 Entry to the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Capitol in Madison. Photograph by Margo Kirchner. By Alexandria Staubach
The Wisconsin Supreme Court opens its session with oral arguments next week, including a case concerning the constitutionality of Wisconsin’s reverse waiver statute. “Reverse waiver” is used to describe a case that begins in adult court but is later transferred to juvenile court. Under the pertinent statute, adult circuit courts exercise original jurisdiction over various homicide charges for any child alleged to have committed the crime “on or after the juvenile’s 10th birthday.” That jurisdiction can only be transferred to juvenile court through the reverse waiver process. Noah Mann-Tate was charged with intentional first-degree homicide, a Class A felony (the most serious), for shooting his mother in November 2022. He was 10 years old at the time. Charges were brought in early 2023 after Mann-Tate made conflicting statements to police about what happened, including an admission that he was angry with his mother, stole and hid the key to her gun safe the night before, accessed a gun, and shot her in the morning. Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Jane Carroll denied Mann-Tate’s motion for reverse waiver. She said that “the most compelling reason to keep Mann-Tate in the juvenile system was his age” and that a 10-year-old did not belong in the adult court system. However, she found she was required to consider only the factors listed in the statute, which do not include age. The reverse waiver statute defines three factors that must be considered by the adult court when considering transfer: whether the juvenile can receive adequate treatment in the adult criminal justice system, the seriousness of the offense, and the effect on general deterrence. The burden is on the child to establish that statutory requirements for reverse waiver are met. In Mann-Tate’s appeal from Carroll’s decision, Wisconsin Court of Appeals District 1 found Wisconsin’s reverse-waiver law unconstitutional. Judge Sara Geenen wrote the decision for the appeals court panel. Geenen wrote that a decade after Wisconsin enacted its reverse waiver statute, the U.S. Supreme Court “fundamentally altered the way in which juveniles are treated in the criminal justice system.” Based on the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the high court distinguished juveniles for the purposes of sentencing. The Court of Appeals found that the distinction is not limited to Eighth Amendment issues. It said that additional factors discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court should be considered during reverse waiver proceedings. Those factors include the child’s chronological age related to maturity and impulsiveness, the child’s ability to appreciate risk and consequences, family and home life and the circumstances of the crime, impact on family, peer pressure, the effect of age on the child’s ability to navigate the criminal justice process, and the possibility of rehabilitation. Mann-Tate argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the statutory factors set out in Wisconsin law are “unconstitutionally incomplete” because they fail to include the “unique attributes of youth” as identified and required by the U.S. Supreme Court. Geenen noted that the circuit court could not find whether adult court treatment services were sufficient because although Mann-Tate had “below-normal-intelligence,” there was no medical diagnosis in the record, despite the child telling officers that he has five imaginary people who talk to him. Because Mann-Tate’s mental health needs were unknown, he could not prove that the adult system could not provide adequate treatment. The state asked the Wisconsin Supreme Court to review the case, leading to next week’s argument date. Of note, Bryan Stevenson, the acclaimed attorney and executive director of Equal Justice Initiative (a human rights organization in Montgomery, Alabama), has entered an appearance on Mann-Tate’s behalf for purposes of the Supreme Court proceedings.
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By Alexandria Staubach
A new legislative committee to study district attorney resources held its first meeting at the Capitol last week. For almost four decades, Wisconsin has struggled with the model used to allocate prosecution funding across the state’s many offices. The State Legislature's Legislative Council created the study committee to evaluate current needs. The current funding formula assigns the available number of full-time employment positions based on caseload as an empirical measure of need. According to some, the evolution of a prosecutor’s practice has rendered the metric obsolete, as it fails to account for changes in the nature of the role and the added responsibilities these attorneys now face. “Wisconsin had the right intention, objective statewide allocation, but the inputs and follow-through have not kept pace with the work,” said Mindy Tempelis, president of the Wisconsin District Attorneys Association, during a presentation at the committee’s meeting, the first of four now planned. During the meeting, Tempelis identified three “interlocking failures” that have undermined the system: the nature of the work changing faster than the system around it, the Legislature’s tendency to fund only part of measured needs, and the measure itself no longer being “trustworthy enough to tell us exactly how large the gap is or where positions belong.” “There has always been a gap,” she said. “Examining whether the formula accurately reflects the offices’ actual workloads and whether it created unintended consequences that do not serve the interests of justice,” will be a lead objective of the committee, said Rep. Ron Tusler (R-Harrison), the study committee’s chair. Tusler is joined by Vice-Chair Sen. Van Wanggaard (R-Racine), Rep. Ann Roe (D-Janesville), Sen. Jamie Wall (D-Green Bay), and subject matter experts like State Public Defender Jennifer Bias, several district attorneys, and professionals in law enforcement. The committee hopes to recommend legislation, said Tusler. “We need to pass something that is passable,” he said. “We’ve had a divided government for the last eight years in Wisconsin, (so) we need to think of both sides and both parties.” “Whether you want more diversions or more aggressive prosecutions, the solution isn’t fewer prosecutors,” said Winn Collins, deputy administrator of legal services for the DA’s association, during a presentation at the meeting. “When you have 300 cases you can’t be creative,” he said. “A prosecutor is left with the option to just say what’s my standard offer in this kind of case.” Tempelis and Collins discussed prosecutor pay, along with allocated positions. Collins attributed the comparatively low pay of government work, coupled with the emotional and time demands of the role, as drivers of the issues elected district attorneys face with retention. The issue isn’t volume of positions alone, but what those positions pay, according to the pair. The result is often a prosecutor core that is young and less experienced said Collins. “People who have less time and people with less time, they’re going to make more irrational decisions.” Evaluating cases for specialty dockets, thousands of hours of digital discovery generated by now commonplace security camera footage and body cameras, and victim communication under Marcy’s Law have all added to the workload of those in criminal justice, the presenters said. They also noted more obscure pressures. How law enforcement is funded impacts caseloads, Tempelis said, referencing law enforcement grants that underwrite specific types of policing. “When law enforcement gets grants to do specific kinds of police work, it generates more cases,” she said, pointing to the increase in cases based on grant money earmarked for tactics like OWI checkpoints. Committee member Wall said the criminal justice system was not set up for “rational management.” “If we were starting from scratch, we wouldn’t start with 71 different nexuses around the state,” he said. He asked what Tempelis and the Wisconsin DAs association hoped to gain from the committee. Tempelis asked for a comprehensive study of what prosecutors’ workloads look like, followed by a measure that accurately reflects the size and scope of work in each jurisdiction and can evolve. She suggested that such an overhaul would necessitate a new entity to oversee the work and “help us make smarter decisions than what we have happening now.” WJI advocates for progressive change in Wisconsin’s justice system. Some of those changes can only come from legislation and who is positioned to make law. Being so, we are also committed to Wisconsin voter engagement. Whether different or supplemental electoral systems may serve voters' interests is an open question. Some believe other systems may enhance voter turnout, de-escalate the political climate encouraging more citizen participation, and give the electorate more say as to who makes it on the ballot. This piece is the first in a short series that covers other electoral systems and their current status in Wisconsin.
By Alexandria Staubach Thirty-nine percent of Wisconsin early voters cast their ballot for governor in this month’s primary election before the final field of candidates was set, according to Marquette University research and policy fellow, John Johnson. And, according to the Associated Press, 68,343 or 8.3% of the total vote count went to candidates that had dropped out - Mandela Barnes, Sarah Rodriguez, Missy Hughes. According to Johnson’s analysis, Milwaukee’s early voters wasted their votes at a much higher rate. 17.7% of the Milwaukee noncandidate votes came from early voting as opposed to 1.6% on election day. In most places it’s impossible to tell who early voters voted for. While the votes are cast in advance of election day, the ballots are not touched until the polls close. Most of the time, these early votes or absentee ballots (they’re the same thing) are transferred to the voter’s ward to be counted along with the votes cast on election day. However in some larger municipalities, including Milwaukee, many absentee ballots are sent to a single central processing location, and those numbers are not subsumed into a ward’s total count. But wasted votes are not the only criticism of this month's chaotic primary election. Milwaukee County Executive David Crowley won the nomination by just 3,800 votes, with just 39.8% of the statewide total compared to Rep. Franchesca Hong’s 38.3% share. Neither candidate touched the majority threshold. Some have suggested that Rank Choice Voting could fix these issues, and the last two state legislative sessions have seen efforts to bring RCV to Wisconsin voters. Real headway was made in the 2023-2024 legislative session when a bipartisan bill for “Final Five” voting was initiated in the Senate and made its way through public hearing. Final Five voting, currently used in Alaska, is a popular model pioneered by Milwaukee native Katherine Gehl. Gehl, who authored a paper on the failure of competition in the U.S. political system, published by the Harvard Business School in 2017, also founded the Institute for Political Innovation which advances Final Five voting nationally. According to Gehl, Final Five is the combination of two electoral innovations. Top-five primaries, and RCV. The combination, according to Gehl, "ensures that we always elect the candidate with the broadest appeal to the most number of voters." Ultimately the bill died in committee and never received a vote but would have brought Final Five voting to Wisconsin for U.S. senator and U.S. representative races. At the time, Sen. Jesse L. James (R-Thorpe), said “change is hard,” but “our current system is not working.” And Sen. Jeff Smith (D-Eau Claire) said the proposal “has the ability to reduce partisanship, encourage cooperation, and puts the power back in the hands of the majority of population.” The bill had ten Democrat co-sponsors and eleven Republican co-sponsors. As the bipartisan effort floundered, a group of Republicans introduced a bill that would ban RCV statewide by constitutional amendment. Then Sen. Duey Stroebel (R-Saukville) said, “there’s little evidence to suggest that adopting an alternative voting method would bring about transformative changes to our political environment,” and that banning RCV would “protect our time-tested election system from such experimentation.” Their amendment never made it out of committee. In the most recent legislative session, a group of Democratic senators introduced a bill that would allow municipalities to use rank choice voting at their discretion, but it too failed. So what is RCV? Last year, the American Bar Association’s Task Force for American Democracy published an in-depth analysis of the electoral system, and while it is not the formal position of the ABA, the work nevertheless concluded RCV “may help improve US democracy.” U.S. elections are run a few different ways. Broadly, there’s the “majority system” in which a candidate must obtain more than 50% of the vote in order to win, sometimes culminating in a runoff if no candidate gets the majority vote. The “top-two … or three or four” system lists all candidates irrespective of party affiliation on a single ballot and a predetermined number of those with the most votes go on to the general election. Finally, “plurality systems” are those in which the majority winner takes all regardless of vote share. This is what we use in Wisconsin. Plurality systems are the most common system in the U.S., but the majority system is well established, especially in the Southern States, where it’s been adopted everywhere except Florida. RCV ranks candidates in order of preference. If a single candidate has a majority (50% +1) they simply win. If no candidate has the majority, the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated and the count starts again. Voters who ranked the eliminated candidate first have their votes transferred to whomever they ranked second and so on. It’s gained considerable traction in the U.S. over the last decade. While examples like the primary race for New York City mayor, in which Zohran Mamdani made history as the first Democratic Socialist elected to that office, make headlines, this isn't the system's maiden voyage in U.S. elections. Between 1915 and 1940, two dozen municipalities across six states adopted RCV, but it fell into disfavor and repeal efforts largely erased the practice between 1940 and 1950, according to the RCV Resource Center. “Politicians displaced by RCV, a lack of organizations amongst groups that benefited from RCV, and a political climate that turned against the parties elected through the proportional representation of RCV,” largely lead to its demise, says the RVC Resource Center. But RCV isn’t a single thing. It, like “top-two,” can be implemented in several ways. In New York City’s mayoral race, RCV was used in the party primary to decide which Democratic candidate went on to the general election. Whereas Los Angeles recently used RCV to hold a nonpartisan “top-two” primary. That ballot included all candidates regardless of party affiliation. If any had won a simple majority, they would have been mayor. However, there was no simple majority winner so the top two candidates – who are both Democrats – will now face each other during November’s general election. According to the ABA, a significant criticism of RCV includes that it is too complex for voters to understand and use successfully. This was also a complaint listed by legislators seeking to ban it in Wisconsin. But the ABA’s analysis found comparable rates of understanding of election rules in a study between voters in RCV cities and those matched in non-RCV cities. The ABA analysis additionally examined whether RCV changes campaign behavior and noted that it has “potential to encourage more civil campaigning by motivating candidates to seek broader support, thus reducing polarization.” “In sum,” says the analysis, “RCV is an improvement over plurality voting with clear benefits in terms of representation, campaign quality, mobilization, and turn out.” The research, demonstrates RCV “encourages greater consensus building as well as more civil political campaigns,” according to the analysis. Below you can find the Wisconsin legislators who have backed or attempted to block RCV. Their contact information is linked for your convenience, if you'd like to voice support or concern. Supported Final Five Sen. Jesse L. James (R-Thorpe) Sen. Jeff Smith (D-Eau Claire) Sen. Robert L. Cowles (R-Green Bay) Sen. Mark Spreitzer (D-Beloit) Rep. Ron Tusler (R-Harrison) Former Rep. Daniel Riemer (D-Milwaukee) Rep. Tony Kurtz (R-Womewoc) Rep. Deb Andraca (D-Whitefish Bay) Former Rep. Bob Donovan (R-Greenfield) Rep. Steve Doyle (D-Onalaska) Sen. Dora Drake (D-Milwaukee) Rep. Alex Joers (D-Middleton) Former Rep. Scott L. Johnson (R-Jefferson) Rep. Joel Kitchens (R-Sturgeon Bay) Rep. Jeffrey Mursau (R-Crivitz) Rep. Todd Novak (R-Dodgeville) Former Rep. Katrina Shankland Rep. David Steffen (R-Howard) Rep. Lisa Subeck (D-Madison) Rep. Shannon Zimmerman (R-River Falls) Former Rep. Jimmy Anderson (D-Fitchburg) Rep. Ryan Clancy (D-Milwaukee) Rep. Jodi Emerson (D-Eau Claire) Rep. Darrin Madison (D-Milwaukee) Rep. Clinton Anderson (D-Beloit) Supported Ban on RCV Former Sen. Duey Stroebel (R-Saukville) Sen. Steve Nass (R-Whitewater) Former Sen. Joan Ballweg (R-Markesan) Sen. Cory Tomczyk (R-Mosinee) Sen. Van Wanggaard (R-Racine) Former Rep. Ty Bodden (R-Hilbert) Rep. Chanz Green (R-Mason) Rep. Joy Goeben (R-Hobart) Rep. Scott Allen (R-Waukesha) Rep. Elijah R. Behnke (R-Town of Chase) Former Rep. Janel Brandtjen Rep. Barbara Dittrich (R-Oconomowoc) Former Rep. James Edming (R-Glen Flora) Rep. Rick Gundrum (R-Slinger) Rep. Nate Gustafson (R-Omro) Former Rep. Gae Magnafici Rep. Paul Melotik (R-Grafton) Rep. David Murphy (R-Hortonville) Former Rep. Nik Rettinger (R-Mukwonago) Rep. Paul Tittl (R-Manitowoc) Rep. Nancy VanderMeer (R-Tomah) Rep. Calvin T. Callahan (R-Tomahawk) Former Rep. Michael Schraa (R-Oshkosh) Former Rep. Donna Rozar Rep. Robert Brooks (R-Saukville) Rep. Dave Maxey (R-New Berlin) Former Rep. Peter Schmidt (R-Bonduel) Former Rep. Ellen Schutt (R-Clinton) Rep. David Armstrong (R-Rice Lake) Rep. Jerry L. O’Connor (R-Fond Du Lac) Supported local discretion for RCV Sen. Chris Larson (D-Milwaukee) Sen. Kristin Dassler-Alfheim (D-Appleton) Sen. LaTonya Johnson (D-Milwaukee) Sen. Mark Spreitzer (D-Beloit) Rep. Amaad Rivera-Wagner (D-Green Bay) Rep. Lee Snodgrass (D-Appleton) Rep. Deb Andraca (D-Whitefish Bay) Rep. Margaret Arney (D-Wauwatosa) Rep. Ryan Clancy (D-Milwaukee) Rep. Ben DeSmidt (D-Kenosha) Rep. Jodi Emerson (D-Eau Claire) Rep. Tara Johnson (D-Town of Shelby) Rep. Darrin Madison (D-Milwaukee) Rep. Vincent Miresse (D-Stevens Point) Rep. Christian Phelps (D-Eau Claire) Rep. Ann Roe (D-Janesville) Rep. Christine Sinicki (D-Milwaukee) Rep. Angela Stroud (D-Ashland) Rep. Shelia Stubbs (D-Madison) Rep. Lisa Subeck (D-Madison) Rep. Jenna Jacobson (D-Oregon)  By Alexandria Staubach and Margo Kirchner
For privacy protection we will refer to a sexual assault victim as Jane Doe. This story briefly recounts a sexual assault. Iron County Circuit Court Judge Anthony Stella Jr. is refusing to release records of what he and a prosecutor said at a court hearing in a criminal sexual assault case. Stella and his staff refuse to allow the victim to purchase a transcript of the sentencing hearing of her assailant. Meanwhile, the judge and his staff have refused Wisconsin Justice Initiative’s attempt to purchase a digital audio recording of the hearing. In both instances, the judge claims only parties to the case are entitled to the records, relying on his blanket policy. Jane Doe contacted WJI about the case and said both Stella and Iron County District Attorney Matthew Tingstad made unsavory comments about her and to her during the June hearing in her assailant’s case. According to Doe, they focused more attention on her line of work as an exotic dancer than the defendant’s conduct in assaulting her. Although WJI generally does not give legal advice or represent individual clients, litigants upset by particular judges or procedures do reach out. Doe contacted WJI to report how she was treated by the court and prosecutor and to ask whether their comments violated any rules of professional conduct. WJI attempted to confirm the statements attributed to Stella and Tingstad by reviewing the court recording or transcript before considering whether to publish anything about the hearing. But the court was quick to deny WJI access. WJI reviewed the criminal complaint, which says the defendant, Brandon Frazer, inappropriately touched Doe during a private dance and orally penetrated her vagina. According to the complaint, Frazer confessed, admitting that “he stuck his tongue out and licked VICTIM.” It also says security cameras recorded the incident and officers reviewed and preserved the footage. Frazer was identified through ATM records subpoenaed from the strip club. Court records confirm that Frazer pleaded no contest to third-degree sexual assault—a felony—in exchange for a one-year deferred sentence at the hearing. The court ordered Frazer to pay a fine, commit no new crimes during the deferment period, avoid Iron County, and notify the DA of any change in address within five days. If Frazer successfully completes the requirements, after one year his conviction will be reduced to misdemeanor disorderly conduct. Doe told WJI she was “blindsided by the light sentence” and the opportunity for the sexual assault crime to be reduced to a nonsexual misdemeanor, without treatment or other conditions from the court. Doe told WJI that she lodged her dissatisfaction with the court and the DA directly and through her victim impact statement. According to Doe, the light sentence was imposed because the judge and DA felt the case was mitigated by the nature of Doe’s work. At sentencing, Stella allegedly said that “hypervigilance might be the appropriate state of mind” for Doe in her line of work, the nature of Frazer’s crime was “different” than other sexual assault offenses, and a felony would “lump” Frazer in with other sexual assailants. The hypervigilance comment was reported by a Michigan news outlet that had a reporter present for the hearing. The reporter was unwilling to speak to WJI for this story. According to Doe, Tingstad made additional comments to her before the hearing about a jury’s unwillingness to take her case seriously. Doe told WJI that Stella said on the record he would not want his family members in her line of work. To verify Doe’s assertions, WJI sent an open records request to Stella and the Iron County Circuit Court court reporter seeking the hearing’s digital audio recording. Recordings from a court’s digital audio recording—DAR—system are supposed to be available to the public upon payment of $10, after the court redacts any confidential or attorney-client discussions. Nevertheless, the court clerk denied WJI’s request for the reasons given in an attached policy of Stella that says “(i)t is the policy of the Iron County Circuit Court to deny the general public access to DAR recordings.” In the policy, Stella says that “only parties to a case who have a right to a transcript have the right to obtain copies of these recordings.” “Anyone who wishes to do so may attend a public hearing and see and hear first-hand what is taking place,” his policy states. Around the same time that WJI asked for a copy of the DAR recording, Jean Bock, the Iron County Circuit Court court reporter, told Doe in an email (provided to WJI), “After review of Supreme Court Rules and speaking with the Judge, only parties can request transcripts in cases.” As a victim, Doe is not a party to the criminal case. Her status as a victim has not mattered regarding the transcript, notwithstanding the Marsy’s Law constitutional amendment, which was supposed to raise a victim’s rights to a level commensurate with a defendant’s rights. Iron County Circuit Court is limiting access to transcripts and DAR recordings to only the parties in a case. In doing so, Stella is blocking the public’s ability to confirm what he says at hearings. Stella says in his policy that his position is based on his interpretation of Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules regarding transcripts and that those rules, not public records statutes, govern access to transcripts. Such a reading would result in an exception to an otherwise valid open records request under public records statutes. WJI could locate no such exception to open records law in statute, the Supreme Court rules, or case law. Regarding transcripts, Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 71.04 provides that the verbatim record of a hearing “need not be transcribed unless required by this rule, any statute or court order,” the court reporter generally must prepare a transcript for a party, and “(e)xcept when requested by a party or by a guardian ad litem appointed in the proceedings, the verbatim record of a proceeding under ch. 48, 767 or 938, stats., shall be transcribed only upon order of the court.” (Emphasis added by WJI.) The chapters of law referenced in the above quote concern juveniles, family proceedings, or when a person is appointed to represent someone who cannot advocate for themselves (mainly children, but also the very elderly and those with mental health issues). Many states, Wisconsin included, have statutes that protect access to juvenile records, ensuring that sensitive information is not disclosed to unauthorized people. It makes sense that the Wisconsin Supreme Court would limit access to a transcript in a proceeding involving one or that was otherwise confidential. According to Stella’s written policy, SCR 71.04 means that “a court reporter is only required to make transcripts for parties to a proceeding, and that under no circumstances should a transcript be made for someone who is not a party or GAL in cases under Chapters 48, 767 or 938 without court approval.” Notably, Doe and Frazer are not juveniles, nor is any other person involved in the case. Stella’s stance denying hearing transcripts and audio recordings to nonparties seems unique to Iron County. WJI spoke with court reporters in Waukesha and Milwaukee circuit courts. They confirmed there is no restriction in their courts on nonparties obtaining transcripts or requesting digital audio recordings. Multiple jurisdictions, including Ozaukee County use a form that has no “party to the case” requirement. In Portage County, while a transcript request from the public costs more to produce, there’s also no mandate that the requester be party to a case. DAR records are not official records of proceedings for purposes of appeal, but are nevertheless records held by the court. The Supreme Court’s rules on DAR recordings are brief and instruct the Director of State Courts to “develop policies for copying and charging a fee for an audio recording.” The Supreme Court’s guiding principles on DAR recordings (adopted in March 2023) say: “Duplicates of the electronic record may be purchased by parties to whom a transcript would be available with the approval of the court official. Care should be taken with confidential proceedings, as only certain parties are entitled to a recording or transcript without approval of the court official.” The use of the word “parties” in these principles appears broader than litigants alone, as the principles thereafter state: “(I)f a member of the public wishes to purchase a copy of the digital audio recording in a matter that a transcript would be available to them, they may do so.” The court reporter is to allow the judge to review and redact privileged conversations but then provide the DAR recording to the requester unless the hearing falls under other rules for confidentiality. According to experts contacted by WJI and a court reporter who has been practicing in Wisconsin for more than 20 years, DAR recordings are subject to judicial review to filter protected information like attorney-client privileged conversations, which the recordings sometimes pick up. As reported to the Wisconsin Judicial Council by various sources, the availability of DAR recordings to the public has caused judges hours of extra work to make sure confidential or privileged statements are redacted before release. The Director of State Courts Office convened a committee to study what might be done. In March and May 2026, Director of State Courts Audrey Skwierawski and committee member Judge Eugene Gasiorkiewicz (Racine County Circuit Court) presented the Wisconsin Judicial Council with a proposed rule revision regarding public access to DAR recordings. The proposal confirms that the current rules permit the release of both transcripts and DAR recordings to the public. The possible rule change would limit disclosure of a DAR recording primarily to parties for use in the litigation, the Office of Lawyer Regulation, and the Judicial Commission. Anyone else would have to file a motion in the underlying proceeding, with the burden of showing why a transcript cannot be obtained. Such a rule change would not be required if the current rules already prohibit nonparties from obtaining transcripts and recordings, as Stella asserts. Gasiorkiewicz told WJI by email that DAR committee’s “unanimous opinion is that (at present) DAR recordings are public records under Wisconsin law and anyone (without giving a reason) can obtain a digital download recording (usually a CD) after the sitting judge reviews and if appropriate redacts the content." Wisconsin public records law states that "(e)xcept as otherwise provided by law, any requester has a right to receive from an authority having custody of a record which is in the form of a comprehensible audio recording a copy of the recording substantially as audible as the original. The authority may instead provide a transcript of the recording to the requester if he or she requests." As declared in Wisconsin’s public records law, the public policy of this state is “that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those officers and employees who represent them.” The law is to be construed with a presumption of complete public access, and access should be denied only in an exceptional case. Blanket prohibitions on nondisclosure are generally prohibited by state law. Requests for records should be considered on a case-by-case basis. WJI has complained to Stella’s supervisory judge, Tenth Judicial District Chief Judge John P. Anderson, about Stella’s blanket policy and asked Anderson to direct the Iron County Circuit Court to provide the DAR recording to WJI and the transcript to the victim.  By Erik Reinthaler WJI Intern On a Thursday morning in July, people trickled into Racine Municipal Court for a docket made up mostly of traffic and ordinance violations. Some seemed to know where to go and what to do. Others needed to be reminded to check in on a computer near the courtroom entrance. As more people arrived, even other court-goers began pointing newcomers toward the sign-in. Once court started, cases moved quickly. Defendants came forward, entered their pleas and explained what had brought them to court. Some cases were resolved within minutes. Others took more time as defendants asked questions or discussed their circumstances with the judge. By then, the routine was becoming familiar to me. Racine was one of six Wisconsin municipal courts I observed over the summer, along with Green Bay, Manitowoc, Little Chute, Mid-Moraine Municipal Court in Hartford, and Lakeside Municipal Court in the Fond du Lac area. Many of the same types of cases appeared from court to court, including speeding, automobile insurance and licensing violations, underage drinking, and other ordinance violations. What differed was the experience around them. Sometimes those differences were apparent before a case was even called: how easy it was to find the courtroom, where defendants checked in, or how the process was explained. Others emerged at the bench, in how judges interacted with defendants and how much room there was to address the circumstances behind a citation. My observations offer only a limited look at Wisconsin's municipal court system. I spent different amounts of time in each court and saw different types and numbers of cases. Still, the visits showed how differently this part of Wisconsin's court system can operate from one community to another. That variation takes place within a system of more than 200 municipal courts across Wisconsin. Unlike the state's circuit courts, municipal courts have limited jurisdiction and handle violations of civil municipal ordinances rather than criminal cases. The cases generally involve less serious violations than those heard in circuit court, but they can still result in forfeitures and consequences involving a person's driving privileges. Getting through the door Some differences between courts arose before anyone appeared in front of a judge. At Mid-Moraine Municipal Court, it was clear where to go. Signs posted throughout the small building directed people toward the courtroom, and a staff member near the entrance checked people in and directed them where to wait. Green Bay Municipal Court had its own dedicated building and a single main entrance, so finding the court itself was straightforward. Once inside, however, no one was stationed near the entrance to direct people. Defendants had to notice a sign inside the courtroom telling them to register, though a court clerk helped those who appeared unsure of the process. Lakeside Municipal Court presented a different setting altogether. The court, which serves several municipalities in the Fond du Lac area, met in the North Fond du Lac Community Center, where another event was taking place in a neighboring room. A sign directed people to the municipal courtroom, but there was no formal check-in when I arrived. Instead, the judge called the names of people listed on the docket, including many who were not present, and defendants came forward as their names were called. The setting occasionally made itself known: for part of the session, a lawnmower working just outside the courtroom window provided some background noise. Little Chute was the only court where I encountered an issue simply trying to observe. I was told that I needed to speak with the clerk and get the judge's approval before sitting in on court. I explained that I was there as an observer and was eventually allowed into the courtroom, though I was asked why I wanted to watch. None of the other municipal courts I visited required me to get permission to observe. Wisconsin law generally requires court proceedings to be open to the public. Wisconsin Statute § 757.14 provides that court hearings are public and may be freely attended, subject to limited exceptions. Understanding what is happening Once a case was called, defendants were generally asked to enter one of three pleas: not guilty, guilty, or no contest. Courts varied in how much they explained those options, and some defendants also needed help understanding the underlying violation they were accused of committing. At Lakeside, the judge began proceedings by explaining the three possible pleas to the courtroom. He described what it meant to plead not guilty, guilty, or no contest and explained some of the consequences of each choice. In Manitowoc, the confusion was not just about how to plead. A man facing a disorderly conduct citation told the judge he did not understand what disorderly conduct meant. The judge explained the elements of the ordinance violation in everyday terms before discussing the man's plea options. When the man remained uncertain about how to proceed, the judge entered a not-guilty plea on his behalf and gave him a date to speak with the municipal prosecutor. A similar situation arose at Mid-Moraine when a woman appeared on a citation involving an allegedly vicious dog. There was confusion over the ordinance listed on the citation, and the woman did not understand what conduct could cause a dog to be considered vicious. The judge pulled up the ordinance and explained what it covered. When the woman remained unsure how to proceed, the judge entered a not-guilty plea on her behalf so she could speak with the prosecutor. In Green Bay, the explanation concerned what would happen next. The judge told one defendant not to pay the citations before speaking with the prosecutor, explaining that payment would result in a no-contest plea being entered. Across the courts I observed, confusion at times arose over the charge itself, what a plea meant, or what would happen next. Those questions sometimes required judges to slow down before a case could move forward. Language access Language barriers came up in three of the courts I observed, but the assistance available was different in each. In Green Bay, a Spanish-speaking court clerk interpreted for a defendant as the judge explained the consequences of an operating-while-intoxicated citation. Through the clerk, the defendant was able to explain that he worked as a delivery driver and was concerned about how losing his license would affect his job. At Lakeside Municipal Court, the arrangement was less formal. When a defendant with limited English proficiency came before the judge, another person in the courtroom stepped in to interpret. When I followed up with the court later, staff said Lakeside generally uses LanguageLine (a telephonic service with trained interpreters), but they could not say what had been used during my July 2 visit. The assistance I saw that day was provided in person, not through LanguageLine. Racine took a similarly informal approach. Someone already in the building helped a defendant communicate with the court. When I followed up afterward, court staff said the person would have been either a defendant's family member or a city employee. From what I observed, she appeared to be a city employee, though I was unable to determine who she was or what role she held. The differences stood out to me given Wisconsin Justice Initiative's advocacy for greater access to professional, trained interpreters in municipal court rather than the court’s use of friends, family members, staff members, or other untrained individuals. Being able to understand the court—and to be understood by it—is a basic part of participating in that process. The role of judicial discretion The outcome of a municipal citation was not always fixed by the time a defendant walked into court. Traffic cases provided some of the clearest examples. Across most of the courts I observed, defendants had opportunities to seek reductions on their citations. Judges often considered driving history when reducing demerit points. In other cases, defendants were encouraged to plead not guilty and speak with the municipal prosecutor before resolving their cases. Insurance and licensing cases frequently turned on what a defendant had done since receiving the citation. Across several courts, defendants who showed they had insurance at the time they were cited had charges dismissed or reduced. Judges also considered whether defendants had taken steps to correct licensing or registration problems. Racine stood out in several cases involving defendants who arrived in court still without insurance. Rather than resolving the citation immediately, the judge suggested they plead not guilty and gave them time to obtain insurance before returning to resolve the case. Municipal prosecutors played a role in resolving cases. In Racine, Lakeside, Green Bay, and Mid-Moraine, defendants who pleaded not guilty could speak with a prosecutor before resolving their citations. Manitowoc handled the process by phone, giving defendants a date and time to call the prosecutor for a pretrial conference. For defendants, that meant the citation they arrived with was not necessarily the citation they left with, after plea negotiation with the prosecutor or amendment by the judge. The tone of the courtroom The judges I observed also differed in how they spoke to the people appearing before them. Racine stood out for its conversational tone. The judge greeted each defendant as they came forward, usually with a “good morning,” and regularly asked people to explain what had happened rather than relying only on the citation in front of him. There were lighter moments, too. When a woman approached with her young child, the judge joked that she had brought her lawyer with her. During another case, a conversation with an older defendant turned into a brief exchange about their ages and staying positive. The humor was usually brief before the judge returned to the case. The judge spent time talking defendants through situations that did not have an immediate answer. One woman explained that she had recently gotten a job but had not yet registered or insured her vehicle. The judge asked about her circumstances and discussed what steps she could take before the case moved forward. At Mid-Moraine, the judge's familiarity with some of the people appearing before her shaped the interactions in a different way. She remembered several young defendants from previous appearances and had made graduating from high school part of how she approached their cases. Two returned with diplomas. She congratulated them, shook their hands, and dismissed their citations. A third young woman returned without one. She had fallen behind on required hours, needed additional testing, and still had a packet of schoolwork to complete. The judge asked whose fault it was that she had fallen behind. The woman answered that it was hers. There was a long pause. The judge told her that she had wanted her to finish and that the point was not simply the money owed on the citation. She asked when the woman expected to complete summer school and whether she had anything from the school showing that she had finished. Without proof of graduation, the judge found her guilty and imposed the forfeiture, but gave her another opportunity to bring proof that she had completed high school when she returned on another citation. In Green Bay, the judge's conversations with defendants sometimes extended beyond the immediate citation as well. One defendant told the court that he was homeless and planning to move to California. The judge asked where he planned to go and what he would do once he arrived. When it became clear that the defendant had few details worked out, the judge encouraged him to think through the move more carefully and have a plan in place. He ended the exchange by wishing him luck. Most of these interactions lasted only a few minutes. But for the person standing before the judge, those few minutes were their experience of the court, and the judge played a large role in shaping it. When a fine is not just a fine Even relatively routine municipal violations could carry substantial financial consequences. But imposing a forfeiture was often only the beginning of the conversation. Across the courts I observed, judges regularly discussed when defendants could pay and, in some cases, how much they could afford. At Mid-Moraine, the judge generally allowed defendants 60 days to pay and regularly asked about their ability to do so. When one young woman said she could not pay a past due $187 forfeiture, the judge gave her another 30 days. Defendants were told to contact the court if they needed a payment plan. In Green Bay, a man who had recently started working was given three additional months to pay what he owed. When he raised rent and other expenses, the judge worked out a schedule of about $100 per month. Similar flexibility appeared elsewhere. In Racine, the judge asked one defendant facing a larger forfeiture how much he could afford to pay, and defendants were commonly given 90 days. At Lakeside, defendants were generally given 60 days to pay. In Manitowoc, the judge asked defendants how much time they needed and indicated a willingness to work with them on payment. Courts warned defendants that unpaid forfeitures could be sent for debt collection. For many defendants, though, paying what they owed would take time, and judges often worked with them on how much time they needed. Questions the observations raise After observing six municipal courts, I was left with questions about how much the experience of municipal court should vary from one community to another. Some variation is inherent in the system. Wisconsin's municipal courts are local, the nontraffic ordinances they enforce differ, and no two cases or defendants are exactly alike. Judicial discretion also gives courts room to consider the circumstances of the people appearing before them. But not every difference I observed stemmed from the facts of a case. How easy should it be to figure out where to go and what to do? What should happen when someone does not understand a charge or a plea? What language assistance should be available? And how much should the experience of appearing in court depend on the approach of the judge behind the bench? For someone who rarely enters a courtroom, a municipal citation may be their first or only direct experience with Wisconsin's court system. Whether they leave understanding what happened, what they owe, and what comes next can shape what that experience means to them. That makes what happens in these courtrooms worth watching. For someone who rarely enters a courtroom, a municipal citation may be their first or only direct experience with Wisconsin's court system. Whether they leave understanding what happened, what they owe, and what comes next can shape what that experience means to them. "Evers' judges" is our effort to present information about Gov. Tony Evers' appointees to the bench. The information is taken from the appointees' own judgeship applications. Italics indicate direct quotes from the application. Typos, including punctuation errors, come from the original application even though we have not inserted “(sic)” after each one. WJI has left them as is. Asterisks indicate paragraphs deleted due to length of the answer.  Name: Tanner Brook Kilander
Appointed to: Milwaukee County Circuit Court Appointment date: Feb. 27, 2026, to term ending July 31, 2027 Education: Law School – Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin Undergraduate – Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin High School – Troy High, Troy, Idaho Recent legal employment: January 2016-present – Children’s Court intake attorney and SPD private bar, Kilander Legal Services, Milwaukee, Wisconsin June 2011-December 2015 – Assistant state public defender, Milwaukee Juvenile Division, Wisconsin State Public Defender, Wauwatosa, Wisconsin January 2007-June 2011 – Children’s Court intake attorney and SPD private bar, Kilander Legal Services, Milwaukee, Wisconsin May 2002-January 2007 – Kilander Legal Services, Milwaukee, Wisconsin Bar and administrative memberships: State Bar of Wisconsin General character of practice: The nature of my practice long predates my law degree. When I was in 5th grade, my best friend didn't show up at school on a random Tuesday, and I never saw her again until we were nearly thirty. I didn't know it at the time, but she had been placed in foster care and would never return to her family or to our school. She lost everything - her family, her friends, her dog. This loss impacted me forever. Once I learned more about the child welfare system, I knew that I wanted to be a social worker. To help kids who were in unsafe situations, but also to help their families stay together so they didn't have to lose everyone they love the way my best friend had. When I got my degree in 1997, I immediately became a child protective services social worker. The two years I spent in that role taught me so much about humanity ... and it taught me that I loved the courtroom. As a social worker, I had all the responsibility to keep children safe, but very little power to advocate for what my families needed. I watched the lawyers file motions and argue in court to help my families, and I knew that's what I wanted to do. I left social work to attend law school in 1999, with my heart set on returning to Children's Court to represent parents in CHIPS cases. After several years managing the Marquette Volunteer Legal Clinic (see Question 32), I applied for and got the position I had always wanted - I secured a spot on the "Intake List" at the Vel Phillips Youth and Family Justice Center, commonly referred to as "Children's Court." This is a closed list of 35 attorneys, and we represent all of the parents in Milwaukee County whose children are taken away by Child Protective Services. I've been defending parents in CHIPS cases for a combined total of fifteen years, first from 2007 through 2011, and then resuming in 2016. During this time frame, I have also taken occasional cases as a guardian ad litem for children in CHIPS and guardianship matters. All of those cases are court appointments. In May of 2011, I went to work at the Wisconsin State Public Defender's Office as an Assistant State Public Defender. From 2011-2015, I worked as a staff attorney at the Milwaukee Juvenile office. There, I represented parents in Termination of Parental Rights cases at Children's Court, as well as youth in delinquency and CHIPS cases. I loved the delinquency work, this was an area I had not explored before, and remains an important part of my practice today. I returned to private practice January 1, 2016, reopening my solo practice, Kilander Legal Services. For nearly ten years, I have remained on the Intake List, and have continued to accept appointments from the State Public Defender for CHIPS youth, TPR parents, and youth in delinquency cases. Since 2022, I have also been representing children charged with homicide cases. Although my clients are children - as young as ten years old - they are charged as adults, and these cases are litigated in criminal court. Aside from one Lincoln County matter I am currently involved in, the entirety of my practice is in Milwaukee County. I have a high volume practice with frequent litigation. Though I am in court day in and day out, I have relatively limited experience with jury trials. (I believe I've had 7 juries reach verdict - 2 CHIPS and 5 TPR.) Most Children's Court cases don't have a jury right, and clients often waive jury in CHIPS cases so as to avoid lengthy delays. I frequently have court trials in CHIPS matters, averaging 2-3 per year for a total of approximately 25 in the past decade. Creative motions and out-of-court advocacy tend to be more effective tools to assist my clients in getting their children back quickly, and I take pride in my problem solving and hands-on approach. An effective CHIPS defense practice requires more than just litigation - it requires knowledge about the administrative codes governing DMCPS, the policies and standards CPS workers are supposed to follow, and a willingness to "remind" them through the use of team meetings and contempt motions when they have deviated from their required standards. In 2024, I added a new aspect to my CHIPS defense practice - a holistic defense team. I contract with several social workers (titled "Client Services Specialists," or "CSS") and paralegals to provide a more holistic approach to my child welfare and delinquency cases. My Client Services Specialists assist clients with the seemingly little things that become big barriers to getting their kids returned ... help navigating public transportation, public benefits, medical and educational advocacy, and sometimes just having someone to sit with them when they are meeting with a CPS worker. My CSS team assists my clients with the out-of-court things that I wish I had time to do. This has proven to be an incredibly effective approach - my clients' children are returning home faster and with less in-court litigation, staying home successfully, and ending their involvement with CPS with lasting tools to prevent future system involvement. I was the first person on our Intake List to implement a holistic approach, and other lawyers are now contracting with our workers as well, with similar results. In addition to my CHIPS defense work, nearly half of my current practice is defending children charged with delinquencies or adult offenses. I am one of a handful of Milwaukee County private bar lawyers certified to take high level felony delinquencies, as well as high level adult felonies. I currently represent three children charged as adults with homicide matters - two with first degree intentional homicides, one with first degree reckless homicide. I have delinquency trials regularly, and have a homicide jury trial coming up in February. I've litigated three reverse waivers in the past three years, and litigate waiver hearings on a regular basis. I have a high success rate in the delinquency trials and waivers. *** Finally, in addition to all of the above, I do make the time to provide pro bono assistance to people who need help. So far this year, I have represented a relative caregiver in a licensing denial, filed a name change for a trans youth that I coach at Beckum Stapleton, and assisted a former caregiver to appeal a no contact order in a TPR. Describe typical clients: My clients are members of my community. I have lived on the north side of Milwaukee for more than a decade, in the same zip codes my clients live in. Without exception, every client I have represented in private practice has been indigent, has qualified for court-appointed representation, or, in two unusual cases, has paid a dramatically reduced flat fee for my work. I choose not to represent clients who can afford the fees most private lawyers charge. Though I left the Public Defender's office in 2016, providing quality representation to clients who cannot afford to hire a lawyer remains my passion, and my commitment to my community. The vast majority of my clients are Black or Hispanic, reflective of the racial bias these systems are built upon. Many of my clients lack sufficient income to meet their basic needs. Many are unhoused, and are struggling with mental health challenges, food insecurity, unemployment and addiction. This is true of both my child clients and my adult clients. While I do spend most of my days in the courtroom, a large part of my practice involves sitting with people in their most difficult moments, helping to access community resources to meet their most basic needs, and helping people navigate the racist systems designed to incarcerate them and separate their families. *** Since early in my career, I have enjoyed working with clients some would describe as "difficult". I've represented a large percentage of the Deaf parents involved in the child welfare system in Milwaukee County, and I have learned so much through my work with the Deaf and Hard of Hearing community. Two of my seven jury trials were with the same Deaf mother, and each trial required the assistance of four ASL interpreters and four Deaf interpreters. The Public Defender's Office often reaches out to me when they have a particularly challenging client to find a lawyer for in a TPR or a delinquency, which is exactly how I wound up representing a ten year old and a twelve year old facing adult homicide charges. Every client is special, but I particularly appreciate the opportunity to work with people others shy away from, the most vulnerable clients prone to marginalization and discrimination by a society that finds them inconvenient, and clients who face unusual challenges. Number of cases tried to verdict: 7 List up to three significant trials, appeals, or other legal matters in which you participated as a judge or lawyer in the past seven years: *Please note, all client names due to the confidential nature of CHIPS and juvenile cases. If actual names are needed, please let me know and I am happy to provide them privately, in compliance with the applicable confidentiality statutes. Case #1: "Venus" (Milwaukee) My work with one particular client has shaped my path as a lawyer, and as a human being, more than any other client, case or legal issue. I met Venus in 2007, which was the same year I started on the Intake List in Milwaukee County. I was only five years out of law school, and less than a year into my courtroom experience. In 2007, when a new CHIPS case came in, the clerk would call for an intake attorney to come to court on the overhead pager, with absolutely no additional information about the case or the client. On this day in 2007, I was paged to come to Judge Glenn Yamahiro's courtroom for a new appointment. I hurried into the courtroom, where the deputy handed me a stack of paperwork that outlined the reasons for the child's removal from the parental home, and pointed me in the direction of a young woman sitting alone at counsel table. I reached out to shake her hand and introduced myself as her attorney, and asked her if I could have just a moment to read the summary page so I would be better able to help her. Her eyes were bloodshot and tearful, and she rocked back and forth in her seat. She let out a loud, angry sound, slapped my outstretched hand out of the air, snatched the paperwork out of my other hand and ripped it up. The deputy rushed over to us as I tried to calm this young woman, and he eventually retreated as she sat back in her seat and put her head in her hands. Judge Yamahiro explained to me that my client was Deaf, and that we would need to communicate by writing notes back and forth, because the only interpreter present was needed for the court proceedings. I had never met a Deaf person before. I had no idea in that moment, as I sat with a heartbroken, enraged client that I could not communicate with or help in any meaningful way, that Venus would teach me the most important lessons of my life. The communication challenges Venus faced became immediately obvious. The State gave an offer of proof, stating in open court that Venus’ infant son had been removed from her care because she lacked the knowledge to care for him, rattling off allegations of neglect. The ADA spoke for about a minute, while I frantically wrote down everything she said since I had no petition to refer to. With no ability to consult my client, I began to object to probable cause and preserve our other legal challenges. Before I could get a whole sentence out, Venus jumped out of her chair and began to scream a series of jumbled, nonsensical curse words, as she flipped the table and rushed toward the ADA. I did not realize at the time that it had taken the entire minute for the interpreter to convey enough of what the ADA had said for Venus to finally have a basic understanding of the allegations. Now the deputy restrained Venus, forcibly guiding her back to her chair as I pulled the table upright. It took several minutes before she was calm enough to proceed. When she did finally compose herself enough to sit down, sobbing violently into her hands, the Court went back on the record. Suddenly, a loud, forceful voice began screaming the same curse words Venus had shouted five minutes earlier. I quickly realized that the interpreter was repeating what Venus had said, complying with his interpreter's oath to accurately and completely interpret what Venus had said throughout the hearing. I will never forget the chaos of that moment, and what it taught me about language, compassion and patience. I represented Venus for the next fourteen years. . . . *** Venus was discriminated against more than any human being I have ever met. She is Deaf. She is Black. She is a woman. She is poor. She was raised in foster care. She has lived through horrifying trauma, and she is often angry and loud. Society has been unkind to Venus, and her trust was hard to earn and easy to lose. Venus taught me to listen. She taught me to break things down to a place where my clients can digest the information - even if it has to be one word at a time. Working with Venus for all of those years helped me to learn to navigate the most insurmountable challenges for every client in my career, because no matter how hard something appears to be for one of my clients, it is inevitably easier to solve than it was for Venus. Case #2. Reverse Waiver Matters: State vs. NMT (Milwaukee County); State vs. DC (Milwaukee County); State vs. JH (Lincoln County) These three children are my clients in unrelated homicide cases, but they share a common tragedy: all of these clients are children, and all of them are charged as adults, without any consideration of their development, health or welfare. NMT was charged with First Degree Intentional Homicide at age ten, and faces a mandatory life sentence. DC was charged with the same offense at age twelve, also facing a mandatory life sentence. JH was charged with First Degree Reckless Homicide at age 16, while placed in a correctional setting. Each of these boys were charged as adults pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 970.032 and 938.183, and I, along with co-counsel . . . have litigated Reverse Waivers for each of these children in the past two years. Wisconsin ranks among the worst states in the country with regard to its original adult jurisdiction laws, requiring children as young as ten who are alleged to have committed certain homicides to be charged as adults. Reverse Waiver is the only tool available for children to ask the Court to move their case to Juvenile Court, but the law pertaining to Reverse Waiver does not include any individualized assessment of the child, makes it nearly impossible for any child to prevail. *** Aside from the breathtaking gravity of fighting to help a child avoid a lifetime in prison, there are two reasons that these matters have been significant for me. The first is the information we have gathered and exposed in our effort to defend these children. One of the factors the child must prove to win a Reverse Waiver is "if convicted, the juvenile could not receive adequate treatment in the criminal justice system." (Wis. Stat. §970.032(2)(a)) As we prepared for these proceedings, we struggled to figure out how to present clear evidence of the elephant in the room - the fact that the Wisconsin Department of Corrections is critically understaffed and overcrowded, and access to "treatment" is all but a fallacy in our adult prisons at this time. Everyone knows this to be true, but who would provide credible testimony to that effect? Certainly not anyone from the DOC. *** The second reason these cases have been significant to me is the appellate work they have led me to do. As public-defender-appointed trial counsel, I am responsible for petitioning the Court of Appeals to hear an appeal of any non-final order. Reverse Waivers fall into the category of permissive appeals, and we lost the Reverse Waivers for NMT and DC within just a few weeks of each other. Attorney Cunningham, who had been my co-counsel throughout the litigation to date, was leaving her practice, so the petitions to the Court of Appeals were my responsibility. *** Experience in adversary proceedings before administrative bodies: I have litigated three appeals of child abuse and neglect findings before Administrative Law Judges in Milwaukee County since returning to private practice in 2016, and appealed one Kinship denial in the same timeframe. In 2024, I represented a relative caregiver in a foster home licensing revocation appeal as well. Describe your non-litigation experience (e.g., arbitration, mediation). Before starting law school in the fall of 1999, I had spent two years as an Ongoing Case Manager with the Bureau of Milwaukee Child Welfare. People's lives were in my young, inexperienced hands, and I spent all of my days in the homes and schools of the families I served, doing my best to make sure children were safe and families were healing. Transitioning to law school from that kind of hands-on work was unfulfilling and, frankly, boring. I was surprised and disappointed to find out that Marquette University Law School did not have any kind of community-based legal clinics or any other opportunities to work with people in need in the community. In search of something meaningful to do, I met two 3L students involved in the Public Interest Law Society who wanted to start a walk-in legal clinic in the community. By the time we met, the 3L students were both focused on graduation and running out of time to devote to this project, and my classmate Bridget and I were happy to try to move it forward. Over the next several years, Bridget and I worked hard to turn the legal clinic into a reality. Our vision was to have hours at a local community center, somewhere accessible to the community and to the law students, where people in need of free legal advice could walk in and be connected with volunteer law students and attorneys, who would sit down and provide as much help as possible in 15-20 minutes. This would include filling out forms, telling people where to go to file things, helping people navigate landlord/tenant issues, and a slew of other issues we could not have anticipated. By the late spring of my 3rd year of law school, in 2002, the Marquette Volunteer Legal Clinic (MVLC) opened its doors at a church on 4th and Brown Streets. We had connected with the Association for Women Lawyers, and put together a small steering committee of attorneys and students who would ultimately build the little clinic from the ground up. At first, we had more volunteers than clients, but that quickly changed as word got out. The clinic grew, and we were lucky enough to find a permanent space at the House of Peace, a Capuchin community center on 17th and Walnut. For the next five years, the majority of my legal work centered around staffing, operating, networking and recruiting for the MVLC. At that time, I was married with two small children at home, and was not the primary earner in the family. I had the time and the energy to devote to the clinic, and watching it grow was one of the most rewarding experiences of my life. Our clinic hours grew busier and busier, and week by week we could see our help making a difference for our clients. Without ever setting foot in a courtroom, we were able to impact thousands of lives in a positive way. We also gave law students an opportunity to participate in real client interviews, while giving back to their community. The most interesting non-litigation legal work I ever did arose from the MVLC, when Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans. Hundreds of evacuees landed at the Tommy Thompson dormitory at State Fair, and I quickly realized that we needed to get on site. The steering committee leapt into action, putting together a clinic 5 days a week for 2 hours a day, staffing it with lawyers and students and filling in the shifts ourselves almost daily. The legal issues were unimaginable. The law was foreign, the people were in utter distress, and the atmosphere both devastating and hopeful. It was hard to know where to begin, and sometimes the most helpful thing we could do was listen. It was a frustrating, important project that I am so proud to have been a part of. In 2007, I became a single parent and needed to provide independently for my daughters, so I had to step back from my intensive volunteer involvement at the MVLC. I still staffed the clinic for a while, and stayed on the steering committee for as long as I could, but finally discontinued my involvement in about 2009. Today, the MVLC clinics continue to serve clients each week, free of charge, with multiple locations throughout the city. Since 2002, our little clinic has provided pro bono legal assistance to thousands in our community. Over the years, the MVLC has also opened a mobile clinic, as well as clinics that specialize in Immigration and Veteran issues. I will always look back with pride at the impact the MVLC has had in our community, as well as for the students at my alma mater. Position or involvement in judicial, non-partisan, or partisan political campaign, committee, or organization: I volunteered for Evan Goyke in his 2018 State Representative race, and his campaign for City Attorney in 2024. I handed out literature for Robyn Vining in 2020, and I believe in 2022 as well. I was briefly a volunteer for my former colleague, Paul Rifelj, in his campaign for Milwaukee County Circuit Court in April of 2016. If memory serves, my children and I handed out literature and signs for Hon. Laura Gramling Perez in her 2012-2013 campaign, as well as Obama for America in the 2008 and 2012 races. Previous runs for public office: None All judicial or non-partisan candidates endorsed in the last ten years: Janet Protasiewicz, Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 2023 Milton Childs, Milwaukee County Circuit Court judge, 2020 Danielle Shelton, Milwaukee County Circuit Court judge, 2019 Brittany Grayson, Milwaukee County Circuit Court judge, 2019 Rebecca Kiefer, Milwaukee County Circuit Court judge, 2019 M. Joseph Donald, Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 2016 Jean Kies, Milwaukee County Circuit Court judge, 2016 Paul Rifelj, Milwaukee County Circuit Court judge, 2016 Kristy Yang, Milwaukee County Circuit Court judge, 2017 Kristela Cervera, Milwaukee County Circuit Court judge, 2022 Professional or civic and charitable organizations: Beckum Stapleton Little League, vice president of softball, board member, 2021-present Significant pro bono legal work or volunteer service: Most of my pro bono legal work comes to me through my clients. I am only appointed to assist clients with the specific cases that bring them to Children's Court, but they are very often in need of additional assistance. I have helped various clients with probate, guardianship, family court matters, evictions, administrative law appeals and various tickets over the years. I would estimate that I assist 3-4 clients per year with collateral legal matters on a pro bono basis. I have also provided a number of Beckum Stapleton families with assistance on a pro bono basis since 2021. (See below.) Additionally, from September of 1999 through approximately August of 2009, I was a Student Volunteer, a Steering Committee Member and a Volunteer Attorney at the Marquette Volunteer Legal Clinic. Please refer to Question #25 for an in-depth description of the work I did at the MVLC. Non-legal Volunteer Service: I am an avid softball fan, and have played since I was big enough to hold a bat. All of my daughters have played softball since they were small. I coached their rec league teams at Tosa Fastpitch (2008-2016), and from 2017 through 2024, I was an assistant softball coach at Rufus King High School - I still make a guest appearance whenever I can. (My youngest daughter plays softball in high school now, so I am on a four year sabbatical from Rufus King so I can attend my daughter's games.) My youngest daughter particularly shares my love for softball. She is a talented pitcher who has been playing on competitive club teams since she was seven. She is bi-racial, and softball is not known for its diversity. Though she is often the best player on her team, she has frequently been bullied and socially excluded on her club teams - until we found Beckum Stapleton. Beckum Stapleton Little League is the oldest Negro-League based Little League in the country, having just celebrated its 60th year in 2024. My daughter had played tee-ball there when she was five, but they didn't have a girls' softball program at that time, so we moved on. However, in the winter of 2021, Beckum started the first softball program within the city of Milwaukee. My daughter signed up to play, and I immediately signed up to coach. The director welcomed us with open arms, and the girls on the team fell in love with the sport, and with each other. We had finally found a place that felt like home. Five years later, I have coached 18 teams at Beckum, and have helped our softball program grow from those first few players to over 150 players registered in 2025. I joined the board at Beckum Stapleton in 2022, and have served as the Vice President of Softball since 2024. I've secured grants to purchase our girls equipment and pay for training, and spend ten to fifteen hours per week volunteering at Beckum in the summer, plus at least five hours per week in the offseason. Quotes: Why I want to be a judge: I applied and interviewed for Gov. Evers' first judicial appointment in 2019. I'd wanted to be a judge since the day I applied to law school, and I put my heart and soul into preparing for the interview. I researched and studied, trying to guess what questions the committee might ask me about personal injury cases or torts - things I knew next to nothing about. I was a ball of nerves, and almost felt relieved when I wasn't selected. I really felt like I wasn't the kind of person who could be a judge, like there was some grandeur or refined presence that judges had to possess, and I am simply not that important or distinguished. In that moment, nearly seven years ago, I was grateful that the judicial selection committee and Gov. Evers saw that I was not judicial material, because I didn't think I was either. This conclusion, though flawed, fueled a renewed love for my work as an advocate. I knew I was a good lawyer, and I pushed myself harder - taking the hardest cases, saying yes to every difficult situation that came across my desk. I poured myself into helping my clients share their stories, fighting to keep their kids, fighting for their freedom. I gained confidence as a lawyer, and as a human being. I found new ways to connect with people during a global pandemic, and managed to find time to have fun with my kids at Beckum. During this time, I convinced myself that being a judge was a job for someone far more ... judicial ... and that I was born to fight injustice in the courtroom. I also detested the idea of becoming a cog in the fundamentally racist systems I had fought so hard against for so long. Over time, I've realized that I was wholeheartedly wrong about myself in 2019. I still don't know all the answers about commercial contracts and medical malpractice, but I know that I am exactly the kind of person who should be a judge. I've served this community in countless ways for nearly 30 years, and I'd always wanted to be a judge because I knew I would be fair and kind. Instead of fighting against injustice, I would be honored to have the opportunity to provide justice in a fair and equitable way. I'm proud of the lawyer I am, and even prouder of the person that I have become. I am still not important in the way my 2019 self believed a judge should be important, but I've realized that the judges I admire and respect most are not that kind of "important" either. They are humble, human, fair, compassionate and consciously, aggressively confront their biases. Those are all my strengths as a lawyer, and as a person, and I would love nothing more than to bring those to the bench. Describe which case in the past 25 years by the Wisconsin Supreme Court or U.S. Supreme Court you believe had a significant positive or negative impact on the people of Wisconsin. The U.S. Supreme Court's 2012 decision upholding the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was a defining moment for my own family, and for millions of other families nationwide. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), parts of the ACA were challenged by 26 states, and the Court's 5-4 decision upheld the ACA. The legal issues in this case were quite technical, and the facts were not immediately relevant to most Americans, but the implications of this decision reached all corners of our society: affordable access to meaningful healthcare would remain a reality for all people. Not just the wealthy, not just the healthy. Not just families with children, not just the disabled or elderly. Everyone. I followed the ACA closely from its inception, not just because of the positive implications for my clients, but for my own benefit. When my husband and l divorced in 2008, I lost my health insurance. I had just started my solo practice, and was making a viable income doing work that I loved. [Redacted] After the birth of my third daughter in 2010, I made the difficult decision to pursue employment at the Wisconsin State Public Defender so I could get health insurance. I took a 40% pay cut, but had access to medical care. Shortly after the Supreme Court ruled on Sebelius, the ACA saved my daughter’s life. Starting in 2012 [redactions] … The ACA gave me the opportunity to return to private practice without losing coverage, affording me the time and flexibility to advocate for my child [redactions] … Thousands upon thousands of people have stories just like mine, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Sebelius laid the foundation for the ACA to withstand relentless legal challenges. Two or three judges whom I admire and why: To me, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson is the bravest, smartest judicial official of our time. The racial and gender-based barriers she faced to even get to the Supreme Court bench proved insurmountable for every Black woman before her - she was held to the highest standard in every possible way, far beyond most justices who make this journey. I simply cannot fathom the vitriol she faced, yet she forged ahead. Since swearing in as a Justice in 2022, Justice Jackson has taken a strong stance as the most liberal justice on the Court. She has a fiery commitment to justice, fairness and equity that is unprecedented, quickly emerging as one of the few leaders in this country who are not afraid of Donald Trump and his administration. Where her more liberal Supreme Court colleagues take a softer, pragmatic approach, Justice Jackson minces no words in decrying corruption, hate and the swift erosion of the separation of powers under the current administration. Her passion is not so consuming that it causes her to be short sighted, though. On November 9, 2025, she granted an administrative stay of the lower court's order to resume distribution of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, immediately halting SNAP benefits for millions. The internet exploded with criticism of this decision, many felt betrayed and shocked that Justice Jackson would let people go hungry. However, Justice Jackson knew that denying the stay would put the matter before the entirety of the Supreme Court immediately, giving the conservative Court a direct opportunity to do far greater damage to the program that so many depend on for their most basic needs. She chose a short term harm to delay or prevent long term catastrophe, in spite of how that decision might look on its face. She is not afraid to upset anyone, even her liberal colleagues and supporters, when she has difficult decisions to make. The law gave her the discretion to grant or to deny the stay, and she did what she could to protect our country's most vulnerable people within the bounds of the law. Locally, the Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice I admire most is former Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson. Justice Abrahamson's approach was one I aspire to achieve: she focused on the impact her decisions made on the actual human beings in her community. Not swayed by large corporations or political interests, Justice Abrahamson applied the law in a way that was fair, just and equal. She was humble, kind and engaging, whether she was talking with a student or a fellow Justice. I met her several times during my work with the Marquette Volunteer Legal Clinic, and was always in awe of her gentle, calm presence. Her impartial fairness and caring approach to life and the law are qualities I would most want to exemplify on the bench. Her balance and integrity shine through the opinions she wrote, and I'm grateful to have had the chance to meet her. The proper role of a judge: The proper role of a judge seems to be a simple question. Of course, judges must fairly and impartially interpret the law, assess credibility and evidence, and carefully make decisions based on the law and the evidence before them. Some, like Chief Justice Roberts, suggest that being a judge is just like being an umpire - your job is just to call balls and strikes, nothing more. This is shortsighted. While I understand the temptation of such a simple analogy, nothing about the role of the judge is as simple as the role of the umpire. The umpire doesn't have to assess the credibility of the pitcher, doesn't have to interpret the intersection of nine different strike zones that might apply to one particular ball, and doesn't have to consider the safety of the fans when making a call. There is great discretion built into the role of the Circuit Court Judge, and this discretion is critical to consider when looking at the role of a judge. Ten different judges could interpret a law and its application to a set of facts ten different ways, and often still be within the bounds of their role as judge. Each judge brings their own experiences, background, areas of expertise and lack thereof, as well as their own biases and fears to the bench. For better or for worse, each judge brings to life the application of the law to the cases before them. These biases and fears have allowed for the mass incarceration of African American men, disproportionate sentences from race to race, and the permanent separation of countless families of color, particularly when poverty is also an issue. Judges sit in positions of great power, entrusted to make decisions about the lives and liberty of those who appear before them. Judges must consider their own biases and assumptions critically, and ensure that their views are not inadvertently (or, for some, quite openly) affecting the way they apply the law. It is unconstitutional for the law to discriminate against people based on race, class, gender, or other protected classes - yet Wisconsin consistently has the highest incarceration rate of Black individuals in the entire country. The law cannot require the Black men and women of Wisconsin to be incarcerated at twelve times the rate of white people, and it is indisputable that discretion and bias play a critical role in our statewide failure to correct the mass incarceration of Black and Latinx residents. Mass incarceration is just one measure of the racial inequities in our state, but the data regarding the separation of Black and Latinx families is just as bleak. Correcting the failures of those who came before us is a difficult task, but one that cannot be addressed until those making the decisions are willing to acknowledge that the work must be done. By Erik Reinthaler, WJI Intern A divided Wisconsin Court of Appeals late last month reversed a Dane County judge's ruling that declared major portions of Act 10 unconstitutional. Act 10, enacted in 2011 under former Gov. Scott Walker, significantly limited collective bargaining rights for most state and local government employees while preserving broader bargaining rights for municipal police officers, firefighters and deputy sheriffs. The appellate court found that Wisconsin lawmakers had a reasonable basis for treating some public safety employees differently from others when limiting collective bargaining rights.  Gundrum Judge Mark Gundrum wrote for District 2 of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
The lawsuit, filed in 2023 by several public employee unions and individual public employees, challenged the different treatment under the Wisconsin Constitution's equal protection guarantee. The plaintiffs argued there was no rational basis for allowing some public safety employees to retain broader collective bargaining rights while denying those same rights to other public safety employees, including Capitol Police, University of Wisconsin police officers, correctional officers and conservation wardens. The Court of Appeals held that no constitutional violation occurred, saying that courts must uphold the Legislature’s policy choices if lawmakers could have had any rational justification for making them. The court found that the Legislature reasonably could have decided that police officers, firefighters and deputy sheriffs play especially critical public safety roles and therefore should retain broader bargaining rights while still advancing Act 10's cost-saving goals. The majority pointed to earlier state and federal court decisions rejecting similar constitutional challenges. Judge Shelley Grogan joined the majority but wrote separately that a law's constitutionality should not depend on changes in the membership of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. She wrote that policy disagreements over Act 10 should be resolved by the Legislature rather than the courts. Judge Lisa Neubauer dissented, saying that the Legislature drew arbitrary distinctions between employees performing similar public safety work. She criticized the majority for relying on hypothetical justifications, including that lawmakers sought to preserve essential public safety services while maximizing Act 10's cost savings and could rely on other law enforcement agencies or the National Guard if excluded public safety employees stopped working. Dane County Circuit Judge Jacob Frost had agreed with the plaintiffs. He found that the law treated similarly situated public safety employees differently without a rational basis. Frost stayed his ruling pending appeal, however, so Act 10 has remained in effect while the case moves through the courts. After Frost stayed his ruling, the unions asked the Wisconsin Supreme Court to take the case directly, without first requiring a decision from the Court of Appeals. In February 2025, the justices declined the request, allowing the appeal to proceed through the normal appellate process. Act 10 remains in effect pending any review by the Supreme Court. Justice Chris Taylor, who joined the Supreme Court on Aug. 1, and Justice Janet Protasiewicz have both publicly expressed views about Act 10. Before joining the court, Taylor served as a Democratic state representative and was a vocal opponent of the law. Protasiewicz has said she agreed with the dissent in the Wisconsin Supreme Court's 2014 decision upholding Act 10 against an earlier constitutional challenge. Justice Brian Hagedorn has announced that he will not participate in any Wisconsin Supreme Court litigation involving Act 10 because he served as Walker's chief legal counsel during the law's drafting and later defense. Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The rule for this is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision. The “upshot” and “background” sections do not count as part of the 10 paragraphs because of their summary and necessary nature. We’ve also removed citations from the opinion for ease of. Italics indicate WJI insertions. Emphasis in the original is italicized and underlined. Case: Wisconsin State Legislature v. Kaul Majority: Justice Rebecca Frank Dallet (11 pages), joined by Chief Justice Jill J. Karofsky and Justices Janet C. Protasiewicz and Susan M. Crawford Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Justice Brian K. Hagedorn (2 pages) Dissent: Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley (29 pages), joined by Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler except as to the first four paragraphs In December 2024, WJI reported on the District 2 Court of Appeals decision in this case (in favor of the Legislature) here.  Dallet Upshot We conclude that the attorney general complies with the pertinent settlement-funds statute when, in accordance with the straightforward language of the statute, he deposits settlement funds into the general fund. That is true even if the attorney general also credits those deposited settlement funds to one or more program appropriations contained within the general fund. Accordingly, we reverse in relevant part the court of appeals’ decision. We further determine that the second issue regarding the program appropriation under a second statute should be dismissed as improvidently granted. In other words, the attorney general, not the Legislature, controls millions of dollars recovered through litigation settlements. Even though settlement revenues are deposited in the general fund, the settlement-funds statute at issue does not preclude crediting the money for the Department of Justice rather than for general purposes controlled by the Legislature. Background The attorney general represents the state in legal matters, including by bringing civil actions to enforce state statutes or otherwise to represent the state’s interests. Sometimes those civil actions end in settlements through which the attorney general recovers money on behalf of the state. Such settlements may include money earmarked for specific purposes like restitution or attorneys’ fees. But they can also include “uncommitted” funds, that is, money that is not designated for a particular purpose by the settlement and is instead left to the attorney general’s discretion. . . . *** . . . . When a state agency receives money on behalf of the state, it must place that money into a “fund” within the state treasury. The budget statutes refer to this act as “depositing.” There are two types of “fund,” namely, the “general fund” and “segregated funds.” The “general fund” consists of “[a]ll moneys in the state treasury not specifically designated in any statute as belonging to any other funds.” The rest of the treasury is made up of “segregated funds,” that is, “revenues which, by law, are deposited into funds other than the general fund and are available for the purposes for which such funds are created.” This case concerns only revenues deposited into the general fund. When money is deposited into the general fund, it must be directed to a specific part of the general fund. The budget statutes refer to this act as “crediting.” . . . “Deposit” refers simply to placing money into the general fund or a segregated fund of the state treasury. “Credit” refers to directing money deposited into the general fund to a specific part of the general fund. The default crediting rule is that money deposited into the general fund “shall be credited to the general purpose revenues of the general fund unless otherwise specifically provided by law.” Money credited to the general purpose revenues of the general fund is “available for appropriation by the legislature.” When the legislature has “otherwise specifically provided by law,” however, deposits are credited elsewhere. *** For many years, attorneys general from both political parties have negotiated settlements through which the state recovered significant sums of “uncommitted” funds—in other words, money that was not specifically designated in the settlement for restitution, attorneys’ fees, or another specific purpose. Those attorneys general, in turn, deposited the uncommitted funds into the general fund and credited them to a program appropriation, specifically the Department of Justice’s . . . program appropriation as “proceeds from services.” Once there, the funds were available for the attorney general to spend on the Department’s programs and activities pursuant to the program appropriation. *** . . . In late 2018, the legislature adopted the current version of the settlement-funds statute, which provides in its entirety that “[t]he attorney general shall deposit all settlement funds into the general fund.” . . . After Attorney General Kaul took office in 2019, the legislature argued that the settlement-funds statute required him to deposit all uncommitted settlement funds into the general fund and credit them to the general purpose revenues of the general fund. After both sides exchanged numerous letters that failed to resolve their dispute, the legislature and an individual plaintiff . . . filed this case in Polk County Circuit Court. The complaint sought a declaration that the settlement-funds statute “requires the Attorney General to ‘deposit all settlement funds into the general fund,’ . . . and does not allow for the depositing of settlement funds into the appropriation account . . . . . . . . The circuit court granted partial summary judgment in the attorney general’s favor, concluding that the settlement-funds statute requires only that settlement funds be deposited into the general fund, and does not require those funds to be credited to the general purpose revenues of the general fund. . . . Accordingly, the circuit court declared that the settlement-funds statute requires only that all settlement funds be deposited into the general fund. Because the attorney general was already doing that, the circuit court concluded he was complying with that statute. Regarding the Legislature’s argument that under a second statute the attorney general could not credit uncommitted funds to a program appropriation as “proceeds from services,” the court found that the case as pled did not encompass the issue. The legislature appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the circuit court’s decision regarding the settlement-funds statute. . . . The court of appeals explained that the settlement-funds statute, together with two other statutes, required that “all settlement funds must be deposited into the general purpose revenue fund.” . . . The court of appeals’ broad holding that the settlement-funds statute required all uncommitted settlement funds to be “deposit[ed]” into the general purpose revenues of the general fund meant that it did not have to reach the legislature’s narrower, alternative contention about the scope and interpretation of the second statute. . . . Nevertheless, when we granted review of the court of appeals’ decision regarding the settlement-funds statute, we asked the parties to address whether “the services rendered by Department of Justice personnel in litigating a civil action on behalf of the State of Wisconsin or an executive branch agency constitute ‘proceeds from services’ under that second statute. The legislature’s primary contention is that the attorney general is violating the settlement-funds statute when he deposits uncommitted settlement funds in the general fund and credits those funds anywhere except the general purpose revenues of the general fund. Assuming we disagree, however, and in response to the court’s order granting review and adding a second issue, the legislature further contends that uncommitted settlement funds may not be credited to the program appropriation . . . because they are not “proceeds from services” as that phrase is used in the second statute. The Guts The settlement-funds statute, entitled “Deposit of settlement funds,” provides in its entirety that “[t]he attorney general shall deposit all settlement funds into the general fund.” This simple, declarative sentence identifies a class of state money (“settlement funds”) and imposes a single, narrow restriction on where that money must be deposited (into the state treasury, specifically “the general fund”). It says nothing whatsoever about where that money may or must be credited after it is deposited. Further, the “general fund,” . . . consists of “[a]ll moneys in the state treasury not specifically designated in any statute as belonging to any other funds.” In other words, everything except money belonging to “segregated funds” falls under the broad umbrella of the “general fund.” That includes not just the general purpose revenues of the general fund, but also program revenues credited to specific program appropriations. Thus, when settlement funds deposited into the general fund are credited to a specific program appropriation, those funds remain within the general fund. For this reason, the attorney general is complying with the settlement-funds statute when he deposits uncommitted settlement funds into the general fund, even if he also credits those funds to a program appropriation. The legislature nonetheless argues that the attorney general violates the settlement-funds statute when he deposits uncommitted settlement funds into the general fund and credits them anywhere except the general purpose revenues of the general fund. But to reach that conclusion, we would have to conflate two distinct terms—“credit” and “deposit”—or read restrictions on where money may be credited into a statute that contains none. Indeed, that is what the court of appeals did when it interpreted the settlement-funds statute as requiring that “[uncommitted] settlement funds must be deposited into the general purpose revenue fund.” As that sentence alone makes clear, the court of appeals conflated the settlement-funds statute requirement that uncommitted settlement funds be “deposit[ed]” into the general fund with a requirement that those funds also be credited to the general purpose revenues of the general fund. In other words, the court of appeals read into the statute a requirement that deposits of uncommitted settlement funds be credited to the general purpose revenues of the general fund. In defending the court of appeals’ decision, the legislature makes a similar argument, namely that we should read crediting restrictions imposed by other statutes into the single depositing restriction imposed by the settlement-funds statute. The problem with these arguments is that “we interpret the statutory language the legislature enacted, and will not read into a statute language that it does not contain or reasonably imply.” As many statutes demonstrate, when the legislature wants to direct both that money is to be deposited into the general fund and that it must be credited somewhere specific, it knows how to do so. But the settlement-funds statute does not even reference crediting, let alone restrict where the attorney general may credit money he deposits within the general fund. Accordingly, like the circuit court, we decline to read into the statute atextual restrictions on where deposits to the general fund may be credited. Therefore, we hold that the attorney general is complying with the settlement-funds statute when he deposits uncommitted settlement funds in the general fund, even if those settlement funds are credited to a specific program appropriation within the general fund. When we granted review in this case, we added a second issue, namely “does the language of a second statute authorize the crediting of civil action proceeds to that appropriation? In other words, do the services rendered by Department of Justice personnel in litigating a civil action on behalf of the State . . . or an executive branch agency constitute ‘proceeds from services’ under the second statute?” After reviewing the record and the briefs of both parties, and after hearing oral arguments, the court is too divided to reach a majority mandate on that issue. Generally, when the court is too divided to reach a majority as to the mandate, we affirm the decision under review. Under these circumstances, however, there is no decision to affirm with respect to the second statute. That is because neither the circuit court nor the court of appeals decided this question we raised, and as the circuit court previously explained, the legislature did not seek a declaratory judgment regarding the proper interpretation of the phrase “proceeds from services” in that statute in its complaint. Given that, we conclude that dismissal of this additional issue as improvidently granted is warranted.   Hagedorn Concurrence in part and dissent in part I agree with the majority that the court of appeals misconstrued the settlement-funds statute. However, I strongly disagree with the court’s failure to decide whether the monies received from settlements in civil cases litigated by the Department of Justice constitute “proceeds from services” under the second statute. The majority declares this an “issue” which we are now dismissing as “improvidently granted.” But we granted review in a case, and the court is not dismissing the case as a whole. Rather, it is declining to decide an issue—one that was briefed, argued, opined on by the court of appeals, and central to the dispute between the parties. Prior to this, I am unaware of this court dismissing an issue as improvidently granted. It is true that this court asked the parties, as a second issue, to address the meaning of the second statute. But we did not do so out of thin air. The court of appeals majority and dissent both opined on whether the attorney general may treat settlement funds as “proceeds from services” under the second statute, reaching different conclusions. We added this issue to ensure it was separately and fully addressed, and to ensure the larger dispute between the parties had a resolution. The court justifies its decision to dismiss an issue as “improvidently granted” on the grounds that the court cannot reach a resolution. However, we are not divided on the meaning of the second statute. In fact, a majority of the court agrees on the proper interpretation of the statute. Our disagreement is simply on how to style the mandate on the second issue, even though—regardless of how we label it—that particular postscript will have no practical effect on the parties in this case. The court’s inability to come together leaves the parties with no clarity about how to conform their actions to the law with respect to the second statute. It is most unfortunate that the court—even while we agree—cannot produce an opinion effectuating our agreement. The parties deserve better, and so does Wisconsin. I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.  Bradley Dissent
Justice Ziegler did not join these three paragraphs: If an attorney makes a false statement of fact or law, she may be sanctioned for violating the rules of professional conduct for attorneys. Unfortunately, supreme court justices can deceive the People of Wisconsin with impunity. Reaching an opinion favorable to Democratic Attorney General Josh Kaul (who faces a contested election in November), the majority dodges the issue we asked the parties to brief . . . . . . . . The majority . . . acknowledges “[t]he default crediting rule is that money deposited into the general fund ‘shall be credited to the general purpose revenues of the general fund unless otherwise specifically provided by law.’” The majority refuses to apply the law, which favors the Republican-controlled legislature over Democrat Attorney General Josh Kaul. Lady Justice wears a blindfold, not blinders. The majority’s machinations have left insufficient time to convert my previously-drafted opinion into a dissent, so (consistent with precedent established by other members of the court) I reproduce below what the majority opinion should have been. This is not the first time justice has taken a back seat to political interests. The members of the majority extend the Democrats’ almost unbroken winning streak in litigation against the Republican legislature since the progressives took control. (Footnote citing 15 cases.) In Wisconsin as elsewhere, “[d]arkness descends on the Rule of Law.” Justice Ziegler joined all of the following paragraphs: Wisconsin’s money belongs to the People of Wisconsin. The People control the allocation and expenditure of Wisconsin’s revenues through their constitutional representatives in the Wisconsin Legislature. For decades, Wisconsin attorneys general have siphoned tens of millions of dollars belonging to the People from large multistate consumer protection and antitrust settlements, to various budget appropriations controlled by the Department of Justice (DOJ). The Wisconsin Legislature became aware of this practice as early as 2010, and has twice legislated to reassert constitutional control over the People’s revenues. Attorneys general have resisted these efforts, interpreting the legislature’s enactments in a variety of creative ways in order to continue spending the People’s settlement funds. The fight between Attorney General Josh Kaul and the Wisconsin Legislature over those settlement funds culminated in this litigation. Kaul claims before this court that the settlement-funds statute, a statute the legislature enacted to resolve the interbranch dispute over settlement funds, requires the attorney general only to “deposit” “settlement funds” to the “general fund” of the state treasury. That is correct. Kaul additionally claims a longstanding default rule controlling budget allocation in the Wisconsin budget statutes allows him to continue “crediting” those moneys to a DOJ program appropriation. That is incorrect. We affirm the Court of Appeals and hold that the settlement-funds statute requires the attorney general to deposit settlement funds to the “general fund” of the state treasury. A budget allocation statute further requires the attorney general to “credit” settlement funds to the “general purpose revenues of the general fund.” Under the latter, the attorney general may credit settlement funds somewhere other than the “general purpose revenues of the general fund” only if the legislature “otherwise specifically provide[s]” another location. A statute to which the attorney general points does not serve as an appropriation account for settlement funds. Under the law, the attorney general must give the People their money back. *** . . . . The legislature maintains the “settlement funds” collected by the attorney general are general purpose revenues, which the legislature controls through its budgeting and appropriations process. The attorney general considers the settlement funds to be program revenues, which the legislature has already appropriated by law, allowing the DOJ to credit them to a specific program appropriation for the DOJ’s own use. *** Once the attorney general has deposited all settlement funds into the general fund, the question remains where to credit them. The “general fund” contains both “general purpose revenues” and “program revenues.” A statute titled “Receipts and deposits of money,” provides the default rule: “All moneys paid into the treasury shall be credited to the general purpose revenues of the general fund unless otherwise specifically provided by law.” The word “shall” creates a mandate. *** Another referenced statute does not provide an exception to the default rule requiring “settlement funds” to be credited to the general purpose revenues of the general fund. . . . The attorney general must return constitutional control over the People’s revenues to the People.  The Milwaukee Common Council meeting on July 31, 2026. Photograph by Alexandria Staubach. By Alexandria Staubach
Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission candidate Jordan Morales failed to obtain enough votes for confirmation at a Milwaukee Common Council meeting this morning after some alders shared concerns about his seeming complacency with the status quo. The confirmation failed in a 6-6 tie with three alders abstaining. The surprising vote comes after Morales was recommended by the Common Council’s Public Safety Committee last week. Morales, who has been an activist regarding the city’s reckless driving problem, had hoped to focus on what he called “quality of life” issues if appointed to the FPC. Alderwoman Marina Dimitrijevic voiced the strongest opposition at today’s meeting, saying that “in this moment” the FPC has “incredibly important work that it must provide.” Dimitrijevic said that with a state legislature “meddling in local affairs” and concern that MPD is the largest and fastest growing item in the city’s budget, she was looking at nominees through a “different lens.” “I am looking for extra oversight, extra independence and diversity of thought,” she said before casting her “no” vote. The city needs “an FPC that is not OK with the status quo, that is going to demand answers.” Alderman Alex Brower said that the city needed FPC commissioners who will advocate for an accountable police department. He added, “I don’t think we’re there yet,” and “I just don’t agree with the applicant enough.” Common Council President José Pérez said he shared Dimitrijevic’s and Brower’s concerns. Dimitrijevic, Brower, Pérez, Robert Bauman, Lamont Westmoreland, and DiAndre Jackson voted against confirmation. Andrea Pratt, Sharlen Moore, Larresa Taylor, Peter Burgelis, Scott Spiker, and Russell Stamper voted in favor. Mark Chambers Jr., JoCasta Zamarripa, and Milele Coggs abstained from the vote. Though it would not have changed the outcome, Zamarripa unsuccessfully asked later in the hearing for unanimous consent to change from abstention to “no.” Nothing good comes from abstention,” she said. Call response times and proactive policing would have been a priority for Morales, who told the Public Safety Committee last week that he felt most violent crime concerns “very few Milwaukeeans.” Also, his neighbors on the lower east side are “not talking about stop and frisk that much,” he said. At a time when police pursuits remain heavy on the Common Council’s mind, Morales told the committee last week that officers should be given wider latitude in chases. He said he would like to see MPD explore the use of more aggressive tactics like the PIT maneuver to stop fleeing suspects. A PIT maneuver (Precision Immobilization Technique or Pursuit Intervention Technique) is a tactical driving method used by law enforcement to force a fleeing vehicle to abruptly turn 180 degrees, causing it to spin out, stall, and come to a stop. “It would be extremely demoralizing for me as a city resident to see someone commit a crime or do something and all they have to do to get away from that crime is flee from the police and them not being able to pursue,” said Morales at last week’s committee hearing. Morales said he viewed such tactics as a “force multiplier” but would ask himself, “is this the right time and are the people ready?” before moving for that style of intervention in policing. Morales did not speak at today’s Common Council meeting. But some of his prior comments seem out of step with Dimitrijevic’s budgetary concerns. When questioned previously on how he would attack the need to hire more police under Act 12, Morales said the FPC would need more funding for recruitment, citing a national shortage of people interested in policing as a profession. Morales said the problem is especially pronounced in “municipalities like Milwaukee, which are tightly strapped for cash with regard to officer salaries.” In November, the Common Council approved tens of millions in additional spending to increase officer salaries. Milwaukee mayor asks residents to weigh in on budget cuts as MPD's share of expenditures swells7/28/2026  By Alexandria Staubach Milwaukee is again facing a nearly $100 million gap between what it wants to fund and the cash it will have in the coming year. Despite the shortfall, the Milwaukee Police Department’s budget is likely to significantly increase. Proposed areas for cuts include election operations and civic engagement, library hours, sanitation and street maintenance. Milwaukee Mayor Cavalier Johnson is seeking input from city residents as his office works to close the $96 million gap. The city has posted a survey asking residents to make difficult decisions about where spending should be cut and what services should be protected. Fire and police could see cuts, but trimming in those areas is not always legal. Any cuts to policing or fire and emergency medical response must come from unsworn staff and equipment purchases under state law. Under the Wisconsin Legislature’s 2023 shared-revenue legislation, known as Act 12, Milwaukee’s police and fire departments must maintain their 2023 numbers and grow both forces by 2034. While Milwaukee’s whole budget is closer to $2 billion, only $685 million of that amount is subject to some discretion according to a video released by the mayor in support of the survey. “That’s what funds our roads, libraries, health services, public works, fire and police,” says Johnson. Johnson says other portions are self-supporting, restricted, or allocated for specific debt and pension obligations. For 2026, nearly half the discretionary amount went to MPD, with an allocation totaling more than $310 million, just shy of the department’s $313 million request. While the 2027 budget won’t be finalized until October, MPD and all other city departments made their respective requests in May. MPD is now asking for an unprecedented $345,822,092. Some of that increase is nonnegotiable, and not just because the force can’t shrink. Last year, the Milwaukee Common Council voted 10-1 on a new contract with the officers’ unions—the Milwaukee Police Association and Milwaukee Police Supervisors Association. Long-stalled negotiations meant the Milwaukee Police Association’s four-year deal was retroactive and will again expire in December. The supervisors’ agreement, covering Milwaukee Police Chief Jeffrey Norman and other top brass, expires in December 2027. Alders Marina Dimitrijevic, Milele Coggs, JoCasta Zamarripa, and Sharlen Moore abstained from the contract vote. At a Nov. 25, 2025, Common Council meeting, the abstaining alders warned of potential budget constraints, as the contract effectively gave a 15% pay increase across the board, with some top brass receiving a more than 25% bump in pay. A Legislative Reference Bureau memo estimated the new contract would cost the city $51 million in additional pay and pension costs alone and did not account for the 5% increase in sworn officers required by Act 12, who have not been hired yet. The new contract also put Norman among the highest-paid city employees. His salary exceeds that of the mayor, municipal judges, and city attorney. Past budgets show that Norman’s pay has grown significantly since 2023, when his salary was $147,336. That number jumped to $151,785 in 2024, and $182,927 in 2025. Under the new contract, Norman was paid $243,000 in 2026, and he will receive $250,290 in 2027. The budget for the mayor’s salary in 2026 is $169,437.  Screenshot of Milwaukee Mayor Cavalier Johnson's short video about the 2027 budget gap and survey. Click on photo to go to the video and survey. |
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