The Wisconsin Senate (left) and Assembly chambers on Sept. 19, 2025. Photographs by Margo Kirchner. By Alexandria Staubach
The Legislature recently ended another busy floor period, having moved forward several bills that implicate the criminal justice system. Meanwhile, two criminal justice bills were enacted into law since our last update, while another two were vetoed by Gov. Tony Evers. Big bills have been introduced regarding legalization of medical marijuana and regulation of cannabis products that have proliferated under the Farm Bill of 2018. The Legislature is rushing to discuss a constitutional amendment that provides “the right to keep and bear arms is an inalienable and fundamental individual right that shall never be infringed.” Culture-war issues like banning guaranteed income—a sister to universal income geared toward low income individuals—and codifying English as the official language of the state are also progressing. All summaries below are quotes from the analysis provided by the Legislative Reference Bureau unless italicized (WJI’s additions). The titles are WJI’s summaries of the often lengthy and sometimes misleading titles provided by the bills' authors. When the bills in the Assembly and Senate are generally the same, WJI links to just one. An asterisk * denotes a bill substantially similar to one introduced in a previous session but which either failed to pass or was vetoed by the governor. For a refresher on the lifecycle of a bill, you can find that here. The rough progression of a successful bill is: introduction → referral to committee → passage by committee → vote by full chamber → transfer to the other chamber to go through the prior three steps there, too → to the governor for signature. The vetoed AB34/SB25 — Court issued criminal complaints (John Doe prosecutions)* Under current law, a district attorney has the discretion as to whether or not to issue a complaint to charge a person with a crime. Current law also provides that, if a district attorney refuses to issue a complaint against a person, a judge may conduct a hearing to determine if there is probable cause to believe that the person committed a crime and, if so, issue a complaint. Under this bill, when there is an officer-involved death, which is a death that results directly from an action or an omission of a law enforcement officer, and the district attorney determined there was no basis to prosecute the officer, a court may not issue a complaint against the involved officer unless there is new or unused evidence presented. Status: Vetoed. AB66/SB76 – Dismissing or amending certain criminal charges and deferred prosecution agreements* Under current law, a prosecutor may dismiss or amend a criminal charge without approval from the court. Under this bill, a prosecutor must get the court’s approval to dismiss or amend a charge if the charge is for any of the following: 1) a crime of domestic abuse or a violation of a domestic violence temporary restraining order or injunction; 2) theft of an automobile; 3) a crime of abuse of an individual at risk or a violation of an individual-at-risk TRO or injunction; 4) first-degree, second-degree, or third-degree sexual assault; 5) a crime against a child; 6) illegal possession of a firearm if the person has been convicted of, adjudicated delinquent for, or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of, committing, soliciting, conspiring, or attempting to commit a violent felony, as defined under current law; or 7) reckless driving that results in great bodily harm. The court may approve the dismissal or amendment of such a charge only if the court finds the action is consistent with the public’s interest in deterring the commission of these crimes and with the legislature’s intent, expressed in this bill, to vigorously prosecute individuals who commit these crimes. If the court approves any dismissal or amendment in a year, the court must submit an annual report to the legislature detailing each approval…. Status: Vetoed. The introed SB534/AB547 — Medical marijuana This bill creates a program that allows a registered patient to possess and use medical cannabis products; allows designated caregivers to possess medical cannabis products on behalf of registered patients; licenses and regulates medical cannabis growers, processors, and testing laboratories; and licenses and regulates dispensaries that sell medical cannabis products. No person may possess, sell, transfer, or transport cannabis or medical cannabis products unless the person is licensed or registered as provided in the bill. Under the bill, “medical cannabis products” includes products in the form of concentrates, oils, tinctures, edibles, pills, topical forms, gels, creams, vapors, patches, liquids, and forms administered by a nebulizer but excludes cannabis in a form that can be smoked. The bill adds medical cannabis to certain provisions under the Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP) and eliminates the sunset of certain requirements under the PDMP. Status: Public hearing held in the Senate, referred to committee in Assembly. AB606 — Regulation of hemp-derived cannabis This bill regulates hemp-derived cannabinoid products in the same manner as alcohol beverages are regulated under current law and renames the Division of Alcohol Beverages in the Department of Revenue as the Division of Intoxicating Products (division). The bill also makes minor changes relating to alcohol beverage warehouses and alcohol beverage production arrangements. Status: Public hearing held in Assembly, no Senate bill introduced. SB202/AB165 -- Guaranteed income prohibition This bill prohibits a political subdivision from expending moneys of the political subdivision for the purpose of making payments to individuals under a guaranteed income program. “Guaranteed income program” is defined under the bill to mean a program under which individuals are provided with regular periodic cash payments that are unearned and that may be used for any purpose. Programs under which an individual is required to perform work or attend training are not “guaranteed income programs” under the bill. Status: Passed in the Assembly, public hearing held in Senate. SJR105/AJR112 -- Constitutional amendment providing right to keep and bear arms is an inalienable right without qualification Currently, the Wisconsin Constitution guarantees the right of the people to keep and bear arms for security, defense, hunting, recreation, or any other lawful purpose. This constitutional amendment, proposed to the 2025 legislature on first consideration, guarantees the right of the people to keep and bear arms without qualification. The amendment further provides that the right to keep and bear arms is an inalienable and fundamental individual right that shall never be infringed. Finally, under the amendment, any restriction on the right to keep and bear arms shall be subject to strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny is a standard of judicial review of government limitations on fundamental rights that generally provides that such a limitation is valid and enforceable only if it is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, if it is narrowly tailored to its purpose, and if no reasonable less restrictive alternative exists. Status: Public hearing held in Senate. The in-between SB459/AB458 -- Admissibility of expert witnesses This bill updates the current statutory rule of evidence relating to testimony by experts to conform with recent changes made to Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 702 intended to clarify the court’s gatekeeping role with respect to expert testimony. Current law parallels FRE 702 prior to its amendment, allowing the testimony of an expert witness if the witness’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact at issue in the case, but limiting the testimony of an expert witness to testimony that is based on sufficient facts or data, that is the product of reliable principles and methods, and that is based on the witness applying those principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Similar to the changes made to FRE 702, the bill confirms that the proponent of the testimony is required to demonstrate to the court that it is more likely than not that the witness’s testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, that it is the product of reliable principles and methods, and, finally, that the witness’s opinion reflects a reliable application of those principles and methods to the facts of the case. Status: Public hearing has been held in both Senate and Assembly. AB24/SB57 — County sheriff assistance with certain federal immigration functions This bill requires sheriffs to request proof of legal presence status from individuals held in a county jail for an offense punishable as a felony. The bill also requires sheriffs to comply with detainers and administrative warrants received from the federal department of homeland security regarding individuals held in the county jail for a criminal offense. Under the bill, sheriffs must annually certify to the Department of Revenue that they have complied with each of these requirements. If a sheriff fails to provide such a certification, DOR must reduce the county’s shared revenue payments for the next year by 15 percent. The bill also requires sheriffs to maintain a record of the number of individuals from whom proof of legal presence is requested who are verified as unlawfully present in this state and a list of the types of crimes for which those individuals were confined in the jail. The information must be provided to the Department of Justice upon request, and DOJ must compile the information and submit a report to the legislature. Status: Passed in the Assembly; passed through committee in Senate and available for scheduling a full Senate vote. AB377/SB357 — Recognizing English as the official language of Wisconsin Currently, Wisconsin has no official language. This bill provides that the official language of this state is English. The bill also allows any state or local governmental entity to provide a person with access to artificial intelligence or other machine-assisted translation tools in lieu of appointing an English language interpreter if the entity is authorized or required by law to appoint an interpreter for the person. Additionally, the bill provides that, unless otherwise specifically required by law, all oral and written communication by all state and local governmental entities must be in the English language, except that such communication may be in another language when appropriate to the circumstances of an individual case, the implementation of a program in a specific instance, or the discharge of a responsibility in a particular situation. The bill also permits state and local government officers and employees to use a language other than English in oral or written communication whenever necessary for one or more of eight specified purposes. Finally, the bill precludes any state or local governmental entity from prohibiting any person from becoming proficient in any language or restricting the oral or written use of any language for a nongovernmental purpose. Status: Public hearing held in Assembly. AB89/SB92 — Retail theft enhanced penalties Under current law, the penalty for the crime of property theft varies by the value of the property taken…. Similarly, the penalty for the crime of retail theft varies by the value of the merchandise or service that is taken…. This bill specifies that, if, in a six-month period, a defendant commits more than one violation of property theft or more than one violation of retail theft, the value of items taken at each violation may be aggregated and the crimes may be prosecuted as one property theft crime or one retail theft crime. The penalty for the crime would be determined by the aggregated value of the items taken. Creates a new crime. Status: Passed in the Assembly; passed through committee in Senate and available for scheduling a full Senate vote. Newly enacted laws: AB77/SB66 — Registration plate concealment devices penalty Under current law, any motor vehicle for which the Department of Transportation has issued registration plates must display those plates, along with any decals issued for the plates. This bill prohibits the possession, sale, purchase, installation, and use of a registration plate concealment device, which is a manual, electronic, or mechanical device designed or adapted to be installed on a motor vehicle to 1) switch between two or more registration plates; 2) move, obstruct, or conceal a registration plate; or 3) alter the appearance of a registration plate so that the registration number cannot be seen and read. The bill also prohibits the equipment of any motor vehicle with a registration plate concealment device. A person who violates these prohibitions may be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than 90 days, or both. Any vehicle equipped in violation of these prohibitions may be impounded, and reasonable costs for towing and impounding the vehicle may be assessed against the owner. Creates a new crime. Status: Enacted into law. AB75/SB115 — DOJ collection and reporting of certain criminal case data* This bill requires state DOJ to collect from the director of state courts all of the following information for each criminal case: 1) the county in which the case was filed; 2) the name of the prosecuting attorney assigned to the case; 3) the name of the court official assigned to the case; 4) the criminal charge filed; 5) the charging recommendation from the referring law enforcement agency, if applicable; 6) for each case, whether the court released the defendant without bail, upon the execution of an unsecured appearance bond, upon the execution of an appearance bond with sufficient solvent sureties, or upon the deposit of cash in lieu of sureties, or denied release, and the name of the court official who made the decision; 7) for each case for which a court required the execution of an appearance bond with sufficient solvent sureties, the monetary amount of the bond and the name of the court official who made the decision; 8) for each case for which a court required the deposit of cash in lieu of sureties, the monetary amount of cash required and the name of the court official who made the decision; 9) any other conditions of release imposed on the defendant and the name of the court official who made the decision; 10) whether any plea bargain was offered in the case; 11) whether a deferred prosecution agreement was offered in the case; 12) whether any charge relating to the case was dismissed; and 13) whether the case resulted in a conviction. Status: Enacted into law.
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 Attorney Calvin Duncan (right) talks at Marquette University Law School on Nov. 5, 2025, with the Lubar Center's Derek Mosley. Photograph by Margo Kirchner. By Margo Kirchner Calvin Duncan, author of The Jailhouse Lawyer, told law students and community members about inequalities in Louisiana’s criminal legal system and the numerous barriers faced by those in prison to establish innocence or prove constitutional violations. Legal roadblocks for those incarcerated include the lack of appointed counsel after completion of an appeal and great difficulty in obtaining court and other records. Now out of custody and an attorney, Duncan helps those incarcerated research and litigate their cases, and he is running for election as a court clerk with the intent to make records more easily obtainable. Duncan recounted his story as jailhouse lawyer to licensed attorney in a discussion at Marquette University Law School with Derek Mosley, director of the Lubar Center for Public Policy Research and Civic Education. Along the way in his career, Duncan helped change laws in Louisiana and Oregon that allowed nonunanimous juries to convict a defendant. At the time of Duncan's conviction, agreement by 10 of 12 jurors was sufficient for conviction. Duncan told the crowd that documentation showed the Louisiana rule was created to preserve white supremacy by making the votes of one or two Black jurors irrelevant. In Ramos v. Louisiana (2020), the U.S. Supreme Court found that the right to a jury trial in the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of a serious crime. Duncan, not then a lawyer himself, worked with attorneys on the case. Duncan stressed for Marquette’s law students that law schools provide “knowledge of the law and how to wield it.” He emphasized that half of the Bill of Rights protects people accused of crime, and that more people need to defend the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth amendments and protect those who cannot protect themselves. Duncan spent more than two decades in prison for a murder he says he did not commit. He told the crowd that from the start of his time in custody, he focused on learning the law and helping his fellow residents with their legal matters. Immediately after his release in 2011, based on a new plea agreement, Duncan set his sights on becoming an attorney. Duncan was just a teen and had moved from Louisiana to Oregon to work when he heard from a relative that police wanted to arrest him for murder. Duncan said he did not know what the matter was about. Although he had committed some shoplifting as a troubled younger teen in New Orleans following years of abuse as a child, he had not been involved in any homicide. Two detectives found him in Oregon and arrested him. Duncan told the audience that he did not meet his attorneys until the day before trial. The prosecutor wanted the death penalty, but the jury disagreed and gave him life instead. He was sent to the Louisiana State Penitentiary, known as Angola. Incarcerated with men on death row, Duncan decided to learn the law, he said. Angola had a program to train “inmate counsel substitutes,” who could do most everything that lawyers could do except go outside the prison to conduct investigations. His girlfriend sent him copies of cases, while he created his own law book comprising newspaper articles that discussed the law. He joked that he “always enjoyed when wealthy people got arrested,” because the newspaper stories about them would include discussion of the law. As an inmate counsel substitute, Duncan wrote letters to obtain court and law enforcement records. He often was unsuccessful until Louisiana law changed in the 1980s to allow access to police reports and district attorney files. However, the requestor had to pay for the records. Duncan said he donated plasma about twice per week to raise money to pay for records. The Orleans Parish court clerk in particular was difficult to get records from. Other parishes were more cooperative. Duncan maintained his innocence for more than 20 years. He obtained his release after the prosecutor in 2011 allowed him to plead guilty to the lesser crime of manslaughter. Duncan said he lied to the court and admitted the killing just to get out. Duncan said that within a week of release, he was at Tulane Law School asking how to attend. It was news to him that he needed to get an undergraduate degree first. He then attended Tulane and received his paralegal certificate and bachelor’s degree. He made it into his first choice of law school: Lewis & Clark, in Oregon. He said the first line of his application read, “I am so tired of illegally practicing law.” Duncan was exonerated during his second year of law school. He said the officers who interrogated him had been investigated for corruption and altering evidence, and notes in the prosecutor’s file showed that a photo array shown to a witness included two white men (Duncan is Black). Meanwhile, Louisiana passed a law allowing evidence of innocence to be presented to a judge, even in old cases. Duncan’s attorney from years before helped present Duncan’s case to a judge in 2021, and the judge and prosecutor reopened his case and dismissed it. Duncan said that when he applied for compensation for wrongful conviction, the Louisiana attorney general said she would prosecute him for perjury for lying to the judge at his 2011 plea hearing if he pursued it. He dropped the request. After graduating from law school in 2023, Duncan founded The Light of Justice, a program helping people in prison with their cases. He also decided to run to replace that New Orleans clerk of criminal court. Duncan said his opponent, backed by the attorney general, argues that he is a convicted murderer. But a prosecutor has “stepped up” and said he was exonerated. Debates have been heated. Duncan’s talk was sponsored by the Lubar Center as well as Marquette Law School’s Andrew Center for Restorative Justice and Public Interest Law Society. The Jailhouse Lawyer, co-authored by Duncan and criminal justice reform advocate Sophie Cull, was published in July 2025.  By Alexandria Staubach Menus recently obtained by Wisconsin Justice Initiative for Green Bay Correctional Institution show a diet dominated by ultra-processed foods high in carbohydrates, fat, and sugar, raising concerns about chronic illnesses and the health of those held in Wisconsin’s prisons. WJI enlisted University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee Professor Renee Scampini, director of the school’s undergraduate public health program, to evaluate menus WJI obtained through an open records request. The Department of Corrections provided menus from GBCI for a sample week in January 2025. The menus included a general menu plus some specialty menus for those needing halal, kosher, soft food, or other diets. Scampini looked most closely at the general menu.  Scampini. Photograph from the UW–Milwaukee website. “This overall diet makes for high total fat content, added sugar content and other cardiac/cancer concerns,” Scampini opined. Taken at face value, the menus indicate incarcerated individuals are provided with an average of 2,689 calories a day if they eat everything provided. That amount is consistent with recommendations from “The Merck Manual” for sedentary adult males, ages 19 to 60. “This menu looks like it was specifically written to meet an institutional standard of the U.S. dietary requirements,” Scampini told WJI. The calories based on serving size provided in the DOC menus are “probably close to correct,” she said. But she added that how “that actually meshes with what's eaten/tolerated is questionable." As an example, Scampini pointed out that satisfaction of protein goals was primarily met though milk—a questionable practice as many U.S. adults are lactose intolerant. Scampini said this intolerance is even more prevalent in minority groups, particularly Asian American, African American, and Native American populations. “This is the same practice that most U.S. schools use because they contract out dietary services,” said Scampini. The practice yields a “massive industry of processed prepared (e.g., heat-and-eat) foods that ‘match’ U.S. dietary guidelines,” she said. “Whole grains, fruit, and vegetable goals are woefully low, which also makes fiber low,” Scampini told WJI. She also said that other nutrient needs, such as vitamins and minerals, were likely being met through fortified and enriched processed foods like cereals and muffins. Scampini’s concerns are consistent with insights from inside GBCI. An anonymous resident there told WJI that breakfast was “strictly dry cereal and bread that at times is old.” The same source told WJI that for a while the lunches and dinners during the weekend were a “bag meal which consisted of basically nothing but junk food and/or old (Un)Crustable peanut butter and jelly sandwiches.” Scampini hypothesized, based on her time spent in industrial kitchens, that animal-based products in the DOC diet may also be ultra-processed. “For example, chicken is often a reconstituted meat of chicken plus fillers/stabilizers for moisture/easy preparation,” she said. Scampini conservatively estimated that 75% to 83% of calories provided by DOC come from ultra-processed foods. That number that could be higher, as she assumed for her calculations that all fruits and vegetables listed on the menu were fresh, which she told WJI was “highly unlikely.” According to Scampini, the long-term concerns associated with eating an ultra-processed diet stem from its effects on the metabolism. In one multinational study, higher ultra-processed food consumption was associated with an increased risk of cancer and cardiometabolic diseases.  A table showing Scampini's calculations of total unprocessed and total ultra-processed calories for each day of the sample GBCI menu. The menu’s calorie count presumes that a prison resident eats or drinks everything, including all of the ketchup, mustard, mayonnaise, sugar packets, and milk provided. For those who are lactose intolerant, do not eat every condiment, or are tired of Uncrustable sandwiches and chips, the calorie intake will be less. There “hasn’t been a meal I’ve had in a while that was fulfilling or even warm to enjoy, which causes me not to even want to eat it, but since I’m not that fortunate to have canteen, I partake in what I can to survive,” the GBCI resident said. Even if an individual has funds to buy items at the canteen, several food items there are also ultra-processed.  The menu at Green Bay Correctional Institution from Jan. 5-11, 2025, provided by the Wisconsin Department of Corrections in response to Wisconsin Justice Initiative's open records request. By Alexandria Staubach
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin heard oral arguments on the road for the first time since 2019. Its first stop was Richland County, the birthplace of retired Chief Justice Ann Walsh Bradley. The court revived the program, Justice on Wheels, conceived in 1993, which provides locals with the opportunity to be up close and personal with the justices and see the highest court in action. The court heard two cases, Wren v. Columbia St. Mary Hospital Milwaukee, Inc., and State v. K.R.C., the latter which has implications for the way school resource officers conduct investigations in school, in Wisconsin. K.R.C. asked the court to define the circumstances under which questioning by law enforcement generally and school resource officers (SRO) specifically constitutes custodial interrogation. With fifth graders in the audience, the court considered arguments centered around the police questioning of a 12-year-old boy, K.R.C. The parties kept the facts vague but shared what was necessary about the circumstances for everyone to understand the arguments. The question, argued K.R.C.’s attorney, Colleen Marion, was whether a reasonable innocent 12-year-old would have felt “coercive police pressures that overcame K.R.C.’s ability to resist the pressure to subject himself to questioning.” In other words, was his questioning “custodial” in nature and should it have required the presence of a known friendly adult or some other warning about incriminating himself? Everyone agreed that the defining line was a close call. Marion outlined a generally accepted set of facts: K.R.C. was removed from class by an SRO, questioned in an office solely used for law enforcement purposes, made incriminating statements against himself regarding the unwanted sexual touching of another student, and a second armed police officer was present and blocking the door during the interview. A sign, written in magic marker, hung askew on the wall and read, “You are here voluntarily unless told otherwise. You are free to leave at any time. You are being filmed,” but was never referenced by law enforcement during K.R.C.’s interview. Consensus among the justices and attorneys also included that Miranda rights, or the set of legal protections which require law enforcement to inform a person in custody of their right to remain silent and their right to an attorney in a custodial situation, are generally not applicable to the schoolhouse questioning of a juvenile. Both sides admitted that the police had used coercive questioning and that K.R.C. wasn’t given any instruction regarding his ability to end or otherwise control the interaction. Marion argued that the nature of school means that “every aspect of movement throughout the day is controlled.” She argued the school environment inherently creates an imbalance of power and a dynamic where K.R.C. or any other reasonable 12-year-old would be unable to stand up and say “‘excuse me, sir, I am leaving this office,” if being questioned by law enforcement. “School is a uniquely coercive environment,” Marion also told the justices. That nature, according to Marion, imposes “additional restraints above and beyond what is normal,” and that K.R.C.’s questioning should be considered a custodial interrogation. Justice Brian Hagedorn grappled with how the questioning differed from that done by a principal or other school official. “Give me the details of what makes this so unique,” said Justice Annette K. Zeigler. Marion responded that K.R.C. was taken out of class versus being stopped in the hall on the way to the bus; he was called down to see not one, but two, police officers; he was not informed he could leave; and he was given guilt presumptive questions with the door blocked by an armed officer, with no other friendly adult in the room. Attorney Kara Lynn Janson represented the state, arguing that K.R.C.’s questioning was more akin to a police interrogation during a traffic stop than a custodial interrogation. Janson cautioned, saying “it is going to be difficult to decide what the dividing line (is) between formal interrogation and something that looks more like a traffic stop in the school setting.” Janson argued that the degree of compulsion necessary to say that questioning of K.R.C. was custodial occurs on a “sliding scale depending on how young the juvenile is.” Janson asked the justices to focus their attention on the relatively short duration of the interview, at 10 minutes and “a near total absence of menacing police questioning.” In addition to hearing oral arguments, fifth grade students from area schools were recognized by the court for their contributions to its Justice on Wheels Civics Contest. Through writing and other projects, the contestants were encouraged to engage with questions regarding fairness, justice and the Constitution. Bradley was present and honored at the beginning of the event. Chief Justice Jill J. Karofsky gave Bradley an award and commemorative plaque, which recognized Bradley's more than 40 combined years on the circuit and Supreme Court benches. By Alexandria Staubach Criminal division judges in Milwaukee County Circuit Court received a letter late last week questioning the independent legitimacy of local group Enough is Enough and its relationship with the Milwaukee County District Attorney’s office. The letter, signed by the State Public Defender’s regional manager Angel Johnson and deputy regional manager Paige Styler, alleges that the group received special treatment from the District Attorney’s office. “While Enough is Enough is primarily composed of community members,” wrote Johnson and Styler, “its activities and formation have been closely coordinated with the Milwaukee County District Attorney’s office since its inception.” The letter requested that the judiciary “consider this context when evaluating any impact statements or the presence of Enough is Enough,” adding “that this court watch group should not be regarded as an independent, grassroots organization.” Enough is Enough President Jeanne Lupo took issue with the characterization of the group’s relationship with the DA’s office in a phone call with WJI. “Bob Donovan actually floated us the idea,” Lupo told WJI. Donovan is the Republican representative for the Wisconsin State Assembly in District 61. Lupo also said that while the group does receive information from the district attorney’s office on occasion, she believes it does not extend beyond what the public and media might get if they ask. “We aren’t collaborating with the district attorney’s office,” said Lupo. “We are an independent 501(c)(3).” Lupo also told WJI that before the group began their Court Watch program, they met with Chief Judge Carl Ashley, “because we wanted to be transparent in what we intended to do.” According to its website, Enough is Enough seeks to raise awareness “about the perils of fleeing an officer and reckless driving resulting in bodily harm or death.” It does not advertise any formal affiliation with the Milwaukee District Attorney’s office. A principal action for the group includes its Court Watch program according to Lupo. The program tracks cases in which pursuits and reckless driving are implicated as they move through Milwaukee courts. On its website, the group highlights monitoring prosecutorial patterns and judicial sentences and says that it offers community impact statements at some sentencings. The group received media attention over the summer as reckless driving cases and police pursuits surged. The group’s website also says that it advocates in court proceedings for increased penalties for unlicensed vehicles and in revoked driver's license cases. It describes itself as providing “oversight of probation and court-mandated requirements often overlooked by monitoring agencies particularly the Wisconsin Department of Corrections.” Nonetheless, according to the letter, through an open records request, the public defender's office received more than 258 emails, the contents of which “outline extensive meetings with members of the DA’s office and Enough is Enough, including ‘learning sessions’ and ‘Q&As’ conducted by members of the DA’s office for the group.” The letter specifically cites Assistant District Attorney Joy Hammond and retired Assistant District Attorney Thomas Potter as being particularly involved in the group’s efforts and says that Hammond and Potter “reviewed, drafted, and edited letters for Enough is Enough addressed to the judiciary.” “In those communications, Enough is Enough was told to remove language that indicated the group’s collaboration with the DA’s office and to frame their issue as a community, rather than law enforcement initiative,” wrote Johnson and Styler. Lupo denied the characterization, saying the group is interested in working with "everyone." “We independently file our impact statements and attend court cases and publish reports about what rulings are,” Lupo told WJI. “We went in with a hypothesis that Judges are too lenient,” said Lupo. “Sixty-nine percent of the time judges rule more leniently than what the DA is asking.” “No one (from the public defender's office) has reached out to me to discuss what we do,” Lupo told WJI. Nevertheless, it is the public defenders' “belief that the Milwaukee County DA’s office, by supplying information to Enough is Enough and then acting as if it is an independent organization, purposely omitted crucial context that should have been disclosed to the defense and judiciary,” wrote Johnson and Styler. They urged the judiciary "to consider this context when evaluating any impact statements or presence of Enough is Enough, recognizing them as part of the District Attorney’s efforts to influence sentencing decisions.” WJI reached out to an author of the letter as well as the district attorney’s office and received no response at the time of this post. You can read the full letter below. *Correction: An earlier version of this post stated that Enough is Enough had reached out to the State Public Defender's office. Enough is Enough has never reached out to the State Public Defender's office and the comment was included in error. By Alexandria Staubach
A recent decision from the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected the State’s application of judicial estoppel to a case evaluating a motion to withdraw a plea, where the plea included an admission of guilt on the record. Judicial estoppel is a legal doctrine that can be argued as a defense by one party or applied by the court. It prevents the party from taking a position directly contrary to a position they previously argued in a separate court proceeding. It prevents parties from making inconsistent statements to gain an unfair advantage. The decision declines to impose a rule that would require circuit courts to bar a defendant’s argument to withdraw a plea based on newly discovered evidence, when that evidence contradicts a fact that the defendant necessarily admitted because of pleading guilty. The District 1 decision was authored by Judge Sara J. Geenen and joined by Presiding Judge Pedro A. Colón and Chief Judge Maxine White. According to the opinion, Scott R. Shallcross pleaded guilty to two counts of homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle after his truck slammed into another truck, killing its two occupants. Shallcross and his passenger, Daniel Gorectke, survived. The complaint, referenced by the court, stated that Shallcross told police he was the driver, but he wasn't in the driver's seat when police arrived because he had crawled to the back of the truck immediately following the crash as the vehicle was on fire. Gorectke also gave a statement to the police and identified Shallcross as the driver. However, Gorectke also told police that Shallcross told him to tell police an unknown third person was driving the truck. In 2009, Shallcross accepted a plea agreement in the case, admitting on record that he was the driver of the truck. Before sentencing, he told the court that he was driving the truck. In 2022, Shallcross filed this appeal, arguing that evidence unknown at the time of his plea required the circuit court to allow him to withdraw his plea. Among the newly discovered evidence was DNA obtained from the steering column airbag of the truck that showed Shallcross's DNA and that of an unknown third party. The additional third-party DNA supported the argument that a third party was driving the truck, Shallcross said. According to the opinion, in circuit court the state argued that Shallcross was judicially stopped from claiming that he was not the driver of the truck, and that “no case allow(s) a defendant to unequivocally admit at a plea hearing that he committed an act and turn around at a later court hearing and unequivocally deny under oath that he committed that same act.” The problem with the state’s argument, according to the appellate court, is the regular use of a test applied to newly discovered evidence in motions to withdraw guilty pleas, as found in cases like State v. Ferguson. The defendant in Ferguson sought to withdraw his guilty plea based on newly discovered evidence, namely that the principal witnesses subsequently recanted their identification of Ferguson. The Ferguson court applied the newly discovered evidence test, not judicial estoppel. “Under the State’s rule, it would be an erroneous exercise of discretion for a circuit court to refuse to apply judicial estoppel,” a circumstance that is inconsistent with the application of the newly discovered evidence test found in Ferguson, wrote Geenen. “The State’s argument that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by refusing to apply judicial estoppel in this case leads to the conclusion that defendants may never seek to contradict a fact admitted to as consequence of pleading guilty,” Geenen concluded. Further, “after determining that the evidence is newly discovered evidence, the test is whether a jury would have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt in a trial that included the newly discovered evidence,” said that court. Ultimately, the weight of the evidence in Shallcross’ case doomed his motion to withdraw his plea. “There is no reasonable probability that a jury would have a reasonable doubt as to Shallcross’s guilt if it was presented with the DNA report,” wrote Geenen. She said “the overwhelming evidence” of Shallcross’s guilt compelled the court's conclusion.  Adam Procell shares the stage with Derek Mosley at Marquette University Law School. Photograph by Alexandria Staubach. By Alexandria Staubach
“Until the community itself says enough is enough… we’re applying Band-Aids to cure cancer,” said Adam Procell at Marquette Law School’s Lubar Center for Public Policy Research and Civic Education “Get to Know” series today. Procell, who was appointed by Mayor Cavalier Johnson to direct the reimagined Office of Violence Prevention, spoke to a full house about his own past and his vision for a safer Milwaukee. Procell brings a unique perspective to the role, having served 23 years incarcerated for violent crime as a youth. “When most people know the worst thing you’ve ever done as a human being, there’s an immediate power imbalance,” said Procell, discussing the aspects of his new role that have surprised him. In his role as director, Procell seeks to prioritize youth in his violence disruption efforts. “I think our city is in trouble,” he said. “I don’t know that we fully grasp how deep it goes,” said Procell about his observation that many have "lost their ability to resolve conflict without violence.” Procell highlighted a recent exchange he had with youth from all over the city participating in a 2025 Emergency Gun Violence Summit, which he said demonstrated the issue. He recounted asking an auditorium full of students at the summit to show their hands if they had heard gun shots from their home in the last month. Procell shared that 95% of students raised their hands. “That is not normal” and “if we don’t understand how that is impacting our young people…we are in trouble,” Procell told the audience. Procell’s office reported five other key areas in addition to early childhood intervention that his office will work to disrupt. He cited real time violence interventions, diversion, enhanced victim services because “hurt people hurt people,” reentry services, and community/police relations as the other key areas. We need to “find a way to leverage what each one of us has to work together,” said Procell, who is no stranger to creative collaboration in the name of creating unlikely bedfellows. At Marquette, Procell helped create an undergraduate course where enrolled students sat side by side with 10 incarcerated students for an entire semester. “It was shocking the amount of community that is created,” said Procell. As a founder and CEO of Paradigm Shyft, a company offering “multidimensional justice solutions,” Procell has also arranged sometimes strange opportunities for law enforcement and the formerly incarcerated community to connect. From orchestrating role reversal traffic stop exercises with law enforcement, to parachuting with police, Procell stressed how quickly police and community interactions can “escalate if you don’t see each other has humans.” “If you can prove (mutual humanity) to yourself 100 feet in the air, you can prove to yourself that it doesn’t matter on the ground,” said Procell about organizing the formerly incarcerated to parachute with police. Procell founded Paradigm Shyft with Shannon Ross, who serves as the company’s operations assistant and is also the founder/executive director of The Community. Procell and Ross, who are frequent collaborators, are often praised for their efforts to reshape the narrative around the formerly incarcerated in Milwaukee. The pair met speaking to youth on a panel at Oak Hill Correctional Institution while they were both incarcerated. Procell also shared his experience visiting other countries to learn about their criminal justice systems. “The difference is culture,” said Procell. He thinks meaningful change will only come to our justice system when “culturally we find a way to see people as human.” Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The rule for this is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision. The “upshot” and “background” sections do not count as part of the 10 paragraphs because of their summary and necessary nature. We’ve also removed citations from the opinion for ease of reading but have linked to important cases cited or information about them. Italics indicate WJI insertions except for case names, which are also italicized. Case: State v. Luis A. Ramirez  Grassl Bradley Majority: Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley (17 pages), joined by Justices Annette Ziegler and Brian Hagedorn in full and by Justices Rebecca Dallet and Jill Karofsky except as to one paragraph and one footnote Concurrence: Chief Justice Ann Walsh Bradley (9 pages), joined by Justice Janet Protasiewicz Concurrence: Dallet (1 page), joined by Karofsky Concurrence: Karofsky (4 pages) Upshot The State sought this court’s review of a single issue: Whether Ramirez’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. We conclude it was not and reverse the court of appeals. Background Ramirez, an inmate at Columbia County Correctional Institution, stabbed a corrections officer in the head and neck with a sharpened pencil on May 5, 2015. At the time of the attack, Ramirez had already served 17 years of a 40-year sentence for armed robbery and battery to law enforcement officers. On February 1, 2016, the State filed a complaint charging Ramirez with battery by a prisoner and disorderly conduct. Delays in appointing counsel, then the replacement of counsel and requests by newly appointed defense counsel for adjournments meant the preliminary hearing was not complete until August 2016. Arraignment occurred in October 2016, and trial was set for April 2017. However, the state requested a continuance, and the trial was reset for September 2017. Because of a conflict with another trial (the Columbia County courthouse can support only one jury trial at a time), trial was rescheduled for April 2018. Further delay occurred. Defense counsel needed a continuance because of the need for health records from the Department of Corrections, so scheduling conferences were set for May 2018 and then August 2018. On September 26, 2018, almost 32 months after charges had been filed against him, Ramirez made a pro se speedy trial demand. The circuit court held an off-the-record telephone conference on October 3, 2018. Less than a week later, Ramirez’s counsel notified the court that October 11 was the earliest date on which he could meet with Ramirez, and that counsel would “report on the status of the case after that conference.” Nothing in the record indicates when counsel met with Ramirez or if counsel updated the court on the case’s status. On November 1, the court set a scheduling conference for December 5. On that date, the court scheduled a two-day jury trial to begin on April 3, 2019. On March 26, 2019, the State requested adjournment of the April 3 jury trial because the prosecutor was retiring and the newly assigned prosecutor needed additional time to prepare. Neither the defendant nor the victim objected to that request. The circuit court rescheduled the trial for December 3, 2019. On April 15, 2019, Ramirez filed a pro se motion to dismiss, alleging, among other things, that his speedy trial right had been infringed. The circuit court held a hearing to address Ramirez’s motion to dismiss on June 17 and denied it. On December 3, 2019, the jury trial began and Ramirez was convicted. Ramirez filed a postconviction motion to vacate the judgment of conviction and dismiss the case, alleging the 46-month delay in bringing him to trial after charges were filed violated his constitutional speedy trial right. The court denied Ramirez’s motion, and Ramirez appealed. On balance, the court of appeals decided Ramirez’s speedy trial right was violated. The court acknowledged the State did not deliberately seek to delay the trial, defense counsel did not object to the State’s requests for continuances, and Ramirez was “somewhat delayed” in asserting his right to a speedy trial. On the other hand, the court claimed that 46 months was “the longest total delay in any published constitutional speedy trial case in Wisconsin,” more than 31 months of the total delay was attributable to the State, and the State failed to explain sizable portions of the delay attributed to it. Additionally, the court noted that Ramirez asserted his speedy trial right twice, did not deliberately seek delay, and it took the State 14 months after Ramirez’s initial assertion to finally bring him to trial. Guts The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The United States Supreme Court has pronounced a four-factor balancing test (the Barker test) to determine whether a speedy trial right has been violated. Those factors include (1) the overall length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the speedy trial right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Like any balancing test, it requires the court to consider the totality of circumstances particular to the case. *** Based on the overwhelming weight of both binding and persuasive authority, the delay in this case—46 months—was considerably less than what courts generally require before finding prejudice as a matter of law. Even if the length of Ramirez’s delay was, as the court of appeals put it, “extreme”, it should not have been weighed “heavily” against the State until the other Barker factors—the reasons for the delay, whether the defendant asserted his speedy trial right, and whether the defendant experienced any prejudice from the delay—were considered. *** Delays attributable to the State are not limited to delays caused by the prosecution, and can include delays attributable to the court system itself. Delays attributable to the State are categorized as valid, neutral, or deliberate. A delay caused by the State for a “valid” reason is not weighed against it. Valid reasons for delay are those considered “intrinsic to the case itself,” such as adjournments required for competency evaluations or the absence of an essential witness. Periods of delay explained by neutral reasons are weighed against the State, but not heavily. Neutral reasons include the State’s negligence, overcrowded courts, inadequate judicial resources, and mounting caseloads. Periods of delay caused by deliberate or bad-faith conduct are weighed heavily against the State. *** … (W)e need not scrutinize every period of delay attributed to the State by the court of appeals. It is clear from the facts that, at worst, the periods of delay caused by the State were for neutral reasons. Consequently, we weigh the second Barker factor against the State, but not heavily. A defendant’s assertion of the speedy trial right is “entitled to strong evidentiary weight,” because it “is in itself probative of prejudice.” Although a defendant cannot waive his right to a speedy trial by failing to assert it, the “failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.” A defendant’s “delay in demanding a speedy trial will be weighed against him.” In this case, Ramirez’s delay in requesting a speedy trial was significant. Ramirez made his first pro se speedy trial request on September 26, 2018, nearly 32 months after charges were filed against him. On April 15, 2019, Ramirez filed a pro se motion to dismiss, in which he again asserted his right to a speedy trial. Ultimately, it took the State just over 14 months to bring Ramirez to trial after his first speedy trial request. Ramirez requested a speedy trial, which should weigh against the State. Because of the significant delay in asserting his speedy trial right, however, we weigh Ramirez’s assertion of the right only slightly in his favor. We consider three interests in assessing whether a defendant suffered prejudice due to a prolonged delay before trial: oppressive pretrial incarceration; anxiety and concern; and the possibility the defense will be impaired. In Barker, the third interest was described as “the most serious.” However, the Court has also described the impairment of liberty as a “core concern” of the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial protections. Ramirez was unable to establish any one of those three interests. While a defendant already incarcerated for a separate crime may be able to show he suffered prejudice in fact from a prolonged delay, Ramirez does not even argue this point on appeal, and the trial court rejected Ramirez’s generalized claims of anxiety and stress. Ramirez mainly contends he suffered prejudice as a matter of law simply from the length of the delay itself. While “the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time,” even the most generous reading of the facts favoring Ramirez— 958 days of neutral reasons for delay—alone does not warrant dismissal. We conclude the prejudice factor does not weigh in Ramirez’s favor. The paragraph and footnote that Dallet and Karofsky did not join discussed Walsh Bradley's concurrence.  Walsh Bradley Walsh Bradley Concurrence In view of the specific facts of this case, I agree with the majority that Ramirez’s speedy trial claim is ultimately unsuccessful due to his 32-month delay in asserting his speedy trial right and his failure to persuade that the remaining 14-month delay on its own constitutes a constitutional violation. However, I write separately because the majority creates a precedent that is too exacting on defendants seeking to demonstrate a speedy trial violation. Indeed, under the majority opinion’s analytical shortcut, it is difficult to imagine any determination of a speedy trial violation absent a delay of over six years or intentional dilatory tactics by the State. Especially in the current moment and considering the systemic challenges we face, such a result is untenable. *** Even though the majority correctly states the dual role of the first factor, this appears to be mere lip service. As the court of appeals observed, this case represents “the longest total delay reflected in any published constitutional speedy trial case from Wisconsin” in the last 50 years. Nevertheless, the majority casts aside the 46-month delay as “generally not long enough to declare a defendant prejudiced as a matter of law.” *** Is the majority creating a bright-line rule that anything under five to six years is not prejudicial? If so, that would appear to run counter to the United States Supreme Court’s instruction that speedy trial analyses must be conducted on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, “any inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case.” And if so, why draw the line there? In addition to being excessively long, a period of five to six years is wholly arbitrary. Why not four years? Why not three? This makes a mockery of the word “speedy.” Despite the significant length of the delay, the majority still says, “no matter,” because the reasons for the delays were “neutral.” It says that delays fall into one of three categories, “valid, neutral, or deliberate,” and then are “weighed accordingly.” Consequently, in contrast to the court of appeals’s thorough approach, which splits up and examines each time period of delay to determine the cause and attribution, the majority opinion states in a conclusory manner that “we need not scrutinize every period of delay attributed to the State by the court of appeals.” *** I fear that the rule arising from the majority’s analysis appears to be that as long as the delays are at least for “neutral” reasons, then there cannot be a speedy trial violation. Yet, delays caused by “neutral” reasons can drag on and on and on and on and on. *** In 2022, the state public defender opined that it would “take several years to clear a backlog of roughly 35,000 cases because of a shortage of public defenders.” In Wisconsin’s vast rural areas, especially in the northern part of the state, the problem has reached crisis levels. Although the data is admittedly at least seven years old, an article published in 2018 describes how “[o]ver 60% of the state’s attorneys practice law in major urban areas, leaving some counties in rural Wisconsin with attorney-to-resident ratios as high as 1:4,452.” In comparison, the statewide ratio is about 1:389. Additionally, the population that is practicing law in the rural north is rapidly aging. As of 2018, “[a]cross the northern half of the state, only six of the forty attorneys in Vilas County are under the age of fifty, and Florence and Pepin counties have no lawyers under fifty. Oconto County has two, and no new attorneys have moved into the county in the last decade.” In total, as of that time, “[n]ine counties in northern Wisconsin ha[d] ten or fewer active attorneys.” Although this data is now seven years old, the problem has certainly not abated. In fact, it has only worsened. As of 2024, the number of active attorneys in Wisconsin had dropped four percent over the last four years, while the number of attorneys in rural Wisconsin had plummeted by seven percent. Eight counties have no certified private bar attorneys to take cases when the state public defender cannot represent a defendant. Such a shortage “not only impacts the constitutional rights of defendants—it also affects victims and our communities.” Despite intervening attempts to address the root causes of the shortage, the problem persists. The shortage of lawyers in rural areas is a systemic problem, not an intentional one, putting it at risk of being termed “neutral” in the parlance of the majority’s speedy trial analysis. It is possible that a defendant could spend months or even years awaiting the appointment of an attorney, a necessity for any trial, much less a speedy one. And as the majority opinion demonstrates, when a delay is termed neutral, good luck to a defendant in succeeding on a speedy trial claim.  Dallet Dallet Concurrence Although I agree with and join nearly all of the majority/lead opinion, I do not join paragraph 37 and footnote 6. These portions of the opinion, which levy criticism against Chief Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and her concurrence, are unnecessarily dismissive and adversarial in tone, and they detract from what is otherwise a well-written and well-reasoned opinion. In our opinions, as in life, we must strive to disagree without being disagreeable. Because the majority/lead opinion fails to do so, I respectfully concur.  Karofsky Karofsky Concurrence
I agree with the majority opinion and join it. I write separately, however, to emphasize that our constitution and statutes require a court to balance the rights of victims alongside those of the State and defendants in speedy trial cases. . . . . In Barker v. Wingo, the United States Supreme Court set forth a four-part test to assess whether a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right has been violated. Under Barker, a court balances (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the speedy trial right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. "[N]one of the four factors identified above a[re] either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process." (Emphasis is Karofsky's.) *** Concurrent to the rights of a defendant, our constitution and statutes guarantee each victim a range of rights, which are to be protected “by law in a manner no less vigorous than the protections afforded to the accused.” The importance of protecting a victim’s rights is echoed again in a statute: “[T]he rights extended in this chapter to victims and witnesses of crime are honored and protected by law enforcement agencies, prosecutors and judges in a manner no less vigorous than the protections afforded criminal defendants.” (Emphasis is Karofsky's.) The Wisconsin Constitution provides that a victim is to “be treated with dignity, respect, courtesy, sensitivity, and fairness.” These rights are consistent with the federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act, and are mirrored in most states. Under the constitution, a victim also has a right to a timely disposition that is protected from “unreasonable delay.” These rights, echoed in our statutes, protect a victim from the stress of unresolved matters. This makes sense: a “lengthy pretrial delay might force a victim of violent crime to continually relive the trauma of the crime in trial preparation . . . .” When a court is deciding whether to grant a motion for a continuance or a motion for a dismissal, it needs to consider the victim. In the context of a motion for continuance, a court should consider that a victim’s right to “[f]airness requires, for example, that the victim be given the opportunity to be heard on the matter of a delay requested by the defendant, especially in light of the victim’s right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.” A court must also ensure a victim has been consulted and heard prior to granting a motion for dismissal. The rights afforded to a victim are not at odds with the Barker test. Instead, these rights reflect additional considerations to be weighed by a court, so that a victim’s rights are protected alongside the State’s and a defendant’s rights. A court tasked with analyzing speedy trial cases needs to balance the constitutional and statutory rights of all involved. As it relates to Barker’s “difficult and sensitive balancing process” a court must consider the crime victim. The four factors of Barker cannot be treated as talismanic; a victim’s rights must always be part of any judicial balancing. By Alexandria Staubach
The Milwaukee Police Department’s executive staff fielded more than 60 questions over nearly three hours from members of the Milwaukee Common Council and its Finance and Personnel Committee last week regarding the MPD's $310 million proposed budget allocation. Department salaries alone cost $195 million. But the bulk of conversation wasn’t specific line items or costs. Rather, the conversation focused on what MPD is doing and the places council members saw room for improvement. The use of emerging technologies loomed large as did the department’s controversial use of facial recognition technology (FRT). Artificial intelligence "is a force multiplier,” Chief Jeffrey Norman said on more than one occasion as the conversation roamed around new and proposed tools. Not all council members were in lockstep around increased use of technology, especially when it came to additional surveillance. Alderman Peter Burgelis questioned whether placing more cameras at intersections would do any good without enforcement of the laws already on the books to identify the cars that cameras are designed to capture. Burgelis was referencing SB375/AB371, fast-moving legislation that would permit 75 red-light cameras to be placed across Milwaukee. Burgelis compared MPD’s low citation rate for failure to display plates—fewer than 200 citations in 2024—to the more than 12,000 tickets written by the Department of Public Works for the same offense. “We as a department can hold ourselves responsible for what we can enforce more,” said Norman in response to Burgelis. Facial recognition technology loomed large in the conversation. Several alderpersons shared concerns about the deployment of federal officers as close as Chicago. “It’s not just in California,” said Alderwoman Marina Dimitrijevic, who called out a letter she helped author to Norman earlier this year in which a supermajority of the council opposed the use of facial recognition technology by the department. (That opposition was shared by the Mayor’s Equal Rights Commission.) Norman compared use of FRT to his department’s use of police pursuits. You’re “damned if you do, damned if you don’t,” he said. Norman said his department is still interested in the technology and alluded to current use in only the direst and time-sensitive cases. But he also said the department was using the public-facing conversations with the Fire and Police Commission and Equal Rights Commission to “understand how do we use the proper bumper guards and rails.” Dimitrijevic reiterated her hope in the current climate “to at least pause,” while Alderman Scott Spiker said there has not been a “sober conversation” about this technology as a city. Other generative AI tools discussed included software called “Draft One,” developed by Axon, which produces initial drafts of police reports from the audio of body-worn camera footage. Spiker highlighted its use in Minnesota cities and proposed that its implementation could reduce some of the additional paperwork burden often cited by MPD as resulting from a legal settlement. Spiker suggested they might be able to have fewer “cops behind desks” with Draft One but acknowledged that staffing mandates imposed by Act 12 wouldn’t permit the reallocation of salary funds to pay for the technology. Assistant Chief of Police Craig Sarnow said the department had considered using Draft One, but rolling it out would likely involve a test period on felonies and would require buy-in of the district attorney. Sarnow also highlighted its hefty price tag. Another topic of conversation was that only 63% of sworn officers live in the city of Milwaukee. A recent Fire and Police Commission survey cited crime as a primary reason male officers live outside the city and education as the primary reason female officers live outside the city. Milwaukee police officers are required to live either within city limits or within 15 miles of the city’s boundary. Alderman José Pérez noted that while on paper crime is down, “people in my neighborhood don’t feel that.” “I think there’s a lot of criminal nuisance behavior that we’re not measuring,” he said. In its presentation, MPD highlighted its priority areas for 2026: sustained efforts to ensure compliance with Act 12 hiring mandates; community relations; youth engagement; enhancing public safety; AI integration “digital trust”; employment of drones as first responders; virtual academy training; vehicle pursuit mitigation; and identifying roles that can be transitioned from sworn to civilian. As for the amount of the proposed MPD budget, while that number is $4 million short of the department’s 2025 allocation, it still far exceeds allocations to every other department. The next largest sum goes to water works ($167 million). "Evers' judges" is our effort to present information about Gov. Tony Evers' appointees to the bench. The information is taken from the appointees' own judgeship applications. Italics indicate direct quotes from the application. Typos, including punctuation errors, come from the original application even though we have not inserted “(sic)” after each one. WJI has left them as is.  Name: Benjamin R. Jones
Appointed to: Dane County Circuit Court Appointment date: May 23, 2025, to a term ending July 31, 2026 Education: Law School – University of Wisconsin-Madison Undergraduate – University of Wisconsin-Madison High School – John F. Kennedy High School, Bloomington, Minnesota Recent legal employment: April 2017-present – Chief legal counsel, Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, Madison, Wisconsin June 2012-April 2017 – Associate attorney, Weld Riley, S.C., Eau Claire, Wisconsin Bar and administrative memberships: State Bar of Wisconsin General character of practice: I currently serve as chief legal counsel for the Wisconsin Superintendent of Public Instruction (SPI) and Department of Public Instruction (DPI). In that role, I supervise a staff of attorneys, investigators, and support staff within the DPI Office of Legal Services. I provide legal advice to the State Superintendent, appointed officers, directors and staff in all areas of the law applicable to a large state agency. I appear for and represent the DPI in administrative hearings and, when necessary, circuit and appellate court. I draft, review, and interpret proposed legislation and administrative rules. I also review and adjudicate appeals submitted to the SPI, including expulsion decisions, pupil discrimination appeals, School District Boundary Appeal Board decisions, statutory waiver requests, and all other administrative appeals. Describe typical clients: My client is the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, led by the Wisconsin Superintendent of Public Instruction. In private practice, I specialized in school law and labor and employment law. My typical clients were local government agencies, including school districts, counties and municipalities, as well as large private employers. Number of cases tried to verdict: Numerous administrative hearings in private practice and on behalf of DPI. List up to three significant trials, appeals, or other legal matters in which you participated as a judge or lawyer in the past seven years: Koschkee v. Evers, 2018 WI 82; Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76 Petitioners, represented by the Wisconsin Institute for Law and Liberty, filed an original action petition with the Wisconsin Supreme Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the Department of Public Instruction (DPI) and the Superintendent of Public Instruction Tony Evers (SPI) were required to comply with 2017 Wisconsin Act 57, known as the "REINS Act." The Act requires the governor to approve all administrative rules proposed by the SPI before promulgation. The SPI argued that Article X of the Wisconsin Constitution prohibits any other officer from being in a superior position of authority in the supervision of public instruction, so that the governor cannot have veto authority over the SPI's proposed rules. I was primary counsel for the SPI and DPI from the time the original action petition was filed in November 2017 until the court's decision in 2019. After the petition was filed, Governor Scott Walker ordered the Department of Justice (DOJ) to represent the SPI and DPI. The SPI and DPI intended to argue the REINS Act was unconstitutional as applied to the SPI. But the DOJ disagreed and informed the SPI and DPI that the DOJ would advance the opinion of the Attorney General, arguing that the REINS Act was constitutional as applied. The DPI and SPI filed a motion to deny substitution of counsel and to disqualify the attorney general from appearing on behalf of the DPI and SPI. The DOJ filed a cross-motion to strike myself and then Chief Legal Counsel Ryan Nilsestuen from the case. I drafted the brief in support of the motion and represented the SPI and DPI at oral argument before the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The court held that the SPI and DPI must be allowed counsel that would represent their position, recognizing there were ethical implications for attorneys that fail to represent the position of their client, and that the Attorney General did not have power to act as a gatekeeper as to whether a constitutional officer could defend their authority in court. Following the court's decision, I continued as primary counsel as the case proceeded to a decision on the merits. In first accepting the original action petition, the court implied it was likely to overturn its prior case decided on identical facts in Coyne v. Walker, 2016 WI 38 . . . . However, while the court ultimately determined rulemaking authority was a legislative power that the legislature could constrain as it saw fit, the court upheld the superiority of the SPI's vested constitutional executive authority. As determined in Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674 . . . the SPI remains in a superior position to all other officers in the supervision of public instruction. Experience in adversary proceedings before administrative bodies: I have represented clients in front of the Equal Rights and Unemployment Insurance Divisions of the Department of Workforce Development, the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, and in front of administrative law judges for appeals filed under Wis. Stat. s. 227.42. I have also represented clients under investigation by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration Describe your non-litigation experience (e.g., arbitration, mediation). In private practice, I represented local governmental units in collective bargaining and all areas of employment, municipal, and administrative law. I have represented clients in multiple mediations involving discrimination complaints, wage and insurance disputes, and contractual disputes. I currently advise the Wisconsin Superintendent of Public Instruction and the Department of Public Instruction on all areas of law applicable to a state educational agency. Position or involvement in judicial, non-partisan, or partisan political campaign, committee, or organization: None listed Previous runs for public office: None listed All judicial or non-partisan candidates endorsed in the last ten years: None listed Professional or civic and charitable organizations: Wisconsin School Attorneys Association, 2012-present National Association of State Directors of Teacher Education and Certification, 2017-present National Council of State Education Attorneys, 2017-present Chippewa Valley Society for Human Resource Management, director of Legal and Legislative Affairs, 2014-2017 American Red Cross Northwest Wisconsin, board member, 2014-2017 Significant pro bono legal work or volunteer service: In law school, I volunteered with the IRS Volunteer Tax Assistance program to offer free basic tax return preparation for low income tax filers. I also tutored middle school students in the Goodman Community Center while in law school. In private practice, I volunteered as the Director of Legal and Legislative Affairs for the Chippewa Valley Society for Human Resource Management and as a board member of the American Red Cross Northwest Wisconsin Chapter. Why I want to be a judge: I have committed my professional life to public service. As a judge, with the skills I have demonstrated and refined during my legal career, I will advance equity and justice for the people of Dane County and Wisconsin. I first realized how highly I value public service while representing school districts in private practice. Almost universally, every individual I interacted with in my representation of schools wanted to do their best to improve the lives of children and the broader community. By extension, I knew that my work to counsel schools served a greater public good. That focus on the public good drew me to leave private practice to represent the State Superintendent of Public Instruction (SPI) and the Department of Public Instruction (DPI). When I began working for then Superintendent Tony Evers in 2017, Wisconsin public education had been under assault for years. Superintendent Evers stood firm in his defense of Wisconsin public schools, the importance of advancing equity in education, and his belief that government played a necessary role in improving peoples’ lives. The legal issues that arose in that environment were novel, complex, and often high stakes. At one point, I successfully argued in front of the Wisconsin Supreme Court that Superintendent Evers must be able to pick his own attorney to defend his office’s constitutional authority. Under these difficult circumstances, my work was and continues to be meaningful and rewarding knowing that the focus is on what is best for children and Wisconsin. As my commitment to public service has grown, so has my understanding of my strengths and competencies as an attorney. In my work as chief legal counsel, I advise the SPI and DPI on all areas of the law and within a broad range of contexts. On any given day, I may meet with our licensing team to discuss a teacher accused of sexual misconduct with a student, discuss with the deputy superintendent whether a school district provided a student with due process, strategize with the school voucher team to defend against accusations of improper rulemaking, or any number of unique legal issues. Each task requires diligent preparation, an ability to quickly identify relevant facts, a nuanced understanding of how the relevant law applies, an understanding of the SPI’s vision, and the anticipation of political ramifications. Above all other considerations, my work requires a deep understanding that my legal advice will have real-life impact on students, families, and their communities. To make sure that impact is equitable and positive, I am constantly vigilant for any prejudice or bias in my own work or the work of the DPI. For example, I have reformed the DPI’s teacher licensing and pupil nondiscrimination appeal processes to incorporate data, reduce subjectivity, and ensure these processes serve all children. My ability to quickly and completely distill relevant information and apply the law while actively working to eliminate bias and incorporate all relevant context into my decision making will make me an effective and impactful judge. Describe which case in the past 25 years by the Wisconsin Supreme Court or U.S. Supreme Court you believe had a significant positive or negative impact on the people of Wisconsin. The case that had the most significant impact on the people of Wisconsin is Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 213 L. Ed. 2d 545, 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022). This case illustrates the negative outcomes that result when justices adjudicate in a self-imposed vacuum, stripping out the nuance necessary to render reasoned and just decisions. A majority of the Court in Dobbs decided to eliminate the constitutional protections recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973). The Court in Roe recognized that a state can regulate abortion in many ways, but a women’s right to choose prior to viability is where the Constitution limits state interference. The Roe Court came to that conclusion in large part because it considered the context of the procedure, how it impacts women’s lives and freedoms, how interference in the decision involves an extreme invasion of privacy, and that ultimately what is at stake is a woman’s control over her own body and medical care. The Court’s analysis in Dobbs simply disregards that context in favor of what white men thought was proper in the 1800s. That willful ignorance leads to the predictable consequences women across the country now experience. A state can impose its own choice on a woman whose doctor detects severe birth defects in a not-yet-viable fetus, a woman who does not have the financial security to care for a child, a woman whose rape caused her pregnancy, or a woman who simply does not want to have a child. And the impacts are disproportionately severe on historically marginalized communities, particularly women of color. The impact of this Court’s opinion will not stop at women’s reproductive rights. The Dobbs majority attempts to isolate the issue of abortion because it involves a “profound moral question.” In his concurrence, Justice Clarence Thomas reveals how thin the majority opinion’s assurance is by concluding the Due Process Clause does not secure “any substantive rights.” This threatens constitutional protections for privacy, marriage, and consensual relationships, protections the public may no longer be able to take for granted. Dobbs also weakens stare decisis. The Roe decision stood for fifty years. Though the circumstances and rationale articulated by the Roe court remain as relevant today, Dobbs disregarded this precedent and severely undermined the integrity of the Court. If the composition of the Court is now what defines a fundamental constitutional right rather than precedent, then how is the Court any different than a legislative body? Does the Court now simply represent the political majority, rather than defend the constitutional rights of everyone, particularly those without the power to defend themselves? The Dobbs majority sacrificed the integrity of the Court in order to strip fundamental liberties from women. With a severe and immediate negative impact on Wisconsin women and their families that will continue to be felt for years to come, Dobbs is the worst decision for the people of Wisconsin in at least the past 25 years. Two or three judges whom I admire and why: Sonia Sotomayor I admire Justice Sonia Sotomayor for her judicial philosophy. She has described her philosophy as “fidelity to the law”, which can mean different things to different people. To Sotomayor, that means that the law must be considered in context and as applied to real people. This can contrast with the approach of other justices. For example, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 168 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2007), Justice John Roberts asserts that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” This might make for a catchy sound bite, but it ignores the entire history of racism in this country and how it continues to shape modern institutions and society. Instead, “fidelity to the law” is better described by Justice Sotomayor, who said in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigration Rights and Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary, “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply the Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial discrimination.” 572 U.S. 291, 381, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1676, 188 L. Ed. 2d 613 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). This philosophy guides my own approach to the law. The law should be considered within the full relevant history and context of American experience, so that it can serve real people. Ann Walsh Bradley I admire Ann Walsh Bradley for her preparation, insight, and judgment when applying the law. These qualities were apparent to me when I argued in front of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Justice Bradley asked meaningful, relevant questions that struck at the heart of the matter in question. She had clearly studied the briefs and understood the legal question in front of the court and the applicable facts, and had a nuanced understanding of the parties’ arguments. Beyond her own understanding, her questions and responses indicated an equal understanding of her colleagues’ opinions and concerns. She asked questions not just to confirm or announce her own thoughts, but to assist her colleagues’ understanding of the law. As an advocate, I felt understood and respected, which should be an objective of every judge or justice hearing a case. Richard Niess I admire former Dane County Circuit Court Judge Richard Niess for his ability to command a courtroom through a combination of attention, empathy, humor, and decisiveness. I interned for Judge Niess during law school and also argued a motion in front of Judge Niess while representing then Superintendent Tony Evers. Like Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, Judge Niess was always well prepared, actively engaged with litigants to ensure they knew they were heard and understood, disarmed difficult conversations with dry – and appropriately restrained – humor, and was sincere in every word he said in court. As a judge, I hope to pattern my own demeanor and philosophy off of these esteemed and accomplished jurists. The proper role of a judge: The proper role of a judge is as a public servant. As a public servant, a judge should be humble, understanding that ego and pride only interfere with a judge’s obligation to the public. A humble judge is able to allow the attorneys in a case to educate the judge on the issues relevant to the case. Similarly, a judge should have the appropriate temperament to be able to effectively communicate with counsel, the parties, jurors and witnesses, and to effectively consider all relevant information and deliver an appropriate disposition. This is much easier said than done, particularly when disputes involve matters of immense importance to the litigants, intense emotions, high stakes, and an often long and difficult case history. I know how difficult these kinds of interactions can be, because I engage with them on a regular basis in my role with the Department of Public Instruction. I communicate with students who have been victims of sexual assault or grooming at the hands of teachers, families who are appealing an expulsion decision, and community members concerned with a school district’s adoption of a controversial new policy. These are all conversations that require patience, an even temperament, empathy, courtesy, active listening, and the ability to then clearly articulate how the law applies to those concerns. I am well tested and confident in my ability to effectively navigate these difficult conversations, including in a courtroom. A judge must actively strive to be an objective decision maker, to ensure the judge’s decisions are equitable and advance justice. This requires effort and constant attention. In my current representation, I am constantly examining my advice and decision making for bias, developing systems that reduce subjective analysis to reduce or eliminate that bias. In the same way, judges should examine the system of justice they are a part of to identify bias, and work to develop systems, policies, and strategies to eliminate those biases. A judge has to be aware they are a judge, both while on the bench and off. A judge is a high profile public figure and must represent the bench at all times. That judge must be committed to the independence and integrity of the bench, avoiding conflicts of interest, upholding the highest ethical expectations, ensuring the public’s confidence in the judge and the judiciary by extension. A judge must also be an actively engaged member of their community, to best be able to understand the concerns and challenges members of that community face in their lives. Without an understanding of the community, it is easier to disregard the real impact that decisions have on members of that community. That connection allows for empathy, understanding, and better- informed decisions to advance justice. Finally, a judge must be accountable. A judge should accept that they can be wrong, which allows a judge to maintain an open mind when hearing disputes and maintain the public’s confidence that the judiciary is committed to the rule of law, rather than the egos and pride of individual judges. |
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