![]() Note: We are crunching Supreme Court of Wisconsin decisions down to size. The rule for this is that no justice gets more than 10 paragraphs as written in the actual decision. The "upshot" and "background" sections do not count as part of the 10 paragraphs because of their summary and very necessary nature. We've also removed citations from the opinion for ease of reading. Italics indicate WJI insertions. The case: Andrea Townsend v. ChartSwap, LLC Majority/Lead Opinion: Justice Patience Roggensack (18 pages) joined in full by Chief Justice Annette K. Ziegler and Justices Rebecca Grassl Bradley and Brian Hagedorn and joined for the most part (except for five paragraphs) by Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, Rebecca F. Dallet, and Jill Karofsky. Concurrence: Justice Dallet (2 pages) joined by Justices A.W. Bradley and Karofsky. The upshot The statutory cap limiting fees health care providers charge for furnishing copies of medical records does not apply to third-party suppliers of medical records. Background On August 2, 2016, Andrea Townsend ("Townsend") was injured in a car crash. Townsend retained a law firm for her personal injuries, and the firm, with her written consent, sought certified health care records and billings from Milwaukee Radiologists, which was involved in her care. Following her attorney's request, ChartSwap replied on behalf of Milwaukee Radiologists and provided a one page certified health care record to Townsend, for which it charged $35.87. Townsend's attorneys paid the bill. Townsend then asserted claims against ChartSwap for negligent or intentional violation of the fee structure dictated for health care providers in Wis. Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b) and a claim for unjust enrichment. Townsend also alleged that ChartSwap had collected fees as the agent for and on behalf of Milwaukee Radiologists. In circuit court, ChartSwap moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the statute applies only to "health care providers" and that ChartSwap was not liable even if it was Milwaukee Radiologists’ agent. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, pointing to the plain language of the statute to determine that the fee restrictions applied only to health care providers and not to ChartSwap, whether or not it was an agent of Milwaukee Radiologists. The court of appeals reversed, holding that as an agent of Milwaukee Radiologists ChartSwap was subject to the fee restrictions. The court of appeals said that the intent of the legislature to protect patients from excessive fees for access to information from their health care providers would be undermined if the fee restrictions did not apply to ChartSwap. The guts The "purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what the statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, and intended effect." Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute. If the meaning of the words are plain and unambiguous, a court's inquiry ends and there is no need to consult extrinsic sources of interpretation, such as legislative history. Statutory language is given its "common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning." *** Turning to the statute at issue, it provides that when fulfilling a request by a person for medical records, a health care provider may charge no more than the total of all of the following that apply: “1. For paper copies: $1 per page for the first 25 pages; 75 cents per page for pages 26 to 50; 50 cents per page for pages 51 to 100; and 30 cents per page for pages 101 and above. . . . 6. Actual shipping costs and any applicable taxes.” By the terms of the statute itself, these restrictions apply only to health care providers, a term which is defined in an adjacent statutory provision. Here, neither the parties nor the court of appeals contend that ChartSwap is a health care provider, as defined . . . . Instead, in order to hold ChartSwap liable, despite not being defined as a health care provider, the court of appeals cited a third statutory section, which imposes "liability upon 'any person . . . who violates” the fee-restriction statute. The court of appeals reasoned that, rather than focusing on a definition of "health care provider," the context and structure of the statute, as well as the legislature's decision to impose liability on "any person," should control whether ChartSwap is liable for charging more than the fee-restriction statute permits. *** [I]t is not absurd for the legislature to make policy decisions regarding the applicability of statutes to different constituents. At some point, there will be a cutoff. This is a policy choice that legislatures frequently make, and policy choices are left to legislative discretion. *** [I]t bears repeating that statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute. If the meaning of the words are plain and unambiguous, the court's inquiry ends, and there is no need to consult extrinsic sources of interpretation, such as legislative history. *** Even after acknowledging that ChartSwap is not a health care provider under the statutory definition, the court of appeals reasoned that the "intent of the legislature was to ensure that patients have access to medical records in the custody and control of health care providers without being charged more than the reasonable costs of copying and mailing them." The court of appeals reliance on its perception of legislative intent when construing a statute is misplaced . . . . *** [O]nce the court of appeals acknowledged that ChartSwap was not a statutorily-defined health care provider . . . the court of appeals' inquiry in regard to ChartSwap should have stopped. . . . *** Townsend seeks to hold ChartSwap liable because of the fees it charged for health care records that were generated by Milwaukee Radiologists, a health care provider. However, an agent is subject to "liability to a third party harmed by the agent's conduct only when the agent's conduct breaches a duty that the agent [itself] owes to the third party." Stated otherwise, in order for an agent to be held liable for a statutory violation committed while acting on behalf of a principal, that same conduct also would need to violate the statute if done in the agent's personal capacity. However, no breach of an independent duty of ChartSwap to Townsend is alleged to have occurred. Rather, a breach of Milwaukee Radiologists' statutory duty to Townsend is alleged. *** We conclude that, under a plain meaning interpretation of the fee restriction statute, ChartSwap is not a health care provider; and, therefore, it is not subject to the fee restrictions . . . which regulate health care providers. Additionally, we conclude that neither common law principles of agency nor the plain meaning of an agency statute supports the conclusion that an agent is personally liable for charging more for health care records than the statute permits its principal to charge. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals. [I]t is not absurd for the legislature to make policy decisions regarding the applicability of statutes to different constituents. At some point, there will be a cutoff. This is a policy choice that legislatures frequently make, and policy choices are left to legislative discretion. ![]() The concurrence In the majority opinion Justice Roggensack referred to a method of statutory construction that involves comparing specific language to general language. She said that “[i]f the court of appeals had employed the general/specific canon of statutory construction, it could have assisted its interpretations” of the pertinent statutes. Although the substantive canons of statutory interpretation may sometimes be helpful in determining what the legislature meant to say, here they only confuse the analysis. The statutes at issue are straightforward, and understanding them requires no outside interpretive help. I agree with the majority opinion that the fee-restriction statute, by its plain meaning, does not apply to ChartSwap. As the majority opinion acknowledges, that should end the analysis. Instead, it muddies the waters by attempting to apply an inapposite canon of construction. I therefore respectfully concur.
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