutes before the end, WISN moderator Matt Smith asked Taylor why she had voted against the constitutional amendment known as Marsy’s Law when she was a state legislator. Taylor served in the Wisconsin Assembly prior to appointment as a circuit court judge in 2020. After Taylor’s answer, discussing her constituents' concerns with the provision, Smith turned to Lazar. He asked her about Marsy’s Law as follows: “Judge Lazar, critics have challenged the wording on the ballot as unclear and insufficient. The court, though, in a 6-1 ruling, disagreed with that. It has led to some questions, including new debates, about what information should be made public and when. Are there negative, unintended consequences to Marsy’s Law?” Lazar first answered that the amendment “is a very good, strong law,” but admitted that “there are some issues that have come up” for the courts to decide. “I think there are some points that will have to be addressed, but overall it has been astonishingly effective and important,” she said. She attributed issues with the amendment to the drafters not knowing all the possible perspectives or effects. “It’s not like we have lawyers in our Legislature drafting most of these bills,” she said. Though Smith did not name WJI or mention the caption of the court decision, his question referenced the lawsuit WJI brought in 2019 to challenge the Marsy’s Law ballot question. WJI argued that the ballot question not only failed to fully and fairly inform voters about the contents of the amendment but, in fact, misled them. WJI argued that the ballot question failed to inform voters of the amendment’s reduction of rights of an accused. An accused's right to a fair trial, for instance, was deleted from the constitution. The Supreme Court in 2023 ruled against WJI, six to one, on a ground that had not been raised by the state defendants and that two justices sprung on the parties at oral argument. The decision gave the Legislature broad freedom to describe proposed amendments, regardless of voters being confused or misled by the ballot questions. Voters are not entitled to a fair explanation of what they are voting on. Justice Brian Hagedorn wrote for the majority that the Wisconsin Constitution “does not require any substantive discussion of the amendment in the ballot question submitted to the people. No explanation or summary is constitutionally commanded.” A ballot question is deficient “only in the rare circumstance that the question is fundamentally counterfactual such that voters were not asked to approve the actual amendment,” he wrote. Justice Rebecca Bradley concurred, saying that “(t)he constitutional purpose of a ballot question . . . is not to educate voters.” “Voters are trusted to inform themselves,” she wrote. A recent bill, AB 207, would have provided voters with significantly more information. Introduced by Republicans, it ended up with bipartisan support in the Assembly, where it passed out of committee with a unanimous vote in October 2025 and then passed the full Assembly in November. The bill would have required the Legislature to draft a one-page disclosure notice for voters with the entire text of the actual proposed constitutional amendment (not just the ballot question), a plain language summary of existing law, and a plain language explanation of the effect of the proposed amendment. The disclosure notice would be published on the Wisconsin Elections Commission’s voter registration website for at least 30 days before an election, posted on each county clerk’s website, mailed with absentee ballots, and posted at the polls on election day. Sponsor Rep. Jerry O’Connor (R-Fond du Lac) stated in written testimony in both chambers that “(n)o one likes to be at a disadvantage when asked to take a position on a crucial matter such as amending the state Constitution. Yet that is how we treat our voters when we present the voters with a referendum question on a ballot. This is unfair and unreasonable. We can and should do better.” Rep. Dan Knodl (R-Germantown) stated in written testimony urging passage, “Ballot questions are not written to explain a proposal, they’re written to implement it.” He noted that the bill "strengthens voter trust through transparency and accuracy." The Senate received the Assembly’s approved bill in November. However, the bill did not progress through the Senate’s Committee on Licensing, Regulatory Reform, State and Federal Affairs. The bill died when the Legislature adjourned in March 2026. The Senate’s version of the bill, SB 205, received a hearing in that same committee in November 2025, but the committee failed to vote on it. As for Lazar’s statement that the Legislature does not have lawyers drafting bills, in the case of the Marsy’s Law constitutional amendment, it might not have been drafted by people in Wisconsin at all. Marsy’s Law has been the personal cause of Broadcom founder, billionaire, and later convicted drug felon Henry Nicholas III, following the tragic murder of his sister. Beginning with a Marsy’s Law constitutional amendment in California in 2008, he and his organizations have advocated for substantially similar amendments in at least 20 states. Marsy’s Law for Wisconsin, LLC spent over $1.5 million from January 2017 through June 2019 lobbying the Legislature to approve the amendment and ballot question so the matter could be sent to voters in spring 2020.  Wisconsin Court of Appeals Judges Maria Lazar (L) and Chris Taylor (R) vie for an open seat on the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The election is tomorrow, Apr. 7. City of Milwaukee commission to study lack of enforcement of housing voucher antidiscrimination laws4/1/2026  By Alexandria Staubach
A Milwaukee County ordinance makes discrimination against housing voucher holders illegal, but enforcement is essentially nonexistent. A City of Milwaukee agency is now looking at the issue. In 2018, then-Milwaukee County Supervisor Marina Dimitrijevic sponsored and helped pass the county ordinance that made discrimination against housing voucher holders illegal. But the county failed to develop a serious enforcement mechanism and has never litigated a complaint, says Stefanie Ebbens, senior administrator of the Inclusive Communities Program at Metropolitan Milwaukee Fair Housing Council. FHC is a local nonprofit that operates a full-service fair housing program. Private landlords are not required to opt into the subsidized housing voucher (known as section 8) program, but if they do, they cannot then discriminate against those who use them. Discrimination against voucher holders isn’t just illegal at the local level. Wisconsin’s fair housing law also prohibits landlords from discriminating based on a person’s “lawful source of income,” which includes vouchers with monetary value. Nevertheless, in a decision from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which includes Wisconsin, the judges questioned whether federal rent vouchers fit within the meaning of "lawful source of income." The City of Milwaukee’s Equal Rights Commission is now taking a closer look at the county ordinance and others around the state that are designed to protect individuals who have managed to obtain a subsidized housing (known as section 8) voucher to help cover the cost of rent. At a commission meeting in February, Ebbens told the commission about the frustration she and her clients experience when trying to secure housing. She said Milwaukee landlords have become “more bold because they know no one is coming after them.” FHC’s Megan Wanke presented problematic trends and discrimination in the acceptance of vouchers in Milwaukee. Maps in the presentation showed a disproportionate concentration of households using federally subsidized vouchers in Milwaukee’s highest poverty areas, which remain consistent with historical racial segregation and Milwaukee’s long history of redlining. The problem is a mismatch of available properties and people receiving housing vouchers. FHC shared data from a Center on Budget and Policy Priorities think tank study conducted between 2017 and 2021, which showed that while only 20% of the city’s voucher affordable properties are located high-poverty census tracts, 32% of voucher holders reside in them. Meanwhile 34% of the city’s voucher affordable housing properties are in low-poverty census tracts, and only 17% of the city’s voucher holders live there. FHC recently conducted its own testing investigation, which showed that 45% of major property owners in Milwaukee prohibit or restrict the use of section 8 vouchers, some with policies that are exclusive to Milwaukee. Wanke told the commission that about three-fourths of those property owners refuse to accept vouchers at all, while the others disqualify voucher holders with targeted restrictions that effectively cut them out of the market. One company in fact accepts voucher renters, just not in Milwaukee. Wanke shared that the investigation involved more than 7,000 residential units. Wanke said the difference in where voucher holders are concentrated cannot be explained by housing stock or average cost of rent, and it has “despicable racial discrimination implications.” Section 8 vouchers belong to a rental assistance program managed by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. They are supposed to ensure that low-income families, seniors with fixed incomes, and disabled individuals have access to private-market housing. Participants pay roughly 30% of their income toward rent and utilities. A local public housing agency pays the remainder directly to landlords. The public housing agencies act as a conduit for the federal funding and ensure that rent makes it directly into landlords’ hands. The agencies have broad discretion in running their programs, which impose strict income requirements. The waitlist to receive benefits is often years long. In Milwaukee, the program is administered by the Housing Authority. Its waitlist is so long that it is currently closed. Participants are subject to criminal background checks that can be disqualifying. The local program must “accurately distinguish between criminal conduct that indicates a demonstrable risk to resident safety and property and criminal conduct that does not,” according to the Milwaukee Housing Authority’s Admissions and Continued Occupancy Policy. Despite these protections, many still have trouble finding landlords willing to take their vouchers. Members of the public who testified at the commission’s meeting shared stories of landlords “ghosting” them at showings or failing to return calls. One woman, Katravia Lee, shared her struggles in attempting to find a landlord willing to accept her voucher in time for her to use it, after she had waited years to receive the voucher at all. Lee also expressed frustration at paying as much as $75 to fill out an application, just to have a landlord decline her without providing a reason. According to Wanke, the pressure to find housing reduces a renter’s desire to file a complaint to enforce the antidiscrimination laws. Complaints would take months to resolve, which they don’t have. Also, many who feel or know they have been wrongfully discriminated against also do not want to risk being seen as problematic. And despite the 2018 enactment of the county ordinance, there is no clear path to file a complaint with the county, Ebbens told the city commission. Milwaukee County's corporation counsel could not be reached for comment on this issue. The issue is not as pronounced in Madison. Wanke and Ebbens said that Madison has a more comprehensive and structured administrative process under a city antidiscrimination ordinance. Commission Chair Tony Snell Rodriguez assured community speakers that the commission would take action, ordering a comparative analysis of the Wisconsin county and municipal fair housing law from the city’s Legislative Reference Bureau and creating a subcommittee to evaluate whether the commission can enact more robust protections. Note: Author Alexandria Staubach serves on Milwaukee's Equal Rights Commission.  By Alexandria Staubach
A Brown County man recently won the right to withdraw his guilty plea after the Court of Appeals held that drug task force investigators used impermissible coercion to gain entry to his home. “This case is a classic example of law enforcement tactics that deeply undermine individual rights and ultimately undercut the state’s interest in investigating and prosecuting crimes,” said defense attorney and Wisconsin Justice Initiative President Craig Johnson. The District 3 per curiam (nonprecedential) opinion issued from the three-judge panel of Presiding Judge Lisa K. Stark and Judges Thomas M. Hruz and Gregory B. Gill. Cris Monge-Davila entered a no-contest plea to a drug-related charge after the trial judge denied his motion to suppress evidence found in a search of his apartment. Whether the search was lawful hinged on whether Monge-Davila willingly allowed officers into his home. In the trial court, the state maintained that Monge-Davila consented to officers’ search or his home. Monge-Davila argued he never gave it. Brown County Circuit Court Judge Marc C. Hammer concluded after a suppression hearing that Monge-Davila consented, as he was heard on body-camera footage saying, “I don’t have nothing, but okay.” Monge-Davila “weighed the options and wanted to minimize the possibility of additional problems,” Hammer said in his ruling. The Court of Appeals disagreed. Looking at the evidence and facts of Monge-Davila’s interaction with officers, the appeals court rejected the state’s characterization of the encounter as “undramatic.” The appellate court said it “view(ed) the interaction as being rather disagreeable and coercive.” In July 2022, members of the Brown County drug task force were executing a warrant at the apartment across the hall from Monge-Davila’s. During that operation, Monge-Davila exited his apartment to find “several armed officers wearing tactical vests, one of whom immediately began asking if he had drugs in his apartment,” wrote the court. Body-camera video presented at the trial court suppression hearing and reviewed by the Court of Appeals showed several officers looking inside Monge-Davila's apartment before he closed the door behind him. The body-cam footage showed at least two officers had Monge-Davila physically cornered at all times. They frisked him and took his phone. One officer grabbed Monge-Davila by the arm, preventing him from leaving. According to the opinion, more than seven officers were present in the hallway when an officer asked Monge-Davila, “Is there some fucking weed coming out of your apartment? I thought I smelled something.” Monge-Davila replied, “No.“ Officers suggested they could get a warrant but would not be forgiving if they had to “go the extra mile.” The appeals court found that any consent given by Monge-Davila was not voluntary. “'Consent to search must be unequivocal and specific, and it must be freely and voluntarily given,'” the court wrote, citing case law. “'Consent is not freely and voluntarily given if it is the result of a mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.'” “Throughout the interaction, Monge-Davila repeatedly expressed to the officers that he did not understand what was going on and that he did not have drugs in his apartment,” wrote the court. He had also rejected officers’ prior requests to come inside his apartment. “The officers made a show of force and otherwise engaged in coercive actions,” the court said. “These circumstances would demonstrate to any reasonable person that the interaction would not end until Monge-Davila provided his consent,” the court wrote. The appeals court remanded the case with directions to the trial court to allow Monge-Davila to withdraw his plea and grant the motion to suppress. “A case like this reinforces the importance of a trial judge’s role in deterring unconstitutional conduct by police through vigorous enforcement of the exclusionary rule,” said Johnson. The decision is available here. By Alexandria Staubach District 4 of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals ruled recently that in a preliminary hearing in a criminal case there is no requirement that any witness have firsthand knowledge of facts of the alleged crime; instead, a mere reading of the criminal complaint may suffice to bind a defendant over for trial if the complaint is thorough and detailed enough. While the court said it would be “difficult to establish generally applicable rules," it rubber-stamped a prosecution in Rock County where the totality of evidence presented by the state was an investigator's reading aloud of the probable cause section of a criminal complaint. Preliminary hearings exist in felony cases to determine whether probable cause exists that an offense was committed on a given day and that the accused is the person who did it. If a judge finds probable cause after the hearing, the case is “bound over” for trial or plea negotiations. If not, the case is dismissed. Preliminary hearings are not mini-trials. Credibility of witnesses is not at issue, and the state is given significant benefit of the doubt. A defendant’s ability to confront witnesses or undermine the state’s case at a preliminary hearing is very limited under Wisconsin law but includes the ability to call defense witnesses. A 2011 statute expanded the field of admissible evidence at a preliminary hearing to include hearsay evidence. Hearsay statements are made outside of court, sometimes second or third hand, and offered for the truth of what is asserted. Hearsay is generally deemed unreliable in court proceedings because the person whose version of events is presented is not in court and not subject to cross examination. In a case challenging the constitutionality of admitting hearsay evidence in preliminary hearings, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 2014 declined to impose restrictions regarding the use of hearsay at such hearings. The high court found that circuit courts are evidentiary gatekeepers obligated to consider the reliability of the prosecution's hearsay evidence on a case-by-case basis to assess whether the state makes a plausible showing of probable cause.  Blanchard This week’s District 4 Court of Appeals decision went farther by concluding that under state statutes hearsay alone can be sufficient. Presiding Judge Brian Blanchard wrote for the three-judge panel, joined by Judges JoAnne Kloppenburg and Rachel Graham.
Latres Christopher Robinson had been charged with several misdemeanors and felonies allegedly occurring on two separate dates. In the circuit court during Robinson’s preliminary hearing, a Rock County District Attorney’s Office investigator, with no independent knowledge of the facts underlying the allegations, was called as the state’s sole witness and permitted to read the probable cause section of the criminal complaint as evidence for the court. That section of the criminal complaint was detailed and purported to summarize information in police reports. The investigator identified Robinson but was asked no further questions by the prosecution. The defense asked five questions, all of which demonstrated that the investigator had no knowledge of the facts of the case other than what he had read from the complaint. At the end of the hearing, the defense moved to dismiss the case. As described by the Court of Appeals, the trial court concluded that the investigator’s recitation did “not provide sufficiently reliable evidence” because “the evidence consistently involved three levels of hearsay, sometimes four.” The judge found “the preliminary examination was defective because the prosecution presented only one witness who merely parroted the complaint.” Nevertheless, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss “on the ground that the preliminary examination defects constituted harmless error.” The Court of Appeals found that the multiple levels of hearsay were not problematic. The “assessment of reliability of hearsay in this context does not turn on a mechanical tallying of levels of hearsay,” Blanchard wrote. Instead, “the assessment of reliability at a preliminary examination turns on a consideration of the same rationales that render certain types of hearsay statements admissible,” he wrote. “This is because the legislature decided to enact an unqualified elimination of the general rule barring hearsay in this context,” and “because defendants are protected by the obligation of a court to assess whether the evidence presented at a preliminary examination, including hearsay evidence, is sufficiently reliable, as part of the court’s overall determination of whether the State has made a plausible showing of probable cause.” Blanchard said the court was not creating a general rule that hearsay statements quoting law enforcement agents are necessarily reliable, but that in Robinson's case the statements were thorough and "convey(ed), at least on their face, timely accounts by people with first-hand information, given with what could be appropriate motivations to provide accurate information to police." Robinson argued that permitting the state to proceed in this manner deprived defendants of any “realistic ability to challenge the plausibility of the State’s case.” He called allowing the prosecution to merely read the complaint at the preliminary hearing “a mere façade of justice,” especially when six law enforcement officers were named in the complaint and could have testified. Blanchard wrote that “there is no basis for such a requirement in current statutory language.” Criminal defense attorneys are concerned. "This case unfortunately takes us one more step down the road toward the complete legal irrelevance of the preliminary hearing in felony prosecutions in Wisconsin," defense attorney Craig Johnson told Wisconsin Justice Initiative after seeing the decision. "Preliminary hearings have historically served an important gatekeeping function by stopping weak cases from proceeding and sparing those who were falsely accused from further burdens. They were an important early test of probable cause and the strengths of the state's case," he said. "Now they are more like empty shells that provide almost no due process protections." You can read the full opinion here. Note that Johnson is WJI's board president. Candidates Aaron Marcoux and Angeline Winton-Roe vie for the seat on the Washburn County Circuit Court currently held by Winton-Roe. The election is April 7. Marcoux is the Washburn County district attorney, having been appointed by Gov. Tony Evers in 2019 and elected to four-year terms in 2020 and 2024. Before then he was an assistant district attorney, and before that an assistant state public defender. He graduated from the University of Wyoming College of Law in 2010. A copy of his resume/CV is here. Winton-Roe is the incumbent, having been appointed to the seat by Gov. Tony Evers in 2019 and elected to a six-year term in 2020. WJI's "Evers' judges" post about her is here. She previously was the elected Washburn County District Attorney; before that she worked in private practice and then as an assistant district attorney. She graduated from the William Mitchell College of Law (St. Paul, Minnesota) in 2008. A copy of her resume/CV is here. WJI asked each of the candidates to answer a series of questions. The questions are patterned after some of those on the job application the governor uses when he is considering judicial appointments. Answers are printed as submitted, without editing or insertion of “(sic)” for errors. The candidates are presented alphabetically by last name.
In Washington County, incumbent Branch 2 Judge Gordon Leech is challenged by Grant Scaife. The election is April 7. Leech was appointed to Washington County Circuit Court by Gov. Tony Evers in July 2025 and took his seat in August. He previously was a prosecutor in the Fond du Lac County District Attorney's Office. Before that he was in private practice and served as an attorney in the U.S. Marine Corps. He graduated from University of Pittsburgh School of Law in 1990. His resume is here. WJI's "Evers' judges" post about him is here. Scaife is a prosecutor in the Washington County District Attorney's Office. According to his campaign website, he previously was an assistant corporation counsel (meaning that he worked for and represented a county). He graduated from University of Wisconsin Law School in 2016. WJI asked each of the candidates to answer a series of questions. The questions are patterned after some of those on the application the governor uses when he is considering judicial appointments. Leech responded to WJI's questionnaire. Scaife did not. Answers are printed as submitted, without editing or insertion of “(sic)” for errors.  Gordon Leech
Why do you want to continue as a judge? When Judge Muehlbauer announced his retirement, I felt ready for this role based on my 35 years of legal experience and my life experiences. I spoke to each of the sitting and retired judges in the county, and they all supported my decision to apply, which confirmed that I was qualified and ready to assume the responsibilities of this position. Having now held this office for the majority of the past year, I know I enjoy the position and believe I am making fair and impartial decisions in the important matters brought to me in all the various case types we handle like criminal, civil claims, divorces, child support disputes, mental health commitments, probate and other matters. I have been out in the community talking to people about my judicial philosophy, which is committed to keeping politics out of the courtroom, and everyone agrees that is important. I don’t see the same commitment from others. So I believe I have something unique and critical to offer the citizens of the county: judicial independence from political parties and special interests that would like to influence the courts. Describe which U.S. Supreme Court or Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion in the past 25 years you believe had a significant positive or negative impact on the people of Wisconsin and explain why. In 2023, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided State v. Johnson. This case has a significant impact on Wisconsin citizens because it appears to add a third plate to the scales of justice for the victims of crime. Prior to the Johnson decision, it was common practice for criminal defendants to have access to a victim’s healthcare records because of a 1993 decision of the court in State v. Shiffra. This practice discouraged prosecution of crimes and inflicted emotional distress on victims. The Johnson decision overruled Shiffra, positively protecting victims from incursions into their privately held healthcare records which helps remove some of the pressures on victims that had discouraged them in the past to prosecute their claims. At the same time, the decision negatively affects the rights of the accused to investigate their accusers in ways traditionally done to examine the truthfulness of the accusations. The Johnson decision is recognized as one of the first cases decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin addressing whether victims had a legal status, known as “standing,” to enforce rights granted them under the constitutional amendment and enabling statutes known as Marcy’s Law. The court appeared to recognize that victims may have standing to exert rights under Marcy’s Law, although the court decided the case on other grounds. The Johnson case is significant because the court overturned almost 30 years of precedent, showing that the court was willing to examine whether the earlier opinion was correctly decided, how workable the decision was when put into practice, and the change in degree of respect our society now gives to victims as demonstrated by the enactment of Marcy’s Law. The opinion essentially says that the Supreme Court believes that being old law alone isn’t enough to justify it and signals that victims may have standing to personally enforce the rights granted to them in Marcy’s Law. Describe your judicial philosophy. I follow the rule of law as given by the will of the people through our elected representatives and as interpreted by the higher courts. I recognize it is my duty to refrain from creating law on the bench. I treat parties fairly, without bias or favoritism, and I make decisions based on the law and the facts before me. Describe one or two of the most significant cases in which you were involved as either an attorney or a judicial officer. As a prosecutor, I handled all levels of felony and misdemeanor cases. One of the last cases I handled was the trial of Timonthy Brown for 1st Degree Murder which I tried with DA Eric Toney to a successful verdict. There were many others too, in particular cases which had victims, that I was honored to be trusted with prosecuting. But one of the most significant cases I handled was not a criminal case, but case involving the termination of parental rights of a parent that was absent, or abandoned, a child but was refusing to let the foster parents adopt the child. The child spent years living in the loving home of the foster parents. The father was absent in his life because he either chose to be absent or due to periods of incarceration. The child experienced psychological trauma when the father had what little contact he exercised. Just before the matter was scheduled to go to trial, the attorney in the DA’s office found he had a conflict and could not handle the trial. I volunteered, though I had no prior experience prosecuting this type of matter and was short on time. But it was a very important matter for the foster parents and the child. The trial was a week long and had many contested issues both factually and legally. It was jury trial. Along with my co-counsel in the DA’s office, we secured a verdict and subsequent judgment in favor of the foster parents, clearing the way to adoption. However, the father appealed the decision all the way to the supreme court, and I continued to handle the matter through appeal. I was able to prevail in each level of appeal, and the foster parents were finally able to adopt the child. I am proud to say that I helped this child get into a loving family that provided for him emotionally, spiritually, and financially. He finally found a home where he felt safe, secure and loved by his foster parents, and his greatest wish was for them to adopt him so that he did not need to fear losing them and could finally call them, forever, his parents. Describe your legal experience as an advocate in criminal litigation, civil litigation, and administrative proceedings. In my more than 35 years of legal experience, I have extensive and diverse experience handling criminal and civil litigation in trial courts, appellate courts, and administrative proceedings. I have handles matters in multiple state courts, federal courts, and military courts. I have also handled matters in federal, state and local administrative courts. I started my career in the U.S. Marine Corps as a Judge Advocate. I was a military prosecutor, and our cases were tried in military courts. I also counseled and defended the Marine Corps in personnel matters that included discrimination and wrongful termination claims held in administrative forums like the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Merit Systems Protection Board. After my active duty in the Marine Corps, I entered the civil practice of law, counseling and representing employers and employees in various employment matters in state and federal courts. I also handled commercial litigation between businesses. I later represented people in consumer protection matters, which were litigated in state and federal courts, where I represented victims of financial schemes and prosecuted those that took advantage of them. I returned to criminal law more recently where initially I represented criminal defendants in state courts, which included taking on indigent clients on behalf of the State Public Defenders Office. Just before taking the bench in my current role, I was hired by District Attorney Eric Tony in Fond du Lac as an Assistant District Attorney prosecuting criminal offenses on behalf of the citizens of Wisconsin. Describe an instance when you were challenged and had to exhibit courage in the face of adversity or opposition and how you handled that situation. Most recently, applying for the appointment to the bench and running to retain my position is an instance where I am challenged and face opposition. Although this position is nonpartisan, partisan politics and politicians are attempting to influence the election with political overtones. I believe that partisan politics have no place in the election of a judge at any level and should not influence a judge’s decisions on the bench where the rule of law is to be applied. When applying for this judicial position, I knew that I would likely face opposition just because I was appointed by a governor that is not popular with a significant population in this county. Knowing this would be a significant challenge, I chose to apply anyway because I wanted this position, felt I was well qualified and ready for it, and I didn’t want someone else to fill the position or worse, that it would be vacant for a year. To overcome the opposition based on my appointment, I am talking to everyone of every political persuasion. I am consistently communicating my qualifications and judicial philosophy with the same message regardless of who I talk to. I emphasize my professional and life experiences and my commitment to keep politics out of the courtroom. I am not a member of a political party, I don’t campaign with a political party, and I don’t seek the endorsements of political parties or special interest groups. Do you support requiring a justice or judge to recuse him/herself from cases involving donors of money or other resources to the judge's election? If not, why not? If so, why, and what contribution limits would you set? Whether judges should be required to recuse him or herself from cases involving donors of money or other resources to the judge’s election is a policy decision that is best left to will of the people through elected representatives. In my position as judge of the circuit court, I don’t take positions on political policies. I do think that judges must be mindful of their own biases based on any type of contribution received as a candidate either in the form of money or intangible compensation like supporting endorsements which can be as beneficial as monetary donations. Judges and judicial candidates should not accept any contribution or support that will either compromise his or her ability to be fair and impartial or give the appearance that he or she cannot be fair or impartial. Significant financial donations or endorsements from political parties or special interest groups may be particularly troublesome to judicial integrity. It is a matter of maintaining the public’s confidence in our decisions. Everyone has the right to expect that their judge will apply the law without favor to anyone. Our rules of judicial conduct already prohibit judges, among other things, from being a member of a political party, from campaigning with a political party, and require recusal where a judge has a conflict of interest or circumstances are such that it appears there is a conflict of interest. It is a rule that applies to me as a judge, and as such I fully honor it. If defined limits are placed on campaign contributions or other restrictions, I will also fully honor them as well. What are the greatest obstacles judges face when trying to deliver true justice? What can or should be done about them? [Define “true justice” as you see fit.] True justice for me as a trial court judge means following the law as written and interpreted by the higher courts and exercising any discretion within those bounds to find a fair and just result given the law and circumstances. It would not be true justice for me to impose as law my own belief of what the law ought to be rather than what it is. Otherwise, people would have no confidence in the courts because each court would have its own version of justice. We can’t keep the integrity of the courts in that manner. If a law is undesireable, the people need to know about it and need to decide to change or eliminate it. The obstacles to achieving true justice is our own limitations in recognizing our own biases and our own limitations on understanding. Political pressures on courts to decide cases consistent with a political agenda are also significant obstacles to any notion of true justice. To overcome these obstacles, we need judges with professional and life experience to guide them and judges committed to keeping politics and other special interests out of the decisions made in the courtroom and out of their campaigns. Provide any other information you feel would be helpful to potential voters deciding for whom to vote. Life experiences are another important factor for voters to consider when electing a judge. When you need advice about an important decision, do you turn to someone who has no or little experience? No, we don’t. We turn to people who have relatable experiences to help us understand our situation and the pros and cons of the possible choices and outcomes. We generally correlate time and experience with wisdom. Having presided in many cases now, including civil, criminal, family and others, I can say that I value every gray hair I earned on my head to find what I believe is the right decision based on the law and within the boundaries of discretion we have as judges when making our decisions. We must strive for what is right under the law and what is right morally within the Judeo-Christian values in our community. I have represented and stood with victims of crime, injured workers, people scammed for someone else’s profit, and for the State as well as defendants in criminal cases. I have lived a full life already having served our country in the Marines during the Gulf War and its aftermath, was married and divorced, happily remarried, raised 3 successful children, am helping my wife raise 3 teenagers, I’ve been a public servant, I’ve worked for businesses, and I’ve owned my own business. I lived in more than four states before moving to Washington County in 2004 to raise my 3 children here. I have remained in Wisconsin and in Washington County most of the years since. These are just some of the experiences I bring with me to the courtroom. These life experiences along with my decades of legal experience give me the confidence to make fair, unbiased and just decisions for Washington County. Book review: "Shielded" is an "engaging and enraging" examination of police immunity from suit3/13/2026  Schuldt If you're reading this blog, you are very likely concerned about justice in Wisconsin, the country, and across the world. But you're probably also pretty busy. How do you choose which books about the justice system to read during your limited free time? In a new series of posts, Wisconsin Justice Initiative founder and former executive director Gretchen Schuldt will help you out. An avid reader, she returns to the blog with book reviews so you can decide what's of interest to you and worth your time. Shielded: How the Police Became Untouchable, by Joanna Schwartz. Viking, 291 pages, 2023. The U.S. Supreme Court first made it possible for individuals to successfully sue over constitutional rights violations. It’s been walking that decision back ever since. The precedent was set in 1971’s Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. The court, in a 6-3 decision, said individuals could sue federal agents for damages related to Fourth Amendment violations. These days, thanks to subsequent court decisions, Bivens is so diminished that justice is unattainable for most people. Schwartz’s book is an engaging and enraging examination of the court’s jurisprudence and other factors responsible for this sorry state of affairs. Take, for example, the court’s decisions creating and expanding “qualified immunity,” a pulled-it-out-of-the-air doctrine that gives legal immunity to government officials, including law enforcement, as long as even the most egregious constitutional violations do not violate “clearly established law.” This new standard applies, the justices said in 1982’s Harlow v Fitzgerald, even if the officials’ actions were not taken in good faith. Schwartz provides a number of examples of the ridiculous ways courts gradually stretched the qualified immunity doctrine to give cover to action a five-year-old child would know is wrong. In one of them, Baxter v. Bracey, an appeals court held that officers were entitled to qualified immunity because there wasn’t an earlier case clearly stating that it was unconstitutional for an officer to set a police dog on a burglary suspect who surrendered and was sitting with his hands up. A prior court had said it was unconstitutional for an officer to release a police dog on a suspect who had surrendered and was lying down, Schwartz writes, but the appeals court said that case did not clearly show that turning a police dog loose on a suspect sitting, hands up, was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court in 2020 declined to hear an appeal of the Bracey decision. Then there’s the outcome of the 1978 Supreme Court decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services holding that municipalities can be sued for civil rights violations only if the conduct was due to the government’s policies, procedures, or customs. The court later said the need for better training, supervision, hiring practices or discipline had to be so obvious that a government’s failure to correct the deficiencies amounted to “deliberate indifference” to citizens’ rights. That led to the court ruling in 2011 in Connick v. Thompson that a prosecutor’s office could not be held liable when a district attorney withheld from a defendant blood work information that could have cleared the man. That led to his wrongful convictions for robbery and murder; he spent 14 years on death row before the information was found and he was exonerated. It turned out that hiding the report wasn’t a one-off. The prosecutor had a history of not turning over important evidence to defendants or their lawyers. But, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote for the 5-4 majority, none of the previous violations “involved failure to disclose blood evidence, a crime lab report, or physical or scientific evidence of any kind.” Schwartz’s takedowns of relevant justice-denying court decisions are convincing, but her analysis goes well beyond that. She tackles, among other things, the difficulty of finding lawyers willing to accept civil rights cases, unrepresentative federal juries, police departments’ failure to discipline rogue and brutal officers, municipal and law enforcement failures to learn from the suits filed against them, the questionable statistics used to justify police immunity, and the political pressure on local judges to not rule in ways that antagonize local political powers. Schwartz’s writing is compelling and accessible. Shielded is for anyone interested in justice and the David v. Goliath issues so often involved in getting it.
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